SECOND CARNEGIE INQUIRY INTO POVERTY
AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Development alternatives for the
Orange Free State with special
reference to QwaQwa

by

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I. DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES FOR THE ORANGE FREE STATE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO QWAQWA

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1. INTRODUCTION

It has long been fashionable to think about accelerated development in terms of more or less sophisticated development plans. Normally these contain extensive statistical coverage of a range of so-called socio-economic (and other) variables and indicators and the relationships between them. Economists in particular have excelled in producing these.

Although being an economist by training, I must grudgingly admit that too much of what passes as development planning bears the stamp of "utopias devised by committees". This remark does not denote the denigration of empirical work or of getting down to concrete evaluations of social conditions and suggestions for its improvement. It signifies scepticism at the misplaced concreteness of much of conventional development planning which harbours the covert pretence of being on a par with an engineering blueprint.

In this country the balance in official circles seems to be tipped in the direction of a heavy reliance on a fairly mechanical way of directing the course of societal change and evolution. This implies an assumption of the dirigibility of political and economic affairs to an extent that is quite astounding. Of late there has been a marked reconsideration of this approach concomitant with a rediscovered faith in the self-correcting capabilities of a market society.

This paper has the intention of focusing on the idea of thinkable alternatives for the region of the Orange Free State and how this can be linked with efforts to bring influence to bear on the possible course of events by way of a development strategy. Although due cognisance will be taken of the empirical data necessary to make prognostications of the likely future of the region, the main aim of this contribution is to provide stimuli for making strategic choices. It therefore has no pretence at the kind of empirical completeness
associated with development plans or programmes.

2. THE IDEA OF DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES

The use of the word "alternatives" denotes the recognition — which is not yet general but in the ascendant — that there is no "one way" of explaining what is meant by development. The questions which have to be answered in addressing the issue centre around the following:

(a) What are the alternatives to defining the problems of development?
(b) What are the alternatives to proposing strategies for facilitating development?
(c) What are the alternatives to specifying the values guiding and ultimately constituting development?

No effort is made to be exhaustive but simply to attempt a clarification of the overall topic.

The flowering of normative declarations on development in the previous decade can roughly be divided in two. One strand — which builds on the conventional wisdom of the two decades following World War II — consists of relatively concrete suggestions for reform in the national and international economic orders in the direction of greater equality. This implies that "more of the same" but with more attention to distributional effects will suffice.

The other strand poses a more formidable agenda by linking greater equality and the elimination of poverty with full participation by the masses in making and carrying out developmental decisions and ultimately with a transformation of societal values.

The conventional strand includes a variety of approaches and has undergone a marked amount of change over time. It derives its identity from the centrality it accords to economic growth in its answers to the questions mentioned above. In answer to the first question its adherents initially posited that the acceleration of economic growth is the heart of the development problem. From among the major determinants of growth — gleaned from the lessons of history — capital accumulation (private and public) was selected as the key.
Guided by this approach, great efforts were made in the 1960's to meet the problem of insufficient capitalization. Before commenting on the result of these efforts, it should be noted that in this approach the nations which were to benefit were viewed more or less in isolation. Their difficulties were seen as primarily internal, the results of inadequate local structures and conditions. In this sense their history of relationships with the industrialized world and its present-day implications were not taken into account.

By the end of the sixties it became obvious that although the efforts at acceleration of GNP growth had produced remarkable results, "development" measured by per capita increase in GNP was not satisfactorily reaching the lives of ordinary people in terms of jobs, income distribution and the alleviation of critical poverty. This led to the recognition of a new target group in poorer countries - the poorest 40 percent of the population. These "marginals" were neither contributing to the growth in productivity nor sharing in the benefits thereof. After gaining the attention of the then president of the World Bank, Robert McNamara, the question of the distributional effects of economic growth received extensive attention in the important World Bank publication "Redistribution with Growth".

With regard to the question of the strategies to follow to alleviate the development problem, the conventional strand naturally followed the cues present in its formulation of the problem. The most widely accepted strategy for development has since the 1980's been "... the creation of conditions for self-sustained growth in per capita GNP and the requisite modernization of economic, social and political structures implicit in the achievement of this goal."

In its emphasis on investment, production and consumption, this strategy gives prime consideration to the industrial sector and rapid urbanization. The traditional sector (which includes agriculture and small cottage industries) is subordinated to the dictates of urban industrial growth and is to be modernized by way of capital-intensive technology. Income distribution is postponed in this approach until sufficient growth has occurred so as not to stifle the entrepreneurial incentives regarded as the real dynamo for development.

It is precisely the "grow first, distribute later" character of this strategy which has given rise to such widespread dissatisfaction that it convinced inter alia the then President of the World Bank (McNamara) that a reorientation
was called for. Attention was to be focused on the step-child of the poorer countries – small-scale subsistence agriculture and concomitant economic activities. Adelman described three stages of a dynamic sequence of strategies which are seen as the basis of the success that had been attained by the reoriented growth strategy in Israel, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. They are: Stage 1 – Radical asset distribution focusing primarily on land; Stage 2 – Massive accumulation of human capital; Stage 3 – Rapid, human resource-intensive growth.

It can fairly be stated that this variation of the conventional approach has up to quite recently been the main strategic frame of reference of most governments and governmentally supported bodies in the rich industrialized countries of the West as far as the development of poorer countries is concerned. It aims at the achievement of a modicum of equality by Third World countries or by their economic systems within an international order continuing to derive its dynamism from production for export and from international flows of investment and technological innovation. It supposes that "development" for Third World countries can continue to mean what it has meant for those now rich and industrialized – mass consumption and mass production continually stimulating each other to new heights. This includes cyclical crises, struggles for markets, exploitation of the weak by the strong and a heavy burden on the human and natural environment. Such – and other – disbenefits of development is to be tamed by some combination of macro-planning, bargaining and goodwill.

It is important to point out that this approach poses demands on which governments can base strategies and seek united action with one another. It furthermore supposes that overcoming the poverty of a country and gaining it an audible voice in the international order are equivalent to overcoming the poverty of its people and giving them an equal voice.

Before leaving this point mention has to be made of the current resurgence of supply-orientated economic thinking in many Western countries including South Africa. This boils down to a reiteration of the home truths of the heyday of capitalistic expansion – the powerful activation of market forces through deregulation of the economy and a drastic reduction in government participation, the stimulation of individual effort and private capital formation by various means, and monetary and fiscal policy directed at stability and the strengthening of private enterprise. The strategic rationale for proposing a return to this approach is of course perfectly on a par with the conventional definition of development as well-nigh synonymous with GNP growth.
The third question which is addressed by the conventional strand concerns the values guiding and eventually constituting development. This can be fairly unequivocally stated as the notion of man-made progress as a continuing process, the product of man's ingenuity and purpose, measured in material abundance and achieved by means of science-based modern technology.11)

It is not surprising that proponents of the conventional approach leave no doubt that the success of measures they propose depends crucially on cultural influences. This implies that the inescapable preliminary to economic development is a "cultural revolution" encompassing far-reaching changes in the legal, political and moral basis of poorer societies — changes which will usher in a cultural framework necessary for market forces to be effective. Clearly, these requirements lie outside the area under the direct influence of economic policy and this is recognised as such by the advocates of the conventional approach.12)

We turn now to the second strand which, according to Wolfe,13) gathered particular momentum from 1974 onwards. In this line of thinking an even greater spectrum of opinion is found than in the conventional approach and no justice can be done to this diversity in a paper of this nature. Suffice it to say that this strand calls in question either the whole social or economic fabric of present day society or its most basic motives and perceptions on the good life. It is therefore concerned with modern culture in its totality, which many of its proponents regard as dominated by a reductionist economistic world-view. For this reason some of those propounding this line of thinking have come up with the phrase "another development" to denote the distance they take from fundamental aspects of the conventional approach.14)

Another way of characterizing the difference between the two strands is by comparing the ways in which they look on the relationship between people's values (or broadly culture) and the means employed to satisfy needs. In the conventional approach the goal is presumed to be economic growth and if people's values (culture) have to change in order to get growth, then such change must be effected (by a variety of ways). For the second strand, one of its central goals is to enhance the basic values of people. Development then becomes the means and not the end, for the end is to enhance what people value. Development or growth is desirable only if it is consistent with people's deepest values. Thus economists such as Denis Goulet define development as "liberation".15)
The liberation intended is from oppressive and exploitative relationships among people within a country and among nations. The key question then becomes: Who is controlling the development process? For this reason the second strand is often typified as a "political economy"-approach.

Thus in response to the question of what the problems of development are, the second strand would answer that the poverty, alienation and frustration of the masses of the Third World are attributable to the international system of unequal economic relations between a few dominant countries and the majority of dominated countries. This has come to be known as the phenomenon of dependence or the development of underdevelopment. This is supplemented with a stress on the people-centredness of development which underlines that development refers not to things but to the whole man and woman and that it is a human experience synonymous with the fulfilment of the mental, emotional and physical potentialities of the individual.

The answer to the strategic question is unsurprisingly that a course of action must be followed which diminishes or overthrows the structures and patterns (e.g. trade) which exist and inhibit the following of a self-chosen and autonomous development path. In concrete it boils down to the formation of self-reliant socialist societies. The most salient example which is offered is the People's Republic of China with its emphasis on rural development, labour-intensive technology, decentralized patterns of control and the input of the ordinary citizen into decision-making processes.

Seeing that the adherents of the second strand do not for the most part belong to the decision-making elites in rich or poor countries, their answer to the third question – the values guiding development – constitutes an important part of their approach to the development problematics. For them it is only after a continuing dynamic, springing from the will of the underdeveloped, comes into operation that the structures which are deemed inimical to development will be changed. This dynamism is sought in new ideologies, cultural identity and pluralism (which resists Euro-centrism) and a regeneration of self-esteem.

The appeals for "integral development" or "another development" within countries raise problems of a nature that governments are hardly in a position to tackle or which places them in the position of being the target of armed revolution. For those adherents of the second strand who do not share the
conviction that change will only come about by revolutionary violence, the agenda is formidable. The indispensable precondition for "another development" is, in fact, a world-wide conversion or change of heart, involving all the social forces that have a share of power along with the groups hitherto voiceless. The prizes for which classes and interest-groups have contended since the dawn of the capitalist order then become much less relevant. The mass of consumers in the rich countries and the rich in the poor countries must learn to live more austerely. The centralized state with its bureaucratic and coercive mechanisms — and all those who benefit from it — must give way to more direct democracy and self-management at the level of the community. The impoverished masses must moderate their demands and expectations as to what a national variant of "another development" can deliver.

The obvious point to consider is what bearing the abovementioned has on the problems of poverty and underdevelopment in Southern Africa. What seems to be an elementary implication is that the public debate in this country — especially in policy-making circles — can very fruitfully be broadened to take into account a broader spectrum of viewpoints and aspects of the development problematique in its local guise. In this respect two things spring to mind: the necessity of relinquishing the facile identification of development with economic growth and bringing into open discussion the link between economics and politics.

With regard to the first point it should be considered that human development means nothing less than the unfolding of all the potentialities of a person. To continue with a strategic adherence to the grand simplification that economic growth is the locomotive (or steamroller) which forces through all the necessary social and cultural changes instead of being only of an enabling character, is not only foolhardy in the light of experience in all parts of the globe but a presumptuous clinging to the idea that only Western views of life are worth pursuing.

If we look at the meaning of economic development itself, it is worth considering whether another look at the elementary formulation of the economic problem does not provide us with an insight that needs to be taken seriously again. It is the idea that economics concerns itself with the relationship between human needs and the means by which it can be satisfied. If scarcity of the latter implies a gap between the two, then economic development has to
be the closing of that gap. That signifies the application of means towards those needs that have first priority in the everyday life of people. This provides the well-nigh obvious rationale of the so-called basic needs approach in development thinking. It is indeed a sad reflection of the degree of instrumentalist thinking in economics that the basic needs idea had to be advanced at all.

Concerning the relationship between economics and politics, it has finally become overpoweringly obvious that the role of political structures vis-a-vis economic privilege cannot be submerged any longer under the presumed supremacy of the race or identity issue. Nattrass has summed up the major characteristics of the distributions of economic and political power in South Africa as follows:

1. A high concentration of economic and political power;
2. A definite geographic and racial side to the concentration;
3. A huge gap in privilege between the powerful and powerless;
4. The role of Government has been to protect and entrench the position of the powerful;
5. A perceived linkage of white supremacy with an economic system organized along capitalist lines

It follows that the intertwining of economics and politics makes it imperative that economic change (as an element of any improvement in the poverty and development situation) has to be accompanied by political change that broadens the base of democracy to include all the inhabitants of South Africa. Any consideration of alternatives has to take all the aspects of meaningful change into simultaneous consideration.

What should furthermore be obvious is that development (however defined) involves choices not only of different organizational frameworks or proximate ends but also of a much deeper nature. What is at stake is the kind of society, culture and civilization which the people of South Africa will move into. To suppose that there exists some kind of blueprint for this or that some kind of societal automaton, inherent in the processes of economic growth, will bring everything to a happy end, is not only wishful thinking but an abdication of responsibility at a very crucial moment.
ON THINKING STRATEGICALLY IN SOUTH AFRICA

Development alternatives will remain enclosed in the realm of thinking if they are not translated into strategies with its implication of action or planning for action. This brings us to the relationship between goals or objectives and the ways and means by which they are accomplished. The intention of this paragraph is not to give any sort of résumé of this well-worn topic. It is rather to focus attention on one aspect of the issue - the way in which we view the goals of our strategies. Goudzwaard holds the standpoint that there is ultimately only two ways in which we can think about broadly defined ends of societal development - ideological and responsive. The ideological approach implies that one or a few societal goals are taken to be final and overarching. To reach this end a whole system of values, motives and norms are devised that can and must be implemented, ultimately in the sense of a quasi-religious justification for whatever action is necessary. In this sense it serves as the argument for why the and justifies the means.

A responsive way of thinking about ends proceeds from the idea of norms such as justice, love and stewardship as principles (principiae) which form the real starting-points to which we respond by way of choosing ends and means in a continuous relation to these principles. Ends are thus chosen and pursued in a much more relative way and cannot justify means which make a mockery of principles.

Goudzwaard goes on to identify four goals which have come to constitute in some or other combination the overarching ends of the modern world. They are survival with your own kind (cultural identity); preservation and expansion of personal welfare (welfare); a guaranteed safety from external threat (security) and the all out struggle against exploitation and repression (revolution). The striving for any of these goals is not evil in itself. It becomes ideological in a pejorative sense at the very moment when any one (or all) of them is elevated to such a position that it (or they) dictates what should and should not be done regardless of any other consideration, norm or principle. It is at this point that such a goal becomes the final and sufficient justification for any means to attain it. It then makes values and norms into instruments for goal-attainment by bending them in any fashion necessary.
It is clear that when goals have been fully ideologized in the above sense, then the action plans to reach them cannot but be of the nature of blueprints. Then it makes no difference whether the "material" which has to be molded to concretize the blueprint, is people and their way of life, including the meaning it confers on their existence.

A perusal of the South African situation and the standpoint of some of its most powerful antagonistic groupings, cannot but lead to the conclusion that the goals mentioned above are also accorded prime position in this country. But even more important is the degree to which all four of them have been ideologized. This paper is not the place to argue this point but it is almost impossible to oversee the recent history of South Africa and the overt and covert conflict over its future without considering the hold of ideologized goals and the strategies implemented to concretize them.

It is therefore imperative that a position be taken on this issue when addressing the question of development alternatives for the country or any part of it. If one departs from the idea that development is intrinsically normative and implies a form of change (broadly interpreted) which implies an improvement, then speaking of development alternatives means choosing between different ends and means. As argued above this can be done in one of two ways — ideological or responsive. Seeing that the approach internationally and nationally has up to now been more or less ideological, and evaluating its results (particularly in South Africa), isn't it time that another approach be given a fair hearing. Is there not some promise of gaining desperately necessary degrees of freedom for manoeuvre in South Africa if we could devise ways and means towards greater welfare, security and justice while providing for the necessary cultural pluralism and diversity on a less ideological basis. For this there is by definition no blueprint. It is a matter of choices of and changes in direction in response to principles and norms and limited by the actual outcome of attempts to promote change. This means that we cannot hope to provide a step-by-step guide to establishing alternative patterns of development.

4. DEVELOPMENT PATTERNS IN THE ORANGE FREE STATE

When elements of the matrix of activity (economic and otherwise) in the Orange Free State are presented, the intention is not to do so in a closely reasoned sense after the example of Chenery and Syrquin. It is used more
loosely and impressionistic to convey an idea of the broader sweep of events which are central to the development of the region.

The province of the Orange Free State comprises an area of 129 307 square kilometers or 10,59% of the total surface area of the Republic of South Africa (Black States included). Of this total area 492 square kilometers belong to QwaQwa and 1139 square kilometers to Bophuthatswana. The Free State has a population density of 0,14 persons per hectare compared to 0,21 persons per hectare for the Republic as a whole. The population of the Free State has from 1951 to 1980 remained an almost constant proportion of that of the Republic, changing from 1 016 557 (8,02%) in 1951 to 1 833 216 (7,71%) in 1980.

The composition and size of the component parts of the population changed between 1951 and 1981 in the following way:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coloureds</td>
<td>14 715</td>
<td>1,45</td>
<td>36 090</td>
<td>2,19</td>
<td>51 748</td>
<td>2,82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>227 652</td>
<td>22,39</td>
<td>295 903</td>
<td>17,94</td>
<td>311 374</td>
<td>16,98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>774 190</td>
<td>76,16</td>
<td>1 317 308</td>
<td>79,87</td>
<td>1 470 094</td>
<td>80,19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Smit and Kok have estimated that the ratio of non-white to White inhabitants of the four provinces (Black States excluded) as shown by the 1980-census was as follows:

- Orange Free State: 5,15
- Natal: 3,77
- Cape Province: 3,15
- Transvaal: 2,63

The forementioned statistics show that the Orange Free State is not as densely populated as the other provinces of the Republic and that the composition of the population has since 1951 changed steadily in the direction of a further increase in the numerical majority of Black people. Comparatively speaking, this makes the Orange Free State the province with
the highest ratio of non-White to White inhabitants, if the Black States are not included. If the high growth in Black inhabitants of QwaQwa since 1970 and of Botshabelo since 1979 is also taken into account, the tendency is drastically reinforced. 29) The next tendency which has to be taken into account is the geographical distribution of the population. From official statistics can be seen that there has been a considerable redistribution of people in the province among all constituent groups of the population. With respect to Whites there has been a steady migration towards larger towns and cities which has brought about a continuing decrease in the White population in most magisterial districts of the south-western, southern, south-eastern and north-eastern Free State. This also applies to a lesser extent to the Black population who have migrated to the Bloemfontein area, the Goldfields, Sasolburg, Bethlehem and QwaQwa. There has been a steady increase in the number of Coloured people in almost all districts but their absolute number remains comparatively very small.

The reasons for the distributional tendencies are located partly in economic factors and partly in political factors. The latter plays its role particularly with regard to Black people. Economic factors have the obvious and determining role of providing the means of livelihood of people and in the pattern of commercialisation of modern societies this is linked with the employment and income-generating effects of the economic process. For this reason it is necessary to look at the Gross Geographical Product (GGP) of the Orange Free State and for the purpose of this paper it suffices to focus on region C of the Government's development regions. 30)

From tables 1 to 4 (see appendix) and concomitant statistics 31) the following conclusions can be drawn:

- The magisterial districts of Welkom, Bloemfontein and Virginia (to which Sasolburg should be added for completeness) make by far the largest contribution per district to the GGP of the region.

- The mining districts in the Goldfields (region 30) in general contribute far more to the GGP than non-mining districts.
Agriculture plays a meaningful role in all magisterial districts of the region and in most regions it is the most important contributor to the GGP of the district.

A closer inspection of the agricultural production of magisterial districts shows that a production of R5 000 per square kilometer or more was in 1975 attained in:

- Wesselsbron
- Bothaville
- Welkom
- Hennenman
- Theunissen
- Koppies
- Bethlehem
- Clocolan

The following districts in 1975 had an agricultural production of less than R1 000 per square kilometer:

- Rouxville
- Bethulie
- Fauresmith
- Jagersfontein
- Koffiefontein
- Odendaalsrus
- Philippolis
- Trompsburg

Several districts have shown a negative rate of growth in GGP between 1970 and 1975. These included:

- Fouriesburg
- Ficksburg
- Clocolan
- Ladybrand
- Zastron
- Bethulie
- Jagersfontein
- Marquard
- Philippolis
- Trompsburg
- Voldersburg
- Winburg

A further conspicuous point is that the tertiary sector has declined sharply in comparison with other sectors. In many districts it has recorded negative rates of growth despite the fact that the tertiary function of many towns as a support for the agricultural production activities in its surroundings, is its main raison d'etre.

The tendencies in respect of economic activity in the Free State can thus far be said to give the following general picture:
With the exception of the goldfields and one or two other districts, agriculture is the most important form of economic activity in the Orange Free State.

The cities and towns mostly find the reason for their existence and good or bad fortune in the rendering of service to the farming community in its vicinity.

The agricultural sector is a slow-growing sector (especially in the western, southern and south-eastern districts) which is steadily shedding people who move to those locations where faster growing activities occur. This makes the southern part of the province as a whole a declining area.

While the migratory tendencies resulting from economic factors have applied with particular impetus to the White population group, it is also present to an increasing degree in the Black population group.

The economic fortune of the Black population group is decisively influenced by the Government's racial policy and in particular by the fact of compulsory relocation of people to effect the creation of separate ethnic units.

With the exception of the areas designated as Black States, unemployment in the Orange Free State is comparatively low.

Up to this point no detailed mention has been made of the position of Black people in the areas which — in the perspective of government policy — form their national homelands. In the Orange Free State there are three such areas viz. the Thaba 'Nchu area which forms part of Bophuthatswana and the Botshabelo and Witzieshoek areas which together constitute QwaQwa.

A group of Barolong people under Moroka settled in the Thaba 'Nchu area in 1833 after negotiations with Moshoeshoe of the Basotho. The territory was annexed by the Orange Free State in 1884 and in the next 30 odd years its surface area was substantially reduced until boundaries were recommended by the Beaumont Commission of 1916. The OFS Land Committee amended this in 1918 to a still smaller area although it admitted that together with the Seliba reserve to the north, it formed the most densely populated of all
the scheduled areas throughout the Union of South Africa. The Land and Trust Act of 1936 provided the legislative framework for finalising the boundaries of land available for occupation by Black people. With the coming into existence of Bophuthatswana in 1977, the consolidated territory, as it is today, was incorporated as one of the seven fragments thereof. For all practical purposes though, it is economically completely subservient to the Bloemfontein area and has little economically functional relationship with the rest of Bophuthatswana. Its ability to serve as an economic basis for its present inhabitants is nowhere in keeping with the demands of a burgeoning population, in large part thrust upon it by a policy of compulsory relocation of Black people from the rest of the Free State.

The present occupants of the Witzieshoek area of QwaQwa consist mainly of the Bakwena and Batlokwa. The Kwena people's forebear Mopeli was given permission in 1857 to settle there by the Volksraad. In 1973 a section of the Tlokwa under Koos Mota were also allowed to settle there. The allocated area remains the same size today as it was when originally demarcated in 1867, which is 50172 hectare.

The limited farming potential, due to topographical reasons, had already in 1913 given rise to appeals for an extension of arable land, which have never been accepted. With a steady growth in population, the situation in the area, concerning its provision of a livelihood for its inhabitants, has steadily declined. Population estimates, though tenuous, are as follows: 4700 in 1911, 10,000 in 1932, 12,000 in 1950, 24,000 in 1970, 300,000 in 1980. This gives a mean population density of 622 persons per square kilometer in 1980.

It can be seen that the area has experienced an influx of people since 1970 on a gigantic scale. This influx is the result of the Government policy of creating an ethno-national homeland for all the Black peoples of South Africa. QwaQwa is in this respect the most explicit case of the failure of this policy as the already grossly overcrowded area in 1970 only contained 1,75 per cent of the de jure South Sotho which rose, according to estimate, to just over 7 per cent at the end of the decade. BENO observed in its economic revue of QwaQwa in 1978 that the overpopulation, geographical isolation, lack of natural resources and capital, complex topography and insufficient infrastructure make any kind of economic development extremely difficult. Smith et. al. show that a thoroughgoing inspection of all relevant aspects of the situation and potentialities of the region, provides no ground for the idea that such a degree of economic development will in the foreseeable future
be attained so as to accommodate the basic aspirations of even the current inhabitants of the region.\(^\text{41}\)

Botshabelo came into existence in 1979 on a piece of land 12 km south west of, but bordering on Thaba 'Nchu. Its inhabitants are mainly South Sotho who are citizens of QwaQwa. The main reason for its coming into existence was the conflict at the Kromdraai area in Thaba 'Nchu between South Sotho squatters and Tswanas. The Sotho's were moved to Botshabelo between May and December 1979 and were soon followed by a huge influx of mainly South Sotho's from elsewhere in the Free State. The population was estimated at 200,000 in August 1983 despite the fact that it was officially foreseen that such a figure would only be reached by the year 2000.\(^\text{42}\) Conditions at Botshabelo are typical of that of a high-density rural settlement in Third World conditions although sanitation and a rudimentary water reticulation system was provided from the outset. Social infrastructural facilities are inadequate although of greater range and magnitude than in other areas where relocation has occurred. A wide variety of housing exists ranging from shacks to meaningful experiments with building techniques more appropriate to Third World conditions.\(^\text{43}\) The main problem is employment because the settlement has no economic base whatsoever. It was designed primarily as an immediate solution to an explosive residential situation. Although provision has been made for an industrial area close to the main transport arteries (road and rail), only three industrial enterprises have as yet been started. There is also as yet little informal sector activities.

From the foregoing it is clear that the Orange Free State as a whole leans heavily on the primary sector (mining and agriculture) to provide a livelihood to its inhabitants. In the long run this implies that if either of these diminishes in ability to provide people with employment opportunities and income, serious problems will arise if no way is found to shift the emphasis of economic activity meaningfully towards other sectors. Because agriculture is a slow-growing activity and in South Africa undergoing a continuing rise in capital-intensity, the employment opportunities in this sector, given present techniques and approaches, are bound to stagnate even further. The mining industry in the Free State focuses almost exclusively on gold and has only a limited life-span.

If these tendencies are brought into relation with the population growth
tendencies previously mentioned as well as with the migratory patterns identified, it seems inescapable to say that no easy passage can be foreseen for the inhabitants of the Orange Free State with regard to the fulfilment of the task of bridging the gap between the needs of all the people within its boundaries and the means at their disposal. It should be underlined that the time is past (if there ever was such a time) when thinking about the future of any region in South Africa could continue as if about half of the population could simply be assumed away or thought of as of no consequence. If the needs of the Black people of the Orange Free State, whether they are living in the Black states or outside it, are not fully taken into consideration, and that means that the Black people themselves have to articulate and bargain for their needs — the future of the region cannot be seen as other than fraught with conflict and instability.

5. SOME ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FUTURE OF THE ORANGE FREE STATE

It is a well-worn phrase today that South Africa has moved into a phase of accelerated change of political and economic structures and policy. Schlemmer has given a broad overview of the different forms and fields of change in South Africa at the present and comes to the following conclusions:

(a) Positive trends are:
- Wage rates for Blacks
- Access of Blacks to certain urban recreational amenities
- Skills training
- Trade union development for Blacks

(b) Positive but too slow trends are operative in:
- Unskilled and semi-skilled employment creation
- Occupational advancement of Blacks
- Funding and quality of Black education

(c) Inimical trends for justice, stability and growth are found in:
- Housing and concomitant amenities
- Influx control laws and practices
- Rights of Blacks in White areas
- Constitutional and political development among Blacks
This can be said to apply to the situation in the Free State as well and from this one can draw some implications for development alternatives.

It is necessary though to give attention first to a much heralded aspect of Government policy which has important bearing on the development question. This is the new regional development policy which has the intention to counter the ever increasing centralisation of economic growth and the pressure for Black urbanisation. In terms of the two main strands of thinking about development which were noted in the second part of this paper, it is clear that the regional strategy falls squarely in the camp of the conventional or mainstream approach to development. This maintains that the development history of the Westernized parts of the world or of countries, provides the best approach to accelerate change for the "better" in other parts of the world. This boils down to urbanized and industrialized economic growth based on an intensive use of resources among which capital takes pride of place. The extreme concentration of economic activity in South Africa (largely attributable to the location of gold mines) testifies to the high degree to which this pattern has also been followed in its development history.

Due mainly to political reasons, there has for the last decade or two been much talk and some effort to decentralise a significant part of economic activity. This has not met with any widespread degree of success. Viewed from a development point of view, this is understandable. The forces and motives for modern economic growth, almost without exception, give rise to agglomeration which does not of its own accord spread itself geographically except in pursuit of further profits. In this sense then, economic activity which could, would or does occur spontaneously in or near the larger economic poles in South Africa, will not easily move or be moved to decentralised locations on a significant scale.

Furthermore, if decentralisation is attempted, it is done by way of a geographical extension of precisely the frame of thinking and organization of production inputs which created the centralisation in the first instance. Proper cognisance is not taken of the situation with regard to human resources and needs in the decentralised areas. This also applies to the political side particularly as far as it logically ties in with economic factors in drawing up and executing development plans. To the extent that decision-making bodies with regard to the regional development effort is heavily dominated by civil
servants and institutional representatives of the dominant economic and political establishment, innovative thinking and planning is likely to be lacking.

Purely on the grounds of the powerful momentum of existing patterns, it seems that the one alternative for the Orange Free State is for the present pattern of development to continue. This leaves us with the problematical phenomena of the declining southern areas and with the three areas of immense concentration of Black people. It seems fair to say that the current approach with regard to the latter phenomenon is to hope that the more diligent application of the standard growth recipe will suffice in creating direct and indirect (informal sector) effects that will keep the situation from erupting.

With regard to QwaQwa Van Rooyen has calculated that about 60 000 persons formed the labour force of QwaQwa in 1980 of which 8 500 found employment in QwaQwa while 18 500 were registered migratory labourers. Of the remaining 32 000 an immense pressure on the employment opportunities of the Bethlehem-Harrismith area could be expected. Although meaningful statistics could not be provided, the fact of the immense number of people in Thaba 'Nchu and Botshabelo compared with the limited number of employment opportunities in the Bloemfontein area, points to the same situation there although some measure of alleviation can be expected from industrial development in Bloemfontein and vicinity. Compared with the results of efforts up to now, it is doubtful if the regional development strategy will contribute sufficiently to the solving of the development problems of the Free State.

It thus remains to consider thinkable alternatives. Nattrass has succinctly reiterated the basic socio-economic choices concerning frameworks for such an exercise as lying on a range from State capitalism to Reformist capitalism. If this is accepted as applicable to the socio-economic order, the most important idea to be added is that of thinking about development as people-centred, taking heed of their needs and socio-cultural situation. It seems from this vantage point that the single most important factor in bringing into play the possibility of alternative strategies for development, is the degree of acceptance by the ruling establishment in South Africa of all the people in the country as having an equal claim on its means and opportunities for development. Since these claims are institutionalised in political structures,
Schlemmer is correct in stating that the political legitimacy and acceptability of any proposal for change underlies any other aspect of it at the present time.\(^{49}\)

The negative connotations of the present government policy spring largely from its intention of the complete separation of White and Black decision making. If the goal of complete separation can be tempered by a meaningful reciprocal acceptance of interdependence, the established nature of administration and economic structures in the national states can be implemented as a basis for a more healthy form of political and economic decentralisation.

The urgency of development problems and the need for co-operation in moving towards a joint future require political innovation not only on a central level, but especially at a local or regional level. As it stands, there is little in the way of implementing this in the Orange Free State but the will to create fair opportunities for all its inhabitants towards the unfolding of the meaning of their existence.
APPENDIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1960 (R '000)</th>
<th>Annual Growth (%)</th>
<th>1970 (R '000)</th>
<th>Annual Growth (%)</th>
<th>1975 (R '000)</th>
<th>Annual Growth (%)</th>
<th>1980 (R '000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Region 29</td>
<td>61 129</td>
<td>6,19</td>
<td>111 502</td>
<td>14,93</td>
<td>223 610</td>
<td>11,60</td>
<td>387 116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region 30</td>
<td>256 770</td>
<td>5,27</td>
<td>429 020</td>
<td>21,77</td>
<td>1 148 370</td>
<td>28,25</td>
<td>3 984 760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region 31</td>
<td>100 541</td>
<td>7,66</td>
<td>210 295</td>
<td>17,11</td>
<td>463 226</td>
<td>15,39</td>
<td>947 762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (Region C)</td>
<td>418 440</td>
<td>6,02</td>
<td>750 817</td>
<td>19,57</td>
<td>1 835 200</td>
<td>23,72</td>
<td>5 319 640</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1) Region C refers to the Regional Development Strategy and consists of Regions 29, 30 and 31 of the National Physical Development Plan. It covers most of the Orange Free State including Thaba 'Nchu and QwaQwa but excludes the magisterial districts of Boshof, Jacobsdal, Koffiefontein, Bethulie, Rouxville, Zastron and Sasolburg.

2) Percentages may not exactly add up to 100% as a result of rounding.

TABLE 2  
Percentage contribution of different economic sectors to the Gross Geographical Product of Region C\(^1\) for 1960, 1970 and 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>PRIMARY SECTOR</th>
<th>SECONDARY SECTOR</th>
<th>TERTIARY SECTOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Region 29(^2)</td>
<td>50,08(^3)</td>
<td>50,82</td>
<td>41,37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region 30</td>
<td>70,48</td>
<td>71,42</td>
<td>86,61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region 31</td>
<td>23,02</td>
<td>12,97</td>
<td>19,08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (Region C(^1))</td>
<td>56,09</td>
<td>51,99</td>
<td>71,29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:  
1) Region C refers to the combination of regions 29, 30 and 31 according to the Regional Development Strategy.  
2) Regions 29, 30 and 31 refer to planning regions of the National Physical Development Plan.  
3) Percentages may not exactly add up to 100% as a result of rounding.  


---

TABLE 3  
The seven magisterial districts with the highest Gross Geographical Product in the Orange Free State at current prices and annual growth in Gross Geographical Product in these districts between 1960 and 1980 (Ranked according to 1980 figures)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>1960 (R '000)</th>
<th>Annual Growth (%)</th>
<th>1970 (R '000)</th>
<th>Annual Growth (%)</th>
<th>1975 (R '000)</th>
<th>Annual Growth (%)</th>
<th>1980 (R '000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welkom</td>
<td>132 659</td>
<td>5,13</td>
<td>218 700</td>
<td>24,95</td>
<td>666 172</td>
<td>33,55</td>
<td>2 830 487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloemfontein</td>
<td>43 091</td>
<td>14,29</td>
<td>163 621</td>
<td>16,81</td>
<td>355 861</td>
<td>14,76</td>
<td>708 376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sasolburg</td>
<td>41 165</td>
<td>7,03</td>
<td>81 181</td>
<td>19,66</td>
<td>199 177</td>
<td>20,50</td>
<td>507 378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>36 140</td>
<td>1,65</td>
<td>42 551</td>
<td>22,71</td>
<td>118 370</td>
<td>29,51</td>
<td>431 247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kroonstad</td>
<td>22 707</td>
<td>6,7</td>
<td>43 464</td>
<td>17,66</td>
<td>98 011</td>
<td>11,50</td>
<td>168 913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odendaalsrus</td>
<td>11 261</td>
<td>7,21</td>
<td>22 592</td>
<td>14,82</td>
<td>45 099</td>
<td>26,37</td>
<td>145 313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
<td>14 558</td>
<td>8,66</td>
<td>33 414</td>
<td>15,46</td>
<td>68 550</td>
<td>11,42</td>
<td>117 719</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX

TABLE 4

The ten magisterial districts with the lowest Gross Geographical Product at current prices in the Orange Free State between 1960 and 1980 (Ranked according to 1980 figures)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>1960 (R'000)</th>
<th>1970 (R'000)</th>
<th>1980 (R'000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippolis</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>3,187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trompsburg</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>3,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacobsdal</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>1,538</td>
<td>3,378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethulie</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>3,389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edenburg</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>3,592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smithfield</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>4,848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fauresmith</td>
<td>1,511</td>
<td>1,285</td>
<td>4,979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reddersburg</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>5,581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fouriesburg</td>
<td>1,191</td>
<td>1,793</td>
<td>5,869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rouxville</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>6,396</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES


3. Henriot (ibid., pp 7-8) lists some of the more noteworthy efforts. See also Emmerij, L.J., "De drie panelen van het derde ontwikkelingsdecanium" in Sint M. & Verburg W., Strategie in Ontwikkeling, Amsterdam, Intermediair, 1980


8. Adelman, op. cit., p 308

9. For a more detailed examination of the presuppositions and content of the "redistribution with growth" approach, see Chenery et. al., op. cit.; Stewart, F. & Streeten, P., "New Strategies for Development: Poverty, Income Distribution and Growth", and Weaver, J. H. et. al., "A critical Analysis of Approaches to Growth and Equity", both in Wilber (ed) op. cit.
10. For a recent discussion see Sautter, H., "Socio-cultural aspects of supply-side Economics for Developing Countries", Intereconomics, Vol 18, No 6, 1983


13. Wolfe, op. cit., p 165. He lists a fairly representative number of composite reports and declarations to which can of course be added a much longer list of contributions by individual authors. It should also be recognized that authors like Baran and later Furtado and other Latin-Americans have been striking different chords from much earlier.


15. Goulet, D., "'Development' ... or Liberation?" in Wilber (ed), op. cit.

16. For a recent analysis of the variations in and intellectual roots of this approach from a sociology of knowledge perspective, see Preston, P.W., Theories of Development, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982

17. See Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, op. cit.


19. Goulet, D., The Cruel Choice, New York, Atheneum, 1971. A special issue of the journal Development (1981, No 3/4) is also devoted to the topic of culture which is called "the forgotten dimension".

21. Nattrass (ibid. pp 300-308) advances arguments for making a choice between three alternative options for the future politico-economic framework of South Africa. They are the socialist option, the free market option and the reform option — the last one being essentially a variant of the free market option.

22. Goudzwaard, B., *Genoodzaakt goed te wezen*, Kampen, Kok, Undated. The term ideology is here used in a stricter sense than merely denoting an approach to practical matters (e.g. politics) in the light of a system of ideas. It refers to an explanatory theory of a comprehensive kind about human experience coupled with a program of different forms of societal organization to reach self-chosen goals.


26. Ibid., Chart 2.2.1 C

27. Ibid., Charts 2.2.2 C, 2.2.3 C, 2.2.4 C.

The figures quoted in the Atlas (footnote 25 et. seq.) follows the Government approach of not including the inhabitants of Black States in figures for the RSA population. As a result the figures should only be used to gain an impression of patterns of change which is in this case not influenced by the omission.

29. The de facto population of QwaQwa was estimated at 300 000 in 1980 by official sources and that of Botshabelo at 200 000 in 1982. Cf. Surplus People Project, Forced Removals in South Africa, Vol. 3, Cape Town, SPP, p 161, 166. It has been unofficially estimated that the non-White population of the Orange Free State grew between 1970 and 1980 at a rate five times higher than the White population.

30. The western magisterial districts of Boshof, Jacobsdal and Koffiefontein belong geographically to the Free State but are functionally linked much more closely with Kimberley. The same applies to Sasolburg which forms a logical and practical part of the PMV-complex. The districts of Bethulie, Rouxville and Zastron in the southern Free State are grouped functionally with adjoining ones in the north-eastern Cape. The functional groupings mentioned here have found expression in the Government's regional development strategy in which the rest of the Orange Free State excluding the districts mentioned above is termed region C. Since this paper intends to draw attention to development in the Orange Free State, albeit in its connectedness with its surroundings, it will not give rise to serious error if region C is used for statistical purposes as a proxy for the Orange Free State.


32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Surplus People Project, op. cit., p 152