SECOND CARNEGIE INQUIRY INTO POVERTY
AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Poverty and wealth in a Kalahari village in Botswana
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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 RESUME

The following paper focuses on poverty in a small village on the eastern edge of the Kalahari sandveld in Central District. It is hoped that a detailed analysis at the micro-level will contribute to a better understanding of the complexity of the causes of poverty in rural Botswana and the strategies adopted by the poor in their struggle for survival. Such a study involves of necessity an analysis of present day class relations investigating its roots in history and tracing how the major economic resources have become controlled by a few wealthy cattle owners.

Mosolotshane, the village that provides the case material for this paper, has a population of approximately 1 000 people who are predominantly BaKgalagadi ex-malata ('serfs') who lived as badisa (herders) looking after the cattle of the BaNgwato dikgosana (royalty). Although the history of the village is significant in explaining current class relations, it is only dealt with briefly in order to discuss the effect of the malata-dikgosana relationship on the lives of respondents. The legal abolition of this relationship at independence has resulted in a new type of dependency which strongly resembles the old badisa system.

The main focus of the paper is, however, on the degree of participation of villagers in different income generating activities and the constraints experienced by poorer households which greatly limit their success.

Although the people of this village appear to be relatively well-off with 95% of households engaged in arable agriculture, 70% owning cattle and 34% having herds sufficiently large to provide independent draft power; these statistics tell us nothing about the enormous variation in size of harvests and herds. They are furthermore misleading in that there are a large number of poor people who live as dependents of wealthy households and who - using the conventional definition of 'household' - would be seen as part of these households but who in reality have no legal right to any of their resources. These dependents may be poor relat-
ives or they may be unrelated as in the case of the 30-40 BaSarwa (San) families who have remained with their former 'masters' after their legal emancipation.

Similarly, although 32% of households have at least one wage earner this says nothing about the incidence or significance of transfers to the different households. This paper tries to look 'behind' the statistics at the relationships and variation which they disguise.

In discussing the constraints experienced by the poorer villagers it also investigates different strategies adopted by about two-thirds of the households in their effort to gain access to the major agricultural resources and the alternatives for those who do not succeed.

1.2 BACKGROUND

Mosolotsana is situated some 22 kilometers north-west of Shoshong on the edge of the sandveld in Central District. It was established at the turn of the century as a cattlepost area for the BaNgwato royalty and has retained this function for many herd owners living in Shoshong, Mahalapye and Serowe which are densely populated villages with heavily over-grazed pastures.

At the time of fieldwork in 1978-9 the de-facto population was estimated to be about 1 000 people including the neighbouring hamlets which fall under the local ward system. It is predominantly BaKgalagadi with one-half of the households belonging to this group and the remainder being mainly BaNgwato, BaKalaka, Herero and BaKaa. One out of ten households, however, incorporated BaSarwa (San) families who were formerly malata ('serfs') who had been inherited by their 'masters' and remained with them after their emancipation at independence working as servants, agricultural labourers and herdsmen in return for food and clothing. There were no other BaSarwa living in the village although there were many who came visiting and begging. In contrast, there was a large number who were squatting at the cattleposts west of the village.

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1. During eight months of fieldwork in this village 104 households were interviewed representing about 90% of the village.
1.3 PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION

Identifying the Poor

In this study the classification of households into different socio-economic strata is based on their access to and control of different economic resources. Cooper has argued persuasively that there are several class situations - wage earning, lands, cattle and even trading - which must be amalgamated into 'one compound class situation' (1982a, p.398, his emphasis).

Whilst this is logical, in practice it becomes problematic with a general reluctance of villagers to disclose information on herd size, wages and transfers. The Water Point Survey (Fortman & Roe, 1981) attempted to overcome this problem by adapting the American 'Gottman Scale of Relative Wealth' to Botswana whereby households were classified according to ownership of a number of luxury goods such as chairs, tables, radios, tin roofs, latrines, etc. which were used as indices of wealth. This method was, however, of little value in Mosolotshane with many wealthy households simply not having indulged in the purchase of such luxury items.

In this study 'poor' and 'wealthy' are seen as extremes on a continuum of relative wealth. There are no clear-cut boundaries which separate 'poor', 'middle' and 'wealthy'. What is more, economic status is not seen as something static, it is continuously changing as indicated by the fluctuations in wealth during the lifetime of respondents. But, even though it is difficult to categorise households in this manner, it is nevertheless important to identify the poorer segment of the population. For the purposes of this paper they are defined as those households that do not have - or have very limited access to the major economic resources i.e. arable land, draft power, ploughs and seed, cattle, labour and/or regular transfers from wage earners.

According to such criteria 6% of households were completely destitute living off begging and 'piece-jobs'. 22% were very poor having no cattle, no wage earners and harvesting four bags of sorghum in 1978 or less. This group also relied heavily on 'piece-jobs' in exchange for food. 30% were less poor (middle) pooling resources with other households in order to obtain draft power and obtaining
harvests of 5-7 bags. Some of these households had a few cattle of their own while others had mafisa cattle or both. Some also had wage earners but transfers were insufficient to enable independent ploughing. 27% were relatively wealthy owning sufficient cattle to supply their own draft power and obtaining harvests in excess of 6 bags. Most of this group employed outside labour on their arable lands or at their cattleposts and some had wage earners. 15% were very wealthy having large herds which were watered at privately owned or syndicate boreholes. Some also engaged in large scale arable production harvesting between 50-150 bags of sorghum which they sold in Mahalapye. Some of these households also had wage earners.

This is a crude classification and is only intended to give a rough idea of distribution of households on the continuum of wealth. Subjective criteria were used to verify the classification of these households. Anthropologists appear to have an advantage over other social scientists in this respect in that during fieldwork they are usually able to get to know the people with whom they are working. It is particularly during times of crisis such as drought or the out-break of foot and mouth disease which occurred during this fieldwork, that one gains insights into hidden resources which are otherwise not apparent. It is during times such as these that poverty becomes visible.

Definition of Household

Before continuing it is essential to define the unit of analysis in this research. The terms 'household', 'lolwapa' and 'family' are frequently used interchangeably without their exact meaning being made clear. In Setswana 'lolwapa' means the enclosed yard around a house or compound and is used to symbolise its inhabitants. It is this unit which social scientists identify as 'the household'. It is characterised by the occupants 'eating out of the same pot' and falling under the authority of a recognised senior person who is the head of the household.

In most cases this is unproblematic but the definition becomes complicated by a high degree of spatial mobility of the population and the custom of having several residences — one usually in the

1. The number of such households a household has also indicates...
village, another at the lands, sometimes a third at the cattle-post and possibly even a fourth in an urban area. The occupants of these different residences are generally considered as members of one household excepting perhaps in the latter case where it would depend upon the attitude of the urban residents as to whether they are still part of the rural household.

Accuracy in definition becomes particularly difficult when dealing with members who are working outside the village—migrants to South Africa and other parts of Botswana—who may have left the village permanently despite claims that they are still part of the lolwapa. The definition is furthermore complicated by a number of local practices such as school children living with relatives during the agricultural season or while working parents are living in urban areas. But perhaps most difficult of all—especially in the study of poverty—is the problem of what to do with those poor people who live as dependents of wealthier households working together with them, eating out of the same pot, accepting the authority of the household head but having no rights to the property held by the wealthy household.

Despite these problems the concept 'household' has been retained in this paper primarily to provide a basis for comparison with other studies. Household membership includes all those people who the respondents consider to be part of their lolwapa and who either live there or who contribute to it economically. It excludes dependents as described above and also excludes those migrants who have not returned during the past two years and/or contributed to it during that period. It furthermore excludes those who have established a lolwapa of their own elsewhere.

It is important to stress that this is only a working tool to help assess the economic resources available to the household. In reality household membership is fluid with people playing a more or less significant part in its economy at different stages in their lives.

I have not actually resolved the problem of how to deal statistically with those who are dependents. Should one classify them as independent households? In this paper the 104 households interviewed refer to those households with physical lolwapa's and consequently excludes these very poor people.
Oral accounts trace the history of Mosolotshane back to the turn of the century when Khama III moved his cattle and herders into the area in order to utilise its superior grazing and water. His badisa were predominantly Bakgalagadi descendents of Sotho speaking people who were conquered during the difaqane. The royal cattle with which they were entrusted under the Kgamelo (milk-pail) system were given to the local headman who distributed them to the men under him. Although this system gave poorer people access to milk and draft power, it was not much liked by the badisa many of whom said that they would have preferred not have taken the kgamelo cattle but did so because they were afraid of what might happen to them should they refuse. The system continued after Khama with later chiefs of Shoshong and Serowe distributing their cattle in this manner.

Amongst the badisa there was clearly a hierarchy with the headman and his close relatives receiving certain favours and occasionally a calf. This was, however, different from the Mafisa system which is discussed later in this paper, in that they had no right to the payment of calves under the kgamelo system. It is interesting to note that many of to-day's large herds owned by Bakgalagadi can be traced back to these calves. Apart from such gifts, some of the more privileged families owned BaSarwa who provided their owners with labour and hunted for them. One respondent explained:

"The MaSarwa were the bahlanka (servants) of the Bakgalagadi. From creation they were made younger than us, just like children. Our fathers just found them in the bush and we inherited them. In those days they did not run away as they do to-day. They used to hunt for us...and we sent gifts of skins to the kgosi (chief) - lions, leopards and others.... The skins were given to our headman who would send them to Khama keeping a few for himself."

(Mos 7-3)

Another old man added:

"Now if the BaKgalagadi didn't have MaSarwa they would have to go and hunt themselves because our tax used to be paid in skins...."

(Mos 6-11)

Hunting constituted an important source of income and enabled the badisa to acquire property - especially cattle - in their...

1. For an analysis of the political effects of the Kgamelo system see Parsons 1972 and Schapera 1976.
own right. But when Setogile Kgamane became chief of Shoshong in the 1930's he prohibited all hunting in the area which was henceforth to be the sole right of the dikgosana. This caused enormous hardship and forced many people to seek employment on the South African mines. Some, however, tried poaching - an activity which cost those who were caught everything that they possessed. In one out of many such cases, a man had his entire herd confiscated:

"At that time nobody was allowed to hunt for themselves, all you could do was steal. In those days only chiefs could hunt. There were many people who hunted for them. My father who was one of them was even given a gun. The problem was that he just went - he was not sent to hunt. But Setogile's brother, Barobe who was also a chief, had sent some MaSarwa out to hunt. They saw my father and told Barobe who told Setogile. He then took everything that my father had - 40 cattle and three horses with saddles but the third horse was later returned by Seretse Khama. Otherwise Setogile kept everything! (Before he was chief) our fathers used to live by hunting. They would make skins which they sold to buy cattle, horses and even guns. Now they are all finished, stolen, confiscated." (Mos 4-1)

Another man who had had a similar experience said:

"It is because of him that we are now poor. He just took our cattle. We were fined any number of cattle."

Such action certainly contributed to poverty in the village. It is difficult to get exact figures on this but at least one out of ten households suffered major losses of this sort. It seems that some dikgosana used any excuse to appropriate the property of their badisa. An example of this occurred when Tsekedi Khama died in 1959. It is said that he had about 22 000 cattle in the area with over 2 000 being looked after in Mosolotsane. When his son who was heir to these cattle, took them away to his ranch, the villagers experienced a tremendous setback not only because some of them were dependent on these cattle for subsistence but also because he apparently took half of their own cattle with those of his father!

1. In 1890 Khama introduced a reform allowing serfs to acquire livestock. Cf. Schapera, 1970, p. 89.
It is possible that the confiscation of property in this manner stems from the kgamelo system which originally gave chiefs the right to claim anything acquired by the holders of their cattle even though they usually only exercised this right as punishment.

Although the village was originally established as a royal cattle-post during subsequent decades new herds moved into the area and some villagers managed to build up herds of their own. The attraction of the area remained the superior grazing and water which consisted of privately owned wells, springs and a village borehole.

The movement of large herds both from Mosolotsane and other parts of Botswana to the sandveld west of the village was facilitated by the sinking of boreholes which started in the thirties with the encouragement of British agricultural officers. During the years that followed there occurred a 'land-grab' by wealthy cattle owners who - with the eight kilometer restriction between water points - gained private use of about 50 square kilometers of grazing land. Today, villagers have 6 privately owned boreholes and there are 5 syndicates. When they were established, however, it was only access to the pasturage which they controlled and it was not until the Tribal Grazing Land Policy of 1975 gave them leasehold rights that they would perceive the land as private property, thereby enabling them to restrict foraging in the area and transforming 'unemployed' BaSarwa to the status of squatters in what was previously their hunting territory.¹

By independence in 1966 the kgamelo system had largely been replaced by the mafisa system and hired herdsmen. The relationship between the BaSarwa and their masters has in many cases continued virtually unchanged despite their emancipation. The only significant difference is that they now have the right to leave their 'masters' which some do in extreme cases of ill-treatment.

3. SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

Before continuing to discuss how villagers make a living in Mosolotsane it may be worthwhile providing a brief overview of these activities.

On the surface of things arable agriculture and small-stock would appear to constitute the most significant source of subsistence in the village with 95% ploughing arable lands and 90% owning small-stock. Harvests are, however, generally very low with households averaging five bags of sorghum in 1978 (a 'good' year) which is considered by villagers to be less than half their annual grain requirements. It is clear therefore that other sources of income are critical for village households. These include cattle (70%), employment (31%), small 'cottage' industries (46%) as well as 'piece-jobs', hunting, gathering and, in cases of extreme destitution, begging. It is the households' ability to engage in a combination of these activities which results in economic security and growth. In fact, only the poorest households were unable to engage in several of these activities while the wealthiest generally combined cattle farming with several other activities.

4. AGRICULTURE

4.1 CATTLE

It is not the intention of this paper to discuss in detail the significance of ownership of cattle in Botswana. It is important however, to realise that this is regarded locally as the single most important asset in the rural areas. Although they still play a significant social and political role as described by Schapera (1970 b, p.214) there are perhaps more important economic reasons for accumulating cattle. Their cash and investment value are recognised in even the most remote parts of the country. They are seen as providing security against famine, drought and old age. But possibly of greatest significance is that ownership of

1. This statement is based on observations in ten villages in remote parts of the Kalahari and Okavango. Cf. also Alverson 1978.
draft power enables them to plough at the optimum
time which Curtis (1972) has shown has a critical effect
on crop yields with those who are unable to take advantage of
the early rains obtaining much smaller harvests.

Ownership of at least one head of cattle is less skewed than
would appear to be the pattern for the whole of rural Botswana
with 30% of households in Mosolotshane owning no cattle at all
compared the Rural Income Distribution Survey's figure of 45%
(CSO, 1976) In this village only 18% had no cattle at all, 12%
looked after mafisa cattle, 26% had a combination of their own
and mafisa cattle, whilst 44% kept only their own cattle.

This is a case, however, where the presentation of data in terms
of 'households' is misleading since these statistics ignore the
Basarwa ex-malata and other dependents living with wealthy
cattle owners who may be kin or totally unrelated. These depend­
ents usually contribute labour in exchange for subsistence but
they have no legal rights to the household's property, in this
case cattle. If one were in a survey to designate independent
'household' status to each dependent family the distribution
of ownership of cattle would be far more skewed than suggested.
For example, if the BaSarwa families were regarded as equal units
of analysis then at least 59% of 'households' (7) would own no
cattle at all.' But as mentioned earlier in this paper the problem
of how to deal with dependents has not been resolved. This
discussion does nevertheless reveal the degree to which the
inequitable distribution of wealth may be hidden by methodological
problems.

So, to return to the discussion of ownership of cattle. Although
it was stated that 70% of households - using the conventional
definition - own cattle this does not imply that such a high per-
centage are wealthy. Syson (1973,13) found in her survey of the
Mosolotshane area that only 4% owned more than 50 cattle,
11% owned 20-49, 19% owned 10-19, and 26% owned 1-9 and 40% owned
no cattle at all. These figures must, however, be treated cautious-

1. The only observed exceptions were in the case of very old or
disabled kin who were closely related to the wealthy household.
ly since villagers are highly reluctant to divulge accurate information of this sort. By approaching the problem somewhat differently it was found during this fieldwork that only 34% (35 cases) owned herds sufficiently large to provide the household with draft power. This implies that they would have herds of approximately 12 cattle or more. 1 37% (38 cases) owned herds that were smaller than this and the remaining 30% (31 cases) owned no cattle at all.

It may therefore be concluded that in terms of cattle ownership two-thirds are extremely poor and are forced to enter into arrangements in order to produce arable crops.

Herd histories

The history of the 35 larger herds show that inheritance and mine wages are are their most significant source with 31% stemming from the former and 35% from the latter (i.e. 31% inheritance only, 12% mines only, 23% both, 32% inheritance combined with other sources). What is more, out of a total 104 households only 5 managed through personal effort alone to build up herds large enough to provide draft power. Three managed this through migrant labour, 1 through a hawkers business and one through mafisa payments.

The source of cattle in the smaller herds shows a slightly different pattern with inheritance, mine wages and mafisa payments being equally significant (38% each) while gifts from kin, payments for well water, compensation for crop damage and payments for agricultural labour accounted for 23% of their origins.

The fact that so few of the wealthier households are 'self-made' is evidence of the difficulty in building up a herd. Case histories show enormous fluctuations in herd size caused by a number of factors such as drought, disease, mismanagement, and personal misfortune. In Mosolotshane onethird of households that own no cattle have had herds in the past but lost them. Small herds are particularly susceptible to total loss during drought and epidemics whereas several studies suggest that herds above a certain size

1. Agricultural Officers have suggested that 20 cattle is the minimum herd-size that would provide 6 draft oxen which is the average size used for ploughing. In this study, however, there were many cases where they used cows as well as oxen to make up the span. So, in this village the minimum size is about 12 cattle
are better able to recover after such disasters. Devitt has suggested that the critical herd size depends on the environment with 40 being suggested for the Kalahari and 20 for the less arid regions further east.

Mos 3-1 who is blind and in his late sixties, had a herd of twelve cattle which he obtained through the sale of game skins but at the time of interview he had only one cow and a few goats left. The rest he had sold to raise money so that he could go to Bulawayo hospital for treatment of his blindness. He now lives by grinding tobacco and selling snuff from which he earns up to 30 thebe per day. His cow and goats are left to stray in the village and are watered by the neighbours children. Poor health and his age make it highly unlikely that he will be able to rebuild his herd.

Mos 4-14 who is about 45 years old built up a herd by collecting and selling building poles. He also helped villagers in the construction of dwellings. Most of his cattle, however, died from disease. The last were sold to pay Setswana doctors to treat his sick wife and finally, to buy her coffin. Since then he has managed to get 18 mafisa cattle from two relatives and hopes with time to rebuild a herd of his own.

These two cases illustrate the loss of herds due to different factors but at different stages in the household development cycle. In the first case, Mos 3-1 and his wife are both old and in poor health. Their children who have all left home occasionally send them money and clothing which would appear to be their main source of subsistence. Without access to efficient labour for herding and watering they will not be able to rebuild a herd. In short, this household is at a most vulnerable stage in the developmental cycle, at the point of dissolution. In contrast with this case, Mos 4-14 who is relatively young and healthy, was able to get 12 mafisa cattle from his father's sister's son and six from his mother's brother's son. Thus, with only labour as a resource and wealthy kinship connections he was at least able to support himself through these cattle.

The Mafisa System

The mafisa (stock-loaning) system is an important redistributory mechanism with as many as 37% (38 cases) of households receiving cattle in this manner. In only six of these cases could the house-
hold be described as relatively wealthy having sufficient cattle of their own to provide draft power without the mafisa. For the remaining 32 households (i.e. almost one-third of the village) looking after mafisa was important for subsistence. This is slightly higher than Hertels’ suggestion that

"...somewhere between 21 and 30% of the rural households are holding mafisa cattle, and... this may account for 9 to 16% of the national herd."
(1977: 11)

According to this system cattle are given on loan, usually to a married male, to provide the recipient with draft power and milk. Although the owner continues to make major decisions such as the sale or slaughter of these cattle, the recipient is responsible for their daily management and consequently, in almost all cases, watering fees and veterinary expenses are paid by the latter. Ideally the recipient should be paid a calf per year for his labour but in practice such payments appear to be utterly hap-hazzard. There was not a single case of a person being paid a calf per year and only one-third of the 57 cases of mafisa-in received any payment at all. On average it was found that a person would have to look after ten cattle for six years before receiving one calf as payment! There is, of course, variation in this as the following two cases illustrate.

Mos 6-15 was probably the most fortunate recipient. His family had been badisa looking after one of the Khamas’ cattle which they did without pay. After the owners death they were left destitute because his son who had inherited the cattle moved them out to a ranch. For several years after that Mos 6-15 depended on borrowing draft power to plough their fields. Then in 1974 he was given 20 mafisa cattle by someone unrelated to him and within 4 years he had been paid 7 calves. This was the highest recorded payment in the village as well as the largest single herd given as mafisa.

This is a rare case which illustrates the ideal with the recipient who is poor receiving draft power and actually managing to build up a herd of his own through mafisa-payments. In most other cases the opposite is true.

Mos 3-5 is married and has ten children, none of whom are employed or married. In 1973 all he had was 3 cattle which he had inherited from his father. But in that year an unrelated person from Serowe 'took pity on him' and gave him 11 mafisa

1. Any domestic animal can in theory be given as mafisa but cattle are by far the most common. In this village there were no cases of other animals being given so the discussion is restricted to cattle.
which reproduced during the six years that he had had them but to-date he had received no payment at all. To make matters worse, he had to pay the well owner one calf every two years as a watering fee.

It is probably incorrect to assume that looking after mafisa cattle had cost him three cattle since it is likely that he would have had to pay that amount in any case to water his own small herd but in principle one feels that the mafisa owner is getting a very good deal - not only free labour but also free water and in this particular case, access to better grazing.

This raises an important point. Frequently it is argued that the mafisa system is especially beneficial to the poor. Emphasis is placed on the recipient gaining access to draft power, milk and the promised calf. The advantages of the system to the owner is largely overlooked. As indicated above, by lending cattle in this way the owner avoids paying watering fees and veterinary expenses, gains access to free labour and in many cases better grazing. Furthermore, studies in several villages strongly suggest that mafisa is rarely given to those households that own no cattle at all since the recipient is expected to have proven cattle management abilities.\(^1\) In Mosolotshane 32 out of the 38 recipients i.e. 84\% were very poor and reliant on the mafisa cattle. 11 of them (29\%) owned no cattle at all while the rest had just a few. It is interesting to note that 9 out of the 11 that owned no cattle of their own received the mafisa from close relatives while \% of all other mafisa transactions occurred between people who were unrelated.

4.2 SMALL STOCK

Goats and sheep are often described by villagers as the 'small change' of cattle. While the latter are rarely slaughtered simply for consumption, small stock provide the most important source of meat in the rural diet. Although their distribution is also skewed, this is not as great as in the case of cattle. What is more, whilst it is relatively rare for women - especially single women - to own cattle this is not the case with goats and sheep.

In Mosolotshane one out of ten households own no cattle, goats or sheep. This means that small stock are owned by two thirds of those who have no cattle. Observation during fieldwork confirms Syson's view that the largest cattle owners are also the largest small stock owners (1973: 8) but these herds rarely seemed to exceed 50 head and the average seemed to be about 20 small stock.

The main use of these animals is to provide the owner with meat for consumption and sale as well as being an important commodity for barter and gift exchange.

4.3 ARABLE AGRICULTURE

Although Mosolotshane is located in a recognised cattle-post area, the majority of villagers cultivate fields which in non-drought years contribute at least part of their subsistence. Sorghum is the main crop produced followed by smaller amounts of beans, maize, millet, cow peas, sunflower seed, watermelon, pumpkin ground nuts and even tobacco which are grown with varying degrees of success. In most cases these crops are produced purely for consumption but there are five cases where they are produced for sale. In each of these cases they were wealthy male farmers who had managed to obtain large tracts of land through the help of the local Agricultural Demonstrator. For the rest of the villagers, however, the fields are much smaller - averaging about 14 acres - and cultivated predominantly by women.

Access to Land

Access to arable land is gained through ward membership. In the past areas were allocated by ward headmen to the male heads of households who in turn, divided it amongst the adult women in their lolwapa's i.e. their wives, unmarried adult daughters, sons' wives and sometimes even keeping a field for themselves. Single women could not apply for land in their own right but in some cases managed to get land through their brothers. This, however, has changed - in theory at least - with the development of the Land Boards. A recent study conducted by Machacha (1981) suggests that women are not being allocated land - whether this is due to pre-
Judice on the part of the Land Boards, headmen practicing their veto rights or women simply not applying, is unclear and requires further research. Case Mos 7-38 would seem to indicate that the application for land by women is fairly complex and suggests that some women are unaware of their right to apply directly to Land Boards.

Mos 7-38 was given a small field by her brother while she was still single. Since her marriage, however, she has been unable to obtain larger lands because her husband who suffers from TB cannot plough and her brother who assists her by ploughing the small field is not interested in helping with larger lands and therefore will not support her application.

In 8 out of the 12 cases where the households have no arable land of their own the reason given for this was that they had not applied because they had no draft power and in the 4 other cases they had been refused fields by the headman because they had retained arable lands in neighbouring villages. This latter point is not, however, practiced consistently and seems to depend upon the individuals involved as the following case illustrates:

Mos 5-2 is a wealthy and powerful Setswana Doctor whose wife cultivates large lands in Shoshong. He has nevertheless managed to acquire a sizable tract of land in Mosolotshane through his friend, the ward headman, where he grows sorghum and tobacco with the assistance of two BaSarwa families.

But, eventhough 12% do not have lands of their own, 95% manage to plough i.e. 7% borrowed arable land from kin and in these cases they also received assistance in ploughing. This may appear to indicate that the distribution of arable land in this village is relatively equal but that is not the case. There is enormous variation in the actual size of the lands cultivated by the different households. Those men who have gone into commercial farming have lands large enough to produce between 50 and 150 bags of sorghum compared with the average harvest of 5 bags. Apart from them, there are a number of wealthy households that hold rights to fairly large fields although they plough only a portion of them. In such households there is ample land for each adult woman and of course sufficient draft power. In contrast, poorer households do not have separate fields for their adult women. This is not because there is insufficient arable land in the area, but rather because these households lack the necessary resources to plough larger areas viz. draft power and/or labour.
Draft Power

Evidence from Mosolotshane strongly supports the view that harvest size is correlated with the ability to plough with the early rains. It was found that those households that had access to sufficient draft power obtained an average of 5.4 bags of sorghum in 1978 (this excludes those who produced crops for the market) compared with 3.1 bags harvested by those who had insufficient draft power and those who had to hire someone to plough for them obtained the lowest yields, 2.3 bags.

Table I correlates the number of bags harvested with the source of draft power in 81 cases. It shows that 96% of those who got above average harvest of 6 or more bags could plough with the early rains (76% with their own, 12% with their own and mafisa and 8% with mafisa only). On the other hand 56% of those who harvested 2 bags or less did not have access to sufficient draft power while 44% did in fact have sufficient with 33% having mafisa

This last point is significant since it indicates that sufficient draft power does not explain on its own the difference in harvests between households because otherwise there would be no difference in harvests between those who ploughed with mafisa and those who used their own draft power. Furthermore, if land is not scarce there should be nothing inhibiting 'mafisa-households' from acquiring larger fields. In reality these are, of course, much poorer households who may be inhibited from ploughing larger areas or may obtain smaller crops for a number of reasons such as insufficient seed, lack of labour for ploughing weeding and bird scaring together with a lack of resources to clear and destump new land.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Harvest Size in bags</th>
<th>No. of Cases</th>
<th>Source of Draft Power</th>
<th>Pooled/Borrowed</th>
<th>Hired/Hand*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Own</td>
<td>Own &amp; Mafisa</td>
<td>Mafisa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 684 bags</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2 27</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5 29</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10 15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More 10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 81</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>684 bags</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first row of figures represents the number of cases, the second represents row percentages and the third represents column percentages.

* There is only one case of a person tilling the soil by hand and in this case she harvested two bags of sorghum.

Labour

Cultivating crops is an extremely laborious task with most of the work - apart from the actual ploughing - being done by women and children. While ploughing is generally done by men it is not unusual to see women either assisting with this or even doing it themselves with the help of their children. It is a difficult task with the oxen often running havoc or being so tired that they require skillful persuasion to continue the task. Although only 10% of village households were female headed, almost all of these had adult sons. A greater constraint than the sex of the head of the household was both the health of the adult males and whether or not they were present in the village during the ploughing season. A further constraint - which is difficult to deal with statistically...
is whether or not they are motivated to help the women plough their fields. Their attitude to this may be effected by poor diet, poor health, high consumption of alcohol and apathy.

Once the crops start growing the household faces the task of weeding and later in the season, bird-scaring. According to some agricultural officers these two factors greatly effect harvests but most households do not carry out these tasks efficiently. The reason for this is the amount of labour that is required to do this work regularly.

There is not much opportunity for poor women to find employment in arable production since only 17% of those who plough utilise outside labour. Half of these have their 'own' Basarwa who do this while the other half obtain agricultural labour through the majako system. The BaSarwa, as mentioned earlier, are not paid for this work but receive food, clothing and tobacco for themselves and their children throughout the year.

The majako system provides a highly precarious source of livelihood for those who participate in it. It enables wealthier households to employ women and their children to work on their fields in exchange for food during the season and an unspecified part of the crop. The risky element for those who do majako occurs in times of crop failure when the employer is not obligated to pay the labourer anything at all although in most cases they will be given a small amount of cash (P5-10) or perhaps a bucket of sorghum - scant reward for four months labour.

In 1978 which was a relatively good year, the women who did majako received on average two bags of sorghum and in one case where a man harvested over a hundred bags four women were paid P8 each at the end of the season.

The women who do this sort of work come from extremely impoverished back-grounds. Some supported themselves entirely off 'piece-jobs' and gathering veld foods and in other cases, they were single
women (the unmarried daughters) in households that ploughed fields of their own but generally obtained very low harvests. These women are not in a position to argue over payment and usually regard themselves as fortunate in getting such work. Normally they wait until the crops have started growing before they look for work. They then try to get work from the owners of fields that look as if they will produce a good crop. In this way they try at least, to minimise the chance of getting no payment at all.

EMPLOYMENT

The discussion thus far shows that agriculture in itself does not support the majority of villagers with only about 12% being self sufficient in grain production and only 34% owning herds of over 12 cattle. It is therefore imperative that most households have other sources of income the most obvious of which is wage employment. As in most parts of rural Botswana there is little opportunity for formal wage employment in the village and those who wish to work are therefore forced to seek employment elsewhere. The National Migration Survey (CSO, 1982) has challenged the official view of a dual economy in which the rural agricultural sector is seen as something separate from the urban sector. The results of their four surveys conducted between October 1978 and September 1979 found that

"...a massive 79% of rural dwelling units had a wage-employed member either resident or absent during that year."
(CSO, 1982, vol 1, p.37)

Commenting on this Cooper states that

"...the vast majority of households in Botswana have members both in the rural and urban (or South African) areas, and that the concept 'worker-farmer' unit is more applicable to these rural households. It is therefore only a minority of the rural population that can simply be viewed as farmers, and they are usually the poorest rural dwellers..."
(1982, b, Vol 2, p. 301)

While agreeing with the validity of the 'worker-farmer' concept and the emphasis on seeing the rural and urban sectors as being closely linked with rural households using employment as one of the resources which they exploit, the incidence of employ-
ment in Mosolotshane appears to be far lower than was found by the NMS. Here only 31% of households had one or more wage earners during the period of fieldwork. It is not clear why this village should deviate from other 'sub-peripheral' sandveld villages in Central District where the rate is suggested to be as high as 79% (Op.cit. Table 5.3, p.315). Two reasons may contribute to the difference in findings:

1. The conflation of the four rounds of questionnaires so that 79% represents the percentage of households that had wage earners in any of the four surveys. Cooper indicates that the figure per round is considerably less i.e. 52% for villages and 41% for non-villages. (op.cit. p.318)

2. The definition of wage employment which includes working on 'traditional farms' i.e. cattle-posts and lands. But even if these are included the figure for Mosolotshane only increases to 40% which is half of what Cooper suggests for the area.

An important question which stems from this last point concerns the value of combining into one category employment on 'traditional farms' with other types of formal wage employment. Sharpe and Spiegel (1983) distinguish between 'secure wage employment' and 'piece-jobs' which offer very low wages and/or no job security. The reason which they give for this distinction is that:

"People who are in receipt of less than a living wage, with little security of employment, are unlikely to be able to sponsor or participate in other activities for generating income in their own households, sites or elsewhere" (Op.cit. p.7)

Classifying households as having wage earners irrespective of what they are doing or paid can create a distorted view of their situation and consequently it is thought that the distinction proposed by Sharpe and Spiegel should be made - especially in the study of poverty. It is misleading to classify a domestic servant earning P60-100 per month, a shop assistant earning a similar amount and a building labourer earning P100-150 together with a herder earning perhaps P5-10 per month or together with a person who occasionally smears a yard or washes clothes in the village at 50 thebe a time.
The classification of herders is difficult. They are an amorphous group in some respects resembling labourers in that they earn - in theory at least - monthly wages; but in other ways they resemble more closely the *badisa* of the pre-independence period. Where wages are paid they are extremely low averaging P5-10 per month and in some cases are withheld for long periods of time. In Mosolotshane 24% (25 cases) of households employed herders to look after their cattle at their cattleposts. 19 of these used herders who were unrelated BaKgalagadi or BaSarwa and 6 employed poor kin i.e. nephews and cousins. None of the BaSarwa herders received wages or calves although some received 'pocket-money' occasionally which consisted of very small amounts given on an irregular basis. Most of the BaKgalagadi herders were promised the payment of one calf per year in return for their services but only four had actually received any calves at all. All herders received what the cattle owners liked to call 'payment in kind' which generally amounted to little more than milk, the meat of dead animals (as was the case under the *kgamelo* system) occasional bags of mielie-meal, tobacco and perhaps some clothing. Clearly the degree to which such earnings can sponsor other economic activities is minimal. It is for this reason that I prefer to deal with herders and those who do piece-jobs as a separate category from formal wage earners.

Returning then to the 31% of households with wage earners, it was found that altogether 51 people were employed with only 8 (16%) working in Botswana - 1 teacher, 1 agricultural demonstrator, 5 clerical workers and 1 labourer; the remaining 43 were all migrants working on the South African mines. 21 households had only one person working, 7 had 2 and 4 had more.

It is difficult to obtain accurate information on the contribution of wage earners to the village economy although they clearly help support some households directly through transfers and others indirectly by spending money in the village especially on locally produced beer. Only one-half of those 32 households with wage earners reported receiving transfers in either cash or kind during the past year i.e. 15% of the total. This increased to only 19% over the past two years. This may, however, be the result of under-reporting on the subject.
Interviews with 53 ex-migrants reflect a far higher degree of transfers with most of them saying that they had either sent remittances while working or else they had returned with cash and/or gifts. Looking at herd histories, 36% were built up at least in part, through wages mainly from the South African mines.

The magnitude of transfers appear to depend on a number of factors including the relationship of the worker to the household and the economic status of the household with support being greatest in the middle range of households. An hypothesis which still needs testing in this village but is strongly supported in another similar village is that sons and daughters in extremely poor households are more likely to cut their ties completely during their period of employment or longer while those from more fortunate households retain their rural links. In Mosolotsane there were a number of elderly people despairing that their children who had gone to the towns to work had 'forgotten' them. One frail old woman dressed in tatters said that the last time she had heard from her son was six years ago when he had given her the clothes that she was wearing. Since then she had heard nothing from him even though 'he knows how to write'. (Mos7-12) Perhaps he had indeed died but what had happened to her other children and those in the other cases? Some had probably never managed to get regular employment while others probably earned too little to share.

The characteristics of those households with wage earners show that they represent a complete cross-section in terms of wealth with 9% (3 cases) being totally reliant on transfers; 50% (16 cases) being relatively poor with three owning no cattle at all and 13 having insufficient to plough with; 41% (13 cases) were relatively wealthy having their own draft power. Table II gives a break-down of households with wage earners in terms of number of people employed and correlates this with their access to cattle, water, draft power as well as their participation in arable agriculture.
# TABLE II: CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSEHOLDS WITH WAGE EARNERS

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. Wage Earners</th>
<th>CATTLE HOLDINGS</th>
<th>WATER FOR CATTLE</th>
<th>ARABLE</th>
<th>Harvest</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None Own Own Mafisa Village Own/ Well draft Power Own Mafisa Pooled Hired 0-2 3-5 6-10 more</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CATTLE HOLDINGS</td>
<td>WATER FOR CATTLE</td>
<td>ARABLE</td>
<td>Harvest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None Own Own Mafisa Village Own/ Well draft Power Own Mafisa Pooled Hired 0-2 3-5 6-10 more</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (21)</td>
<td>5 9 5 2 4 4 3 5 4 3 4 5 3 2 6 (16)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24% 43% 24% 10% 19% 19% 14% 24% 14% 34% 19% 14% 19% 31% 19% 13% 38%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 (7)</td>
<td>1 3 2 1 2 1 - 3 - 3 2 1 1 1 2 3 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14% 43% 29% 14% 29% 14% 43% 43% 29% 14% 14% 14% 29% 43% 14% 14% 29% 43%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More (4)</td>
<td>4 - - - 2 1 1 2 1 - 1 - - 1 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100% 50% 25% 25% 50% 25% 25% 25% 75%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total with workers (32)</td>
<td>17% 50% 22% 9% 19% 22% 13% 28% 9% 40% 19% 13% 19% 22% 19% 22% 37%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without workers (72)</td>
<td>13% 30% 20% 9% 15% 8% 15% 21% 22% 26% 20% 21% 24% 9% 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (54)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL (104)</td>
<td>19% 46% 27% 12% 21% 15% 19% 30% 5% 35% 32% 24% 8% 27% 29% 15% 10 (81)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* As there is missing data on harvest sizes the percentages presented here are calculated on the basis of the information available. The number in brackets and asterixed represents the total number of households with this information.

+ Number of cases
There would appear to be a correlation between those households with wage earners and returns in arable agriculture. 83% of households without workers obtained 5 bags of sorghum or less while 41% of those with wage earners got below average yields. The most marked difference seems to occur between those households with two or more wage earners compared with those who have only one person employed or none at all. 73% of households with more than one worker obtained above average harvests, while 50% of those with one worker achieved this and only 17% of those without workers managed this. The difference becomes more critical when one looks at what the villagers consider to be their minimum annual grain requirement viz. 12 bags of sorghum. This is of course a crude average since requirements in reality will fluctuate by household size and other types of nourishment consumed by them. Nevertheless, as a crude yardstick it was found that none of those without wage earners harvested this amount and one-third of those with workers managed this.

6. PARTICIPATION IN OTHER INCOME GENERATING ACTIVITIES

By this stage it should be apparent that poverty is more widespread in this village than the superficial impression suggested by statistics on participation in arable agriculture, livestock ownership or wage employment. In reality over half the village struggles to survive on very meagre resources. Small local industries and 'piece-jobs' supplement most incomes and for many - especially the poorest - they are their major source of livelihood.

Small Local Industries

Almost one-half of the village households engage in what Kerven has descriptively called 'penny-capitalist self-employment' (1982, vol 3, p.546) In Mosolotshane this includes a whole range of activities the most important of which are beer brewing (30%); collection and sale of firewood and water (18%); leatherwork (8%); carpentry, collection and sale of building timbers (8%); sale of agricultural produce on a regular basis (milk, eggs) (9%); dress-making, knitting, brick-making, building, grinding and selling snuff together with more lucrative businesses which
include hawking and Setswana Medicine. Some villagers are regarded as specialists in these activities while others engage in them intermittently depending on personal requirements and local demands.

46% of local households have members who engage in these activities on a regular basis. Again, they represent a complete cross section of the population in terms of wealth. This is not actually surprising. There is instead a marked difference in the intensity with which poorer and more wealthy households engage in these activities. For example, let us compare 18 households that collect and sell firewood. In 10 cases women go out with their children and collect firewood bringing back what they can carry on their heads. These women earn about 50 thebe a load or a small dish-full of sorghum. In 7 other households men go out using teams of oxen and sledges to transport the wood back to the village earning about P3 per load. In 6 of these cases they had borrowed their transport in exchange for a supply of free timbre and piece-jobs as well as a cash payment in one case. In the final case the household is very wealthy and owns a truck. During trips between the cattlepost and village the owner usually stops to collect firewood which he sells in the village earning about P6 per load.

These cases illustrate what goes on 'behind' the statistic. To simply classify households as collecting and selling firewood tells us nothing about the intensity with which this is done or the likely returns they may gain from such activities.

Beer brewing is probably the most popular method of raising cash in the village and almost all households will at some stage sell it. This is an exclusively female activity with adult women of any age doing this. In most cases the money earned belongs to the woman herself but in poorer and middle range households it is expected that these earnings should contribute to their subsistence.

Cooper has emphasized the structural link between migrant labour and cash brewing:
"It is important to understand that this pre-dominance of beer sales is directly related to the labour reserve structural position of Botswana this century. In point of fact 'female beer selling' is simply the reverse side of the 'male migrant labour' coin. The structural undevelopment of the 'Protectorate' resulted in men turning to migrant labour as their only cash earning outlet. Simultaneously, with other more productive rural industries and cash cropping closed to them due to the same underdevelopment, women turned to siphoning off some of the cash returning from these migrants – by the best means available in this context, beer brewing."
(Cooper, 1979, p.26)

Fieldwork in Mosolotshane supports this view with the peak period occurring at Christmas when there are the highest number of wage earners in the village. It also, however, showed a strong link with the cattle industry with local brewers feeling the pinch when cattle sales came to an abrupt halt due to the outbreak of foot and mouth disease.

Although almost all households engage in cash brewing, only 30% do this on a regular basis i.e. at least once a month. These women come from households of diverse wealth and resources excepting the poorest segment of the population who simply cannot afford to brew. Again there is a difference in the intensity of brewing and returns with poorer women earning much less than their wealthier counterparts. There are several reasons for this: firstly they sell mainly khadi - a fermented beer made of wild roots, berries, honey or sugar – which is less popular than the sorghum based bojalwa but requires less capital; secondly, they attract fewer customers because their lolwapa’s are generally less comfortable and lack the social ambiance of wealthier households; thirdly, they cannot afford to give their customers credit which the wealthier brewers are able to do; and fourthly, apart from not being able to afford to brew in large quantities in terms of cash requirements, they cannot risk not selling their beer or even producing a bad brew.

While those households that engage in these different income generating activities do not come from any particular class, the success with which they engage in these activities is

is closely related to the wealth of the households. In an earlier study of 'small producers' in three villages it was found that:

"The poorest members of the community lack capital and are generally unable to deal in credit. Living from hand to mouth, they are unable to delay payment for their produce. While they may possess the ability to organise, low social status makes it difficult for them to deal with village institutions such as the V.D.C. which control (or interfere with) a large number of productive activities." (Kjaer-Olsen, 1980, p.60)

'Piece-jobs'

For most poor people 'piece-jobs' constitute their most important source of food. There is very little straight forward charity in the village and most of the wealthier households who help poorer people with food do this primarily in exchange for the performance of domestic chores. During the arable season women and children do majako often travelling to more fertile neighbouring villages such as Kalamare and Shoshong in search of such work; men and women destump agricultural fields; whole families may be involved in constructing thorn-bush fences around arable lands; men may help with the watering of livestock either at the local wells or out at the boreholes in exchange for free water for their own animals or food; women usually stamp corn in exchange for the husk which is eaten; they collect the manure and mud for repairing or building houses and assist in this; fetch water, wash clothes, sweep the lolwapa's - in short, all the more laborious household chores are done as 'piece-jobs' in exchange for food or a few thebe.

7. CONCLUSION

The obvious question which stems from the discussion thus far is how do the poorest segment of the population survive under such adverse conditions? Many, of course, do not survive but die of diseases related to both malnutrition and insufficient calory intake. Dr. Sebina explained:

"Where populations are under-nourished, the incidence of tuberculosis, for instance, is significantly higher. Diarrhoeal diseases
result in larger number of deaths in undernourished children. Similarly we have observed that the mortality due to measles was about ten times higher in children with underlaying malnutrition.”
(Cited in Prah, 1980, p.28)

For those who manage to survive the struggle is hard. Among the destitute are the old and infirm for whom charity is their only source of livelihood. While those who have close ties with wealthy households may receive regular assistance, the image of an extended family always supporting such people does not hold true and there are many who frequently experience hunger. These people generally have no resources to fall back on. Sometimes they have been abandoned by their children and sometimes their off-spring are equally poor.

Those households that have labour as a resource generally survive off piece-jobs. Some manage to use this to gain access to critical agricultural resources held by others. Guldbrandsen (1980) has shown in his study of 'a family's development cycle' that access to labour is inextricably bound to the stage in the cycle that the family has reached. Thus, the mature extended family has maximum labour resources whilst the newly formed nuclear family would only have the labour of the adult couple and the old, disintegrating household consisting only of the aged would have no labour at all. In this study, however, the stage of a household in its development cycle is only significant for poor and 'middle' households since wealthy households are able to buy labour if they lack this resource. In addition these households do not disintegrate whereas poorer households cannot afford to hold their members together.

In the above discussion it has been seen that two-thirds of households lack some of the critical resources for agricultural production. Most of these households gain access to these by means of pooling their own resources with those of neighbours and kin. Thus 37% obtained cattle through the mafisa system, 23% pooled their resources in order to obtain draft power and 7% borrowed land from kin. In an analysis of the effect of reciprocity and sharing on agriculture it was concluded that:
"The characteristics of reciprocal relationships are in many respects decided by the social and economic distance between the parties involved. Although rights and obligations are usually socially defined according to custom, the exact benefits resulting from the relationship is decided by the individuals involved, especially the stronger party... In cases such as majako and mafisa where the weaker party seems to be highly disadvantaged, the meagre benefits obtained through the relationship offer an alternative to what is perceived to be a worse situation. Working on arable lands or cattleposts in return for food may be more attractive than begging or trying to find wild foods under adverse conditions."
(Kjaer-Olsen, 1981, p.37 emphasis added.)

This paper has tried to show that most households in order to survive must exploit a number of economic resources and it is their to do this which largely determines the quality of life experienced by the household members.
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'The effects of Migration on Agricultural
Production'
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Author</th>
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<td>Kerven, C.</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>'The effects of Migration on Agricultural Production'</td>
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<td>Syson, L</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>'Some Agricultural Data from the Shoshong Area, 1969-71 UNDP Project BOT/71/014, Technical Note No. 3</td>
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These papers constitute the preliminary findings of the Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty and Development in Southern Africa, and were prepared for presentation at a Conference at the University of Cape Town from 13-19 April, 1984.

The Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty and Development in Southern Africa was launched in April 1982, and is scheduled to run until June 1985.

Quoting (in context) from these preliminary papers with due acknowledgement is of course allowed, but for permission to reprint any material, or for further information about the Inquiry, please write to:

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