CONTRACT LABOUR FROM RHODESIA TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOLD MINES:
A Study in the international division of a labour reserve
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Saldru Working Paper No. 6

Cape Town

October, 1976
ERRATA

We apologise for the number of misprints in this paper. The more important errors are indicated with an asterisk (*).

Page 1, line 23: read 'diminution' for 'dimunition'
Page 1, line 28: delete 'which'
Page 2, line 6: read 'systems' for 'stystems'
Page 5, line 30: read 'already' for 'alreday'
Page 12, line 6: read 'Acts' for 'Act'
Page 13, line 29: read 'manoeuvres' for 'manoeuvres'
Page 13, line 33: read 'guerrilla' for 'guerrila'
Page 13, line 39: read 'foreseeable' for 'forsseeable'

*Page 15, line 21: read 'annually' for 'monthly'
Page 15, line 27: read 'period' for 'perid'

*Page 15, lines 31 & 32: should read 'since 1973 by 22,1 percent to R87,20 monthly in 1974'
Page 15, line 33: read 'acquisition' for 'aquisition'
Page 16, lines 5 & 6: read 'unemployed' for 'unemployment'

*Page 16, line 14: read 'by' for 'but'
Page 19, line 7: insert 'in' after 'terms'
Page 27, line 38: read 'consciousness' for 'conciousness'
Page 30, line 26: insert 'of' after 'conscious'

*Page 41, line 19: read 'lobola' for 'lobala'
Page 45, line 30: read 'calculated' for 'caluclated'
Page 46, line 25: delete 'a' where it appears for the second time and read 'migrants' for 'migrant'
Page 51, line 24: read 'an' for 'on'
Page 57, line 27: read 'result' for 'resultant'
Page 59, line 36: read 'exist' for 'exists'

Page 69, footnote 28: read 'Diplomacy' for 'Deplomacy'

*Page 70, footnote 38: insert 'Triangle' after 'estates of'
# Contract Labour from Rhodesia to the South African Gold Mines: A Study in the International Division of a Labour Reserve

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This paper examines the origins and economic impact of recruitment of contract labour for the South African gold mines from Rhodesia. It makes special reference to the changing labour situation and political economy of Southern Africa. It also attempts to analyse these changes in the context of a theory of the international division of labour reserves.

Recruitment in Rhodesia has been conducted through the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (Wenela) the labour supplying bureau of the Chamber of Mines (S.A.) concerned with recruitment from 'Tropical Areas' and from Mocambique South of Latitude 22° S. Recruitment began in December, 1974, following the various heightened labour supply crises on the mines in South Africa in the post-1973 period.

Formal contract recruitment from Rhodesia since then has differed from such relationships which have existed with South Africa in the case of other peripheral supplier states and areas within the Republic. The principal differentiating features are twofold: (1) Rhodesia has typically been a 'labour importer' of both 'free flow' and contract workers - although a 'clandestine labour' exodus has existed in respect of both Rhodesian Africans and other foreign workers in Rhodesia gravitating to the higher wage zones of the Republic; (2) the Rhodesian state, like its South African counterpart, has created distinctive areas of the country (the Tribal Trusts Lands) for the purposes of providing labour reserves. Wenela's implantation into this economic system represents an international division of those labour reserves and a diminution in their previous exclusive role of supplying labour to local employers.

The installation of a contract labour system for South African mines in this context has thus required agreement in principle and practice over the international division of the labour reserves of Rhodesia. This process which has led to some unique conflicts of interest and has within it some important long-term structural implications for the character of development of the Rhodesia economy.

1. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: FROM THE PROCESS OF INFORMAL 'CLANDESTINE LABOUR' EXODUS TO THE INSTALLATION OF A FORMAL CONTRACT LABOUR SYSTEM FOR SOUTH AFRICAN MINES.

Rhodesia has constituted a 'peripheral centre' in the sub-continental economic system in Southern Africa. The implantation and development of a colonial economic system both created the need for, and depended upon ......
upon, a sustained supply of cheap labour for the factories, plantations, mines and kitchens of various classes of employers. Two sources of labour-power were tapped in order to obtain this commodity: domestic reserves and foreign colonial states, as far afield as Angola and Tanganyika. For a long time, the gradual underdevelopment of the originally viable rural economic systems, required a heavy reliance on these foreign colonial states. In this respect, Southern Rhodesian employers faced stiff competition in labour recruitment from their counterparts in South Africa, particularly in the form of W.N.L.A. but also as a consequence of the 'free flow' 'clandestine labour' flows from and through Rhodesia to relatively high wage jobs on the Rand.1/

As in other areas of 'dupsonistic' and restricted competition, strong tendencies towards collusion operated to force a 'solution' which was, initially considered, at least nominally, mutually advantageous to the colluding parties. Equally, collusive agreements are not binding contracts. Thus, from the earliest times, the Rhodesian Native labour Bureau (1901-1933; defunct 1933-1946; later to become the Rhodesian Native (African) Labour Supply Commission, (R.N.L.S.C.)1946) entered various collusive arrangements with W.N.L.A. in a quest to divide up the sub-continent's labour reserves.

In 1901 an Agreement was arrived at whereby W.N.L.A. accepted that (a) it would not recruit labour in Southern Rhodesia, Ngamiland or Zambesia and (b) it would provide Southern Rhodesia with 17.5 percent of contractees from those areas of Portuguese East Africa for which it had been accorded 'exclusive rights'.2/ In practice this Agreement provided little direct benefit for Southern Rhodesian employers. No workers were directed from W.N.L.A. controlled areas of P.E.A. Further, W.N.L.A. also continued its recruitment in the Gwanda district of South-West Rhodesia (circa 1903), contrary to the Agreement - a fact which annoyed the British South Africa Company, then in control of the relatively 'labour-starved' company state of Southern Rhodesia. The southward passage of W.N.L.A. 'labour gangs' were also reported to have been instrumental in 'inciting trouble' and 'labour unrest' amongst local labourers, the principal forces of discontent being the Rand/Rhodesian cash wage differential for contractees. Despite legislative and police attempts to halt the southern drift of both local and foreign workers which this knowledge occasioned, there were 1700 Rhodesian 'boys' working 12 month contracts on Rand mines alone in 1910. These pressures were ......
were not abated by the various politico-economic crises which forced down real wages in Rhodesia in the 1906-39 period: e.g. the agricultural product price slump in 1923-4 and the agrarian labour supply crisis in 1924-28, the Great Depression of 1929-33, the effect of the Maize Control Act (1931) on peasant production and a continuous process of involution in the peasant economy throughout the period. 3/

By 1933 the R.N.L.B. ceased to function. The inflow of 'free flow' workers was sufficient to meet most employer demands at levels below pre-Depression wages. In 1934, however, W.N.L.A. negotiated for the establishment of a depot in Salisbury for the purpose of co-ordinating recruitment in its non-Southern Rhodesian 'tropical' catchment areas. Another Agreement in 1939 gave W.N.L.A. facilities for establishing roads, stations and rest camps in exchange for an undertaking that it would not attest contractees from Southern Rhodesia. 4/ The General Manager of W.N.L.A.'s Tropical Division (W. Gemmill) moved to Salisbury in 1940. Stations were set up at Msasa (Salisbury), Bulawayo, Umtali, Wankie and Inyazura. The Rhodesian railway network was extensively used to transport recruitees in and out of South Africa and 'feeding points' were also established en route. To some extent these facilities competed with a similar network established by Ulere (a Cewa term for 'free'), the free migrant labour transport service operated by the Southern Rhodesian government from 1938-58 in the two Rhodesias and in Nyasaland. 5/ But because the latter network operated in a distinctive and segmented catchment area, direct competition with W.N.L.A. was minimised.

Despite having to acquiesce to a 'labour market-sharing agreement' - primarily founded upon the political power of Southern Rhodesian employers in excluding W.N.L.A. from 'their domain' - W.N.L.A. was able to boost substantially its recruitment of 'Tropicals' (those workers recruited North of Latitude 22°S.), from 3 000 (1.1 percent of the Chamber of Mines black labour force) in 1936 to 32 000 (10.6 percent) in 1946. 6/ At this stage (circa 1936-) W.N.L.A.'s preoccupation in the Tropics was with recruitment in Barotseland and Nyasaland, a recruitment permit having been obtained for the latter which by 1939 allowed an annual take-off of 10 000 contractees. 7/ In this area Southern Rhodesian and W.N.L.A. interests clashed strongly and were 'resolved' through open competition. The Southern Province of Nyasaland was a prime source of 'free flow' labour to Rhodesia. In a challenge to W.N.L.A. / intrusion ........
intrusion, the Rhodesian Chamber of Mines sought and obtained a permit for 5 000 workers as a 'counterblast' to the Union's initiative. This, now open, international conflict over the Nyasaland labour reserves placed Southern Rhodesian employers in a dilemma. They preferred a 'free flow' (so-called 'voluntary') system - because under it a greater probability existed of more workers being unable to afford the prohibitive costs of protracted and/or regular migration south of the Limpopo. It was also openly admitted in 1939 that 'On an equal footing the recruiters for the Rand mines, with their huge resources, will beat us easily ... they are surely not a type of opponent to compete with on a buying basis.'

The interposition of the war put into abeyance the prospect of Southern Rhodesian mine and farm employers taking serious initiatives in regard to W.N.L.A. competition, which continued to grow in the North. In any event, the Compulsory Native Labour Act (1943-46) in Southern Rhodesia secured tens of thousands of local Africans for short-term employment, especially in low-wage primary industries.

By the end of the war, however, Southern Rhodesia was facing a 'labour drain' to South Africa on two fronts in its 'traditional' labour 'catchment' area. The outflow via W.N.L.A. from Nyasaland increased and the 'clandestine labour' exodus gathered momentum from Southern Rhodesia itself.

In 1944 the Chief Native Commissioner's Annual Report recorded that there were 14 000 'clandestine migrants' inside the Union in addition to which it was believed there were 9 000 similar workers from Nyasaland and 5 000 from Portuguese East Africa and Northern Rhodesia (though these latter groups need not all have come via Southern Rhodesia). In terms of annual increases in Southern Rhodesian demand for labour, this amounted to a substantial drain of labour-power. In 1945 it was estimated that the total 'clandestine' non-indigenous migration from Southern Rhodesia to the Union was 20 000 workers. In addition, there was the 'clandestine' indigenous flow to be considered as well as the net outflow of authorised migration of local and foreign workers to the South (a minimum of 3 508 in 1945 alone). The fact that significant numbers of women accompanied men in this exodus can be taken to imply that either long-term or permanent migration was anticipated in the case of a considerable number of authorised indigenous migrants. This judgement would tend to be confirmed by the fact that the government bus, based in the Gwanda District for the purpose of bringing '/clandestine' ......
'clandestine' migrants' back into Southern Rhodesia, carried 1,019 persons in 1941 but only 532 persons in 1945. Whilst it was thought at the time to be uneconomic to maintain this service, it was in fact continued because of a fear that its withdrawal would lead to further 'clandestine migration'. The southern 'labour drain' worried officials and employers who feared that local economic structures would be jeopardised both during the period of migration and in the long term. 'Labour shortages' (at 'going wages') were experienced on farms and mines especially. It was also noted that South African officials were not being wholly co-operative in presiding over 'illegal' in-migration. Official laxity was considered in Salisbury to indicate South African sanction of the de facto benefits which higher inflows of cheap foreign labour brought to employers and the state. After attempts to police the thousands of square miles of border proved to be both expensive and abortive, the Southern Rhodesian government once more sought to get a 'working agreement' with Pretoria. The urgency felt in Salisbury, even in mid-1946, however, was met with by procrastination in Pretoria. By the end of 1947 no Agreement was forthcoming. In the interim it was decided, under pressure from employers, that Southern Rhodesia would re-establish its formal contract labour system (the Rhodesian Native Labour Supply Commission) which would operate externally in direct competition with W.N.L.A., particularly in Nyasaland. An element of inter-state competition for foreign contract labour supplies thus became mediated through formal bureaux. This point marked the end of the period of mutual agreement over the division of international labour reserves situated within the Southern African economic complex. A flurry of inter-governmental negotiations took place in the 1946-48 period, the purpose being the securing of supplier agreements with the political powers controlling 'labour exports' from northern colonial territories. The W.N.L.A. Agreement with the Nyasaland government, secured in September, 1946, had already begun to affect adversely Rhodesian labour supplies. Private Southern Rhodesian recruiters had been displaced by the W.N.L.A. initiative in that territory. The R.N.L.S.C.'s permit was only secured in late 1947, to take full effect in the following year. In respect of negotiations over stopping 'clandestine labour' no success was reported. And, in respect of W.N.L.A.'s expanding operations, the best that was arranged was an agreement that the latter would direct to the R.N.L.S.C. ....
R.N.L.S.C. any workers who, upon presenting themselves at the Associations' depots, 'desired to work in Southern Rhodesia'. In addition, the W.N.L.A. Agreement with Agricultural Native Labour Limited (originally entered into with the Rhodesian National Farmers' Union in 1943), whereby W.N.L.A. would send to Southern Rhodesia farms those workers recruited for the mines but who were regarded as 'unfit', remained undisturbed. This agreement continued to function until 1965 when the A.N.L.L. folded up and ceased operations.

In Nyasaland 'duopsonistic competition' between the two bureaux worked largely in favour of W.N.L.A., the higher wages stipulated on the latter's contracts being the all important determinant of the distribution of labour supplies between them. Only Nyasaland government limitations on permissible W.N.L.A. recruitment levels enabled the R.N.L.S.C. to secure a growing level of supplies as its permit maximum was periodically re-negotiated upwards. In northern Bechuanaland a similar pattern of W.N.L.A. superiority prevailed, the supply of R.N.L.S.C. recruitees from this country being very small. South of latitude 22° S. the N.R.C. operated for the Chamber of Mines.

Even after the establishment of the Federation in 1953, whereby Nyasaland became more firmly under the political power of Southern Rhodesian employers, W.N.L.A. continued to dominate the Nyasaland foreign contract labour market. However, Southern Rhodesia continued to place most of its reliance on the 'free-flow' system though the R.N.L.S.C. did build up annual recruitment to a relatively high level. The peak was reached in 1956 with a total recruitment of 16,234 workers. After 1958, with the onset of economic recession in the Federation, the growth of a substantial labour surplus in Southern Rhodesia and the adoption of a new foreign labour policy by the Southern Rhodesian government, the R.N.L.S.C. contract system faced steadily increasing supply constraints. Its annual throughput began systematically to be run down. This occurred as W.N.L.A. hegemony in Nyasaland became more easily asserted and as farm wages fell seriously in real terms in Rhodesia after 1963. By 1960 the Chamber of Mines (S.A.) had recruited 83,000 'Tropicals' (20.9 per cent of all their African mine-workers in South Africa). By 1973, as may be seen in the table below, the figure for Malawian workers alone had reached 106,638 or 27.7 per cent of the total complement.

/Table 1 ......
### TABLE 1

**COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF AFRICAN MINEWORKERS ON GOLD MINES IN S.A.**

Sources: Mining Survey No. 78/3, 1975
Financial Mail, 8th October, 1976

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<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>84 752</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>78 082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>20 676</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21 780</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>5 602</td>
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<td>85 380</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2 948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
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<td>362 642</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>384 402</td>
<td>100</td>
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The post-Federal period of Malawian independence created additional political difficulties for the R.N.L.S.C. Higher wages on W.N.L.A. contracts meant higher remittances of scarce foreign exchange with which to finance imports and industrialisation in Malawi. It also implied a higher potential Malawian tax capacity. This attracted the bureaucratic strata inside Malawi. Thus the Malawian government itself tended to favour South Africa over Rhodesia. Further, after 1961 all R.N.L.S.C. contractees went to farms, where the minimum wage stipulated on contracts tended to become equated with the actual wage - which fell in real terms from 1963-72.

Rhodesia's illegal international status after November, 1965 and the offer to Malawi of credit, technical assistance and aid from the Republic of South Africa, helped cement Malawi's 'preference' for South African employers. By this stage the struggle for control over the Malawian labour reserve had been effectively won by W.N.L.A.

Up to 1973 this 'balance' pertained. But then a combination of unique processes coincided and various events transpired which, in a relatively short period, threatened to transform relationships between centre and periphery in the Southern African labour-supplying complex. At the same time, the processes of rural under-development, urban-located unemployment growth and further politico-economic subordination of Rhodesia to South Africa, operated to make the former a potential supplier State, ministering to the contract labour needs of South African mine employers. Some of the details of these two broad transformations in Southern African political economy, which have marked the further peripheralisation of Rhodesia, are noted in the following sections.

Thus, in the space of three decades in the postwar period, Rhodesia has foregone its effective role as a 'labour importer' and has been re-cast in the market as an exporter of contract labour. In one sense this new role formalises the older status of a 'clandestine labour' exporter and conduit for 'Tropical' labourers seeking to enter South Africa. But it also implies a greater institutionalisation of a complex set of dependency relationships in which Rhodesia's prospects for 'self-centred' development have become further subordinated to external decisions.
11. THE CONTEXT OF THE LABOUR SUPPLY CRISIS ON SOUTH AFRICAN GOLD MINES

A full analysis of the changing context of the political economy of labour supply to the South African gold mines will not be attempted here. Only the salient points need be raised.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GOLD MINES IN THE ECONOMY

Firstly, it will be useful to re-iterate some basic points concerning the significance of gold mining in South Africa, not only in respect of employment, incomes and production but also foreign exchange and profits. The significance of the gold mines, which were considered until 1970 to be an asset of declining importance, has been transformed (at least in the short-term) by the international agreement to value gold at 'market prices'. The 1970 value of net gold output in South Africa (of R837 million) rose to R1 770 million in 1973. Gold mining's share of G.D.P. rose from 5.7 percent to 8.7 percent in these three years while State revenues from tax and lease liabilities increased nearly fourfold in current prices in this period. Subsequently however, the gold price has fallen. In employing more than one third of a million African workers from local and foreign sources, the industry has a profound international impact on regional incomes, employment and foreign exchange resources as well as the international pattern of accumulation. In South Africa itself, the industry has not only remained but has enhanced its position as a key net earner of the foreign exchange necessary to finance 'autonomous industrialisation' in the Republic. Whilst marked price increases took place in the 1971-4 period, gold mine profits are reported to have risen from R100 million to R410 million. Even using inflation accounting adjustment techniques, this represents a remarkable increase in the real value of funds available for distribution, accumulation and reinvestment in gold mining and/or other forms of production. The mining labour system has also remained a key institution and determinant in the economy, even though the output of the industry continues to fulfill an essentially unproductive function.

These facts highlight the broad set of interests that employers, the state and key employee groups inside and outside of the mining industry have had in ensuring the on-going viability and long-term expansion of this branch of extractive industry. This 'harvest of gold' has depended on a sustained international 'harvest of cheap labour' from a number of peripheral supplier states. They have also changed internally. . . . . .
nally in socioeconomic terms and politically in relation to South Africa and the international context. This has merely underlined the necessary South African pre-occupation with stability, relations of dependence and the on-going acceptability of a sub-continental foreign contract labour system. It is not surprising then, that events and socioeconomic processes in train in Southern Africa in the 1970's constituted a major crisis which was then regarded as profound in its potential impact.

ROOTS OF THE CRISIS

The crisis appears to have one of its immediate roots in the locally uncompetitive wages of black miners vis-à-vis black wages elsewhere in the South African urban-industrial complex. By 1972 the South African complement of black mine-workers employed by the Chamber of Mines had fallen to 54.7 percent of the historical peak of 157,300 in 1962. Special zoning protections afforded to farm owners divorced their wage rates from those pertaining in other sectors. In the late 1960's mineowners faced what Francis Wilson has called an 'historic decision'; either compete locally with urban-industrial employers in order to attract more black South African workers or substantially increase dependence on foreign labour supplies. The decision to stress the former course, re-inforced by the 'untying' of the gold price, was rapidly overtaken by events which called forth a different set of complex and inter-related decisions concerning not only the political economy of gold mining, but that of the South African labour system itself and in effect the status quo in the sub-continent.

The rise in the gold price from $45.35 per oz when it was fixed to the US dollar, to $65 in October 1972, and to a peak of about $180 in April 1974, after which it fell to level at around $140 in the rest of that year, transformed the possibilities of wage increases for African mineworkers. Whilst higher wages could undoubtedly have been paid even if the price increases had not occurred, now increases would cost even less in terms of the mass of diminished profits.

It was mid-1972 before the Anglo American Corporation began to implement minimum .......
minimum wage increases, from 50 cents to 60 cents per shift. Whilst the Chamber of Mines followed suit in upwardly adjusting rates, it did so from the lower levels of 42 cents to the old AAC level.\(^{20}\) Even so, the actual industry cash wage at this time was 76 cents per shift, some of the excess above the minimum accounted for by the higher AAC actual average of 92 cents per shift. Thus, for many miners at this time minimum wage increases represented a theoretical adjustment, at best a greater legal protection and not an economic gain. Nonetheless, further increases followed swiftly, partly influenced by the impact of the 1973 Durban strikes and foreign criticism, (e.g. the British House of Commons Committee Report on wages of British Companies in South Africa), and by 1975 the average annual cash wage for black gold miners had risen by 119 percent (in current prices) to R948.\(^{21}\) By June, 1975 the industry minimum shift rate exceeded the 1972 level by 500 percent. In June 1976 a R2,50 minimum shift rate prevailed. Noticeable changes had also occurred in non-wage labour costs. These higher rates had started to have an impact on local labour supplies, the August, 1975 recruitment level of South Africans being 42 percent higher than that recorded for June, 1974. Accompanied by a rapid absolute fall off in contracted foreign workers (See Table 1.), local labour content thus rose from 22 percent in 1972 to 32 percent in June 1975. By mid 1976 170,000 black South Africans were employed on the gold mines, 43 percent of the total.

It would appear unwise to consider these real wage increases as having been simply occasioned by higher gold prices. It would also be naive to believe that managerial initiatives were taken without acute appreciation of the changing and/or prospective structural context of foreign and local labour supply. In particular, rapidly changing conditions of labour and social stability and a gradually growing labour shortage, which created a sudden void in the 1973-75 period, combined to make quickly redundant any 'wage excess' (i.e. payments above that necessary to attract the requisite labour supply) embodied in the higher wage policy introduced by the Chamber of Mines and its members during this brief period of 'wage reform'.\(^{22}\)

The post-September, 1973 compound confrontations, which within 2\(\frac{1}{2}\) years led to over 170 deaths, 'de-stabilised' the 'normally' ordered compound system.\(^{23}\) Even foreign (e.g. Lesotho) government appeals for calm did /not...........
not help. These conflicts affected producer interests in two important ways: firstly, production levels dropped and costs rose as confrontations spread; and, secondly, a 'bleeding' of labour supply took place as repatriations rose, strikers were dismissed and disciplinary action and 're-allocations' were necessitated. 'Walk offs' had also been facilitated by repeal of the Masters and Servant Act in 1974. The industry was relatively unprepared for these sudden and large-scale conflicts which were made all the more serious by the high gold price. Among a host of other factors, the conflagrations were strongly related to low wages and the high degree of social control necessitated under compound conditions. The 1972-75 'wage reform', although begun before compound violence escalated, would thus probably have in any event been necessary in some measure in order to re-stabilise the situation.

The Botswana air crash in April, 1974, which quickly led to a ban being imposed on Wenela recruitment by President Banda, had a similar and sudden 'labour shortage' creating impact, notably on mines heavily dependent on Malawian labourers. By August, 1975, the Malawian complement was down to 10 percent of its usual (1973) level, many miners in situ having opted to return home prior to completion of contract. In September, 1974 the Malawi Congress Party confirmed the ban and, despite meetings between the Chamber of Mines (South Africa) and President Banda later in the same month, as well as other subsequent initiatives including the granting of a R19 million loan to Malawi in 1974, the M.C.P. made the ban 'permanent' a year later. Again, had these events occurred in the context of constant real wages, it is more than likely that significant wage adjustment would have been necessitated in order to obtain required labour supplies. Thus by December, 1974, it was reported that the gold mines were operating 26 percent below the level of the normal complement of black mineworkers. Thereafter the inflow slowly picked up as recruitment from South Africa improved and as the supply of labour from Rhodesia, negotiated at precisely this, the most, serious juncture, began to flow through Wenela bureaux.

Another major factor at this time was the 'sudden' decolonisation of Mocambique, foreseeable at least in terms of its probable inevitability if not precise timing, from around 1972 onwards. The event of metropolitan capitulation in April, 1974, the predictable installation of a
radical political party in the form of Frelimo in control of the new state, which was in principle and formal constitution opposed to the underpinning of South African mining capital by means of a sustained Mocambiquan dependence on migrant labour, re-defined the parameters and possibilities in medium-term and long-term strategic planning for the Chamber of Mines (South Africa).\textsuperscript{25/}

Uncertainty over Frelimo's precise and immediate strategy, its short-term dependence on receipt of the foreign exchange earnings from the free market price of the sale of gold given to it in lieu of migrants' remittances under the 1928 Convention and talk of 're-negotiation' of the 1964 Agreement, together with a growing relative importance of the 'Mocambique connection' in terms of numbers of labourers supplied (up from 22 percent to 28 percent from June, 1974 to August, 1975) and also probably, labour-time supplied per contract, combined to make decisions on this front crucial to the overall labour supply equation.\textsuperscript{26/}

It is most likely that whilst short-term considerations have not been markedly altered by Frelimo's 'pragmatism', given the prevailing 'shortage', longer-term dependence on Mocambique has become a strong negative consideration in the planning considerations of the Chamber, particularly in the apparently remarkable ability of Malawi to sustain its total disengagement from the South African labour market from the period of the ban taking effect to date.\textsuperscript{27/}

The payment of greater value per unit of labour, in terms of gold, compared to other suppliers (a point raised in political quarters in South Africa), may also influence long-term decisions.

Finally, the crisis in international mine labour supplies has been precipitated further by the political and economic undercurrents which have occasioned the inauguration of the South African government's policy of détente. No full contemporary account of the overt and covert diplomatic, political and economic manoeuvres embodied in détente yet exists.\textsuperscript{28/}

Essentially, however, one objective of this policy is intra-regional 'normalisation' together with further economic integration of the states and labour supply systems of the region. The fluctuating fortunes of détente - compounded by the on-going Angolan conflict, escalating guerrilla war and socioeconomic difficulties in Rhodesia, economic decline in Zambia and the isolation of Malawi from its 'dialogue' partner - thus appear likely to have a direct bearing on Wenela's access to the international labour reserves of the sub-continent. As much as this was explicitly recognised by one key figure, Mr. Harry Oppenheimer, who, noting in 1974 that there was 'no realistic prospect of phasing the (migratory labour) system out in the foreseeable future', has also said that the industry's future is intimately linked with détente policy.\textsuperscript{29/}

/REACIONS ......
REACTIONS, TACTICS AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS

As a consequence of the broad base upon which the roots of the crisis have depended, a wide range of short and long term responses have been occasioned at the industry, national and international levels. These have a bearing on the integration of Rhodesia into the contract labour supply system.

Firstly, intra-industry re-organisation helped diminish the impact of higher wages with 'labour shortages'. The shortfall was partly offset by 'labour shedding', viz the nominal shortage did not accurately reflect real shortage because some mines had tended to 'hoard' or carry 'excess' labour supplies. It would, however, be unwise to over-emphasise this factor as Mr. A.W.S. Schumann, President of the Chamber of Mines, may have done when he called the labour shortage 'a blessing in disguise'. But it would appear that a higher degree of managerial efficiency has been forced on the industry. Thus the President of the Chamber (A.W.S. Schumann) has reported that the 11 percent fall in gold output in 1974 was 'almost entirely due to a reduction in grade'. However, some of the re-organisation merely involved a change in priorities and the re-allocation of labour from tasks directed at expansion in productive capacity to direct primary production and extraction.

Tendencies towards mechanisation have been strengthened, especially in those mines and groups which have been amenable to the deployment of lower man/machine ratios. A long-term and well financed industry research programme, stimulated by the crisis, has been directed at this end. The Chamber's President has thus argued that a 'reduction in labour dependency will be in the best interests of the gold mining industry'. It is likely that the successful implementation of greater mechanisation will not only reduce overall labour demand (at any given level of production), notably for foreign and unskilled workers, but will also lead to a changing class composition amongst the black and white labour force, the former possibly experiencing greater stratification as a semi-skilled class develops in size and the latter probably becoming increasingly dependent on bureaucratic/supervisory functions more removed from the production process itself. It is thus intended that the black labour structure become more pyramidal, with those at the top relatively 'stabilised' most probably with their families living on or near the mines. As happened in the postwar Rhodesian mining industry, these changes could potentially lead to 'inter-racial' coalitions of interest in the field of unionism as well as protracted disputes over pay, status and job demarcation.
demarcation between skilled employees and management, state arbitration being relied upon by the former to mediate these conflicts in a direction which ensured their privileged socioeconomic position in the industry.  

The establishment of a Human Resources Group (financed with half a million Rand for 1975) to research into social and economic conditions on mines appears to have a number of functions: to provide informed insight into both specific and industry problems, using the methods of 'social science' to examine and articulate long-term managerial interests; to monitor levels of discontent and provide post-conflict evaluations to be used to 'manage unrest'; to assist in the formulation of strategic problems relating to manpower utilisation, labour policy and productivity in general; and to promote profitable means of mediating management/labour antagonisms.

The promotion of training schemes, combined with the application of political pressures and lobbying to induce a greater state acceptance of 'job fragmentation' schemes, is also likely to become more prominent in overall labour policy, even if the short-term price is the payment of higher wages to white miners. On the other hand, the concession of a five day week initially scheduled for introduction in mid-1975, under pressure from the various white unions, has paradoxically provided further short-term protection to skilled artisans which may well boost average white earnings above the 1975 average level of R7 929 monthly but potentially at the cost (to them) of greater efforts being made by mine owners to maximise the rate of change towards exclusive managerial control over the technological and social characteristics of the production mix. To date, however, the 68 percent rise in white average earnings to R6 409 per annum in the 1969-74 period belies the view that black wage growth in this period has 'cost' white workers.

Secondly, at the national level, important initiatives have already been taken, apart from aligning the minimum mine earnings level more closely to competitive rates in the urban-industrial complex. Rates in the latter, especially manufacturing, have also risen since 1970 by 22.8 percent to R87.20 monthly in

The acquisition by mineowners in 1974 of a relaxation of the state requirement that workers finishing their time-defined contracts be directly 'repatriated' ..........  

* But not yet introduced by July 1976.
'repatriated' to their 'homelands' - a provision which severely restrained urban recruitment - has now opened the doors to the establishment of 6, 9 and 12 month contracts with local workers in the environs of the mines. This has resulted in a greater through-put via Mine Labour Organisation (NRC) Ltd., the domestic counterpart of Wenela. Unemployment and low-wage urban employees can now be more effectively exploited. Further, the additional flexibility for mineowners induced into the contract mix has enabled the more effective pursuit of a wage policy of polyvalency (the minimising of the wage bill by means of control over the contract-mix) on both domestic and international fronts. This policy enables the reducing of both the wage bill, by allowing a better synchronisation of labour supply and demand in a market situation where end-product prices now fluctuate daily, and overall labour costs, but reducing to some extent the fixed non-wage costs of obtaining labour supplies (as a consequence of lesser reliance on Transkeian and/or far-flung foreign sources). Some mines, notably those in the Anglo American group, already employ a high proportion of South African blacks. The mine recruitment publicity campaign articulated through the media (notably Radio Bantu) has also assisted local recruitment and may even promote the 'illegal' breaking of contracts and/or laws of enforced domicile amongst some low-wage rural workers on white farms. By early 1975 the Chamber of Mines had already reached an agreement with the South African Agricultural Union, whereby the Chamber obtained selective rights of recruitment in previously reserved areas of labour supply formerly monopolised by the members of the S.A.A.U. In these areas monthly cash wages have been around R11.50 while family incomes have been about R4.00 monthly. This synchronisation of primary producer interests, only apparently competitive in nature, is likely to be ensured by the regional containment of mine recruitment, excluding it from the bulk of the 3.7 million black on-farm population with its (approximately) 800,000 full-time workers. The S.A.A.U. can afford the agreement to be effective within limits. Indeed, it is to their advantage provided it does not seriously affect farm wage structures, because of the existence of 'labour slack' on the farms, the greater efficiency that 'mild competition' may promote in some areas, the real possibilities of substitution of juvenile and female labour for male workers 'inadvertently' siphoned off to the mines, and the prospect that the further mechanisation of farm production will 'displace' a number of rural workers. There are, however, likely to be strong pressures within the S.A.A.U. seeking to have the agreement

/set .........
set aside. Most likely these will be located amongst small and marginal producers, though large producers in the Natal sugar industry have already reason to want to resist placating the Chamber of Mines as a consequence of having to pay higher basic rates to contractees in the 1971-75 period.38/

Thirdly, at the present juncture, the most important initiatives of mine owners pertain to the international relations of mining capital and supplier states. Now embracing seven separate states, and potentially another one, the viability of the labour system can be seen to depend on a host of different agreements, contract forms, conditions in disparate reserve economies and state labour and political policies.39/ Considerations bearing on foreign labour supplies have thus remained at the core of present mine labour strategy, even though declared policy of the Chamber is to increase its South African labour content. Here it would appear possible that a policy of polyvalency on an international level might be sought, viz the number of supplier states might be maximised with foreign labour needs (possibly diminishing over time) being distributed across them in the form of an implicit quota, regard being given inter alia to the degree of security of the agreement, total costs of recruitment and 'wage-offer' prices in the local segmented markets.

It is in this broad context that the installation of a contract labour agreement in Rhodesia should be understood, as well as apparent Chamber of Mines (SA) reluctance to 'over-rely' on Mocambique and, should Malawi 're-enter' the market, reluctance wholly to reconstruct the same links which previously had been regarded as 'traditional'. At the present time, with Malawian labour supplies held in abeyance and Angolan recruitees likely to phase out quickly, it made sense for Wenela to take up the opportunity offered to recruit in Rhodesia. It is almost certain, too, that it would like to do so in the Western Province of Zambia, if President Kaunda, following the advice of some of his U.N.I.P. Members of Parliament, entered a formal inter-state contract with the Republic. Foreign exchange shortages, unemployment and agitation in Western Province are the pressures which have caused some Zambian politicians to want to change the Zambian government's policy. At this time, there seems little likelihood of Botswana or Lesotho and Swaziland with-drawing from the labour-supplying system, or the Lesotho-based 'Mine Workers Union' (slogan: 'let us pray and work) being made effective. Nor does even inter-state collusion between suppliers operating to re-structure wages and conditions of labour ........
labour seem likely to be successful at this stage.

The outcome of the Chamber of Mines' ability to retain the Mozambique supply, coax Malawi back, placate other more dependent minor suppliers, build up the Rhodesian link, and possibly draw in Zambia, could have important effects on long-term mine wage rates. Should conditions of over-supply soon pertain, a not unlikely possibility, then a process of wage stagnation, signs of which have already become apparent, or even real wage cuts, secured through the 'invisible hand' of inflation, could well ensue. This would appear to be more likely now that AAC/JCI have rejoined the wage-setting collusion and as a consequence of powerful resistance from Goldfields to a high wage policy on the Gold Producer's Committee. It is against this background that the conditions inside Rhodesia which led to the re-establishment of a contract labour system for South African mines, should be evaluated.

III. CONDITIONS INSIDE RHODESIA LEADING TO THE INSTALLATION AND STABLE FUNCTIONING OF WENELA:

Three inter-related sets of factors leading to the installation of Wenela in Rhodesia can be isolated for analytical purposes: deteriorating socioeconomic conditions for many African workers and the unemployed; changing foreign labour policies leading to reduced dependence on both further in-migration and existent foreign workers resident in Rhodesia; and the imperatives of political decision as these have coincided with state and employer interests in Southern Africa.

DETERIORATING SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS:

Rhodesia's post-UDI real annual growth rate in G.D.P. per head of 3.92 percent has been impressive but structural problems, have, if anything, got worse. From 1965-74 real G.D.P. (at 1965 prices) grew at an annual average rate of 7.8 percent. By 1973, however, the prospect of severe difficulties had become more apparent. The foreign exchange shortage was growing more acute. Import quotas began to be cut. Transport difficulties loomed with the prospect of a Mocambique border closure (realised in March, 1976). The costs of an escalating guerrilla war were beginning to rise considerably both in terms of fiscal costs and the diversion of skilled manpower from industry. Peasant production was severely disrupted in the North-East as a result of massive...
massive re-locations of the African population into 'protected villages'. Some provinces were experiencing rising malnutrition.41/ Urban un-employment appeared to be growing and overall African unemployment remained at a high level.42/ The inflation rate moved into double figures in 1975 and the volume of manufacturing output fell by 1.4 percent in the same year. The real growth rate also fell 1.5 percent in 1975 and is forecast to fall in income per head terms 1976-7.43/

The seriousness of the unemployment problem grew in the 1960's, according to conservative estimates. More recent evaluations indicate that, following rising redundancies and more extensive short-term working occasioned by foreign exchange cuts in industry in 1974-6, the position has become more critical.44/ At the same time, the real value of African agricultural gross output (inclusive of 'production for own consumption' and marketed sales of Tribal Trust Lands and Purchase Lands) has been erratic and low when measured on a per capita basis, the 1973 level for example being 25 percent below the 1972 level.45/ Even the recovery in 1974 was only a small margin above previous years.

Because of the high level of dependence of workers and their households on income supplementation from the reserves, these statistics should not be judged in isolation from wage structures. As shown in Table 2 average earnings on plantations and in domestic employment remained very low in 1974-5 as did the level of minimum wages regulated by most Industrial Boards and Councils where the rate of increase in wage minima has slowed down compared to previous years.

/TABLE 2. .............
TABLE 2.
'OPPORTUNITY COSTS' OF WENELA CONTRACT WORKERS
(Rhodesian dollars monthly)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector/Occupation</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>1974</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1976</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture (plantations)</td>
<td>average monthly earnings</td>
<td>12,99</td>
<td>14,87</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>average monthly earnings</td>
<td>36,43</td>
<td>42,00</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic service</td>
<td>average monthly earnings</td>
<td>26,80</td>
<td>29,41</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>average monthly earnings</td>
<td>52,68</td>
<td>59,63</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Going rates at entry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>farm labourer</td>
<td>cash wages monthly</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>underground labourer</td>
<td>cash wages monthly</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(small working)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gardener</td>
<td>cash wages monthly</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cook</td>
<td>cash wages monthly</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unskilled factory work</td>
<td>cash wages monthly</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>27-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Boards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowest low</td>
<td>cash wages monthly</td>
<td>17400</td>
<td>17,71</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average minimum</td>
<td>cash wage monthly</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>34,88</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest low</td>
<td>cash wage monthly</td>
<td>45,00</td>
<td>60,20</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Councils</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowest low</td>
<td>cash wages monthly</td>
<td>25,40</td>
<td>31,22</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest low</td>
<td>cash wages monthly</td>
<td>41,71</td>
<td>47,47</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, C.S.O., Salisbury; various Rhodesian government Notices (1974/75)

Note: 1. Excluding the mining industry where labourer's monthly minimum were $9.10 in 1975 (and will be so for 1976-77).

Measures of average earning levels, however, tend to present a distorted view of intra-sectoral distribution patterns, the wages at the bottom of the ladder tending to be the relevant index for comparison in the case of unskilled workseekers, whether new entrants to the labour market (growing at about 50,000 annually in the case of adult males only) or other unemployed persons. In Table 3, data on the number in each sector receiving a monthly cash wage lower than $10.00 are shown.

/TABLE 3. .........
TABLE 3.

WORKERS RECEIVING CASH WAGES BELOW $10. MONTHLY
1975 (June)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>% of total in Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and Forestry</td>
<td>119 670</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and Quarrying</td>
<td>2 260</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>2 070</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity and Water</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance, Insurance, Real Estate</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution and Hotels</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Communications</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration</td>
<td>970</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Services</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Services</td>
<td>21 320</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Services</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>148 460</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: C.S.O., Wage distribution of African Employees By Industrial Sector For The Month of June, 1975, DL/973/60, November, 1975, (mimeo)

Note: Only permanent workers are included in the estimates for Agriculture and Forestry.

Substantial numbers of persons (148 460 in June, 1975) have been in this lowest wage category and even more (229 030) have been in the $10-$20 bracket. At least 28 790 workers in the lowest wage bracket have been in non agrarian jobs. The data in Table 3 also include employees of African employers in urban areas - around 15,000 in 1969 - many of whom get below $10 in cash monthly.

The fact of serious poverty of this magnitude (the PDL for a family of four for 1975 was estimated at approximately $60 monthly) has meant that Rhodesia has become extremely fertile soil in which to implant a contract labour system offering not only employment for the unemployed but relatively attractive earnings as well (see a later section for details on the cost/benefit of alternatives open to contractees). /These ........
These benefits have obviously had more attraction in a situation in which formal employment growth has slowed down in all major sectors, as may be seen in the following table.

TABLE 4.

AFRICAN SECTORAL EMPLOYMENT GROWTH RECORD

1972-75

(Thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Mining</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
<th>Domestic</th>
<th>All Sectors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>Change</td>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>Change</td>
<td>Numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>334,3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>54,3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>112,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>348,2</td>
<td>13,9</td>
<td>54,5</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>120,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>357,7</td>
<td>9,5</td>
<td>58,1</td>
<td>3,6</td>
<td>130,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>366,9</td>
<td>9,2</td>
<td>60,6</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>137,2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: a) Figures for 1975 are the January - September averages.

b) The 1975 data make no allowance for 'short-time working', particularly in manufacturing.

For job seekers the growing 'stabilisation' of present incumbents in urban-industrial jobs has also reduced the probabilities of obtaining employment because job queues have lengthened, no public sector employment creation programme exists, farm jobs on offer (almost permanently so) enforce an inacceptably low level of subsistence on takers, and the African female labour participation rate (typically omitted from calculations of the annual inflow of work-seekers) has tended to rise in recent years. At the same time, although the prospects of income-earning in petty production and 'informal' employment do exist, these activities offer little security and often very little in the way of full-time subsistence. Under present conditions these 'occupations' have tended to become highly competitive.

The need to provide employment is implicitly recognised by the state in terms of its foreign labour policy, although it is explicitly negated by regular myopic utterances from key state officials, including as late as 13 January, 1976 the following from the Minister of Labour:

'I can .......
'I can never accept that there is unemployment in Rhodesia. The fact is that we have a labour shortage (of 36,000 farm jobs). The state's foreign African labour policy is thus of significance in the context of the export of labour from Rhodesia to South Africa.'

RHODESIA'S POSTWAR FOREIGN AFRICAN LABOUR POLICY: FROM IMPORT TO EXPORT

The state's foreign labour policy from 1958 up to 1973 has been examined in detail elsewhere. In essence, it amounted to a major change from an importation of labour up to 1958, to de-escalation from 1958-73 (in both the 'free flow' and contract labour systems) and an unforeseen policy of export of local labour from early 1975. During the post-1958 period, after the Foreign Migratory Labour Control Act of that year, more extensive efforts have also been made to squeeze out foreign workers already in employment - initially those in urban areas (defined as Closed Labour Areas) and to a lesser extent those in mining and plantation employment. In the last two instances, however, employer resistance has been strong, the foreign labour components of these low-wage industries, although they have been falling, still being in 1975 49/43,2 percent and 34,6 percent respectively.

The pattern of 'free flow' migration of adult men has shown a consistent outflow in each year since 1957, except for 1973 for which bureaucratic re-classifications make it impossible to determine the real net flow. Gross immigration and emigration levels have fallen to around 30 percent of the 1969 levels. In 1975 the net exodus continued, 6 830 adult males leaving in that year. The significance of this outflow can perhaps best be judged in relation to the fact that in 1974-75 it represented 74 percent of the overall African agricultural employment growth and 19 percent of total African employment growth.

The Malawian withdrawal and ban which so severely affected labour supplies also had the effect of suddenly cutting off contract supplies to the R.A.L.S.C. (Mtandzi) on April 16, 1974. No contract workers have come to Rhodesia since that date. However, those on contract at the time of implementation of the ban have remained in employment in agriculture until the end of their two year contracts. A 'normal' level of 'desertion', of 12,4 percent, was sustained in 1974. Data on these last inflows of R.A.L.S.C. contractees are found in the following table.

TABLE 5. ......
TABLE 5.
RALSC CONTRACT LABOUR SUPPLY
1972-76
(Annual)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>As % of African Agric. Workers</th>
<th>As % of 'Free Flow' Immigration (gross)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>4 307</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>5 098</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>3 529</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>50.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>0.21 (est)</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>760 (to April)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The numbers of contractees have been falling steadily since 1958, a result largely of supply and not demand constraints. Whilst in 1974 R.A.L.S.C. contractees formed 1 percent of the plantation labour force, by the next year this proportion had fallen to 0.21 percent. After April, 1976 there were no Malawian contractees employed in Rhodesia. Although contractees have formed a not insignificant element of gross immigration of foreign African adult men, by 1975 this significance had diminished noticeably.

Prior to the ban the demand for Malawian contractees - entirely from plantations - had been running at a high level. In 1974 3 212 'orders' for contractees were placed 2 440 (76 percent) remaining unsatisfied at the end of the year. The 1972 'capitation fee' of $47 was revised to $53 on 22 February, 1974 and warning of an impending further increase of $12 caused only 20 percent of those employers who placed orders to say they would not be prepared to meet the higher price. The highly inelastic demand for contract labour, typical of the past, thus remained.

The cessation of Malawian attestation came upon instruction on April 16, 1974, by telephone from the Malawi Government to the R.A.L:S.C.Malawi /Representative..........
Representative. Fifty recruits en route, in Limbe, were ordered to return to their villages. Clarification was sought through the Rhodesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on whether the ban affected 'free flow' supplies, the reasons for it, its likely duration, and the nature of the Malawi government's change in policy, if any. No answers were given to any of these questions, though the permanency of the ban was confirmed on 23 May, 1974. Pending a possible change in policy, the R.A.L.S.C. was instructed to maintain a 'holding operation'. Despite information that R.A.L.S.C.'s recruitment activities have been 'under consideration' in Malawi, the status quo has remained. Thus the R.A.L.S.C. has spent all its energies and resources on repatriation and the settlement of disputes.

The cutting off of Rhodesia's access to foreign contract labour has probably been one of the various pressures behind the mild upward increase in real earnings in agriculture in 1974-75. The lack of such a facility for plantation employers has stiffened the resolve of this group's opposition to extensive Wenela recruitment in Rhodesia. Rather than 'solving' the unemployment problem by means of exporting it to South Africa, the Rhodesia National Farmers Union and Rhodesia Tobacco Association would have preferred to see a stricter application of influx controls in urban areas in order that labour supplies be 'canalised' to the farms where 'labour shortages' exist at 'going wages'. To some extent this policy would boost output and (perhaps) export volumes and foreign exchange earnings, but presumably inter alia the state, usually responsive to the interests of plantation producers, has decided that unacceptable problems exist with proposals for greater 'labour direction' and that potential foreign exchange earnings from Wenela's activities outweigh the marginal returns to be derived from meeting the farm 'labour shortage'. Recent constraints on the logistical problems of moving exports of bulk agricultural commodities probably now make this view more significant than it might have been at the time of the decision to allow Wenela access to Rhodesia.

As part of the continuation of post-1958 foreign labour policy and a direct concession to farmers, however, the state decided to introduce the Foreign Migratory Labour Amendment Act in June 1976. The Act seeks to apply more rigorously the Closed Labour Areas Order (1966), itself provided for under the parent Act of 1958, which gave persons who arrived in Rhodesia before 1959 exemption from its provisions until 1966. To some extent these policies have been buttressed by policies of urban councils, notably the ........
the Salisbury City Council. 53/

In terms of the 1976 amendment the Act now makes it not only an offence to engage a 'foreign African' (defined as a person born outside Rhodesia) for employment in a closed labour area (presently the main urban areas) but also to keep in employment such a person already in employment. Initially the amendment to the Act will only apply to men, but the Minister has warned that it could be amended to apply to women. The 69 000 foreign male workers not in agrarian or mining employment would appear to be those most likely to be first affected by this measure. They constitute 35 percent of the total number (196 000) of foreign male workers in 1975.

TABLE 6.
FOREIGN AFRICAN WORKERS IN RHODESIA
1972-75

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>Foreign</th>
<th>All Workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>203 658</td>
<td>18 130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>201 987</td>
<td>18 461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>199 333</td>
<td>18 418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>195 725</td>
<td>18 296</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 7.
FOREIGN AFRICAN WORKERS IN RHODESIA
1956-75

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>309 775</td>
<td>50,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>278 373</td>
<td>45,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>229 154</td>
<td>34,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>221 788</td>
<td>27,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>214 021</td>
<td>23,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As an indication of the state's desire to make the policy more effective, the Act also provides for stiffer penalties on employers breaching its provisions, for higher penalties for second offenders and for the establishment of an inspectorate to police the Act. In short, the Act will operate as a 'job reservation' measure for local workers some of whom, presently unemployed, may obtain the option of taking over jobs held by foreign migrants. This is one of the explicit intentions of the proposed Act. However, it is also designed to provide an 'option' to 'threatened foreigners', viz. to leave the country or to take up employment in the low-wage primary industries. The application of the Act might thus in effect meet part of the 'shortage' on farms and also in the process help dampen wages in both this sector and in mining. The sectors most likely to be affected in the urban-industrial complex are the following (with numbers and percentages of foreign male workers noted in brackets): manufacturing (17 400: 13.0 percent); domestic employment (25 000: 18.9 percent); construction (8 300: 12.1 percent); distribution (5 600: 9.7 percent); transport and communications (3 800: 16.6 percent); and to a much lesser extent Public Administration, Education and Electricity and Water services.

In order that the Act be not applied in an 'indiscriminate fashion', the Minister of Labour gave assurance in the debate on the Bill's Second Reading that 'where Africans have any special skills, or where there are compassionate grounds, application could be made ... for exemption to be granted.' The intention of the Act is thus that it will apply primarily to unskilled workers, the labour form in highest demand in plantation agriculture.

The degree of stringency in application of the Act could make considerable difference to: a) the numbers of the jobs made available to local workers and b) the extent to which a ready surplus of labour could be available for export to South Africa. Under conditions of limited employment growth, the pressures from workers and the unemployed to apply the Act 'strictly' will probably be strong. It is significant that the Bill was 'well received' by African M.P.'s in the House of Assembly and Chiefs in the Senate and would probably gain a measure of popular support 'on the street' as the economic crisis deepens. However, some degree of employer resistance, founded on cost consciousness, can be anticipated in certain instances. What the new measure does imply, however, is /that ..........

that a large level exodus of Wenela contractees could easily be sustained without in any way disturbing aggregate local labour supplies to farms and mines (and perhaps even increasing them if large numbers of foreign workers were diverted to employment in the primary industries).

The new Act thus provides the state with a potentially powerful policy tool with which both to re-allocate (foreign male) labour supplies to the low-wage industries and absorb some local unemployment. The amendment of the Act to induce women, hinted at as a possibility by the Minister of Labour, could make this multifaceted task even easier to achieve. (For data on numbers of women see Table 6. page 26.)

Given that the Act became operationally effective in law in mid 1976, there may in fact be no need for active state intervention to cause some (at this stage unquantifiable) 'volitional' reallocation of labour supplies to sectors likely to be unaffected by the Act. The promulgation of the new law has already increased further the degree of job-insecurity that urban foreign workers have felt since they became the object of a policy of 'phased removal' some 19 years ago. Some may simply see the writing on the wall and attempt to pre-empt eviction from their jobs. For most, however, the prospects of alternative employment opportunities outside Rhodesia, in their countries of origin, appear very bleak. As of 1975 the potentially affected male nationals outside agriculture and mining were broken down as follows: Malawians (36 700); Mocambiquans (23 600); Zambians (6 800); and others (1 800) which included workers from Botswana, Tanzania, Angola, South Africa, South West Africa, Zaire, Lesotho and Swaziland (listed in order of numerical significance). It might reasonably be anticipated that a number of these affected workers will take up farm jobs and, to a lesser extent mine employment. In most enterprises in the mining sector supply already exceeds demand. Undoubtedly, many will experience enormous problems, if only: a) because of the 337 840 foreign-born Africans in Rhodesia in 1969 nearly 65 percent arrived in Rhodesia before 1959 and b) because many of the workers in this group have been in their jobs for many years and they will not be in a favourable position to begin anew elsewhere - whether inside or outside Rhodesia.

Hence ........
Hence, whilst the export of mine labour to South Africa has raised some new problems for farm and mine employers, the state has provided itself with the means of meeting their requirements should the necessity arise. The new tack in Foreign African Labour policy involves no radical departures from the policies of the last two decades which have diminished the numbers of foreign workers in the economy by nearly 100,000. However, the rate of 'phasing out' of foreign workers from Rhodesia has slowed down a lot in the 1970's, largely as a result of resistance from the RNFU and Chamber of Mines (Rhodesia) to the state's attempts to enforce these policies in primary industry. Now, with more foreign workers likely to seek jobs in these sectors as a result of displacement from urban-industrial employment, these employers will probably play some role in hastening the displacement of more foreign workers from the economy. Paradoxically, however, whilst the forced repatriation of foreign workers may prove functional to the state by increasing local African employment, this may cause African workers to become a greater potential de-stabilising element because foreign workers in Rhodesia in the past have tended to be relatively apolitical and have not played a prominent role in the postwar union or nationalist political movements.

THE POLITICAL INSTANCE IN THE STATE DECISION:

The most significant aspect of the installation of Wenela's return to Rhodesia in the field of active contract recruitment was that the original initiative, according to Wenela's General Manager in Rhodesia, Mr. Harry Plumb, was proposed by the Rhodesian government. The Foreign Affairs Ministry approached its South African counterpart in order to solicit and sound out Wenela's prospective interest in establishing a contract labour link. Wenela required no coaxing. The co-incidence of interest at that particular juncture was especially strong. It added another, relatively reliable, supplier state to the list in the face of one noticeable withdrawal and other prospective ones. Inflows of foreign 'single' men would help overcome the complication artificially induced by the South African government's reluctance to allow the settled married component of the mine labour force to rise in excess of 3 percent of total supplies. It would help ensure that in the medium-term wages would not have to rise further because of supply constraints. It helped maintain, as far as possible, the labour-intensity of the industry whilst cheap labour supplies were still available. It enabled advantage to be taken .........
De taken of the relatively low costs of recruitment per contractee which are associated with attestation in areas of concentrated (urban) unemployment.

A second important feature of the negotiation of the Wenela Agreement was that it was conducted without any consultation between the Rhodesian government on the one hand and the RNFU and Chamber of Mines (Rhodesia) on the other. Announced on 2 January 1975, after the decision in principle had been agreed in November of the previous year, the agreement became operational from January onwards. One publicised state consideration was the safeguarding of labour supplies to local primary producers. Nonetheless, both the RNFU and the Chamber of Mines (Rhodesia) initially expressed their concern at having had the decision thrust upon them as a fait accompli. A visit from the South African Chamber of Mines followed in late January and a reciprocal visit to South Africa by the local Chamber together with a number of state officials followed in April. By this time the Chamber of Mines (Rhodesia) had been placated and its President commented that Wenela had 'complied with discussions between the two Chambers'. The Chamber's 1975 Annual Report confirmed this situation. However, no such quick and easy reconciliation to the fact of export of unskilled labour took place in respect of the RNFU which was a lower-paying sector than the bulk of producers in the mining industry.

The decision to export contract labour (particularly, at first from the urban areas) to South Africa also came at a critical stage in Rhodesia's political crisis. Although thrust into détente manoeuvres as an unwilling ally, the governing Rhodesian Front party have been conscious the need to project Rhodesian interests as being co-incidental with those of the South African public, if not those of elements within its government. At this stage, almost any consolidation of ties with South Africa - in the diplomatic, military, social, political and economic arenas - was welcomed in Salisbury. The Wenela link could not have been unrelated to such strategic considerations.

There was also a growing need felt by officials in Rhodesia to do something to de-fuse the potential crisis fuelled by urban unemployment, particularly in Salisbury amongst the young, many of whom were considered to support broadly more militant policies within the African National Council. Many of these persons were thought to underpin the 'old' Z.A.N.U. .......

(30)
Z.A.N.U. group within that body. The risk of urban discontent, occasioned by a tension-charged political atmosphere at a time when most of the released African nationalist detainees were located in Salisbury, was not one which the government had wanted to continue. In many respects, however, these factors came more to the fore in the ensuing months as the split between the Zimbabwe African National Union and the Peoples' Caretaker Council came into the open, ruptured in September and eventually resulted in the Muzorewa ANC abandoning the 'negotiations only' path towards political 'settlement'.

Finally, the establishment of 'protected' and 'consolidated' villages in the North-East caused widespread economic disruption to peasant production. One result was to concentrate unemployment in already poverty-stricken reserves. In the past these persons were more widely distributed between scattered settlements. Thus the Wenela Agreement offered an opportunity to 'siphon off' some of these persons. This objective became realised to some extent in October 1975 when Wenela began to recruit in the North-East, the only rural area in which up to that time it had been commissioned to do so. Evidence would suggest that the 'off-take' of workers attested directly in these areas, as opposed to those attested indirectly from these areas, has not been very high. However, an undisclosed number may well have found their way to Salisbury to attest for contract on their own initiative.

IV. Nature of the Agreement:

The Agreement, which nominally runs for 5 years (with one year's notice thereafter on either side) was struck in accordance with the provisions of the African Labour Regulations Act (1911) and Rhodesian Government Notice No. 150 of 1939 between the government and Mine Labour Organisations (Wenela) Ltd., acting on behalf of its 55 listed gold mining companies. The South African Bantu Labour Act (1964) and relevant sections of the South African Mine and Works Act (1956) apply to these contracts. The Agreement provided for a minimum of 20,000 workers to be contracted.

Under the Agreement, workers are transported at Wenela's cost to Johannesburg where they must remain until 'placed' in mining employment. The exclusion of dependents reduces indirect costs associated with employment. Costs of recruitment are apportioned out to users after being averaged in the 'Labour Charges Pool Account' to which members...
members contribute on a cost per shift worked basis (16 cents per shift in 1974). After then passing a medical examination, workers are immediately registered with an employer for a minimum period of 12 months, commencing on the first day after arrival on the mine. 'Rejects' are repatriated or, if able and work is available, given surface employment. Wages are set at minimum rates stipulated in South African currency in the Agreement. Over-time is paid at more than normal rates and food is provided as prescribed by government regulation. Quarters are provided free though no stipulations regarding quality are provided. Hospitalisation costs are borne by employers. All transport costs from the depots of recruitment to the mines are borne by Wenela.

After completion of contract, should the recruitee not wish to return home, employment may continue for a period not exceeding a further 6 months but only on the mines. One month's notice must be given if the extra period is for less than 6 months. Thereafter the contractee must return to Rhodesia - either the point of attestation or the nearest Wenela office thereto - at the cost of Wenela. After the first three months of work, 60 percent of basic rates of pay per shift (of 8 hours) is retained from earnings by the employer. It is then paid through Wenela to the contractee in Rhodesia, the monies going into a Post Office Savings Bank account. However, employees may agree to Wenela withholding any amount required to liquidate admitted debts in the Republic. These forced savings can be considered an eventual source of small-scale accumulation but during contract they typically act as an insurance that funds are kept aside for dependents in the country of origin. Further, the withholding of earnings by the state agreement emphasises the disadvantaged status of workers who effectively thus do not control receipts from the sale of their labour. 'Desertion', or 'absconding' as the Chamber of Mines now prefers to call it, thus becomes an expensive action.

The completion of contract, in which at least 270 shifts of 'continuous underground employment' are worked, entitles contractees to receipt of a certificate which, on presentation to any Wenela employer within a period of 8 months from the date of discharge, enables the worker to re-commence work at the basic rate of pay cited on the certificate. In effect the contract provides for some wage advancement in the case of regular workers who effectively tie themselves to mine labour, /even ..........
even though they switch employers. Of the 1,000 Rhodesian contractees who returned in the first three months of 1976, about half had already re-contracted with Wenela before mid-April. The clauses represent an attempt by the industry as a whole to mitigate the 'repulsion' effect structurally built into contracts by establishing a countervailing albeit mild 'attraction' effect.

To some extent, enforced contractual turnover is functional to the supplier state. The migrant's return facilitates lump-sum expenditures of accumulated 'savings' and helps 'conserve' familial, kinship and social links with dependents and others in the reserve economy. In the case of Rhodesia, the clause also provides local employers with an option to compete for the labourer's services after he has returned. The state also ensures a higher probability that tax liabilities are met. The injection of monies into either rural areas or low-income urban households is facilitated, and at probably a much higher level than if migration involved a permanent move. In the latter instance, also, the supplier state could be burdened with a greater cost in terms of caring for those left behind, usually the aged and/or young. The supplier state also gains from the fact that a higher local turnover of contractees causes the recipient state to expend a greater sum on the fixed foreign exchange costs associated with recruitment.

On the other hand, the South African employer is provided with an opportunity to 'weed out' lax workers from the labour force while the recipient state avoids social security costs for workers and dependents. The regularised turnover also builds into mining employment a predictable degree of worker insecurity in that the latter can never anticipate permanency and security in employment because workers are forced to oscillate periodically under conditions which necessarily require them to become divorced from their families for lengthy periods at a time. The Agreement itself, upon which the individual's contract ultimately depends, is beyond his power to influence. Permanent or semi-permanent oscillation engenders a more regularised severing of these bonds. These conditions would seem at least superficially to suit management. They tend to reduce the prospects of successful and sustained collective worker organisation against employers. 'Spontaneous' and sporadic upheavals in mine compounds, a common feature for many years, would thus appear to express a structural incapacity on the part of contractees to negotiate benefits or even /influence ......
influence conditions of contract and labour. These pressures operate independently of the non-recognition of African unions in South Africa for the purpose of collective bargaining. Thus any benefits workers might achieve can only be temporal in character insofar as the individual is concerned. On a subsequent contract the worker may not be able to guarantee return to the mine which offers the precise benefit he requires and about which he may have previously expressed preferences or even gone on strike. The structure of contracts would thus appear to have a major importance which seems to have been overlooked in much analysis to date on the question of social control over mine workers.

Persons found 'medically unfit' for underground labour may be used for surface work (to which lower wages pertain) or, if the employer so desires, the worker can be repatriated at the employer's expense. The application of restrictive criteria (concerning age, weight and health) in the area of origin help reduce the degree of repatriation for medical reasons from South Africa.

Employees are required to work on every working day, on day or night shift, on piece work or daily rates, at the employer's option. When called upon, workers must work on a number of specified public holidays and Sundays on work authorised by the government. Workers are required to do overtime as and when management decides. These aspects of the contract heighten managerial control over 'volitional' participation in the labour process and enable management discretion to be serviced as a priority before employee considerations come to bear.

When 'Acts of God' prevent a worker from working he is entitled to half pay calculated at the average pay earned by him during the previous 3 months, or any shorter period worked to that date. In such circumstances, workers may be reallocated to jobs for which they did not originally engage and remuneration is determined at the rate for the job, not in terms of the rate of pay on the worker's original contract. This is provided that the pay is not less than the level of half pay stipulated above. This work counts towards the fulfillment of contract. In such instances, either party has the option of cancellation of the contract. Where employers cancel, the worker is 'offered' to other members of Wenela, provided that conditions of service are no worse than those previously pertaining.

V. THE CHARACTER .........
V. THE CHARACTER OF RECRUITMENT TO DATE.

Data on the outflow of Wenela contractees are provided in the following table.

**TABLE NO. 8.**

WENELA OUTFLOW AND MIGRATION OF FOREIGN AFRICAN MEN

**1975-76**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>FOREIGN AFRICAN MEN</th>
<th>WENELA</th>
<th>AGGREGATE FLOW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>Emigration</td>
<td>Net Flow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>-270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>-150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>-440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>1 020</td>
<td>-490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>1 240</td>
<td>-660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>1 250</td>
<td>-610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>1 790</td>
<td>-1 350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>1 830</td>
<td>-1 140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>1 410</td>
<td>-860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>1 180</td>
<td>-610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>-150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| TOTAL    | 6 320       | 13 150   | -6 830  | 8 622      | -15 452 |
| January  | n/a         | n/a      | n/a     | 3 115      | -3 295  |
| February | n/a         | n/a      | n/a     | 3 719      | n/a     |
| March    | n/a         | n/a      | n/a     | 2 641      | n/a     |

**SOURCE:** Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, C.S.O., Salisbury; and interviews with Mr. H. Plumb (General Manager: Wenela, Salisbury) February 1976.

**NOTE:**
1) These figures, for Wenela, do not account for the repatriation of contractees prior to the termination of contract. The figure for repatriation was about 800 for 1975 and 100 for January and February (combined) in 1976.

2) Included in the above are 2 'Coloureds'.

/The recruitment ........
The recruitment of workers began moderately in January, 1975, picked up towards the year end and increased substantially in the first two months of 1976. In 1975, 8,622 workers were sent to South African mines, about 800 of whom were eventually repatriated for various reasons. The total for the first quarter of 1976 was 9,475, a level which implied an annual rate in excess of 30,000. About 150 workers have been repatriated in these three months. The Wenela General Manager's original forecast for 1976 was around 25,000 recruits. All indications are that this level could have been easily exceeded. However, the return to full complements on South African mines in early 1976 led to the imposition of a quota of 1,000 monthly from April to May 1976. But with a sudden slump in Mocambiquan recruitments in April/May the quota was lifted. As a consequence Rhodesian recruitment for 1976 will probably reach about 28,000. The General Manager (Wenela, Rhodesia) reported that 1,500 applicants monthly were turned away from Wenela depots during the period of the quota. In line with the quota, selective recruitment was being applied. No one under 60 kgs. in weight was taken. It was previously 50 kgs. Persons under 22 years were excluded as well as those of 45 years and older.

The outflow on Wenela contracts for 1975 noticeably exceeded the net outflow of 'free flow' foreign African adult men for the same period. In aggregate these two flows amounted to a 'labour drain' of 15,500 workers. The rate of outflow has been rising substantially in 1976. Compared to the annual growth in jobs in the economy as a whole, this aggregate outflow is highly significant, being 42.9 percent of new jobs created in 1974-75 and 32 percent more than the total number of new jobs created in the two primary industries in that period. It may be inferred that, had these workers not left the country, unemployment would have been at a higher level, even though a portion of the contractees in fact left jobs in Rhodesia to take up contracts in South Africa. By March, 1976 it could be ascertained that there were at least 13,600 Rhodesian workers employed on gold mines in South Africa (after allowing for repatriations and discounting persons recruited in January/February 1975 who may have stayed on longer than 12 months). As yet, however, no data exists on the quantum of labour-time represented by this inflow. In 1975 Rhodesians represented approximately 4 percent of all the black workers on South African gold mines and 6 percent of all foreign workers. The figure may also be compared with the reported number of up to 80,000 black Rhodesians /said .....
said to be employed in South Africa in 1976. 66/

It was not possible to identify all the socioeconomic characteristics of every contractee. But, after discussion with the staff of Wenela's Head Office in Salisbury and a perusal and sampling of the individual contract forms and remittance schedules kept there, as well as the interviewing of 100 recruits in April 1976, a number of basic features were discernible. 67/

Much of the initial recruitment in early 1975 was from urban areas. Originally this was confined to Salisbury, but then recruitment extended to Bulawayo and Fort Victoria (in March 1975). Wenela's lease in the latter town was granted on a 99 year basis on an area of land located in Mucheke township. In Salisbury, older Wenela property, dating from the 1930's, has been used. These locations were chosen with regard to the initial strategy of confining recruitment to the urban unemployed, already at a sizeable level according to an on-site Wenela review of the situation in Salisbury. 68/ Wenela has stayed away from the Midlands and Manicaland where farm employers were more likely to be affected by 'labour-shortage' induced by recruitment offers of higher wages on South African mines. Indeed, following RNFU concern in 1976, and after a tripartite meeting with the Minister of Labour, Wenela was restricted from the Chipinga, Melsetter and Buhera Tribal Trust Lands. But it has been given a recruitment permit to operate in three other TTL's - Gutu, Plumtree and Matopos. To meet its quotas Wenela does not need these facilities but having them makes for a greater supply and thus more stringent selectivity. Wenela has relied largely on newspaper publicity and word of mouth transmission of information, but it has also been assisted by the policy of state officials at urban labour exchanges and referrals from the Salisbury X-ray Clinic through which hundreds of Africans pass daily, many being directed to Wenela's depots. No mineworkers or foreign workers have been recruited in the first year of operations. Moreover, President Banda has given instruction through the Malawi Government Representative in Salisbury to the effect that no Malawians have 'authority' to contract with Wenela in Rhodesia. The restriction under the Agreement which is applicable to mineworkers, has been designed to protect Rhodesian mine owners. It has drawn criticism from the President of the Associated Mine Workers Union who has noted that the restriction effectively forces these workers to become 'captive labour' for local employers, a point which the General Manager of the Chamber of Mines (Rhodesia) has in part admitted in his /observation ......
observation that the Wenela agreement effectively circumscribed the negotiating rights of local mine-workers. 69/

Despite an express focus on urban recruitment, however, many recruits have in fact been persons domiciled in rural areas (e.g. Darwin, Marrandellas, Mazoe, Mrewa, Chiredzi, Makoni and Chibi as well as Gutu and Buhera before the ban on the latter two areas) the exact proportion being impossible to accurately determine because the place of domicile noted on the individual's Registration Certificate need not co-incide with the actual place of residence and/or previous employment. Nor may it accurately co-incide with family domicile. Nevertheless, of a sample of 166 (13%) of the 1263 recruits attested in November, 1975, it was found that 39 percent identified a large town (Salisbury, Bulawayo, Umtali, Gwelo or Fort Victoria) on their contracts as being their domicile, whilst 7 percent noted smaller towns and the balance were at least nominally, from 'rural areas'.

On the other hand, of the 100 contractees interviewed in April 1976, (to be referred to as the Survey) three-quarters were domiciled in the Tribal Trust Lands. The urban bias in recruitment has thus not been unimportant. Earlier attestations for January to June (1975) were heavily biased towards urban recruitments, especially Salisbury.

A sample of the 342 contract forms for 1975 showed that 75 percent of contractees were under the age of 25 years (see Table 9). Another 22 percent were between 26 and 35 years of age and only a handful (0.6 percent) were older than 46 years. It is apparent therefore that the bulk of contractees have been young men, some no older than 18 years. The Survey in April 1976, however, showed that 22 percent were under 19 years of age whilst only 43 percent were under 25 years of age and only 15 percent were over 40 years.

From the contract forms available at Wenela depots it was impossible to determine unambiguously the extent to which recruits had been actually unemployed around the time of contracting. One sample of 194 contract forms, however, did establish that of jobs previously held (the date of discharge from employment was unspecified) 4.2 percent were former employees in domestic employment, 1.5 percent in plantation employment, 0.5 percent from mining and 53.6 percent were put down as 'other'. Just over 40 percent of the sample left a blank ......
a blank when asked to identify their previous sector of employment (an action made relatively easy by the fact that new Registration Certificates are available for $1.00 each). Discussions with recruiting officials revealed the belief that in fact many of the recruits were either unemployed, or, in the case of young persons, were taking up their first job. This belief appears well grounded and was confirmed by the Survey results which showed that 93 of the 100 recruits were unemployed before contracting with Wenela. Of the unemployed, 22 had been unemployed for more than 2 years whilst another 18 for 12-24 months and 13 for 6-11 months, the balance for less than 6 months. The character of the unemployment behind this contact flow was thus undoubtedly structural in nature. Significantly, perhaps, there were only 18 recruits who said they would not re-contract after their return. All the rest expressed such a desire, 16 of them conditionally. Despite the high incidence of actual unemployment at the time of contract, only 54 percent themselves said it was unemployment which drove them to contract with Wenela. There were 9 percent who said it was the fact of unemployment combined with a lack of other/kinship support during unemployment that caused their presence at Wenela depots. Another 36 cited 'low wages' as the cause of going, even though most of these persons, being unemployed, were not in receipt of wages at the time. Hence, the 'condition of unemployment' must be interpreted here in the light of the nexus of low wages and rural poverty. The rural located character of much of the unemployment identified as indicated for instance in the fact that 80 percent of the Survey contractees intended to return to the Tribal Trust Lands after completion of contract. However, these persons were not essentially peasant farmers. Only 13 had never had a job before (these persons were the younger contractees). All the others were wage-labourers (27 as industrial workers, 29 as farm labourers, 9 in domestic employment and 22 in other categories, e.g. clerks, road labourers, driver etc.) Furthermore, of the father's occupations noted only 10 percent were full-time peasant producers, the balance being wage employees, (mostly in low-paid jobs). Indeed, 31 of the contractees had at one time or another worked on farms, 29 in their last occupation. Further, 19 had at one time worked in domestic employment.

The importance of the low wage issue behind the decisions to contract /was ...
was great. Of the 87 persons in the Survey who had worked for wages before, 16 received less than $10 monthly in cash from their last job, (all but one also getting 'rations') while 27 (14 of whom received 'rations') were paid a monthly cash wage between $11-$20. Only 16 contractees had been in receipt of a wage greater than $30 per month. Significantly, 60 percent of contractees were paid a wage on their latest job which was less than received in prior jobs.

Despite contracting with Wenela, most recruits would have preferred to find adequately remunerative employment locally. Thus all but 2 said they would take an industrial job in Rhodesia if one were available. But only 6 said they would work in Rhodesian plantations and farms, given present wage structures. Attitude to domestic employment was less unequivocal, 22 claiming they would not object to an adequately paid domestic job. Perhaps significantly, only 45 of the 100 expressed a willingness to take up mine employment in Rhodesia.

Other socioeconomic characteristics of recruits are of relevance. Firstly, most recruits have had education of some kind, only 7 percent in the Survey having not been to school. There were 41 percent who had reached Standard 7 or above whilst 75 percent had been through grades higher than Standard 3.

**TABLE 9.**

**AGE STRUCTURE OF WENELA CONTRACTEES**

(SAMPLE N = 342)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of birth</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950 - 59</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>75,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940 - 49</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>22,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930 - 39</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before 1929</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0,6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Drawn from a sample of Wenela's contract forms in Salisbury Head Office, February 1976.
The idea that many contractees were single unmarried persons should not be overstressed. This may have been evident to a greater extent in the early phase of Wenela recruitment when policy concentrated on the young urban unemployed. The Survey data, however, showed that 48 percent of contractees were married at the time of contract. These persons had 188 children between them, an average of 3.9 each. The majority of married households (52 percent) had 4 or more children whilst 15 percent had 6 or more children. In all, 90 (48 percent) of the 188 children were 7 years of age or older, but only 72 (38 percent) were in school at the time of contract. Whilst the male parent is away, children along with others in the family are cared for by various relatives (the contractee's father's households in 35 percent of the cases and his brother's in another 31 percent).

The kinship system of support also operates in respect of the contractee's (expected) expenditures. More than half of the contractees (52 percent) intended to contribute financially to their parents and 9 percent to their brothers (usually the payment of school fees).

Most recruits have definite objectives they wish to fulfill upon return. Thus 31 in the Survey intended to meet lobala (bride price) payments with their accumulated funds from remittance whilst 28 intended to purchase cattle and 33 'other assets' (brick houses in the reserves, farm implements etc.) A number of the latter also desired to acquire a driving licence whilst 16 wanted to spend their earnings on their children's education.

Given all these factors, Wenela operations in Rhodesia thus appear as fulfilling a slightly different function within their 'traditional historical role' of mediating relationships between the worker and peasant households located in rural reserve economies and the capitalist mode of production in South Africa. Now the function appears to be more diversified. In addition to this 'traditional role' Wenela has been acting to 'stabilise' the 'labour context' of the dependent capitalist structures in Rhodesia. This has been achieved by absorbing excess labour supplies from within these components of the Southern African economic system. It has apparently also done so to a lesser extent in Mocambique (where some recruitment has been from Maputo) and is now doing so to an increasing extent in South Africa's urban-industrial complex.

/In this ......
In this situation, the basic causes behind migration would seem to be little different from what they have been in the case of migrant workers proletarianised from a rural base. The basically economic factors - of unemployment, low wages and difficulties in obtaining adequate subsistence - would seem to have prompted the sharp response in Rhodesia which Wenela's offers of employment in South Africa have elicited. In as much as these conditions have been structurally determined as a consequence of an historical process, the migration of contractees has only been 'volitional' in a highly restricted and abstracted sense. 

VI. WAGES AND REMITTANCES ON CONTRACT

Data on the Wenela contract wage structure for 9 different types of work are shown in the following table.

TABLE 10. WENELA'S MINIMUM DAILY WAGE RATE PER SHIFT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grades</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Dollars per shift</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Surface labourers</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Underground labourers</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Belt minders</td>
<td>1.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Miner's Assistants</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Gang Supervisors</td>
<td>2.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Senior Gang Supervisors</td>
<td>2.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Artisans</td>
<td>3.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Senior Team Leaders</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Senior Training Instructors</td>
<td>4.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although the full range of wages and occupation cited in the above are advertised .........
advertised to contractees, in practise only the two lowest are relevant to 99 percent of contract workers. Some semi-skilled workers, and others with educational skills (e.g. 'O' level qualifications or even trade skills), have indeed been contracted. But they are the exception, not the rule. Thus, the minimum rate stipulated for underground labourers of $1.63 per shift is the most pertinent rate given that almost all contractees perform this type of work. A far smaller number of less fit persons take up surface work, at appreciably lower rates of pay.

Since the pay earned is partly consumed in South Africa and in part remitted, after conversion into Rhodesian dollars, the rate of exchange has a direct bearing on the real value of the contractee's total remuneration.

The South African devaluation in September 1975 had the effect of reducing the dollar value of remitted monies in periods thereafter.

TABLE 11.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grades</th>
<th>South African Rands</th>
<th>Values in Rhodesian Dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Basic Day</td>
<td>Remittance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface</td>
<td>1,40</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>1.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>1.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>1.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>2.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>2.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>2.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>3.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Own Calculations.

NOTES: The post devaluation rate is compiled on the basis of an exchange rate of R1.00 = Rho.0.74 which Wenela used for conversion. Monthly values are calculated on the basis of a 26 shift month.
In effect the higher grades incurred a greater monthly loss, but since most workers have been underground labourers, the loss was probably close to $2,60 monthly on average. Workers entering contracts after that date contracted at post-devaluation rates. No compensation factor exists because in the basic Agreement rates of pay are stipulated in Rands.

Minimum rates of pay do not clearly indicate the actual value of earnings, a fact clearly indicated by data on the size of distribution of a sample of remittances shown in the following table.

**TABLE 12.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under $10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10 - $20</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$20 - $30</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$30 - $40</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$40 - $50</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$50 +</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>552</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Drawn from a sample of Wenela's remittance schedules in Salisbury Head Office, February 1976.

All workers are on a 'ticket system' of pay and it is possible that the number of shifts worked could vary from 26 monthly (on the basis of one daily, allowing for Sundays off) to a maximum of as many as 60 in a month (here assuming unrealistically that the worker works in each possible shift). Theoretically, then, earnings could vary enormously between workers who are on the same minimum rate of pay and even where actual rates per shift do not differ. The data in the above table shows that the bulk of the 552 workers sampled 244 (44.2 percent) remitted between $30 - $40 monthly. Over 4 percent of workers remitted more than $50 in the month concerned and 13.1 percent sent home less than $20.
The significance of these monthly remittances should be judged against the local cash wage distribution of workers in employment in Rhodesia. (See for example, the number receiving less than $10 monthly cash wages in 1975: Table 3.p. 21). The majority of contractees (at least as indicated by the sample) appear to remit more than $20 monthly. This level is 25 percent higher than the value of monthly earnings of the average agricultural worker in Rhodesia. Further, possibly around 65 percent of contractees are in a position to remit a monthly amount in excess of the average monthly earnings of a domestic worker or the full annual average cash wage of a non-agricultural worker. ²²/  

VII. BENEFITS AND DISADVANTAGES TO CONTRACTEES  

There are analytical and empirical difficulties in computing the exact financial value of benefits to contractees. The price structures for (urban) black households in Rhodesia and South Africa differ. Thus the ideal measure of value, in terms of the bundle of commodities which earnings could buy, cannot simply be calculated by adding together the value of earnings paid in Rand and the Rand-equivalent value of those received in Rhodesian dollars. Furthermore, because the timing of consumption of the two different sources of expenditure differ, account should in theory, also be made for the differential rates of inflation applicable to Rhodesia and South Africa. Ambiguity is also introduced into calculations by the possibility that workers can send remittances in excess of basic rates of pay and can also export to Rhodesia the value of commodities purchased in South Africa. There is also no completely satisfactory or standardised method of valuation of payments in kind (shelter, food, medication etc.) received whilst on contracts, the very basis of which varies from mine to mine.  

EARNINGS INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA  

Notwithstanding the above necessary qualifications, the minimum value of cash earnings for use inside South Africa can be calculated, together with an assessment of the value of remittances for an average completed 12 month contract cycle of 312 shifts. Data on these two aspects are shown in Table 13 and 14. In the former the potential minimum consumption level attainable inside South Africa is noted as R354,64 for an underground labourer or a monthly amount of at least R32,24 for April 1975.
TABLE 13.
'POTENTIAL' VALUE OF RECRUITEES' CONSUMPTION IN SOUTH AFRICA
(EXCLUDING PAYMENTS IN KIND)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Basic Shift Rate Less Remittance (in cents)</th>
<th>Monthly Basic Earnings (less payments in kind)</th>
<th>Total Value of Consumption from wage payments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Basic Earnings from Shift in Monthly Periods</td>
<td>Total Value (Annual, Monthly level in situ)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Months 1 - 3</td>
<td>Months 4 - 11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface Labourer</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>109,20</td>
<td>225,68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underground Labourer</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>171,60</td>
<td>354,64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 2</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>183,30</td>
<td>386,82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Own calculations as per contractual conditions.

NOTE: The following points are assumed. No consumption can take place from earnings in the last month, payment being made at the time of departure. A 12 month contract is assumed. Estimates are based on wage minima for a 26 shift month.

The value of earnings received inside South Africa would be arrived at by adding the value of payments 'in kind' on to this figure. Various estimates have been given for all payments 'in kind' but one of R15,00 monthly seems not too far off the mark for many mines. 73/

Given that the average cash earnings of black mineworkers on gold mines was reported to be R79 monthly in July 1975, 37 percent above the minimum of R57,60, it is likely that real consumption levels significantly exceed the potential minimum noted above. 74/

It would seem likely, given these wages and prevailing prices, that the real earnings level was in excess of the single person's P.D.L. income requirements. However, as is well known, a large portion of a 'single' migrant are in fact married and have extensive family commitments to meet in their areas of domicile.

THE VALUE OF FUNDS REMITTED

Estimates of the value of remittances at the Rhodesian end are given in the following table.
### TABLE 14.

**Minimum Lump-Sum Value of Income of Wenela Contractees on Return Home**  
(Rhodesian dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Value of Remittance</th>
<th>Interest</th>
<th>Imported Commodities</th>
<th>Last Month's Wage and Cash in Hand</th>
<th>Total Lump Sum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monthly (26 shifts)</td>
<td>Annual (8 transfers)</td>
<td>POSB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface Labourer</td>
<td>16,25</td>
<td>130,00</td>
<td>2,46</td>
<td>50,00</td>
<td>47,30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underground Labourer</td>
<td>25,53</td>
<td>204,24</td>
<td>3,87</td>
<td>50,00</td>
<td>62,38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 2</td>
<td>27,30</td>
<td>218,40</td>
<td>4,13</td>
<td>50,00</td>
<td>81,10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Own calculations based on contractual conditions.

**NOTE:** The following points are assumed. Estimates are based on 12 month contracts computed on wage minima (as per February 1976). POSB interest rates of 3½ percent on daily balances are used. A 7 week 'delay' occurs between the time of receipt of monthly wages and its payment into the contractees' POSB account in Salisbury. It is assumed that workers do not engage in 'commodity arbitrage' (i.e. buying cheap goods in South Africa which are later sold for a profit in Rhodesia). Commodities 'exported' reflect savings taken out of South Africa 'in kind'. Workers are assumed to bring $Rh. 20.00 out of South Africa in cash. All debts in South Africa are assumed to have been met from income for current consumption.

The total lump-sum figures of $320,49 for underground labourers is a composite of 8 remittance transfers, interest accruing in the Post Office Savings Bank account (with due allowance for 7 week delay in transfers and with interest calculated at 3½ percent per annum on daily balances - which with inflation effectively implies a negative rate of interest), an imputed value of R50.00 for imported commodities, the full value of the final month's work, and cash-in-hand assumed to be equal to $20.00. Again this reflects a minimum valuation based on minimum rates of pay. As remittance data indicate, and as is most likely given the divergence of actual cash wages from contract minima, these values will in practice turn out to be significant underestimates. Nonetheless, on the basis of the calculations on Table 14, the migrant .......
migrant in effect returns to base with the equivalent of the capitalised value of the annual earnings of an average domestic worker. These relatively high rewards, considered against the present background of low wages in Rhodesia and limited employment opportunities, have been influential in causing a number of the first batch of returnees from contact to re-contract more or-less immediately for a further 12 months. \textsuperscript{75} An as yet still undisclosed number have opted to stay on in employment for the extra 6 months allowed by the contract.

From the above evidence, it is clear that there are powerful economic reasons 'persuading' persons to take up contract work on the South African mines. These forces are so pervasive that 'target worker' explanations of labour supply, recently resuscitated in some circles in South Africa, mis-focus attention away from structural conditions outside of which 'behaviour' cannot be understood. In terms of the unemployed or low-income worker's 'opportunity cost', the 'incentives' are strong (Cf sectoral earnings for Rhodesia in Table 2. p. 20). If for no other reason, in order not to disturb the prevailing pattern of labour supplies to primary producers, the state has re-inforced its institutional and social control over the allocation and potential re-allocation of African labour in Rhodesia. This is not to say, by way of implicit assertion, that a 'loosening' of these controls would cause every lower-paid worker to want to migrate on a short-term contract to the Rand. Migration is influenced by a variety of factors. In the case of many workers, the social costs of enforced familial separation, insecurity in job tenure, and divorce from 'land rights' located in the reserves could be evaluated as 'too high'. These factors could offset the purely pecuniary advantages which absorption into the South African mining industry might entail.

SOME DISADVANTAGES OF MINE EMPLOYMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

Amongst the costs to be considered in taking up mine work, migrants would not be unaffected by the sure knowledge that life in the compound 'labour batteries' which typify many mines is not altogether a pleasant experience. Compound confrontations and violence attract public attention largely because they affect labour supply and production, but for those involved or caught up in these conflagrations, during which time the risk of life and limb is extremely high, these events constitute a formidable personal threat. The /male-dominated ......
male-dominated compounds, which have few normal social contours to their composition, present obvious disadvantages. Mining is also not a riskless occupation, especially for underground labourers. Accidents, pneumoniosis and other forms of damage to health are also factors weighed in the balance even though workers are covered by the South African Workmen's Compensation Act. The fact of having to serve a full 12 month contract may also prove to be disadvantageous should a personal or family crisis precipitate a desire to return home. The high degree of social control exercised within many compounds and over the labour process in underground work also probably contrasts strongly, at least in degree, with life and labour in urban and rural employment in Rhodesia.

The general discontent evident amongst miners in South Africa generally has not escaped black Rhodesian workers who have been subject to the same conditions of labour and subsistence. A number have already died in conflicts with other workers, a number returned home as a result of conflict in the first 15 months that the labour system functioned, large numbers have sought 're-allocation' to mines other than the ones they initially began to work on, others have gone on strikes, whilst relatively few would appear to have escaped being embroiled in one capacity or another in mine conflicts.

The social background of the bulk of Rhodesian miners may also have exacerbated some of the underlying tensions endemic in compound conditions. Speaking English, a sizeable group being largely urban-rooted and many having urban experience, having a resistance to the use of 'fanakalo' (behaviour that is apparently much resented by first-line supervisors), being relatively highly politicised and having come from a country in the throes of a major socio-economic and political crisis which to most miners might appear on the brink of radical constitutional and political changes, black Rhodesians do not fit the orthodox pattern. At the same time, as newcomers, there exists the possibility that the late intrusion of Rhodesians into the mine contract labour market may be considered, by black South Africans and others, as a wage-depressing influence of disadvantage to the latter.

VIII. RHODESIAN EMPLOYERS AND THE WENELA EXODUS

The different branches of production in Rhodesia have not been equally affected by Wenela's activities.

/Although ......
Although initially ruffled by non-consultation over the Agreement, the Chamber of Mines (Rhodesia) has come around quickly to giving Wenela's presence its tacit support. This appears to be tied up with the following factors: a) the fact that the application of the state's new Foreign Migratory Labour Amendment Act (1976) could well benefit mining employers; b) the protection in the Agreement that no contractees who have been in mining employment 12 months immediately prior to contracting will be taken; c) the belief that those miners who do return will have received some 'training' which could be useful to and acquired at no cost by local producers; d) the belief that the return flow of local contractees will create a larger supply of ex-mineworkers who, once seeking employment, will be easier to 'attract' to mining; e) a possible expectation that the foreign exchange earnings from the contract labour system will in part benefit the mining industry.

Unless and until Wenela's activities adversely affect mining producers directly and significantly, it is unlikely that opposition from the Chamber will ever amount to much. This is also likely to be so even if labour supplies are drawn away from the labour-intensive and low-wage small-worker component to the mining industry, employing about 10,000 African workers, because Smallworker Associations remain a minority and to some extent dormant interest within the Chamber. The voting structure of the latter body is biased so as to protect large-scale interests, the bulk of which are foreign-owned companies - many of them located in South Africa (for example AAC and Charter Consolidated).

Opposition to Wenela from the Rhodesian National Farmers' Union and the Rhodesian Tobacco Association seems to have mounted in the last year. Equally taken by surprise by the state's announcement of the Agreement, these producers constitute the lowest wage industry in the economy. There is also a quasi-permanent 'labour shortage' found in this sector, unlike in mine employment where average earnings are roughly double what they are in farming. The RNFU and its newly established 'watchdog body' on labour matters, the Agricultural Labour Bureau (ALB) have expressed serious concern at Wenela's operations. In particular the RNFU and ALB is concerned that there is no laid down maximum to the number which Wenela can recruit.

Meetings have taken place between Wenela and the RNFU and between the latter two and the government. Wenela has sought to allay the fears of agrarian producers but, with the cessation of importation of contract labour supplies, the RNFU's members have not been, and are unlikely to be, easily persuaded. The Ministry of Labour has thus undertaken the monitoring of the sources of 'last employment' of contractees which to date are recorded from contract forms as only in small numbers coming from plantations. But scope does exist for error on this score and here the RNFU has been keeping a watching brief. Indeed ....
Indeed, the Survey results reported earlier indicate a higher off-take of farm labourers for April, 1976. To some extent the downturn in the economy in general in 1975 has operated to allay immediate RNFU concern over labour supply, but this situation may not pertain in the medium term if the expected upturn in early 1977, coupled with buoyant agricultural prices, comes off. Indeed, for as far ahead as 1980 the ALB projects a 'labour shortage' (estimated at going wage rates). Whatever the exact trend, however, it can be expected that RNFU resistance to Wenela's expanded operations will remain, at least in a mild form, if only because the RNFU stands to gain from even lower wages or even lower rates of increase in farm wages in the future.

Although in theory some domestic employers stand to experience wage increases as a part consequence of Wenela recruitment, these households are not organised to make effective representations to protect their interests. Indeed, most are probably not aware of any connection of this kind and in any event the increases in wage terms will probably be very small.

Up to the present, the state has yet to express any misgivings about the Agreement. Indeed, the Minister of Labour has commended its benefits in the form of extra jobs and foreign exchange earnings in the House of Assembly. From a state policy viewpoint, the operation of the system appears to have been going according to plan and, insofar as 'labour exports' have exceeded initial expectations without having any obvious effects yet on wage structures, perhaps even better than initially anticipated. There is at present no concern evident that the export of labour marks on explicit acknowledgement of the structural incapacity of the local economy to provide adequate employment. The fact that the Wenela Agreement more firmly 'locks in' Rhodesia to South Africa is favourably recorded by the government.

**IX. ECONOMIC IMPACT ON THE RHODESIAN ECONOMIC SYSTEM**

Alternative theoretical perspectives may be used to evaluate the economic impact of the installation of Wenela's contract labour supply system.

In orthodox cost/benefit terms, the immediate export of workers at a juncture when local unemployment is high confers benefits on workers who obtain jobs otherwise not available. The state also gains from the 'stabilisation' of economic conditions which follows from the exodus. South African employers gain, too, their supply being supplemented and the profits made from .......
from the surplus appropriated from production being used for re-investment in South Africa and/or distribution to shareholders, few of whom probably live or would re-invest in Rhodesia. The South African government's tax receipts from revenue are also boosted and users of South African foreign exchange gain through an assured supply of gold production and sales.

At the same time, as shown in the following table, there are also potentially important foreign exchange gains for Rhodesia, part of which also supplement state revenues.

TABLE 15.

ESTIMATES OF 'POTENTIAL' FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS OF WENELA'S OPERATIONS

IN RHODESIA (FEBRUARY, 1976 PRICES)

(thousands of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Contractees</th>
<th>Remittances of basic pay</th>
<th>Stamp Duties</th>
<th>Worker Travel Documents</th>
<th>Air Rhodesia Levy</th>
<th>Wenela's Costs</th>
<th>Worker's Cash in Hand</th>
<th>Worker's Imported Items</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fixed</td>
<td>Variable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 500</td>
<td>1 736</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>2 042</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 000</td>
<td>3 064</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 000</td>
<td>4 085</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>1 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>5 106</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1 250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 000</td>
<td>6 127</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 000</td>
<td>7 148</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1 750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 000</td>
<td>8 169</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>2 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Own estimates based on discussions with General Manager, Wenela, Salisbury.

NOTE: The following assumptions are relevant. All workers are taken to be 'underground labourers'. A 26 shift month is used and a minimum 12 month contract is assumed. Calculations are based on the remittance of 8 months of basic pay computed on wage minima, not actual earnings. Stamp duties are levied at $Rh 6.00 per contract as noted in the African Labour Regulations Act (1911) as amended. The cost of WTD is $Rh 4.00. Air Rhodesia is given $Rh 5.00 per contractee by Wenela in lieu of rights to breach its air monopoly for Rhodesia. It is assumed that fixed costs of 3 depots are invariable with the volume of throughput. Variable costs are estimated on the basis of approximate variable costs at February 1976 throughout levels. Workers are assumed to bring back $Rh 20 cash in hand on return. Workers are assumed to import commodities valued at $Rh 50.00 on return. The Table excludes other 'non-contractual' remittances in cash and kind made to family dependents during the course of contract.
The higher the level of recruitment the greater foreign exchange earnings from remittances out of basic pay, stamp duties, monies for the issue of Worker Travel Documents, the levy payable to Air Rhodesia by Wenela for authorised infringement of its air transport monopoly, the fixed and variable expenditures of Wenela on recruitment, the cash-in-hand brought back by contractees and the value of imported commodities brought back after completion of contract. The table shows that, at the level pertaining for 1975, the total foreign exchange earnings will probably amount to a minimum of approximately $2.8 million. On rates of recruitment current for the first quarter of 1976 (in excess of 30 000) they will be worth close on $9 million. Under present conditions of foreign exchange shortage, this is not an inconsiderable amount. To earn such a figure through (say) industrial investment and export would require a substantial capital investment.

Just how inflow of remitted funds, located in many thousands of small amounts of savings, will be spent cannot be accurately forecast. Whilst some may be invested in new or established enterprises in either rural or petty production, it is likely that a significant portion of it will be expended on consumer goods. Hence the local market may receive a fillip and local producers also, to the extent that imported commodities are not purchased. The inflow could also expand the numbers of Africans in the income distribution structure located in the middle income bands. Additionally, the inflow of funds in the absence of an increase in domestic supply, is essentially inflationary. 79/

It is also possible, in reducing the length of local job queues, the exodus of labour will exert some upward pressure on the African wage structure at the unskilled level. However, in many respects local labour markets which could be affected have either been effectively insulated from the potential effects (e.g. in the case of protection afforded to mine employers) or, if they become affected, upward pressures on wages may be offset by the more stringent use of the Foreign Migratory Labour Act to reallocate foreign male labour to enterprises experiencing a 'labour shortage'. The high level of local unemployment, however, implies that little wage pressure is likely to result from Wenela's operations. Two other 'benefits' put forward by Ward in an analysis of gains from migrant labour for Lesotho may also be thought to be marginally applicable, viz. that the price of mine labour has been rising more quickly than commodity export prices in Rhodesia, and prolonged absence of married men could reduce the birth rate. 80/ However, the price of mine labour in South Africa could well stagnate in future and the latter 'benefit' is probably hypothetical, even if such an assumed demographic change was occasioned by migrancy.

/From .....
From a structuralist perspective, the impact of Wenela's operation could be considered as negative in a number of significant respects. By contracting into the South African mine labour system, Rhodesia has conceded to decision-makers outside the economy a greater power to influence local unemployment levels, consumer demand, foreign exchange earnings and inflation rates. Growing dependence on South Africa in this quarter re-inforces the latter's existing control over the economy, already substantial in respect of the presence of South African companies and the proportion of shares held in listed Rhodesian companies by shareholders in South Africa, not least of all in mining companies. 81/

The export of labour to South Africa also relieves the Rhodesian government of an important pressure to design and implement an adequate employment growth programme capable of meeting local needs. Under these circumstances there is the possibility that necessary structural changes will be further forestalled, with the effect that should South Africa find it necessary or expedient in the future suddenly either to terminate the Agreement or to reduce radically contract labour demand, the Rhodesian economy will be placed in a position in which not only must it cope with the growing unemployment backlog, but it must also rapidly find jobs and/or subsistence for large numbers of displaced migrant contractees. In effect, this peripheralisation of the economy marks a further step along the road to under-development and not a move towards autonomous development, understood in the sense of transformation in the economic structure. It would be idle to pretend that political issues are not involved in these alternative outcomes. At the least, it would seem that 'structural ossification' of this sort represented by existing policy can only but serve those groups with a vested interest in the status quo at potentially tremendous cost to the rest. For how long these structures will be capable of being sustained under such conditions is problematic.

In a similar fashion to the artificial blockage caused in respect of employment policy, so too does the impact of Wenela's operations work to ease pressures on the need to develop the rural areas, in particular the Tribal Trust Lands. In so doing, the state has the option to divert more resources away from rural development to other activities which, given the chronic imbalances in the economy, cannot be considered desirable on developmental grounds.

/It is .....
It is quite possible that the above effects could be short-term in nature or even significantly mitigated by the simultaneous adoption of policy designed to offset the structural effects resulting under present strategy. It is more likely, however, that they will not be. Future economic circumstances and problems may well be compounded by the contemporary impact of Wenela in Rhodesia. 82/

X. THE LONGER TERM

In considering the longer-term of the Wenela link with Rhodesia, it is pertinent to assess both supply and demand factors as well as the socio-economic and political context within which they might operate.

The 'lesson' of Malawi's withdrawal has had important implications for such an assessment. On the one hand, it indicates that a politically conservative government can take 'radical action' on the South African labour supply question, at least in the short-term. This stands in stark contrast to the Mocambiquan government's apparent 'pragmatism'. How a future government in Rhodesia or Zimbabwe may act does thus not seem to depend simply either on professed ideology, level of dependence on mineworkers' remittances, or apparent state conservatism in terms of African nationalist policies. At this juncture, however, it would seem likely that the presently constituted government would maintain the Wenela link at least over the period of the Agreement. The same cannot be unambiguously said for a new government which might materialise out of the prevailing crisis in Rhodesia. On the other hand, however, the fact of Malawian disengagement is not an event which the Chamber of Mines (South Africa) would want to have happen again. The Chamber may well change its strategic considerations in regard to the level of dependence that employers will wish to build up with any one supplier state. In this context demand considerations may place limitations on the labour flow pattern, even if the cost of labour supplies to employers is raised in so doing.

Two questions thus need to be answered: how many workers could be recruited by Wenela, at least in theory, and how many Rhodesian workers could Wenela be likely to want to recruit, should they have the long-term option to do so?

A host of economic and political variables influence both of the above calculations. One method of approaching the first is to determine the theoretical maximum number of workers who, under 'market-wage' conditions alone, might be 'persuaded' to take up mine employment in South Africa. 83/ From ........
From this figure would need to be deducted those which local policy would ensure, by various means, were insulated from recruitment for the purpose of satisfying local employers in agriculture, industry, mining and (to a lesser extent) domestic employment. Clearly, both of these estimates, crude or otherwise, require some projection about likely structural developments in the economy. In particular, regard must be given to unemployment, income distribution, rural development, demographic trends, labour supply growth, foreign African labour policy as well as potential male/female substitution in local labour markets.

AN ASSESSMENT OF SUPPLY CONSTRAINTS

Consider, firstly, the trend in African labour supply. Data on labour supply, the change in numbers left non-employed, and other aspects of the 'unemployment debate', have received increasing attention since the publication of the 1969 Census. Many of the analytical conclusions drawn depend upon the conceptual framework used and the use made of available data. Only the salient points will be referred to here, more by way of this author's assessment as opposed to the setting out of the views of all the participants to the debate thus far.

The 1969 Census showed that there were 23,930 adult male 'workseekers' aged 16-60 years at the time of enumeration, a 'workseeker' being identified as a person who actively sought employment in the week before the Census was conducted. Hawkins has correctly criticised this interpretation as being essentially naive in that it ignores those potential workseekers available for employment who did not 'actively' seek work in that week. Hawkins has also shown that the 1962-69 increase in the adult male labour supply aged 16-60 years (after accounting for net emigration, retirement of persons aged 60 years and mortality estimated at 0.8 percent per annum) was in excess of the 1962-69 growth in formal African employment by 56,960. Thus, by 1969, ignoring the unsatisfied backlog of unemployed as of 1962, there were a larger number of persons who had to find subsistence from sources other than formal employment, e.g., in petty production, as employers, or in peasant production. At the same time, the 1969-75 increase in the adult African male potential labour supply was 430,820, as may be seen in the following table.

/TABLE 16 ......
TABLE 16.
AFRICAN ADULT MALE LABOUR SUPPLY CHANGES
1969-75

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>African Males reaching 16 years of age between 1969 and 1975</th>
<th>430 820</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Less mortality</td>
<td>72,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Less net emigration of foreigners</td>
<td>35 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Less those retiring (i.e. reaching 60 years of age)</td>
<td>65 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Net addition to labour supply</td>
<td>258 589</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


NOTE: 1) Mortality at 0.8 percent per annum is calculated as per C.A.L. Myburgh, RJE, 5,2, June 1971.
2) The recorded 1973 net inflow of foreign African men is discounted on the ground that it represented (mostly) new registrations and not an actual inflow.
3) The small increase in the numbers of the increase in the age group 16-20 years who became employers is discounted.
4) The 1975 figure for Wenela's outflow (8622) is not accounted for in the calculations in (3).

From this should be deducted mortality (72 100), net emigration (35 100) and retirement (65 100), leaving a net increase in supply of 258 589.

The numerical increase in adult men in employment (1969-75) was 175 200, leaving a (possible) shortfall of 128 900 who had to find subsistence elsewhere. If this is added to the 1962-1969 'backlog' (on Hawkins' estimate), the resultant figure is 188 900 adult men. Even using the very conservative Census estimate of 'unemployment' as of 1969, the resultant is an increase of 156 500 men left dependent on income sources outside the labour market. As a proportion of total adult male labour supply in 1975 these data represented a level of 13.08 percent and 10.84 percent respectively.

/Now .....
Now, it is possible to forecast labour supply for 1976-85 only by making assumptions about a) the foreign adult male net emigration rate and b) the likely trend in the Wenela outflow. Alternatively, in order to determine the scope for b), it would be possible first to assess labour supply with regard to a) - which might in the 1976-85 period be influenced profoundly by the Foreign Migratory Labour Act - and make an assessment of the potential increase in likely job creation.

For 1976-85 the inflow of men into the age groups 16-60 years will be 886 260 as may be seen in the table below. Deducting those persons who 'withdraw' through mortality (140 193) and retirement (176 630), the increase would be 569 437 adult men aged 16-60 years.

**TABLE 17.**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AFRICAN ADULT MALE LABOUR SUPPLY</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1976-85</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. African males reaching 16 years of age between 1976-85.</td>
<td>886 260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Less mortality</td>
<td>140 193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Less those retiring (i.e. reaching 60 years of age)</td>
<td>176 630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Net addition to labour supply before allowing for emigration of foreign men.</td>
<td>569 437</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**NOTE:**  
1) 1969 births (Jan-April) were adjusted on an annual basis.

2) Mortality estimates at 0.8 percent per annum as per C.A.L. Myburgh, RJE., 5,2, June 1971.

Added to the increase in the numbers who did not find formal employment in the 1962-76 period (using Hawkins' estimate of 60 000 for 1962-69), net additions to the adult African male labour supply amounted to 758 300 persons. If the net emigration of foreign African males is 70 000, 115 000 or 189 000 (posing three different possibilities), then the net /supply ......
supply will increase in the period by around 688 000, 643 000, or 569 000 respectively. This implies that for all these persons to take up employment, under the three options, jobs would have to be created for adult men at annual average rates of increase of around 68 000, 64 000 and 56 900 jobs respectively. Even taking the latter, most conservative measure which implies a severe application of the Foreign Migratory Labour Amendment Act and, after allowing for the fact of an increasing African female labour participation rate and a substantial increase in the number of African women who will not get jobs, as well as the possibility of some male/female substitution, it is clear that the employment creating power of the economy would have to rise markedly to absorb all these potential workers. 88/ For 1969-75 the number of jobs created for African adult males was on average only 29 000 per annum. And 1976 is expected to be a poor year, negligible or a low real growth in GDP being forecast for the year. It is more likely that the necessary requirement of this option, that nearly all foreign workers are forced out of Rhodesia by 1986, will be difficult to apply without serious disruption. Thus, even greater annual increases in employment (say around 64 000) will probably be needed in order to absorb all male persons in the 16-60 age group as shown in the second option. The potential Wenela off-take could thus be substantial when it is acknowledged that even a high job-creation trend for adult males of 50 000 per annum would mean that by 1986 there could be as many as 140 000 adult males who would not be able to take up formal employment under this option. Further, even if 25 percent of the adult male labour supply increase were 'economically inactive', this conclusion would still hold. 89/ Moreover, the Wenela exodus, it should be pointed out, is not a permanent emigration and thus an annual off-take of (say) 30 000 would not be cumulative. It can be calculated therefore that, from Rhodesia's viewpoint, the policy cannot solve the mounting 'unemployment' problem.

Data on income distribution patterns (the tendency being for increasing numbers of African males to take up jobs in wage categories below the Wenela 'offer-price') and rural development (which is proceeding very slowly) further point to the prospect that supply factors will not turn out to be the operative restraint.

It would thus appear that, in the absence of a state policy decision to stop the outflow of contractees to South Africa, there exists few likely supply constraints on Wenela recruitment. Such constraints could also, if they materialised in agrarian and mining production, be mitigated by the application of a more stringent policy in terms of the Foreign Migratory Labour ..........
Labour Amendment Act (1976), or the changing of the form of the Act to include women under its terms of reference. It is also possible if Malawi allowed South African recruitment again in the future, that the RALSC could obtain access to the Malawian contract labour market. This would have the effect of relieving 'shortages' in low-wage plantation agriculture. But, at this juncture, such a possibility appears unlikely. A further development of mechanisation both on the South African or Rhodesian mines and in agrarian production could have the same 'displacement' effect. It also seems improbable that wage policies in Rhodesia will alter radically in the future at the unskilled level in order to transform the prevailing wage differential between the latter form of work and mine labour in South Africa. Even if the differential closed, it would not markedly alter potential supply. And even after discounting the numbers of persons, theoretically 'advantaged' by mine employment, but who for personal, social or other reasons might not wish to go to South Africa, the potential supply could still remain at a level high enough to allow Wenela rapidly to increase its off-take to 50-50 000 and sustain a level above this in the years ahead. Further upward adjustment to real wage rates on South African mines would clearly simplify this task for Wenela.

OVERALL CHAMBER OF MINES LABOUR SUPPLY STRATEGY

The question of whether a maximum off-take 'fits' the Chamber of Mines' strategy remains. If 'normalised' political-economic inter-state relations pertained in the sub-continent, then supplier-states might be forced to compete on the basis of costs of reproduction of labour-supplies. However, under conditions of both uncertainty and changing socio-political conditions, there is a strong possibility that Wenela's strategy would follow a policy of maximising the number of supplier states and distributing, within bounds, the Chamber of Mines' demand for foreign labour across them. In such an instance, demand constraints could become operative. The application of a quota on Rhodesia, for April and May 1976, is positive evidence of the application of such a strategy.

How then might the demand for foreign labour in toto on South African gold mines be expected to grow? This would be both contingent on overall growth in labour demand and the South African/foreign worker ratio obtained. This ratio is rising at present. Offsetting a continuation of the latter trend is the possibility that higher 'wage-competitiveness' in urban-industrial South Africa will tend to raise wages and working costs. There will thus be a powerful set of economic pressures operating in South Africa to cause mine-owners to want to retain a substantial foreign dependence even if it is less than before. The growth and management of unemployment
in South Africa could of course diminish this requirement. Mechanisation on the mines, if successful, will also affect the volume as well as the pattern of demand. Expanded production could have a similar effect in an opposing direction and changing world gold prices will have a profound effect on the life of marginal mines, the rate of development of new mines as well as the volume of output in existing mines.

The above contingencies are all difficult to estimate and quantify for the forthcoming 5 or 10 year period. Such a forecast will not be attempted here. But it is necessary to identify those critical factors affecting future patterns in order to comprehend the limitations placed on an assessment of the South African Chamber of Mines' foreign labour policy in years to come. Given these qualifications, let it be assumed here that in respect of Rhodesia the Chamber's demand is unlikely to exceed 40 000 workers per annum at any stage in the next decade.

Two possible forms of future change dominate assessments on the mine labour supply issue between Rhodesia and South Africa: firstly, the possible consequences of a change in South African mine labour demand or strategy causing a fall in Wenela's demand for contract labour and the effects of this on the economy; and, secondly, the possible consequences of a 'phased' or 'total' withdrawal of the supplier state from the labour-supplying Agreement.

REDUCTION IN SOUTH AFRICAN DEMAND

A fall-off in South African demand for mine labourers from Rhodesia could be occasioned by a variety of factors e.g., a rapid increase in the intake of South Africans and the lowering of overall foreign labour demand along with the imposition of a more restrictive quota on supplier states. In these conditions, a less than average reduction in the quota on Rhodesia could depend on its assessed reliability as a supplier, as seen from the perspective of the Chamber of Mines (South Africa). In the event, however, any action could take the Rhodesian (or Zimbabwean) government 'by surprise' in that the latter might not have already taken measures to offset the effects locally e.g. higher unemployment in urban areas and reduced foreign exchange earnings. The ability of the supplier state to cope with such a contingency could depend on its long-term employment growth policy, land and rural development policy and social security provisions. It does not seem that a quota reduction will be imposed in the next couple of years under the Agreement.

/The Agreement ........
The Agreement does however stipulate that a minimum of 20,000 workers be contracted. For (say) 1978-80, the possibility that contract levels could settle around this minimum should not be overlooked. Eventually, however, further reductions could result. Under unchanged structural circumstances this 'shunting backwards' of 'redundant labour supplies' could have substantial socioeconomic implications inside Rhodesia. After 1980, when the Agreement becomes subject to one year's notice by either party, a complete reduction in South African demand for Rhodesian labour is theoretically possible. But, understandably from the South African mine owners' viewpoint, it is unlikely. The prospect of a controlled pattern of 'labour shedding' on an international basis seems more possible. What makes this option serious in its possible consequences is that it might occur without adequate planning having taken place in the supplier state to offset the effects introduced by new conditions.

**SUPPLIER STATE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE AGREEMENT**

**ITS VARIOUS POSSIBLE FORMS.**

The possibility of supplier state withdrawal from the Agreement could be considered from two viewpoints: that of 'phased' withdrawal and that of 'sudden' withdrawal. Each has a different potential impact, in degree if not in kind.

Theoretically, it might be anticipated that withdrawal could come under one of the two sets of conditions: those of expansion in the economy of the supplier state and those of limited development and/or stagnation. The former implies that withdrawal is used as a policy to increase local labour supplies, (possibly) keep down local wage rates and ensure that development does not proceed under conditions of severe 'labour shortage'. Given trends in labour supply, likely increases in the potential African female labour participation rate, the slow growth in employment in 1975-76, the time it would take for substantial economic recovery from the international recession, and even the possible withdrawal of capital that may flow from political transition, it might appear unlikely that in the 1976-85 period this eventuality will occur. Even a serious attempt to 'peasantise' the latent, unemployed and low-income workers now existing, and who are likely to be greater in number in future, by means of land reform programmes and rural development policies, will not guarantee that the supply of labour will be less than local demand. It is thus more realistic to consider withdrawal primarily from the perspective of an economy in which there will be difficulties in productively absorbing all those contractees who may be affected by a change in policy.

/Both
Both phased and sudden withdrawal could occur within the terms of the Agreement or outside of it. 'Illegal' withdrawal, i.e., reduction in the exodus below 20,000 workers in the 1976-80 period, or 'breaking' of the annually renewable contract between 1981-85, could occur if the government in the supplier state felt this necessary or desirable. In the event of a new regime in the country, it might even be locally considered that the Agreement, being a contract with an earlier administration, was no longer valid. This might then provide a rationale for withdrawal. On the other hand, 'illegal' withdrawal could invite sanctions or retaliation. The Chamber of Mines' desire or ability to do this would rest with its Members' power or control in the Rhodesian mining industry. Such actions would almost certainly be rebuked and/or thwarted by the supplier state. The South African government may also have some sanction, however, which should not be overlooked. As a consequence, 'illegal' withdrawal from the Agreement could have other unanticipated effects detrimental to the supplier state.

Phased withdrawal in terms of the Agreement could take place at almost any stage from the end of 1976 onwards, assuming that the 20,000 minimum is reached by year end. It could involve either gradual or rapid reduction to the 20,000 level, the off-take being kept at the level for 1977-79, and the Agreement being terminated in 1980 after appropriate notice or else renegotiated downwards to the level accepted by the supplier state or imposed by South African needs. The character and timing of phased withdrawal could thus affect the international location of the growth in local labour supplies as well as foreign exchange receipts.

Complete withdrawal in terms of the Agreement can only take place after 1979. The impact of such a withdrawal then would depend on structural conditions at that time, both in South Africa and the supplier state.

Having outlined the potential forms of withdrawal, it is now possible to make a crude evaluation of some potential effects that the above changes might have.

SOME POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF WITHDRAWAL

The effects of withdrawal will depend upon: 1) the timing and phasing, if any 2) the state of the local labour market 3) the composition by age and domicile of the contractees who return 4) the degree of planned and effective ......
and effective preparation made by the government to cope with the re-
quirements of finding subsistence and/or productive employment for re-
patriated workers 5) the ability of the economy to forego the reduction
of foreign exchange involved 6) the effect on income distribution, con-
sumption and savings patterns.

Perhaps the most critical issue in the event of withdrawal relates to its
potential effect on local unemployment, especially its socioeconomic
character, regional location and cost (in terms of necessary offsetting
policies and/or impact on the reserve economy). Withdrawal after 1980
will most likely occur in conditions of mounting local unemployment, possibly
concentrated in urban centres from where many of the contractees would have
already been recruited. This itself could occasion a more severe application
of the Foreign Migratory Labour Amendment Act, its application to women and
even the declaration of certain areas of or occupations in mining and/or
agricultural employment as Closed Labour Areas. A total withdrawal could
make these effects more pronounced or cause them to be introduced sooner.

It thus appears that one cost of the Wenela link is its longer-term
impact of making withdrawal a very difficult process. The effect of the
Wenela link in forestalling structural reform may thus only be limited.

Almost inevitably, the severity of the local unemployment crisis will re-
assert itself, structural changes at this point become more necessary except
at the price of a heightened degree of social control. A new form of
dependency will thus have been created.

Withdrawal could also, apart from increasing unemployment at the unskilled
level and among the young, concentrate the demand for jobs amongst work-
seekers on mine employment with a possible consequence that wage increases
in this sector might become more easily resisted by employers. Also, a
withdrawal could tend to increase the numbers of persons dependent for
subsistence on urban petty production or the Tribal Trust Lands. The
farm 'labour shortage', should it then still prevail, might also be much
eased by withdrawal, provided workers were effectively diverted to these
jobs. At the same time, the tendency towards a higher female labour parti-
cipation rate might become less pronounced. Many of the above effects,
however, would be contingent on possible changes that might be made in
labour, social and rural development policy. These changes would not only
depend on economic necessities but would be affected by the future balance
of political interests.

/The crucial ......
The crucial variables which cannot be forecast are thus political and
development strategy. Whatever the outcome in the future though, it would
not seem wise for planners in the economy to adopt a formulation suggested
by Ward for Lesotho whereby the state 'locks in' its future to the South
African labour market. Essentially, such a strategy underpins recent
recommendations for Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho made by Stahl. The
latter has advocated a 'commercial policy of labour export' under which
the 'Governments of BLS should approach the South African government and
negotiate an arrangement whereby BLS --- could take up employment in the
secondary and tertiary sectors'. For Rhodesia, with its productive
possibilities, such a strategy would be grossly sub-optimal, even if South
African labour relaxations allowed higher returns to contractees. A
more appropriate concern should clearly be with local development.

The quest for 'autonomous development' is, however, more easily specified
than achieved. Total withdrawal à la Malawi would not necessarily guarantee
such a prospect for Rhodesia or Zimbabwe. A fact to be borne in mind
also is that a reported 80 000 black Rhodesians live 'illegally' in South
Africa, many of them allegedly in domestic employment in and around the
Rand. Whilst South African authorities have relaxed a threatened
expulsion of these workers in late 1975, and offered an amnesty in March,
1976, under which registered 'aliens' would not be liable for repatriation,
the fact remains that this large number of persons could be forced to re­
enter Rhodesia in the future. The 1976 amnesty was an attempt to 'regu­
larise' their employment status. Apparently, the amnesty followed South
African/Rhodesian negotiations over repatriation in late 1975. After
1st April 1976 all illegally employed adult male Rhodesian blacks were
given 6 weeks to get registered. They are now only allowed authorised
employment in domestic jobs, as waiters in licenced restuarants, as emp­
loyees in the hotel industry or as farm and mine labourers. Furthermore,
employers must deposit a non-refundable repatriation fee of R50.00 (or
R20.00 for farm labourers in non-prescribed areas) as well as paying a
certain percentage of the worker's wages to the Bantu Administration Board
for transmission to the worker's home district in Rhodesia!. Persons
found 'illegally' employed after 15th May 1976, are liable to repatriation.

The prospect of repatriation of 'illegal' residents in South Africa is
thus real from the present time onwards. The prospect of a change in
policy forcing out even those now in legal jobs also should not be dis­
counted in assessments of employment growth requirements on Rhodesia.
X1. CONCLUSIONS

The implantation of a formal contract labour system for South African mines has transformed Rhodesia into an exporter of mine labour for its dominant partner in the Southern African economic complex. Earlier policies of 'internalisation' of (local) labour supply mechanisms were only a temporary prelude to this new export-orientation.

The Rhodesian state is now involved in the orchestration of a complex foreign labour policy. On the one hand, it seeks to shift labour into labour-scarce and low-wage primary industries whilst at the same time exporting local workers as contractees to South Africa. On the other, it is seeking to 'indigenise' the higher-wage jobs by pushing many foreign incumbents into a choice to either repatriate themselves or take up lower-wage jobs on mines and farms. This two-handed policy is designed around broad stabilising requirements, in particular the possibly irreconcilable goals of the need to forestall structural changes and reduce African (urban) unemployment.

The state has successfully overcome initial tensions between employers and Wenela to date - though these have not yet been severely tested. Wenela is now functioning to stabilise the centre as well as the periphery of the economic system. This represents a new phase in the development of the economy and a new aspect of the international division of labour reserves in Southern Africa. In particular, the inflow of labour to South Africa may reduce the prospects of outflows of 'fresh' investment capital from that economy to Rhodesia, one cause of prior investment being the abundant supplies of Rhodesian labour for expansion in industrial production in relation to relative 'labour shortages' in South Africa. Wenela's inflow to South Africa has a subsidiary impact of reducing the otherwise higher level of demand that would be placed on black labour in the South African urban-industrial complex. It also further 'de-nationalises' the Southern African labour force.

The exodus of workers to South Africa has also made more insecure the continued fact and form of job-tenure of foreign workers in Rhodesia. This has implications for the countries of origins of these (various) nationals ....
nationals, notably Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. It is unlikely, however, that the effect of the Agreement, in an attempt to 'solve' local unemployment problems, will be other than short-term. Long-term structural problems on this count will not be eradicated merely by contracting into the South African mine labour systems. It thus appears likely that these difficulties will again come more prominently to the fore in the late 1970's or early 1980's. By that stage, withdrawal from the Agreement may compound the severity of the local crisis.

The evidence on the Wenela connection with Rhodesia also indicates that South African mine labour policy has been used to mediate the closer integration of the various modes and forms of production in Southern Africa. The utilisation of the reserve economies of the region are also now more closely intertwined. In this context, it is perhaps pertinent to point to the need for a more adequate 'theory of the labour reserve' than now exists in the literature. Leys' attempt at analysis of the political economy of the Lesotho labour reserve is a step in this direction, but it does not wholly explain the process of accumulation in the Southern African economic system. In Rhodesia, the essential accumulation process remains the 'primitive' form, albeit in its advanced 'scientific' phase, even though some firms or industries pay in excess of labour's cost of reproduction and are able to depend upon retained earnings for re-investment requirements. Taking South Africa as a whole, which means accounting for agrarian industry, the same situation probably pertains. A more pertinent and comprehensive theory of sub-continental labour reserves thus appears to be a necessary component for an adequate theory and analysis of accumulation at this juncture.

Data for the period up to 1933 are drawn from Charles van Onselen, Op. cit.

On these issues see G. Arrighi, op cit; M.C. Steele, The African Agricultural Labour Supply Crisis 1924-1928, Labour Research Seminar No. 6, Department of Economics, University of Rhodesia, 1973 (mimeo); and D.G. Clarke, Agricultural and Plantation Workers in Rhodesia, Mambo Press, Gwelo, 1976, (f/c).

For details on WNLA in this period see William Gemmill, The Growing Reservoir of Native Labour for the Mines, Optima, 2, 2, June, 1952.

For details see Peter Scott, op.cit.


ibid., p.7.

Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary of Native Affairs and the Chief Native Commissioner, 1944, p.203.

ibid. These estimates exclude the authorised outflow from Rhodesia via Bulawayo and Plumtree.

For details on the A.N.L.L. see D.G. Clarke, Contract Workers, op.cit., Appendix A.

See here correspondence from the General Manager, RNLSC to the Department of Labour, 15 January 1964, especially the following comment: 'Nyasaland appears to be very much in the pocket of the Republic'.

There has been no farm wage minimum application in Rhodesia to date.


Roger Leys, op. cit.

...
The production of gold is here considered as an 'unproductive function' from the perspective that its 'consumption' does not have any effect on either reducing the costs of subsistence of labour or adding to 'productive capacity' directly or indirectly, or reducing the costs of raw materials used in producing other commodities.


See the lengthy article by W.D. Wilson in *Optima*, 25. 2. 75. It was also around this time, for a brief period of a couple of years, that AAC 'broke away' from the wage-fixing collusive agreement of the seven mining houses under the auspices of the Gold Producer's Committee of the Chamber of Mines.


The longer-term perspective should be kept in mind in this regard, notably the fact that real wages for black miners did not increase in the 1911-69 period. See Francis Wilson, *Labour in the South African Gold Mines 1911-69*, Cambridge, 1972. Account should also be taken of the effect of the need for wage increases to compensate against deteriorating conditions in the reserves. At least AAC appears to have conducted a survey into these conditions at this time. See *Financial Mail*, 17. 5. 74.


*Financial Mail*, 7.1.75. This date appears to have been the lowest point of the Crisis as considered by this indicator.

According to *Sunday Express*, 22.9.74, Frelimo statutes (No.15) stated that Frelimo would strive 'for the abdication of compulsory labour and existing immigration arrangements by which Mozambique workers are sent to South Africa and other colonial countries'. For a historical perspective on Mozambique contract labour see David Webster, *Colonialism, Underdevelopment and Migrant Labour in Southern Mozambique*, University of the Witwatersrand, 1975, (mimeo).

For details of the Mine Labour Agreement between Mozambique and the Republic of South Africa and the Treaty of 1964 see W.J. Breytenbach, *Migratory Labour Arrangements in Southern Africa*, Africa Institute, 1972. Francis Wilson, *op. cit.* also reports that the average Mozambiquan works 413 shifts per contract compared to 383 for 'Tropicals' and 248 for workers from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. The effect of a higher shift rate is not only to increase labour supply but to reduce costs of recruitment per unit of labour-time.

The lessons of Malawi's withdrawal have profound implications, yet no analysis on the domestic impact of the move is available. It is understood however, that whilst some urban unemployment has become noticeable, the effects have been cushioned in part by the receipt of British foreign aid.


See *Financial Mail*, 17.5.74 and *Rand Daily Mail*, 9.12.74


32/ ibid.


34/ For some details on this research programme see *Financial Mail*, 17.10.74.

35/ For an exposition on the implications of polyvalency in labour policy see Ernest Feder, *The Rape of the Peasantry*, New York, 1971. In terms of diagnosis of wage policy in Southern Africa generally, it is this writer's contention that much too little attention has been given to this aspect of labour cost minimisation and its effects on dependents.

36/ It is reported that of the 79,000 black miners recruited for the mines from South Africa about 85 percent have come from the Transkei. See *Financial Mail*, 7.1.75.

37/ *Financial Mail*, 4.4.75. For details on contemporary farm labour conditions see Merle Lipton, *White Farming: A Case Study of Change in South Africa*, *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, II, 1, March 1974.

38/ It would be wrong however, to attribute these wage increases wholly to the effect of competition. As in Rhodesia, on the estates of *Ltd.* (a subsidiary of Huletts Corporation of South Africa), farm wage increases have signified partly a transition to more stable labour supplies. In the Rhodesian example cited above, the increase in wage was necessary for the earning of higher profits. See D.G. Clarke, *Agricultural Workers*, op.cit.

39/ For some comparative data on contracts, although now dated, see W.J. Breytenbach, *op.cit*.


41/ For example see Margaret Murphy, *Report on Malnutrition in Rhodesia*, RCBC Commission on Social Service and Development, February 1976, (mimeo) where it is noted that for Manicaland the incidence of malnutrition amongst under 5 year olds rose from 0.60 percent to 1.47 percent from 1973-75. These data were compiled on the basis of 20 clinic centres and 10 mobile clinics.


44/ Based on reported redundancies of approximately 4,000 by February 1976 and evidence of short-time working in manufacturing.

45/ See *Rhodesia, National Accounts*, *op.cit*.

46/ ......
Rhodesia Herald, 13 January 1976, Emphasis added. For a critique of this 'exploration' of the 'labour shortage' in agriculture see D.G. Clarke, Agricultural Workers, op.cit.

D.G. Clarke, Contract Workers, op.cit.

By unforeseen I mean that in Rhodesia it was not even considered a likely option until the announcement of the Agreement. In the source cited in the previous footnote I had argued that the structural tendencies in foreign African labour policy were leading to an 'internalisation' of labour supply mechanisms in Rhodesia. Whilst the case at the time, in retrospect this view should be qualified by the new fact of 'internalisation' and labour export.


For data see Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, C.S.O. Salisbury, 1976. The 1973 'inflow' of 3 950 comprised a large number of re-registrations of 'foreign adult African males' by the authorities.

Part of the high 1975 exodus was occasioned by an outflow of Mozambiquan workers in the Eastern Districts leaving employment in the wake of the establishment of Frelimo control over Mozambique, See for example, Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 30 October 1975.

See here details in RALSC, Chairman's Report for the Financial Year Ended 31 December 1974, Salisbury, (mimeo). The 1975 Annual Report, due in March 1976, has been delayed, reportedly until May. It is understood this may be connected with the possible decision to close the RALSC and 'call it a day' as well as save monies for the exchequer. Should this happen, one of the most damaging institutions in the economy will have come to a formal end. The end it served, however, will remain unaltered by such an event - other means (e.g. the use of informal internal African labour mediating labour-scarce farms and labour-surplus reserves) having already been put into operation to supplant the 'parent' mechanism for the generation and canalising' of cheap labour supplies to plantations.

See Rhodesia Herald, 5 May 1975.

C.S.O., African Employers, op.cit.

Rhodesia, Parliamentary Debates: House of Assembly, 4, 92, 17 Feb., 76,

C.S.O., African Employees, op.cit.

Based on discussions with the Wenela General Manager in Rhodesia, Mr. H. Plumb, February 1976.

For some reasons why the labour content of gold production has been stressed see M. Williams; An Analysis of South African Capitalism: Neo-Ricardianism or Marxism, Bulletin of the Conference of Socialist Economists, IV, 1, February 1975.
See Presidential Address, Chamber of Mines Rhodesia, 9 April 1975. (mimeo) where the following statement is found: 'the availability of unskilled labour, both now and in the future, has become much more problematical since the government permitted Wenela to recruit Rhodesians for the South African mines. This decision, which could have serious repercussions for our mining industry, was made without the usual consultations with the Chamber. This was a grave departure from the Government's normal procedures but I am assured that it will not be repeated .... the more unfortunate consequences which might have ensued were averted by the co-operative attitude adopted by Wenela itself'.


See for instance the reported fall off in production noted in Grain Marketing Board, Annual Report 1975, Salisbury.

Data in this section are extracted from the Agreement contained on the reverse of the contract form signed by each contractee. Additional perspectives came from Wenela propaganda handed to contractees (documents in the vernacular translated by Wilbert Garaba).


Wenela representatives in Salisbury explained these reasons as: dislike of underground work, being 'trouble makers' and being 'disturbed' and 'unsettled'.

G.M.E. Leistner and W.J. Breytenbach, The Black Worker of South Africa, Africa Institute No. 26, Pretoria, 1975, p.15, report a figure of 11 000 black Rhodesian workers as reported by the 1970 Census in South Africa. This is undoubtedly low. Dept. of Bantu Affairs figures are much higher. For example, see Rhodesia Herald, 3 April 1976.

I am grateful to Nicholas Dziva who conducted the interviews in the vernacular.

When starting operations, the Acting Manager of Wenela (Mr. N.D. Nicolle) conducted an on the spot review of unemployment in and around Salisbury. From this cursory investigation, he was well-satisfied as to the extensive evidence of urban unemployment in Salisbury. It is also worth reporting the comment of the President of the South African Chamber of Mines that an off-take of 20 000 contractees 'would not make a dent in the local labour market'.

See Business Herald, 6 February 1976; and Financial Mail, 9 May 1975.

I am grateful to Ian Phimister for pointing this out to me.

It is an interesting point to be recorded that, according to the General Manager of Wenela in Rhodesia, the publication of political news indicating heightening of the local political crisis and/or possibility of change has brought about immediate fall-off in recruitment intake levels.

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See, for example, the estimate of annual Chamber of Mines food cost per worker for 1970 of R59.00 noted in C.W. Stahl; A Commercial Strategy in the Labour Export Market with Reference to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, Botswana Notes and Records, 7, 1975.

Data from Financial Mail, 23.7.75.

Discussion with Mr. N. Nicolle, Wenela, Salisbury.

See Rhodesia Herald 27 January, 1975, in which Dr. Alves said: 'I do not believe it is in the interests of the health of the African population of this country that they should work in the South African gold mines'.

On labour and social conflicts involving Rhodesian miners see Financial Mail, 29 August 1975. These issues have also been raised in the House of Assembly by African M.P.'s in 1976.

This caricature should of course be tempered with the fact that a not dissimilar position was held, in some respects, in the case of Mozambiquan workers, a number of whom of late have been recruited from Maputo.

A similar point applies for other supplier states. This appears to be seldom mentioned, if at all, in the literature on the effect of migrancy on the economic structures of dependent states. In this case, the greater the extent of dependence on contract labour, the greater the danger of imported inflation.


A pertinent point, made by Samir Amin, is relevant here: what (migrant labour) supplier state has developed to the extent of its recipient partner in the 'labour transfer'?

The 'theoretical maximum' is here conceived of as excluding workers deemed necessary to local production whom Rhodesian employers would not readily wish to go to South Africa.


These issues have been examined at greater length in D.G. Clarke, African Unemployment and Economic Structure in Rhodesia, 1976, (forthcoming).
The assumption made here is that the same male juvenile/adult employment proportions in 1969 (juveniles being 7.38 percent of the male labour force) pertained in 1975.

For 1969-75 the net inflow of females into the 16-60 age group was in excess of 300 000. For 1976-85 it will be in excess of 750 000.

C.A.L. Myburgh, Updated Population Trends, op.cit., has argued that a 20-30% inactivity rate applies to African adult males in Rhodesia. This may be disputed as being high, on a number of grounds, e.g., that it considers the rate in abstract from the manner in which the reserve economy functions to absorb (and eventually repel) unemployed persons.

Herein lies a 'paradox' for Malawi should it decide to re-enter the labour market. Being a low-cost supplier it would, under a new Chamber strategy, be left incapable of 'exploiting' its relative comparative advantage.

The 'paradox' of the economy with high and growing unemployment also importing foreign labour, which prevailed for Rhodesia up to 1976, also applies to South Africa. See Francis Wilson, 'Unresolved Issues in the South African economy: Labour' S.A.J.E. December 1975.

Michael Ward, op.cit.
C.W. Stahl, op.cit.
ibid., p.91.
Rhodesia Herald, 13 September 1975.
According to the Star (4.10.1976) the number of Black Rhodesians illegally in South Africa is somewhere between 80 000 and 100 000, the majority being in the Johannesburg - Pretoria area.
Rhodesia Herald, 9 January 1976.
ibid.
Roger Leys, Lesotho: Non-Development or Under-Development: Towards an Analysis of the Political Economy of the Labour Reserve, African Studies Institute, University of Witwatersrand, 1974 (mimeo).