RURAL DEVELOPMENT
IN
BOTSWANA

Norman Reynolds

Saldu Working Paper No. 13

Cape Town

September 1977
Contents

Introduction 1
The First Decade, 1966-1976 1
Current Problems 3
The Task Before Botswana 6
Drought Relief and the Guarantee of Employment 19
Conclusion 28

Tables

I Income Required to Raise Family Incomes of the Five Poorest Classes to the Poverty Datum Line 7
II Hypothetical Family Budget of Family in Poorest 5% Category with an Employment Guarantee Programme and a Company Grazing System 27

Figure

Model Organisation of Rural Development 24

Note: Norman Reynolds is Programme Officer for Rural Development, the Ford Foundation, New Delhi, India. On secondment to Saldru.
Acknowledgements

Saldru wishes to express its grateful thanks to the Ford Foundation, India for its generosity in seconding Dr. Reynolds to Saldru for three months, June - August, 1977.

We are grateful too, to the Harry Oppenheimer Institute for African Studies at the University of Cape Town for a grant enabling Dr. Reynolds to travel through Southern Africa in order to undertake the research on which this paper is based.

Glossary

ARDP - Accelerated Rural Development Programme
TGLP - Tribal Grazing Land Programme

Saldru is affiliated to the Centre for African Studies, University of Cape Town.
Introduction

Botswana has completed a decade as an independent country. When Botswana became independent in 1966 she represented an unlikely case for an economic success story. Her resources were a vast semi-arid and arid tableland; a potential but difficult to exploit water resource in the Okavango delta; a small relatively young population with few modern skills and with little formal education; a large herd of cattle (1.2 million); and abundant wild life which promised the development of a tourist industry if that resource were carefully husbanded.

At independence none could foresee the time when Botswana would be able to finance her own development. Like the other two Southern African ex-British Protectorates, Botswana was, and looked like remaining, a bread-basket case with the common additional complication of heavy reliance on migrant participation in the South African economy. The discovery in the late 1960s of valuable mineral resources, diamonds at Orapa, copper-nickel at Selebe-Phikwe and coal at Morongule has changed Botswana's economic position.

Botswana's open and democratic society has lent a special moral stature to the country within the increasingly problematic political conditions of Southern Africa. Her domestic financial strength, exhibited in the recent decision to introduce her own currency, provides Botswana with the chance to forge new economic policy instruments and programmes, particularly on rural development, that could provide valuable lessons for the region.

The First Decade

Botswana's first decade of independence has been well used to realise the discoveries of mineral wealth and to begin developing democratic institutions and government capacities. Official statements, in particular the National Development Plan 1976-81, stress the need to turn attention to the large disparities within the countryside and between the countryside and the towns.

Mineral development, the growth of government, the initial provision of physical and social infrastructure, and a run of fair to good weather has expanded the economy considerably. Between 1966 and 1973/74 GDP rose from P37 million to P192 million and per capita GDP from P68 to P305. The
leading sectors being Mining and Building it inevitably meant that the first decade was characterised by high capital outlays. In agriculture, good weather, following a drought-cycle prior to independence, led to the build up of herds (1976 about 3 million cattle) which culminated in the substantial export of beef to Europe in the early and mid-1970s. Organised slaughter and export through the Botswana Meat Commission (BMC), good veterinary services and favourable prices enabled the payment to farmers by the BMC to rise from P9,2 million in 1970 to P28 million in 1974. The throughput of cattle only doubled from 127 000 to 210 000 over the same five year period, a slight decline in the percentage off-take of the national herd from about 8% to about 7,7%.

The second and most important half of Botswana's first decade saw a concentration of funds on construction and fixed capital formation that was largely urban in character and witnessed increased off-take of cattle with high profits to those in a position to sell. Both factors favoured those better placed to take advantage of these extraordinary developments. Those less well placed presumably lost ground as income disparities grew. Indeed, official figures show that the lower income households lost absolutely: their GDP per capita rose 23% while their cost of living rose 50% over the period 1964-74.

Aware that the rapid growth of the economy was lopsided, Government took several measures to redress the balance. In 1972 an Accelerated Rural Development Programme was launched. The ARDP funded the construction of education, health and other physical infrastructure. District Councils and Village Development Committees were drawn into the management of the programme with mixed but generally better results than were expected. Also in 1972, the Government requested Messrs. R. Chambers and D. Feldman to prepare a Report on Rural Development upon which the Government could act. The Report, which will be discussed later, won ready acceptance by Government for most of its proposals, the central part of which is embraced in Government's recent White Paper No. 2 of 1975, the Tribal Grazing Land Programme (TGLP). In the last year a most useful survey on Rural Income Distribution has been completed. The Survey's findings underline the urgency with which Government must adopt effective measures to reverse the impoverishment of roughly half the rural population and to do so within institutional conditions that will further promote the commercial ranching of cattle and assist in the beginning of a more viable crop agriculture.
3.

It is believed that Government will soon announce the setting up of a Commission on Local Government to report within the year. Extensive discussions currently being conducted at the District and Village level on the TGLP White Paper proposals and the work of the expected Commission on Local Government suggest that by early 1978 Botswana could have the legislative and the programmatic wherewithal to tackle the central economic and social problem of growing rural poverty.

Current Problems

The purpose of this paper is to review the requirements for successful rural development in Botswana and to evaluate current approaches against those requirements. The paper will argue that Botswana is moving towards an overly legalistic and a rather too mechanistic approach that is not in keeping with local conditions and the small size of the population, 725 000.

Botswana's rural economy is fragile, governed as it is by the uncertainty of the rains. In the past some 35 000 Botswana annually have sought work in South Africa as migrants. In other words, one-quarter of the male labour force underwrote the fluctuations in rural incomes, as weather varied, by work outside the country. Today it is known thanks to the Rural Income Distribution Survey, that many in fact seek work outside the rural areas because of rural poverty. The Survey discovered that 40% of the rural households, containing 35% of the rural population, live below the rural poverty datum line (household annual income of P507 in cash and kind). There appears to be a strong correlation between the maldistribution of income, similar maldistribution in the ownership of cattle and the present low productivity of arable farming.

The high capital:employment ratio of recent years has held back the general growth of employment opportunities. Between 1972-75 employment in the Government sector, mostly in education, grew 40%; in mining, manufacturing and construction it grew 27%; and in large scale farming it grew by only 4%. The completion of much of the construction and the fixed capital formation of the recent phase of economic growth means that employment growth in the first two categories will slump. In 1975 only 20% of those whose education qualified them for employment in the formal sector had a job. The National Development Plan 1976-81 predicts that by the year 2000, and given high rates of employment growth, the proportion of those qualified in jobs will rise to
only 25%. Clearly there is a great need to create employment in the countryside if rural poverty is not to spread into the towns and if Botswana's present reliance on migrant work in South Africa is not to remain a potential Achilles heel to her economic and social stability.

The success story of beef exports to Europe hides the problems that accompany a larger national herd and, accepting the apparent slight decline in off-take levels, the destruction of pasture land. The demonstration of some capacity in local government to oversee building programmes, as in the ARDP, and a beginning to economic management with the tribal Land Boards is encouraging. Nonetheless, there is no regular or standby drought relief machinery that can come into play quickly and efficiently. As a result, families, particularly the 70% of rural households whose income equals that of the top 5%, cannot afford to make the decision to rely on Botswana's undoubted financial strength to carry them through periods of drought. Until that condition is met it is unlikely that technical and market infrastructure improvements by themselves will enable the poor majority to improve their stake in the rural economy.

Botswana has, on the drawing board, a Labour Intensive Construction Unit. Given the history of capital intensive construction and maintenance methods borrowed from South Africa this is a significant departure of great potential benefit to the country. The aim is to develop labour intensive construction techniques in a pilot organisation that can be then be adopted nationally. Lesotho has recently set up such an organisation as a part of the Ministry of Works. Both countries are likely to face the same problems in getting their units off the ground. The pressure for jobs and the expectation of full-time employment by a Government organisation - backed by minimum wage law in Lesotho and by an Incomes Policy in Botswana which so far has worked rather as a minimum wage mechanism - makes it difficult to predict a wage rate that will attract labour and yet be low enough to make labour-intensive methods viable. In Botswana the consultants have recommended a wage rate above P1.00 per day\(^1\) which is almost certainly too high for the purpose.

In Lesotho the difficulty is compounded by the use of the labour intensive construction unit as a contractor to bid for work required by other departments. This has led, in only the first flush of the unit's life, to

\(^{1}\) P0,86 = Rand 1,00.
Government's apparent insistence that the unit become absorbed in the construction of Maseru's prestigious international airport. The unit is necessarily small (250 employees in the first year and 500 thereafter) because of its experimental nature and its expensive foreign technician leadership. The fundamental obstacles, however, are the setting - a small net increase in employment of a full time nature within the requirements of law and popular expectations set against the alternative of migrant work at recently enhanced rates in South Africa. An alternative approach is suggested below, the strength of which is its ability to provide part-time work at rates below those ruling in the countryside; rates which are a fraction of the present urban determined rate for full-time employment.

The long period of benign colonial neglect has left Botswana with little technology suited to her rather extreme agricultural conditions and with little skilled manpower or institutional capacity to produce the same. Botswana's willingness to use foreign experts provides her with the ability to draw upon international experience as a short cut. This Botswana is doing as problems are identified. It is more difficult to create an ethos and organisational arrangements which allow local (field) interests to govern the work of short-term foreign technicians. Similarly, it would be unfortunate if the training and early work experience of national technicians were to be unduly influenced by the social and the professional status elements introduced by foreigners.

Botswana's central government is organised much as many other third world governments in terms of Ministries of Planning and Finance, Agriculture, Works, Local Government and Lands, Education, Home and Foreign Affairs. It is distinguished by having a Ministry of Mineral Resources and Water Affairs, in keeping with their unique place in the economy. What marks Government functioning is its openness and the amount of structured inter-Ministerial contact (through the mechanism of committees). As Government has sought to tackle more complex issues so the need for contact between Ministries has increased. Today some key committees have been given executive powers. The growing complexity of decision making through the use of committees fits the present phase in which Government is attempting to advance on a number of fronts at once. It also reflects the weakness of local government and the concentration of power at the top, this despite official intentions to the contrary.
The Centre, finding its own way in terms of policy and programmes and operating in an open manner, is also charged with the husbanding of local democratic institutions. It is doing the latter under difficult circumstances: there is little trained manpower and there is the undoubted handicap of a still heavy reliance on expatriates to staff many key central and local positions. It will be of great interest to see how the expected Commission on Local Government proposes to handle the matter. The virtual absence of nationals in the Local Planning and Local Lands officers posts (two in each of ten districts) may reflect the short period during which the country has consciously attempted to create manpower of that type. It may also reflect the present paucity of entrance points to rural management, a too formal approach to selection for government service and, as discussed below, an inappropriate search for precision which discounts local knowledge and local capacities.

Once a clearer approach to the problems of the countryside is gained it should be possible to simplify in the Central Government arrangements for policy making and for supervision and to devolve much of the daily management to local government and other semi-autonomous units. The number of current ad hoc proposals should all be reviewed in this light.

Botswana does appear to have successfully separated the traditional roles of the Tribal Authorities from the newer concerns of the District Councils, especially over land use and infrastructure development and management. Some overlapping of representation remains that should prove amenable to reform. The present balance struck between popular and traditional representation remains delicate and its evolution could be upset should the more economically stronger rural families seek to protect their interests by alliance with the Tribal Authorities. Careful attention must be given to programme formulation if that stultifying development is to be avoided.

The Task Before Botswana

Rural development in Botswana, particularly the reduction of rural income disparities and the provision of increasing levels of productive employment to her young and fast growing population, may be looked at in two ways. Since 1972/73 Botswana has had a surplus of recurrent revenues over expenditures. In 1975/76 revenue was P72 million and expenditure P47 million,
a surplus of P25 million. Foreign aid that year was P30 million. Revenue projections in the National Development Plan to 1980/81 show a continued and strong growth in revenue. In that year revenue is projected at P120 million. Botswana's financial strength means that she can cover local costs while making commitments to large future debt services. Botswana can afford to develop and fund her own programmes without recourse to foreign aid while retaining the capacity to fund the local costs of aided projects. The real test is likely to be the converse: how well can Botswana develop programmes and build the capacity to absorb large funds in the countryside?

A simple but satisfactory measure of the level of funding required to flow into the countryside to remove rural poverty can be constructed from the Rural Income Distribution Survey. Using data that is reproduced in the National Development Plan in table 4.1 we can estimate the income required to raise to the poverty line the family incomes of the 40% of the rural households whose income is below that line. For this purpose the 220 000 rural population who fall below the poverty line is divided by 5.5 (persons per household) to reach the figure of 40 000 households.

Table 1  Income Required to Raise Family Incomes of the Five Poorest Economic Classes to the Poverty Datum Line

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>No.of Families</th>
<th>Annual Household after Tax Income</th>
<th>Extra Income required per Household (2)</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poorest 5%</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>P182</td>
<td>P450</td>
<td>P2 250 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5% - 10%</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>P233</td>
<td>P400</td>
<td>P2 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10% - 20%</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>P325</td>
<td>P300</td>
<td>P3 000 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20% - 30%</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>P402</td>
<td>P120</td>
<td>P1 200 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30% - 40%</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>P507</td>
<td>P 50</td>
<td>P 500 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Poverty Datum Line approx. P507  Total cost : P8 950 000

(1) Derived from Table 4.1 page 72 National Development Plan 1976-81.

(2) These are rough estimates based on class intervals. As a result they are conservative since they treat all families in each class as having the top income for the class. In the 30% - 40% class an arbitrary income gap of P50 is used to provide an estimate.

The households in the poorest category require P450 extra income per year to raise family income to the poverty line. At the other extreme P50 per year would suffice for the 30% - 40% class closest to the poverty line. The total amount required is P9 million per year, or about one-third of Botswana's present surplus on current account.
The difficult question to answer is how P9 million can be usefully placed in the pockets of those 40,000 odd unidentified poor families. Projected expenditure by District Councils in 1980/81 is P8.5 million, but over half of that goes to pay establishment costs. In the National Development Plan it is stressed that Government intends to see that development expenditure in the rural areas does not fall below the planned 29% of all development expenditure. Communication, mainly roads, is projected to claim a further 32% of development expenditure. For 1980/81 it means expenditures of P18 million and P20 million for rural development and communication respectively or P38 million out of a total of P62 million. These figures must be compared with an average planned total outlay of development expenditure during the three years 1973-74 to 1975-76 of P30 million and actual expenditures that averaged P20 million.

The National Development Plan 1976-81 admits that "Government's limited capacity to implement projects is a greater constraint on rural development than the shortage of finance". Also that increased knowledge of the problems shows how much more difficult a task it is than was first thought. There is a need "for greater precision" in reaching those in small villages and in unusual environments who tend to be the worst off. Further it is stated that "much innovation" is required by Government. The tone of this is disturbing. It appears in full clarity in the next statement. "For each project, Government must be clear precisely which group it is trying to assist, precisely what it can achieve, and precisely how it can achieve this".

The insistence on precision jars with the rather general and not unusual objectives set for rural development, with the complexity, mobility and sparseness of Botswana's rural population; with the high risks which attend agricultural production; with the pervasive poverty; with the ill-effects on family production of large numbers of men away as migrants in South Africa; and with the admitted limited capacity of Government and the general lack of skilled or suitably experienced people.

1. Para. 4.3 page 67
2. Para. 4.5 
3. Para. 4.4 
4. Para. 4.5
The Plan proposed early studies on migration and on ways to stimulate employment creation and announced the intention to evaluate the building programme funded under the ARDP. Greater allocations are proposed for physical and social infrastructure: "Augmenting social infrastructure (health, education, domestic water supplies) is the main way in which an immediate improvement in rural welfare can be effected". The past difficulties of ensuring both a supply of trained personnel to man these facilities and the gravitation of trained personnel to the towns and larger villages suggests otherwise. Constructing the buildings does pump funds into the countryside but efficient services that reach into the smaller villages and amongst the poorer groups will take some time; probably not within this or the next Plan period. A necessary pre-condition may be that the present lop-sided economic power in the countryside be significantly reduced if services are not to be captured by the powerful.

The Plan emphasises the complexity of rural development and that it is the subject of several Ministries. It argues that more effective co-operation is required. In future there is to be stronger policing to see that departments adhere to set guidelines. Again, along with the call for greater precision there is in the Plan a push towards the acquisition and the use of superior knowledge at the top. No mention is made of organic processes, of local interests and knowledge, of innovation arising from lots of disparate field experience. There are bold statements that policy prescriptions for arable land use will emerge from the Integrated Farming Pilot Project at Pelotshetla (technical aspects) and from the Barolong Farms Project (tenurial aspects). Well designed and managed as the two projects are, the attitude as revealed in the Plan that single experiments are a sufficient basis upon which to devise national policy is worrisome.

It is pertinent to comment on the Report on Rural Development prepared in 1973 by Robert Chambers and D. Feldman. This report has led to the White Paper proposals entitled the Tribal Grazing Land Programme. I presume that one has to read the Report and the White Paper in the light of recent knowledge on rural income distribution provided by the survey of 1975/76. In 1973 Chambers and Feldman did not have to face the very unequal distribution of rural income that was subsequently revealed by the survey. For instance, it is unlikely that they would have guessed that the top five

1. Para. 4.53 page 67.
per cent of rural households have a share of rural income equal to that of the lower 70% of rural households. Equally important, it is unlikely that they would have estimated that 45% of rural households lived below the poverty line and that this figure is almost identical to the figure for those rural households who own no cattle. There is a presumption in their report that practically all rural households do in fact partake in the livestock economy in terms of ownership of livestock. The survey has shown that it is only the two top categories of rural households, that is the middle income and the richest households, who receive income from livestock. In these categories, income from livestock forms 34% and 63% respectively of income.

The proposals to separate the grazing interests of the large cattle owners from those who run smaller herds on communal land has to be seen against the enormous relative power of the few large families who own up to half of the cattle of the country. The proposal is to zone tribal grazing land into commercial ranching, communal and reserved areas. Commercial ranches, mostly in the western less populated regions, are to be held under leasehold tenure. Settlement on these lands would be by the larger livestock owners. The purpose behind this proposal is to ensure the continued development of commercial ranching. As a corollary to this proposal, the removal of the large herds to leasehold ranches is intended to relieve pressure on the communal lands. These are the lands closer to settlements that have been heavily grazed in the past and are in need of restoration. There is a third category, reserved areas, which is not important in this discussion. The aim behind the proposals, to combine the promotion of commercial ranching with protective devices for the smaller livestock owners who will continue to rely on communal grazing, is laudable. What is questionable is the means whereby this is intended to be carried out.

In essence, the proposal is for a once-for-all settlement of livestock interests. Considerable benefits will flow to the wealthier families who obtain leasehold ranches, unless, as proposed, in the first instance small livestock owners combine together to claim the same privilege. There are several factors that suggest this will not happen. The first is that 45% of the rural population have no cattle and so are out of the running from the start. Secondly, all available evidence suggests that at present it is few families who practice the commercial management of herds. Farmers on
freehold lands, which comprise only 6% of Botswana and on which live only 4% of the population, deliver half the cattle slaughtered by the BMC. Traders and speculators, and co-operatives deliver a further 25%. The remaining 25% of the supply of cattle to the BMC comes from the tribal lands. The latter despite the fact that the tribal lands comprise 71% of Botswana and that tribal grazers who could afford to do so have gained control of much of the state land, which comprises 23% of the total, by means of sinking boreholes. Only 25% of the cattle sold to the BMC come off 94% of the land. The evidence suggests that a few freehold ranchers and a larger number of cattle speculators have exploited the favourable beef prices by buying in stock from tribal grazers for fattening prior to sale to the BMC. In contrast to the average of roughly 185,000 cattle sold to the BMC in the mid-1970s, other sales averaged roughly 38,000. Steeply differential wealth in the countryside and the dominance of a "business" sector in commercial ranching suggests that tribal grazers cannot be expected to partake in any significant way in the early claims for rights over tribal and state lands designated as commercial.

There are no certain answers to the question, "what is there to prevent the large livestock owners from combining ranching on leasehold estates on the areas designated commercial with the grazing of animals attached to their traditional households on communal land?" The power of the wealthier households in the countryside is such that one must presume that they can influence members of their extended family groups. Through informal arrangements with family members and through what might be corruption of the "Mafisa" system of borrowing-in cattle it may be possible for large livestock owners to retain stock near their traditional homes and thereby to utilise communal grazing. The Report on Rural Development does touch on the subject but does not provide satisfactory answers. The reason for the failure seems to lie in the mechanistic nature of the methods proposed. A serious fault is the absence of any reference to the large number of families who have no cattle. Is that position simply to be accepted for the present and for the future? It may be that the extensive discussions now being carried out in Botswana over the White Paper proposals will educate the public as to the intention of the proposals so that the public itself will become a watchdog on the working of the arrangements. Thus far nothing has arisen that would reduce the concern. The final section of the Rural Income Distribution Survey raises the same concern.

1. The freehold farms are largely owned by non-citizens. In recent years wealthy Botswana have bought many of these farms with the aid of a steeply differential transfer tax on sales to non-Botswanan.
It is disappointing that there is not more discussion in the Report as to the manner in which a traditional institution, namely the tribal right to graze, has responded to the newer commercial opportunities in ranching as well as to the growth of population. The increasing proportion of the population who have little or no livestock and who remain, since Botswana is primarily a livestock economy, very poor suggests that the traditional right has failed to handle the changed situation satisfactorily. A serious discussion on the institutional aspects of traditional rights may have led to a different formulation. The half of the population who today have no cattle and the great majority of the population who have less than the mean number of livestock have undergone a process akin to that of disinherance. The exercise of traditional rights to graze originated under very different conditions from those that rule today. Presumably population was small and land abundant. Since cattle were the mainstay of the economy every family had livestock and therefore exercised their grazing rights. Extended family relationships and the "Mafisa" custom ensured that everyone had a modicum of livestock. Changed conditions today mean that only half the population effectively exercise their right to graze. The weakness under current conditions of the traditional right is that it grants only access to land. In order to exercise the traditional right a person must have cattle or smallstock. If he/she has no livestock, or indeed if he has far less than the norm for herds in his community, he has essentially foregone a basic right conferred by the community. By foregoing the right he confers upon others benefits at no cost to themselves and with no return to himself.

Botswana represents a clear case of the need to evolve traditional forms to accommodate the commercial world. One of the forcing houses of the modern world is the company concept: essentially simple yet radical. A parallel development would be to up-grade the right to graze (that is, the right of access to land) into shares over communal land controlled equally by member households. The shares would refer to grazing units according to the grazing capacity of the communal land. In other words, the community would become a company in the modern sense, the asset base of the company being the land it controlled. In this way the right to grazing would be converted to a right over an asset i.e. land which has a certain grazing capacity. At annual general meetings of the company (the equivalent of the community) it would be decided what the carrying capacity
for livestock units was for the coming year. The carrying capacity decided upon would then be converted into units per share as controlled by each household. Soon thereafter, perhaps one week later, a public auction would be arranged by the management of the company. The auction could be overseen by a district magistrate. At the auction the annual rental on the excess shares controlled by households with insufficient stock to utilise fully their grazing right would be put up for sale. Legislation should prohibit the sale of the shares for a period of five to ten years until members have had a chance to realise that they control an asset that commands a price rather than a non-marketable right. In this way it would avoid the early cheap purchase by those who understand better from those who did still did not. Provision for the inheritance of shares would be necessary.

The annual auction of excess grazing rights would establish a price for the right to graze. A separation would occur between the value of the asset controlled equally by the individuals as members of the community and the value added to cattle ownership by grazing during the period of that year. The conversion of the right to graze to an equal right over an asset and the introduction of a system of annual auction of grazing rentals should meet the two conditions which the authors of the Report on Rural Development strove to achieve. Namely, some equity in the access to grazing and equity in terms of income distribution balanced by a continuing growth of commercial livestock ranching. The company concept provides a dynamic form in which the interests of right holders and cattle owners can be matched. The dynamic element enters through wider public concern for the maintenance and improvement of the asset of the company, grazing land. The rental value of the grazing rights established at the annual auction would reflect current weather, market conditions and herd size and composition. The price established would be a vital, non-official and self-policing instrument affecting individual decisions as to livestock management.

In para 11.5 of the Report on Rural Development the authors raise a key point which I believe their proposals fail to answer. "A commitment to a free enterprise system based on the private sector and the accumulation of capital must involve deepening patterns of exploitation as society in Botswana becomes more stratified between owners of cattle and wage labourers. It is difficult to ensure social justice in these relationships without a strict government control of wage levels and work conditions. These will
be extremely difficult and expensive to implement in the rural areas and might inhibit the expansion of commercial development". The present concern in Botswana that the TGLP may not be able to meet the requirements of social justice is presumably a concern that the legislative and supervisory requirements under the TGLP may not succeed. It in turn reflects a concern that the TGLP, if implemented in full, would run severe political risks since it could not in itself provide answers to the income distribution and security problems in the countryside. The use of a company concept conferring rights to assets rather than mere rights to grazing would immediately place control over capital in the countryside equally in the hands of all households and by the mechanism of the annual sale of grazing rentals provide income to the poorest families. Needless to say, the larger cattle owning households would receive returns from the annual grazing rentals they controlled by purchase through the running and the sale of cattle. The rental price would act as a local tax on anticipated trading profits.

A further benefit that could flow from the company concept is that water resources could come to be regarded, through customary practice or legislative measures either at the local or national level, as common resources. The concept could be extended to areas where strictly commercial interests wish to identify grazing rights with demarcated areas over a long period of time. Where these are state lands and no community ownership can be claimed the arrangements proposed under the White Paper should be followed. In areas where there is a community claim over the land equal shares over that land could be distributed to all members of the community on a household basis. A separate auction for the purchase of annual rentals on that land would then be organised. Purchase in that case would be for a period of 10, 20 or more years as was deemed technically efficient. Provision for community recall of the agreement for misuse of the land would be proper and useful.

It can be argued that under this scheme government would not receive revenue. That can be remedied and indeed should be remedied. It should be possible at the time at which the company concept is introduced to tax individual share holders. The tax rate could be set according to a simple formula. The formula would reflect the amount of standard grazing land available per household in each community. In other words, communities who had more units of standard grazing land at their disposal per house-
hold would pay a higher tax rate. The tax would act as an asset's tax. It would provide a better system of taxation of the bigger cattle owners who today benefit from several subsidised or free services. The tax paid to buy-in grazing rentals would include the tax payment per share as the basic component of the price.

The mechanism whereby government taxes shares held by each household would extend local and national government interest into the management of community affairs. For instance, government can learn to use the tax to help establish optimum rental prices in terms of herd size, composition and off-take. It is important that livestock services should be sustained and extended to cover more of Botswana's livestock for the country has to retain access to land and its competitive edge over markets in Europe and elsewhere. The need to provide effective services suggests that the veterinary, breeding and other services for livestock should remain free or be subsidised. The tax on the share holding should be seen, and explained, as a separate charge for the use of an asset which in turn pays for services which assist livestock owners in the use of that asset. It would also avoid the proposal contained in the Report on Rural Development that the Botswana Meat Commission or other bodies should attempt to classify clients as small or big and to serve as agents for the Revenue Department. Those proposals appear to be awkward and undesirable.

There is proper concern that herd sizes in Botswana should be of an optimum size so that take-off can reach efficient levels. It is felt that herd sizes of at least fifty are desirable. Following on from this premise there is considerable discussion in the Report on the need to develop co-operative or joint stock company forms through which small holders of livestock can join together to run efficient herds. The optimum size herd in Botswana is now thought to be closer to 200. The adoption of the company concept to manage communal land controlled equally by shareholders should provide a form and a forum from the acquaintance and knowledge of which further elaborations of that concept can occur. The elaborations that I foresee would be towards commonly managed herds; the raising of company herds financed by local taxes on the shares and the company purchase and management of stud-bulls, common facilities, transport, water development etc. In fact separate companies can be formed for herd ownership and for the provision of services. This would allow development to occur without having to achieve community consensus first. The right to land would remain intact.
The Report on Rural Development calls for agricultural legislation to control the use of grazing lands. It rightly argues that Botswana's pastures are a national asset belonging to the whole society. The Report goes on to argue that leasehold arrangements for fixed and short term periods may encourage lessees to "hammer" the land in the period before their lease expires. There is therefore a need for effective legislation to prevent this. Legislation may indeed be necessary but should be regarded as a last resort. The formation of communal land companies would provide a natural interest on the part of share holders that pasture be managed and even improved. Under present conditions in Botswana where nearly half the population have no direct interest in cattle, it is reasonable to hope that those same people, having been granted nearly half of the shares controlling the grazing, should act as a local and immediate guardian over pasture management. The establishment of a price for grazing would help to set efficient norms for herd size. Pasture improvements should also be reflected in higher rental prices making for easier relations between the community and technical services. It would not therefore be necessary, as proposed in the Report, officially to set the stocking ratio or the ceiling on any one family's holding of livestock. Further, the proposed distinction between commercial ranching areas and communal grazing lands would be as unnecessary as it is undesirable.

The establishment of a price on grazing should help at times of drought or of any other condition that requires a reduction in or an altered composition of the total herd. In the last ten years the cattle population has grown 250% to 3 million while the off-take rate has remained almost unchanged at the low overall level of 8%. One, if not more than one, year of drought must now be imminent, at least in statistical terms. If severe, and if it were to develop into a cycle of bad years, the pastures carrying capacity would drop considerably, perhaps to between 1.5 and 2 million. Favourable beef prices, while they last, would help to raise the off-take, perhaps even as high as double the current level or about 400 000 head of cattle a year. In other words over two years the market might handle 800 000 out of the 1 to 1.5 million head that should be culled; or 50% to 80% of the requirement.

A fall in beef prices, not so likely the European prices but certainly the local sale prices, would upset the off-take so that the conservative
figure of 50% of the requirement handled would be the proper basis for policy. The preponderant nature of the commercial market, that of speculators rather than cattle raisers, suggests that individuals would resist cattle sales as long as possible. In the process, and particularly on the tribal lands, the bigger owners would be able to further squeeze out the smaller. By holding cattle longer, the bigger owners would exploit the communal or state lands without cost to themselves either directly or by the corruption of traditional ties. The damage to the pasture would be born by society.

An annual rental should work to moderate the pressure on grazing. As herd size rises so the rental price should rise, forcing a higher off-take and thus keeping size down. With the advent of drought or a decline in beef prices, owners would be squeezed between the rental price and the market value of their cattle. Off-take should rise quickly. A law which allowed government to introduce bi-annual auctions of grazing rentals might be worth considering for it would allow the price for grazing to keep pace with unfolding weather, and market conditions.

The company concept with a tax on the share held by each household could help to avoid the difficulties that may arise in the enforcement of rent collection. This should be so because the tax would be paid equally by every household rather than, as with rents, by a few powerful families. The tax on the shares could be collected immediately after the annual auction. That would mean that small holders and those without cattle would receive cash from the sale of the excess grazing units they controlled and so be able to pay their share of tax. At the same time large livestock owners would be present as they would have an interest in the purchase of annual grazing rights. The fact that everyone paid an equal tax based on the share they controlled should make the avoidance of tax payments an action which runs up against social sanctions.

The authors end a discussion on the probability under their proposed scheme that established livestock owners may strengthen their position both through gaining leasehold rights over commercial ranches as well as by maintaining "Mafisa" and small stock on communal lands with the statement that "... political will and personal commitment are needed at all levels of government to ensure that such a displacement does not occur in Botswana".  

1. Para 41.31
significant because it does not mention the exercise and influence of local interests upon the process proposed. Yet it is the immediate governance of local interests that can most effectively ensure a happy mix of social justice and of commercial exploitation.

A similar reservation that I have with regard to the proposals is the stress placed on the educational programme required to ensure their successful implementation. There is always a role for an educational programme. There is a difference, however, between a programme separate from the working of the proposals themselves and an inbuilt education component. Reliance on the former means reliance on an extra to the scheme that introduces added uncertainties. The government of Botswana at present is conducting widespread discussions at the village and district level of the proposals contained in the White Paper for the TGLP. Last year a radio discussion group involving 60,000 people was organised for the same purpose. The desire to consult is a measure of the openness with which public affairs are conducted in Botswana. The results of the discussions will be worth following for they are likely to illustrate the difficulty of conducting true consultation. Government, in this case, have adopted proposals prepared by consultants. This is not unlike accepting a Five Year Plan prepared by a Planning Department. Alternate proposals are thus eliminated before consultation begins. At best the present exercise of consultation may provide several ideas of how details in the proposals can be altered. It is unlikely to lead to any major structural change because the public are not invited to suggest alternatives. At present those who have no cattle have no direct stake in the proposals. It would take strong action by political groups to make them aware of what they stand to lose and to express their concern effectively.

An economic factor that underwrites the need to achieve a distribution of the income from the wealth represented by the cattle population of Botswana, and which supports the adoption of the company concept, is that the mean income per household from cattle, P480, is over four times that from crop production, P110. The two lower categories of the four used in the Rural Income Distribution Survey to distinguish household income classes, apart from having no income from livestock, receive only 13% and 10% respectively from farming. The remainder comes from employment, gathering, transfers, beer brewing, etc. Effective income distribution in the short term is more
likely to be achieved through the redistribution of income from livestock than from the expansion of cropping. The low level of income from crop production is unlikely to improve until there is greater security in the countryside, more confidence on the technical side and the development of a service infrastructure to support production processing and marketing. Rather than the present and sadly conventional coarse grains, it may pay-off to explore the value of exclusively or mainly fodder crops in support of small scale beef finishing. That would require the development of certain supplies and stable prices for grains within a government run or supervised network of outlets so that the peasants can devote themselves to a cash crop in the form of fodder to be converted into beef. Such an arrangement would allow small farmers a manageable entry into the beef economy. Meanwhile a 5% - 15% redistribution of the value added through the grazing of livestock by way of grazing rentals and tax payments would represent a significant improvement in the distribution of income in the countryside. Taking an ideal situation in which the 94% of the land represented by the tribal and state lands played a more proportionate role in commercial ranching than at present, the value added applicable to the argument might be 70% of the 1973/74 figure of P40 million. P1 to P4 million would strengthen the ability of the poorer families to undertake crop agriculture, to partake in the livestock economy as grazers or fatteners and would provide revenue to government to cover some of the additional services required.

Drought Relief and the Guarantee of Employment

The National Development Plan 1976-81 has little say on the management of the rural economy during periods of drought or, which could occur simultaneously, if beef prices should collapse. It does discuss the implications for revenue, for trade, for formal employment creation and for plan implementation. That is not the same as the considerations that would emerge from a serious interest as to how the state can minimise the cost and the hardship in the countryside should the weather and beef prices turn perverse.

Drought management requires either a standby or, preferably, an inbuilt relief machinery. There should be a simple mechanism which allows relief to flow where it is needed when it is needed without the encumbrance of major national political and financial decisions. An analogy is that regions need their own thermometers with which to take their temperatures
and provide their own remedies rather than having to seek referral upwards to the centre and await the official diagnosis and prescription of an otherwise occupied specialist. In India droughts are managed under an old drought relief code written by the British. Under this code the state government has to declare an area affected by drought before drought relief begins to operate. Under the Colonial administration this probably was a convenient form of handling emergencies. Since independence it has been found that popular government has allowed the procedure to become a source of enormous pressures on the state government. Drought relief confers benefits on an area in the form of a strong flow of funds which can be easily captured or at least manipulated by officials, local politicians and by those who are better placed in society. It is natural therefore that powerful citizens will represent a case to the state government that their area be declared drought affected. It makes the decision to respond to a need for relief very difficult on the part of the state. A decision to declare one area drought affected will almost certainly reduce the arguments for not declaring other areas similarly affected. As a result one initial decision to declare an area affected often leads to areas which have little or no need for relief to be so declared as affected. This makes the State Government, particularly the Finance Ministry, extremely wary of agreeing to the declaration of areas as drought affected. In the process there are long and costly delays before the state sets up drought relief machinery. During the delay there are acrimonious conflicts over the accuracy of local reports of weather conditions and the degree of suffering involved. When government finally declares an area affected, there is a mix of triumphant and hurt feelings over the decision and consequently it takes some time, and invariably a serious drought, before government and society work as one to remedy the effects of the drought.

The second part of drought management is that government must have productive works designed and ready to be implemented once there is a need for work to be created in the countryside. The Indian experience has shown time and again that governments are loathe to commit the finance necessary to allow for sufficient preparation of works. Moreover, whenever funds have been provided for the purpose of advance preparation, the technical departments receiving the funds have often used them for the preparation of works which they consider to be of importance rather than for the wide distribution of small works suited to drought relief.
One way of defining an efficient drought relief machinery is as follows. Individual citizens should be able to register for work as a means of relieving the effects of drought. Government, on its part, should undertake to provide work according to rules that suit local conditions and assist in the management of an efficient programme. The basis whereby wages would be prescribed by the rules could either be a daily wage or piece rates (piece rates appear to have several advantages; they allow flexibility in the setting of norms that govern average daily wages earned, they reduce the overseer role to one largely of supervision of task measurements, and they contain an incentive to productivity). The rules would also specify the period of work to be provided upon registration; the nature of the work, invariably unskilled manual work; the relationship of work location to residence; and the minimum number of work seekers who have to register before new works are opened.

Within the rules Government would enter into a social contract with the citizenry. When people seek work, Government is obliged to provide work. The catch, unless it is a regular contract, is that government would first have to proclaim a region as drought affected before the programme came into operation.

An answer to the problem lies in the Employment Guarantee Scheme as evolved in Maharashtra State in India in the last four years. Without a regular programme whereby citizens can seek and obtain work it is unlikely that government would be organised to quickly open a large number of productive small works. The guarantee of work, it appears, can only be implemented if it is a regular part of the management of rural development.

The guarantee of work in the countryside as a regular programme necessitates a move from the consideration of the most efficient form of drought relief management to a programme that, while operating as an automatic standby machinery for drought relief, is a major instrument of income redistribution. It is also, since income is redistributed by wages earned on work sites, a programme that can build much of the physical infrastructure required in the countryside.

In table 1 there is an estimate of the amount required to raise all families up to the poverty datum line; P9 million annually. In the previous section a company concept to manage grazing lands is proposed which, through the sale
of annual rentals on surplus grazing rights, would bring some P1 million to P4 million extra income, minus taxation, to the poorer families. If we take the net transfer involved at P1 million to P3 million, we are still left with the question of how government can productively place P6 million to P8 million into the pockets of the poorer families.

A guaranteed employment programme does provide a mechanism - the registration of work seekers - whereby the poor identify themselves and receive wages in exchange for labour. The cost of such a programme is not entirely an extra cost since it can finance much of the physical construction government would undertake otherwise. What it does do is to force government to explore a number of technical and organisational questions that otherwise are convenient to ignore. By placing the initiative in the hands of individual citizens it helps to redefine the service roles of technical departments in contrast to the empire building and management roles that technical departments often seek.

Botswana's sparse population and its simple economy has allowed it to follow a South African contractor-dominated approach to construction. The innovation of the labour brigades and the intention to create a labour intensive construction unit demonstrate the desire to move to more appropriate methods. A works programme that set out to channel at least P6 million into the pockets of the poor would have to design and supervise productive works able to employ, at perhaps P0,80 per day as an average wage, 7,5 million man days per year. Botswana's small population could not provide that much labour. The average employed per day over a 350 day work period would be 214 000 per day, or roughly 2 persons per household or 4 per household under the poverty line. At P2,00 per day it would require an average attendance of almost one member from every household for 350 days a year or 2 from the poorer families. Clearly neither magnitude is likely.

By the end of the century when Botswana's population will have doubled from the 700 000 odd today to nearly 1,5 million such magnitudes will look both more likely and probably as, or more, desirable. At present it would seem that a guarantee employment scheme would not be able to spend more than about P2,5 million in wages a year at an average wage rate close to P1,00 per day. That would leave a gap in the minimum income distribution sought of P3,5 million. It raises the question whether or not Botswana should not examine a higher wage as socially desirable, perhaps P2,00 per day. Almost
certainly the information on rural wage rates and contractual relations as well as on returns to economic activities does not exist upon which to make such a judgement. There is a prima facie case for a set of local experiments in different regions to test the demand for casual labour and the effect of an alternate source of employment on local labour markets under different piece rate norms and programme rules.

The need to prepare contingency plans should Botswana's 35 000 odd migrants be forced to stop work in South Africa is a powerful argument to start experiments to work out suitable rules. It also underlines the need to seek a formulation that provides as high an average wage as is consistent with the essential requirements that labour not be enticed away from economic activities.

A further reason for experiments is that Botswana has not devoted her own or foreign expertise to the question, "On what works can a lot of labour be productively employed?" Pasture management, for instance, has concentrated on rotational grazing, resting and seeding. It has not asked what benefit contour furrows, fodder and shade trees, grass seed raised in nurseries and distributed over the pastures by hand (or by aeroplane), and more permanent fencing in the form of trenches or stone walls would bring to different regions. Nor has much work been done on a wide variety of soil and water conservation methods. Other areas to explore are the creation of woodlots for fuel, building material, fodder and other materials; public brick making for sale to public bodies and private citizens; the design and construction of improved cattle pens, grain stores etc. Roads, particularly in Botswana, offer considerable scope for trial with labour intensive methods on both construction and maintenance.

In figure I a simple organisation chart is presented to illustrate how the adoption of an employment guarantee programme helps to redefine the management of rural development. Funds are devolved to local government which oversees the implementation of the guarantee on behalf of the state. The technical departments assist local government in the design and the supervision of works; thereby retaining the power of technical sanction over works and their execution. Since the funding of works under the programme is controlled by local government rather than pre-allocated within annual technical departmental budgets, the technical departments are required to discover and put forward
Figure I  Model Organisation for Rural Development

National Level

- Technical Depts.
- Local Government and Lands
  - Training Personnel
  - Land Policy
- Finance and Planning
  - Economic and Financial Sanctions
  - Monitoring and Evaluation
- National Assembly
  - District Council

Local Government

- Technical & Economic Planning Team
- Land Board
- Employment Guarantee Programme
- District Plan
- Communal Grazing Companies
  - Leasehold Ranches
- Village Development Committee

Field Level

- Regular Works

Employment Guarantee Works
useful things to do in the countryside if they are to partake in any major way in activity in the countryside. Larger works and maintenance that require strict timetables should be funded through departmental budgets or the regular budget of local government, whichever is the practice.

The establishment cost of an employment guarantee programme can be regarded as an extra. It should not cost above 40% of the total cost of the programme since the intention, by labour intensive methods, is to transfer funds into the countryside through wage payments. The support for the establishment cost should be an attractive proposition for foreign aid donors because of the programme's combination of rural construction, local determination and social justice. Such an arrangement would underwrite government's capacity to carry beef prices or of a decline in state revenues.

Overall control would be vested in the Ministry of Finance and Planning. The Ministry would monitor the programme, undertake concurrent evaluation of the economic and social worth and, perhaps by placing an economist in some or all districts, participate in local government's financial and administrative approval of work's designs and their place within local development planning.

It may well be asked how an employment guarantee scheme would fit with the Incomes Policy of government. The aim of that policy is to prevent a widening of the present gap between urban and rural incomes. It is a legal mechanism which applies to those in permanent or full-time employment. The philosophy of an offer of guaranteed work is to provide employment to those who have no employment. Those to whom it provides employment do not fall in the legal category of employment affected by the Incomes Policy. Rather, an employment guarantee programme, by underwriting security and a modicum of income to those able to seek manual labour, would improve welfare in the countryside and reduce the pressure on urban jobs. In that way it would complement the Incomes Policy. It may even make the Policy effective for the first time since such an employment programme would tackle the more fundamental and structural problems behind the large disparities in incomes within the countryside and between the urban and rural areas that are beyond the compass of a legal provision.
In Table II a hypothetical family budget for a household in the category of the poorest 5% has been constructed. It illustrates the present impoverishment of such families and in rough terms shows how the two proposals outlined in the paper would improve that family's welfare and ability to undertake agricultural ventures. In addition to the arithmetic of the table, the favourable results should reduce significantly the number of rural households, presently 40%, that are temporarily or permanently without adult men. If the figure for absent men were to fall below 25%, it should be reflected in a marked upturn in crop production, rural industrial and service activity and possibly in livestock ownership and management.

It illustrates the ability of two programmes to create favourable conditions for an upturn in economic activity in the countryside despite the initial difficulty of matching the income transfers required through employment creation. An increase in economic employment and the ruling wage rate in the countryside should follow so that, after a few years, the level of transfers required would fall. As it fell, so the employment guarantee scheme would be able to match the need more completely. Delay for ten years or so would make the race more difficult to win.

The Report on Rural Development rightly stresses the need to develop a credit programme in Botswana. Botswana's present comfortable budgetary position suggests that the formation of a fund to support credit operations in the countryside would not be difficult. As the Report stresses, the difficulty is to implement credit programmes without too great a financial risk to government or to the banks. It is unlikely that Botswana, even under the most favourable conditions of finance and manpower, could develop an effective credit system that would reach the majority of rural households for at least the next ten to twenty years, largely because of the great difficulty in working with impoverished clients under conditions of high risk. Credit programmes are most likely to succeed when there is a modicum of economic security in the countryside and when the development of the physical and service infrastructure provides increasing opportunities for profitable activities. The adoption of the two proposals outlined above, an Employment Guarantee Scheme and the use of the company concept to manage grazing, would infuse P3.5 million to P9 million annually into the pockets of the poorer people. Of this, between P2.5 million and P5 million would be additional income in the countryside. In times of drought or other calamity the component under the employment guarantee would rise and would flow to households in all economic categories as they sought work.
Table II  
Hypothetical Family Budget of Family in Poorest 5% Category with an Employment Guarantee Programme and a Company Grazing System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Before Income</th>
<th>Before Expenditure</th>
<th>After Income</th>
<th>After Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farm Operations</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Income</td>
<td>99</td>
<td></td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfers</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>250(1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sale of Annual Rental on Grazing Rights</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50(2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home and Farm Improvement</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax on Grazing Rights</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savings</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                      | 160 | 160 | 480 | 480 |

(1) Need P450 to reach poverty line. Any additional income earned under an employment programme above P250 would probably add considerably to Farm Improvements, Consumption, Savings and Expenditure on Farm Operations.

(2) Calculated on rough share of P1 million total transfer by rental sale.

N.B.

Accepting the above figures, P250 earned and P50 from the sale of annual grazing rights would:

i Increase family income by P320, particularly from larger outlays on farm operations.

ii Increase family on-farm investment and savings from zero to an appreciable proportion of income, here above 20%.

iii Raise expenditure on health and education 500%.

iv Increase expenditure and income from farm operations appreciably, 500% on each, thereby increasing the supply of consumption and agro-industrial crop to society and producing a downward pressure on prices.

v Create a general demand for services and a capacity to pay a greater share of the cost than hitherto, this, particularly with transport, storage and trading, and with health and education should lead to greater efficiencies.
Conclusion

The paper has argued that Botswana can afford and would benefit from a more organic, more experimental, more locally determined approach to rural development than the apparent inappropriate drive for greater precision. The two proposals used as examples of such an approach, the upgrading of the traditional rights to graze to a right over communal land under a communal land company concept and a regular employment guarantee scheme, are both wonderful laboratories in which to test and improve budgetary rules, local government capacities, centre-periphery relations, individual and group security and initiative, and technology. At the same time they are effective instruments for income distribution, for the management of common assets and for the provision of physical infrastructure.
Bibliography

National Development Plan 1976-81
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning.

Report on Rural Development
R. Chambers and D. Feldman
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning

Rural Income Distribution Survey 1976
Government of Botswana.

White Paper No. 2 of 1975 (Tribal Grazing Land Programme)
Government Printer, Gaborone.