

Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit

TELONA

Don
Pinnock

Some reflections on
the work of a private
labour recruiter

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The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit.

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
1. Introduction	3
2. The ragged road to 1912	5
3. The structure of private recruiting, 1912-1948	9
The central agencies	9
Traders: 'the native's friend'	17
Advances: the bribe that became a necessity	22
Transport: the bombellas	28
4. Underdevelopment, class formation and resistance to recruitment	30
5. Voluntaries, squatters and rising urbanisation	39
6. The development of manufacturing, labour bureaux and the squeeze on Telona	50
7. Conclusion: unemployment and the mechanisms of labour recruitment and control in the 1970s	63

FIGURES

Migrant labourers	1
3.1 Telona courtesy card	16
3.2 Number of migrants recruited by Telona between 1928 and 1979	18
5.1 Locals, voluntaries and blacks recruited independently in 1913	42
5.2 Population growth, city of Johannesburg	44
5.3 Recruits passing through Telona, December 1937	45
5.4 Repeat of graph 3.2	47
5.5 Commission earned by Telona and agents during 1963	48
5.6 Destination, by Industry of workers recruited by Telona, 1964 to 1970	48
5.7 Destination of recruits passing through Telona in the 1960s	49
6.1 Number of blacks employed on gold mines, in manufacturing and on SAR/H between 1933 and 1951	51
6.2 Graphic representation of 6.1	52
6.3 Number of recruits moved from Transkei by Teba, Telona and the Labour Bureaux between 1960 and 1978.	57
6.4 Graphic representation of 6.3	58
7.1 Legal laagers of the 1970s	67
7.2 Workers per sector recruited in South Africa	68
7.3 Transkei workers per sector recruited, 1977	69
7.4 Black labour force, 1970	70
7.5 Transkei call-in card	73

PHOTOGRAPHS











	<u>Page</u>
Mine management, indunas and labourers on a South African mine C1904	2
The offices of Telona, Johannesburg	4
New recruits at the WNLA compound C 1910	7
A batch of 'joins' outside recruiting office in Mafeking, C 1940	12
Henry Taberer of NRC and Pax Theron of Telona	12
Interior of Robinson Deep compound C 1910	13
Robinson Deep compound, overall view, C 1910	14
Women collection remittances and goods at a trader-recruiter store in Pondoland	26
Work-seekers outside the Labour Bureau in Nelspruit	26
Hansens' recruiting office in Port St. Johns	26
Compound, Associated Manganese Mines, Kimberley	34
Migrants sorting manganese, Associated Manganese	35
one near Dimbaza resettlement camp, Ciskei	37
Member of Transkei elite, Port St. Johns	37
Malnourished peasant woman, Port St. Johns	37
Squatter camp near Johannesburg, 1955	40


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MIGRANT LABOURERS — Black States and Southern Africa


MAP 2.1

-  Republic of Transkei
-  kwaZulu
-  Lebowa
-  Venda
-  Gazankulu
-  Ciskei
-  Republic of Bophuthatswana
-  Swazi
-  Qwaqwa
-  Ndebele



BLACK STATES 1970
ALIENS 1978


NUMBER OF LABOURERS



100 50 0 100 200 300 km

Department of Geography
University of Pretoria

* Source: Rieker Commission



Mine management, indunas (with whips) and labourers on a
South African mine c1904 (Cape Archives No. J2106)


1. INTRODUCTION

On the corner of Main Reef Road and Goch Street in Johannesburg, over the road from John Vorster Square police station, is Theron & Company. The firm's courtesy card describes it as a 'native labour supplier to companies, syndicates, prospectors, contractors, in every industry, in any number, of any type or class and anywhere'. Behind the site's high wall is a compound, a kitchen and a scattering of offices. Most of the walls in the yard have a black grease-line at sitting height (testimony to the many workers who have waited there), and the plaster, made with sand from the mine dumps, is falling off the walls in chunks. The iron-roofed buildings have the air of a British DO's office in a period of late colonialism. In the main office, alongside the old brown desks and a large map of Southern Africa, is the labour contract filing system; each batch of contracts covered with white linen and hooked on a line like drying washing, adding to the room the suggestion of a wash-house.


Apart from the few black clerks none of the staff is under fifty, and several are over seventy. In 1974 the firm had its licence to recruit labour in 'white' South Africa withdrawn, confining its labour-catching areas to the black satellite states and the Bantustans. If suggestions central to the Riekert Commission become law, Telona¹ stands a chance of being closed down, and the era of the 'independent' recruiting organisations will have ended.

'It may be' says its director, Thomas 'Pax' Theron, 'that we are an anachronism and it is now time we faded out. For nearly 60 years we have tried to serve the little man, as opposed to the big man; the little employer, the trade-recruiter and the man wanting a job. The big firms merged and got bigger, the government listened to them. We're just small-fry.'

It is true that since beginning operations in the mid-1920s, Telona has moved only about a million workers - less than half the number presently being oscillated annually through the state's labour bureaux. But the firm's changing fortunes, spanning the period from the destruction of the pre-capitalist mode of production to the rise of foreign-owned manufacturing monopolies, is a sensitive index of the dynamic relationship between capital and labour in South Africa.



The main office, Telona



The compound, Telona

2. THE RAGGED ROAD TO 1912

According to its labour ledger, Telona began as an independent labour recruiting organisation during the Great Drought in 1928, and went out of business two years later in the Depression, only managing to get back into recruiting again in 1934. That its founder, T.A. Theron, could recruit at all, considering three previous decades of vitriol poured over private recruiters by the Chamber of Mines, is an interesting statement about the labour needs of the time. In order to understand these needs it is necessary to look briefly at the conditions in South Africa which predated the company's shaky beginnings.

From the beginning of mineral extraction in the 1860s the mine's attempts to regulate labour recruitment and channel the labour supply had represented a rationalisation of the production process aimed at maintaining a high rate of profit for the mine owners. This was especially acute in the Transvaal due to a fixed price for gold on the international markets and fears that the metal was a 'wasting asset' which might soon run out. In addition the high costs attached to mining on the Reef together with the low grade ore on many of the mines required, for profitability, a labour force from which the industry could exploit a high surplus value. Initially, however, this requirement was thwarted by the buoyancy of the non-capitalist mode of production, causing a labour shortage which was exploited by labour touts who bribed chiefs for the labour of their juniors and frequently 'captured' for sale to the mines workers who were already on the road to the Reef.²

'... a few of the most powerful companies ... spend thousands a year in paying touts who seize upon natives actually on the road here, and get paid 10s or £1 per head for escorting them to the particular mine for whom they have an order. Touts do not bring a single boy here. There is an abundance to be obtained in this country ... and it is our duty to induce that extra labour to come, and not to fritter away thousands every year in escorting boys who were coming anyhow.'
(6th CMAR, 1894, p.19).

However the mines, desperate for labour, were forced into competition with each other and into agreements with touts, who enjoyed the upper hand in the bargain. Reports of abuses by these men abounded. One which particularly annoyed mine owners was labour 'theft' from some mines through fraudulent promises of higher wages on others.


Co-operation between the mines and pressure on the state to act finally squeezed out the tout system. In 1890 the Chamber of Mines requested the Transvaal Volksraad to enforce Pass laws, and when this was not acted upon the Chamber set up its own Native Labour Department to deal with the problem of 'free' workers and labour fluidity. In 1896 the mine wages for black workers were able to be cut by 30 per cent, and the same year the Rand Native Labour Association was formed.³ The creation of this labour catching association had followed a refusal by the Transvaal government to take over labour recruiting. In 1899, however, a Native Labour Agent Bill was passed to provide for the appointment of licenced labour agents in the British territories (with penalties for not licencing and for labour 'theft') and for the drawing up of a written contract with black recruits.

In 1901, before the end of the Anglo-Boer War, the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association was formed by the Chamber of Mines with the object of:

'... avoiding the evils of competitative recruiting ... because it was held that competitive recruiting, according to the experience of the past, had led to evils which it was desired to avoid in the future. There were not only the evils ... of the trouble caused among the natives by the disputes of the competing recruiters, and by the exaggerated promises held out to attract labourers from one to the other, and by the stealing of recruits, and in other ways, but there was the economic loss caused to the mines by competition.' (CMR, 1906, p.650).

The Association's formation was followed by a drop in wages from 50/- to 30/- between 1897 and 1902, but due to a labour shortage after the war the previous rate was later returned to. However the administration of recruiting had been considerably tightened and the groundwork laid for a recruiting monopsony.

At the root of the problems that were to dog the WNLA throughout the Reconstruction period after the war were the low-grade mines. In the boom of the previous decade the Randlords (notable among whom were Barnato of the Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Company and Robinson's group) had committed themselves to opening up these low-graders. These mines were risky ventures, highly vulnerable to small increases in costs and sensitive to the price of labour. Furthermore the Transvaal government



New recruits at the WNLA compound on the Reef c1910
(Cape Archives No. J2105)

was committed to support these mines to maintain total gold output (which may have caused it to blink at the particularly shocking conditions in the Robinson Group's compounds).⁴ They were also the first, in times of labour shortage, to cheat - offering under-the-table bonuses to private recruiters in violation of the WNLA agreement.

The 1906 crisis was precipitated by just such a labour shortage, and it threatened to destroy the recruiting monopsony. In mid-1905 the labour supply - dependent on seasonal factors - took a sharp downturn due to a good agricultural year. This was one of the reasons Chinese labour was imported, under licences issued by the British Unionist government. In December 1905 the Unionists fell to a Liberal government, which took a stand against Chinese labour. The Robinson Group, which was chaffing at the restrictions imposed on it by WNLA membership, obtained from the new Secretary of State, Lord Elgin, permission to recruit in Mozambique, challenging thus the WNLA monopoly. Although Robinson ultimately failed to obtain labour from Mozambique, due to the Portuguese refusing to grant him licences for runners, he was excluded from the WNLA and sought labour elsewhere. This laid the groundwork for the rise of a host of private recruiters and labour contractors, serving both Robinson and WNLA mines. As a consequence the WNLA began to lose control, not only over the labour supply, but over its own recruiters, many of whom signed up with Robinson or went independent and sold to the highest bidder. Under the circumstances the Association had little choice but to release its members from the recruiting agreement, giving rise to renewed competition and the threat of an increase in the costs of labour.⁵ The government, alarmed by the anarchy over recruiting, set up the Government Native Labour Bureau in 1907. And the Chamber of Mines warned that:

'...you cannot have a number of people competing with one another for a commodity, the supply of which will not go round, without putting up the price of that commodity very considerably.'
(CMR, 1907, p.651).

Union followed in 1910, and in an attempt to stem the tide of recruiting anarchy, the Native Recruiting Corporation was formed in September 1912 with a capital of £2 500 and a brief to handle all recruiting in British South Africa and the High Commission Territories. However by 1914, when the Native Grievances Inquiry sat, it was informed that there were still 68 recruiting firms and labour contractors in the field with a total of 2 059 registered recruiters.⁶ The biggest among these, besides the NRC, was A.M. Mostert, with 350 recruiters in the Eastern Cape alone.

3. THE STRUCTURE OF PRIVATE RECRUITING, 1912-1948

The Central Agencies

'In the tender annals of bourgeois political economy', commented Marx, 'the idyllic reigns from time immemorial'.⁷ Rhodes, somewhat more pragmatic than a bourgeois economist, observed that:

'... if you are one who really likes the natives you must make them worthy of the country they live in, or else they are, certain, by inexorable law, to lose their country; you will certainly not make them worthy if you allow them to sit in idleness and if you do not train them in the arts of civilization.'⁸

The lesser agents of British imperialism, however, were past masters in Orwellian talk, and never more than the recruiters. Products of a racist education they were, in the early period, being called on to sell proletarianization and wage slavery under a smokescreen of civilization, kindness and concern. As unemployment grew in the late 1940s, the biggest recruiting companies developed into impersonal, professional corporations, rationalized in terms of personnel, production, marketing, advertising and the reduction of labour costs to mining. The smaller recruiters like Telona, on the other hand, entrenched themselves as 'the native's friend':

'The recruiter is a middle-man, seeing that justice and kindness is done. We just want to serve the people who need us'.
(Interview with Theron).

Recruiter benevolence to workers, however, was generally the kindness of paternalism:

'The Pondo is a lazy, likeable creature. Characteristically he is amoral, untruthful, conservative and suspicious of any innovation, and generally the fear of being caught deters him from committing a crime rather than his conscience. He has a good sense of justice.'⁹

'The outstanding feature of the characters of these natives is their propensity for telling lies. In fact it is part of their ancient creed to tell the story best fitted in their minds to the occasion.'¹⁰

'The native by nature is very lazy and unless he is stirred up continually he would not come to work at all.'¹¹
(All NRC statements)

Unlike liberal dual economy theorists (an economy of the rich and an economy of the poor separated by individual ability), the recruiters were well aware of the dynamic links between the capitalist economy and the areas becoming rapidly more underdeveloped: indeed their livelihood depended upon it. The NRC observed that:

'In view of the possibility of another good agricultural season in 1926 and the established fact that a good season means a bad recruiting year, it appears desirable to review the principal facts in connexion with the native labour supply for the forthcoming year.'¹²

'Crops in most of these areas (Transkei) have been very poorly this year and people are hungry. This augurs well for recruiting.'¹³ (Telona)

'Everywhere the excuse is: "helping to reap", and of course I go for them for remaining at home and helping to consume the little food there is.'¹⁴ (NRC).

When under pressure from recruiting monopolies and the labour bureaux, Telona bulletins were not chary of sermonizing:

'To Telona Recruiters, Transkei: Be steadfast! Don't go over your grievances and fears in your thoughts. Just know that God is completely in control ... God loves you. Get on with your recruiting with us whole-heartedly. Fill your days and thoughts with getting on with the job and leave no room for worry and tension.'¹⁵


Fozia Fisher has defined a class as being all those individuals who have similar positions in the system of production and distribution of costs and benefits.¹⁶ Because they occupy similar positions in the system, they have similar problems and a similar lack of problems, which is why it is useful to treat them collectively. And because they share similar problems/advantages which result from the nature of the social system, they also have common interests in changing or preserving the system, although they may well not be aware of this common interest. Telona's

apparent later opposition to the 'system' was not representative of the opposition of a class, but of a fraction of capital threatened by monopoly takeover, both by corporation and state recruiters. The origin of Telona, however, was lodged firmly within the framework of the imperial bourgeoisie.

Its founder, T.A. Theron, was the son of a Member of the Cape Parliament. He was educated at SACS College in Cape Town and joined the gold rush to Barberton while still in his teens. From there he went to Pretoria (he walked; lions had eaten his mules and his companions had died of fever) where he became secretary to Edward Esselen, then practicing as an advocate. He later became a clerk to the Chief Justice of the Transvaal, and was intimately involved in that Department's investigations into the Jameson Raid. In 1910, having been involved in labour recruiting, he was given the task of working with Henry Taberer, formerly Director of the Labour Bureau and then manager of Eckstein's Recruiters, in drafting what was to become the Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911. This Act contained the ground rules for the present recruiting system in South Africa. As a result of this involvement, Theron was appointed recruiting manager of Mosterts, a labour contractor and later the NRC's biggest competitor.

Andrew Mostert had begun recruiting labour in 1888, but landed his big contracts from the Robinson Group after the departure of the Chinese workers in 1907. Apart from the NRC there were four types of recruiters operating after Union:

1. Recruiters of the type that Telona was to become - registering workers with the mines and profiting from the capitation fees.
2. In an attempt to control 'loose natives' large numbers of pass offenders were offered to the mines by the government on their release from prison.
3. Specialist miners recruited gangs of workers who were registered to them as well as being fed and paid by them. Physical abuse and non-payment of wages was extremely common among these men, who were continually criticised by various Commissions of Inquiry.
4. Big recruiting contractors like Mostert. As registered employers they recruited their own labour, fed and paid their workers and supplied compound staff. All the mines provided was the compounds. They were paid by the mine according to how much rock was moved. Their profit gap was therefore between how much they could charge a mine and how little they could pay for labour. This led to frequent abuses.




A batch of 'joins' and indunas outside 'Kwaga' Simpson's recruiting office in Mafeking c 1940. He recruited for Telona



Henry Taberer of the NRC



'Pax' Theron of Telona



Interior of Robinson Deep Compound, c1910
(Cape Archives No. J2108)

Mostert kept his own farm, feeding recruits from it according to what was in season. He claimed to have reduced the daily cost of feeding recruits to 4.115d a day, but the Select Committee on the Native Regulation Bill decided in 1911 that it was considerably lower, having received numerous complaints from Mostert's recruits about undernourishment. Another complaint was that Mostert contracted only to pay a 'hammer-boy' if he drilled to a depth exceeding 36 inches, whereas the mine paid Mostert for any hole exceeding 30 inches. These profits allowed Mostert to out-bid the NRC for recruits, offering cattle advances and free rail passes. In 1913 the Chairman of the NRC complained of this to the Native Grievances Inquiry:

'When I took over, all boys from East Pondoland had their railway fares paid, but I stopped that ... If this Corporation had not come into existence the wages would have been considerably increased by now and the cost of recruiting would have been considerably increased. From January 1911 to January 1912 one organisation (Mostert's) increased from £5 900 to £60 000. That was capital involved in the business of recruiting. That was advances made to Agents. The main object of the corporation was not so much to curtail this, but to prevent its going any higher.' (Villiers evidence, p. 101).

Abuses attributed to Mosterts in an investigation by the government in 1911 included recruiting 12-year-olds, often without their parents' consent, theft of labour from farms, mines and other recruiters, bribing chiefs with large amounts of liquor and cattle, underfeeding workers and forcing them to live in overcrowded and unsanitary compounds, and a high death-rate. One contractor told the inquiry that of 4 371 recruits brought up to the Reef in one year, 77 deserted, 290 were sent home sick, 16 died of 'natural' causes, 17 were killed by accidents, 27 were sent home injured, and 25 because they took 'fits'.¹⁷ However contractors were allowed to continue functioning because, if nothing else, they got cheap labour to where it was needed in the numbers required. The response of the Chamber of Mines was to silence this form of opposition to its recruiting monopoly by agreement and merger:

'An agreement was entered into by the NRC and the Mostert organisation, that the number of existing licences be considerably reduced; and it was agreed by both these parties that neither organisation should employ any agent who had been rejected by the other ...'¹⁸

Two other big recruiters, Baerecke & Kleudgen and Goldfields, were also absorbed or tied into agreements with the NRC. However Theron and a contractor, H.J. Hansen, left Mosterts with a number of trader-recruiters to join Hadleys Recruiters in order to fight off merger. When Hadleys was finally forced under by the NRC Hansen formed his own agency (which was later bought out by Anglo American), and Theron moved away on his own, recruiting mainly farm labourers and attesting 'voluntaries' (men who had found their own way to the Reef and those who remained there after their contracts had expired). This was in 1928, and two years later he was put out of business by the Depression. The firm re-opened in the mid-1930s and was joined by Theron's son, an Oxford-educated schoolmaster. The firm continued to rely on 'voluntaries' and supplying labour from remote areas to unpopular employers, notably farmers whose labour was moving off farms and into the squatter camps growing around the industrial centres. Other 'customers' were the new mines, particularly manganese and coal.

3.1

Telona Courtesy Card, 1930/40

NATIVE LABOUR SUPPLIERS ON CONTRACT TO COMPANIES SYNDICATES PROSPECTORS CONTRACTORS IN EVERY INDUSTRY IN ANY NUMBER OF ANY TYPE OR CLASS AND ANYWHERE	P.O. Box 1954 PHONE 33.4040 TEL. ADD. "THERONCO"
THERON & CO.	
HEAD OFFICE: 11-12, NEW MINES HOUSE COR. FOX & SAUER STREETS. JOHANNESBURG	

However, squeezed between the Chamber of Mines recruiters and increasing proletarianization of the workforce, Telona's early development was slow. It was not helped by the report of an International Labour Office delegation in 1938 which heavily criticized private recruiters.¹⁹ In 1943 Telona attempted to negotiate an agreement with the NRC to supply Telona with 'young underage boys, from about 16 to 18' for farm work in the Transvaal and Free State 'at a wage of from 1/- to 1/2 per day worked'. Voluntaries on the Reef were not prepared to work for these rates. But the NRC refused. A further, more urgent appeal was made to the NRC two years later:

'We are small recruiters doing our best to supply employers big and small with native labour that they require. The demand is big when the supply is small and vice versa ... If we could get a steady demand from some big industry which would keep our staff working at all times and give us a source of income at all times, it would give balance to our business not to compete with your recruiters in any way anywhere. I do not expect we would be able to deliver more than about 100 to 150 recruits per month on average.'²⁰

But by this stage, with the destruction of the non-capitalist economy complete and workers flooding the cities from white farms, the NRC was not interested in Telona and again refused the request. Indeed Telona continued to operate near the edge of liquidation, acting largely as a clearing-house for voluntaries in Johannesburg, until migratory labour was underwritten by the Nationalist government after 1948. From then its fortunes rose rapidly, as the graph shows, peaking at about 45 000 recruits a year in the boom of the sixties.


Traders : 'the native's friend'

At the rural end of the labour-catching chain were the recruiters, and during the first half of the century nearly all of them were traders. Their job was to select and forward workers to the compounds of the central agencies, for which they received a capitation fee per recruit. The suitability of using traders was pointed out by the Chairman of the NRC, Villiers, in 1913:

'We employ a large number of traders as recruiters. When I took over the various groups and formed this Corporation, there were a good many people who were not traders, and who were most unsatisfactory. They did us down in enormous sums of money. They had told so many lies to the boys that they shifted their recruiting areas and had to get out. The trader, on the other hand, has a stake in the country. He is dependent on the native for his living. If he does the boys down, they leave his trading station. It is not in his interests to do the boys down. The amount he makes out of (it) in recruiting fees is very small indeed. He makes his money out of trading. The recruit assists him in his trading on account of the advance system, and it brings customers to his shop ... Last year we recruited 57 000 boys at an average (capitation fee) of 43/-. That is about £130 000 over 914 recruiters.'²¹

3.2

Number of Migrants Recruited by
Therons Native Labour Organisation
(Telona) between 1928 and 1979



(Of the 914 recruiters, only three were salaried employees of the NRC). The Native Grievances Inquiry in 1914 was even more direct about the traders' interest in recruiting:

'The recruiter who is a recruiter pure and simple will not, of course, exert himself to procure labour unless he is remunerated for his efforts. But the trader will; it is entirely in his own interests to do so. The trader's business is to sell his goods, and to do so he must have customers with money to spend. In the Territories, the bulk of his customers are natives, and the only way in which they can get money in any quantity is by going out to work. Capitation fee or none, the trader will always use his influence to induce the natives in his neighbourhood to go and earn wages, provided that those wages are, to a substantial extent, spent with him.'²²

The initial need for money on the part of the subsistence farmers was to pay taxes levied for the purpose of getting out labour. Once the labour cycle had begun, the traders saw to it that it was continued with increasing intensity. Their livelihood depended on the harshness of the tax collectors and the wages paid to workers by the mines, and they were only too willing to tighten the knot of non-capitalist dependence on the commodities of merchant capital. They were also in no doubt about the value to recruiting of the increasing underdevelopment within the peripheral areas in which they operated. In answer to a complaint by a mine doctor over the condition of recruited workers, Telona wrote:

'The native does not usually take a contract to go to work until he is starving. When he has no food or money left at home, then he goes to the recruiting office and takes a contract to go to work. This is the recruit that comes before you. If the mine is properly run he will soon put on weight and before he is finished his contract period at the mine he will be well and fat and cheerful.'²³

But after the 1930s, when conditions in many peripheral areas were deteriorating rapidly, contradictions began to arise between trader-recruiters and the central agencies. The first of these was over the conditions of recruits. In an exasperated confidential letter to recruiters over 'poorly' recruits, Telona wrote:

'We sent circulars giving the MINIMUM WEIGHT for PENGCE as 130 lbs. Believe ir or not, we received back 16 yesterday (out of the first 200) and all of these sixteen weighed 105 lbs. and less! DON'T ever send to any mine before the month of June (after which food is scarce - DP) any recruit who weighs less than 110 lbs' (sic).²⁴

An example of a more specific set of requirements was this Bulletin, issued in 1948:

'PHYSICAL AND MEDICAL STANDARDS FOR RECRUITS:

Recruits must be at least 18 years of age and must not weigh less than 108 lbs stripped (i.e. without clothing), for mines and of an acceptable physical and medical standard. Particular attention must be paid to the following:

Defective lungs:

Under this heading is included all those showing signs suggestive of early Tuberculosis ... Special care should be taken in the examination of Natives with long underground mining histories.

Valvular Lesions of the Heart:

Blindness or near blindness in one eye:

Paralysis:

Congenital Deformities which interfere with proper performance of work.

Old injuries:

Flabby muscles and loose skin showing recent wasting:

It has been the experience that the majority of such Natives, especially older boys with a mining history, develop tuberculosis and it is useless to send such men as they will invariably be rejected. But when flabbiness and loose skin are due to under-feeding, improvement may be obtained in some weeks and for this reason re-examination is suggested.

Defective development:

Senility:

Spinal curvature:

Caries in the teeth: such recruits will not be accepted for underground work.

Pyorrhoea: this and other septic conditions of the mouth are sometimes an indication of scurvy.

Epilepsy: such recruits should NOT be recruited, except for farms in mild cases.

THE MOST COMMON CAUSE FOR REJECTION IS THAT THE RECRUIT HIMSELF CLAIMS THAT HE CANNOT WORK BECAUSE OF AN OLD INJURY.

Age limits: Farms = 16/45 years: Mines = 18/45 years.

Two other contradictions which had begun to arise were over the wages and remittances of recruits and over poor conditions in the mines. Due to the bad food, accommodation and compound managers at some mines it was often difficult for recruiters to sign up labour to work on them. Often recruits would be attested for such mines and receive an advance, but would desert on the way up. The recruiters would then forfeit the advance money. This led to recruiters, particularly privates, putting some pressure on mines to improve conditions, as this Telona Bulletin of 1953 indicates:

'There are new compounds which are good at Penge but there are other parts where the compounds are old and definitely bad. You can be sure that we have wasted no time in letting their Directors know just what we found at the mine. We are telling them that unless all our recruits are moved this week-end to the Kromellenborg Section, which is the best, WE ARE STOPPING RECRUITING.'

The third area of abrasion - wages - was caused because, being traders, most recruiters tended to exert pressure on mines in times of labour scarcity to increase payments to workers. This, of course, was because their business interests benefitted from an increased circulation of capital in the rural areas and a better 'bait' with which to catch labour. Both this, and the need to pay trader-recruiters a capitation fee, tended to exert pressure on the mine's total wage bill.

The response of the Chamber of Mines was to phase out traders in favour of salaried employees. The time of the trader-recruiter was coming to an end. His task of creating a rural dependency relationship on commodities had been successful. Traditional skills, by the 1940s, had been replaced by an increasing demand for capitalist manufactures and a growing debt among rural people. But Telona, based squarely on trader-recruiters and officially frowned on in government commissions of inquiry, was to find a new lease of life in the events following 1948: the entrenchment of migrancy and the growth of manufacturing.

Advances: the bribe that became a necessity

By the time of Union the mines were demanding far more labour than could be extracted 'naturally' through taxation. A solution, in part at least, was to institutionalise bribery. Initially the bribes went directly to chiefs:

'Labour recruiters, like colonial and settler governments, soon realised the advantage of working through the traditional powers of the chiefs and headmen, in one way or another. At the very least recruiters needed the approval of a chief to operate without hinderance in his area. With luck he may be able through bribes, firearms, payments and gifts, to make the chief or headman a reliable collaborator who would regularly instruct groups of his young tribesmen to become labour recruits.'²⁵

The practice of bribing chiefs was well established before 1900, when:

'... the commonest way of securing labour, if it was unwilling to come forward on its own account, was by bargaining with the chiefs, who often showed no consideration at all for their followers.'²⁶

In 1903 the Native Commissioner in the North West Transvaal wrote to the Secretary for Native Affairs and commented:

'You are no doubt aware that Native Chiefs and Headmen receive directly or indirectly, payment from labour agents.'²⁷

In fact labour associations kept large amounts of 'secret service' money at their disposal for 'business' with these functionaries. As the demand for labour rose these bribes increasingly went to the labourers themselves. In Mozambique hut taxes were advanced in return for labour, and in Pondoland, especially after the rinderpest and east coast fever epidemics, cattle were 'advanced' in return for labour.²⁸ The sons of chiefs and headmen often moved into the role of guides for new recruits, and were given privileged jobs on the mines as compound policemen and indunas.²⁹ The issuing of advances rapidly became the distribution of 'bait' to induce peasants to bind themselves into labour for the capitalist sector.

'It is said with considerable force that some natives who are under no economic necessity to leave home are attracted by the prospect of £5 down in immediate cash and, to obtain it, commit themselves to an undertaking to go to work at some future time, which they would never do unless they had been caught by some such bait.' (Native Grievances Inquiry, 1914, p. 80).

The nature of the advance varied. Ecksteins Native Labour Department used maize, a practice which forced the NRC to follow suit. The reasons for this were explained by Taberer:

'Natives today are very short of food and the price of mealies is rising very rapidly. What the natives require is food and even though advances in cash may be made to them, they experience difficulty in buying mealies, and where they get them (from traders) they have to purchase them at a very high price.'³⁰

Mosterts, however, were making advances in cattle, sheep and horses on a scale with which the NRC could not compete. 'As we are unable to adopt these methods in recruiting', complained Taberer, 'we are losing a large number of recruits'. These advances were not necessarily paid in immediate response to the attestation of a contract:

'Many recruiters let (the native) have the advance and do not require him to proceed to the mines until some time later, the interval varying from one to six months; in fact one recruiter told me that he sometimes had to allow boys eight or nine months.' (Evidence to the NGI).

The traders were able to offer such long-term bribes because the force of the law was behind the collection of the peasant's debts. Questioned by the same Inquiry, Taberer made this clear:

'The lack of rounding up the native by a trader and his runner would ... lessen the output of natives.

Q. *If your native is hungry, he does not need your local trader to influence him. I understand that you consider persuasion to be on economic grounds. Of course when a man owes you money, you have to be at him all the time to recover it. If the native has got into the ribs of the trader, the trader will round him up without you doing it.*

A. The trader may poke him up by selling his sheep or his cattle.

Q. *Or by threatening him?*

A. Yes, by threatening him. He specifically gives him this advance because the native undertakes when he gets the advance that he will go and work it off on the mine, or wherever he possibly can. As soon as the trader gives him the advance, he usually tries to attest him. He trusts to this attestation that if the native does not fulfill his undertaking he will probably be fined before the magistrates.

Q. *So in that way you are paying the recruiter to advertise as much as possible his method of recovering his debts from the native by giving the advance on condition that they are going to the mines?*

A. Yes.'

Of significance was the fact that unless the recruiter attested a recruit he was unlikely to obtain repayment on the advance if the recruit defaulted. If the black was attested and then refused to 'come out' the offence was then not one of failing to repay a debt but, under the 1911 Native Labour Regulation Act, of not fulfilling the stipulations of a contract. So what traders increasingly agitated for was legal stipulation of the time between the issuing of an advance and signature of a contract. However the complete abolition of advances, although considered from time to time, was never carried out. Asked why traders objected to a suggestion to abolish them, the Chairman of the NRC, Villiers, told the Grievances Inquiry:

'(They object) ... because it circulates money in their country. Take the 40 000 boys we sent from the Cape Province last year. That means two hundred thousand sovereigns that is turned over. The circulation of money through the recruiting agency is enormous. There is also Mosterts and other people. It (would) affect them most seriously. The traders would go broke left and right.' (p. 51 of his evidence).

For the peasants, the relationship with the trader-recruiters was one of bitter necessity, one which sharpened with the underdevelopment of the countryside. As the relationship developed, the advance, in a large number of cases, simply became the repayment of a debt already incurred. No money would change hands, the trader would simply agree to write off a certain amount of accrued debt in return for his debtor signing a labour contract. On other occasions the £5 advance was all a recruit would have to take home to his family after nine months of labour on the mines:

'Do you know what (the recruit) is doing today? He agrees to come up here and he gets £5 and a railway ticket and his food. He spends nearly all the money he gets up here. He goes straight home, and before he dare face his people at home he goes to the trader and signs on again for another term. He then gets £5 from the trader and that £5 is what he takes to his own family.' (Villiers to NGL, p. 52).

Throughout the first two decades of the century the state was critical of the advance system, and the Chamber of Mines had an interest both in keeping it as low as possible and limiting the period between its issue and contract attestation. In 1910 the new Union government limited the advance to £5, and in January 1912 reduced it to £2. But due to an extremely poor agricultural year it was restored to £5 'in times of famine only' in November 1912. (It is still issued today, usually being around R10).

In 1923 Villiers suggested to the government that a regulation be framed 'making it a criminal offence for any native, after accepting an advance to refuse to go forward to work on the date agreed upon at the time the advance was made.³¹ This suggestion was taken up in Proclamation 77 of 1924, making it a crime not to work after taking a £5 loan. Reaction to the Proclamation varied according to the degree of worker resistance capable of being shown. In some areas it was hardly necessary:


'The stability of the Swaziland supply is discounted by the fact that in most of that area the crops have been bad while in any case the £5 tax in force there compels the native to come out under almost any circumstances.' (NRC Gen. Manager's report, Nov. 1925).

Others resisted despite the Proclamation:


'In order to satisfactorily maintain the supply of recruited labour our agents are compelled to take the risk of making cash advances to natives who possess no assets. Defaulters who have obtained cash advances are frequently sentenced to short terms of imprisonment or small fines, and, on release, refuse to either enter upon their contracts or refund their advances. Others, having obtained an advance from one recruiter, obtain a second advance from another recruiter and go forward for the latter.' (Transkei District Superintendent to NRC, Dec. 1928).



Women collecting remittances and goods at a trader-recruiter in Pondoland



Work seekers outside the Labour Bureau in Nelspruit



Nansen's recruiting office in Port St Johns, Transkei, 1979

AGREEMENT

(In Terms of Proclamation No. 77 of 1924)

I,the undersigned native, in consideration of having received an advance of / from the undersigned duly licensed labour agent, do hereby undertake and agree to present myself when called upon to do so and not later than before the duly authorised Attesting Officer at Johannesburg for the purpose of being attested for service underground in the employment of any Gold Mining Company whose name appears at the foot hereof on the service terms as specified on the reverse hereof.

Signed this day ofOne thousand Nine hundred and Twenty



Left thumb impression

Native
Signature or mark

(Independent
adult witness
(to signature)

Labour Agent

(Independent
adult witness
(to signature)

NOTE:— This agreement is exempt from stamp duty under the Stamp Duties Act, 1911, in that it is not of the value of £10.

THE FOLLOWING ARE THE GOLD	Modder Deep Levels Ltd
MINING COMPANIES OF THE TRANS-	Modderfontein East Ltd
VAAL PROVINCE REFERRED TO IN	New Kleinfontein Co Ltd
THE FOREGOING AGREEMENT-	New Modderfontein G M Co Ltd
Brakpan Mines Ltd	New Primrose G M Co Ltd
City Deep Ltd	New State Areas Ltd
Consd Main Reef Mines &	Nourse Mines Ltd
Estate Ltd	Randfontein Estates G M Co (Wit) Ltd
Crown Mines Ltd	Robinson Deep Ltd
Durban Roodepoort Deep Ltd	Ross Deep Ltd
East Geduld Mines Ltd	Simmer & Jack Ltd
East Rand Prop Mines Ltd	Springs Mines Ltd
Ferreira Deep Ltd	Sub-Nigel Ltd
Geduld Prop Mines Ltd	Van Ryn Deep Ltd
Geldenhuis Deep Ltd	Van Ryn G M Estate Ltd
Govt G M Areas (Modder) Cons	Village Deep Ltd
Ltd	West Rand Consolidated Mines Ltd
Lanlaagte Estate & G M Co Ltd	West Springs Ltd
Meyer & Charlton G M Co Ltd	Witwatersrand Deep G M Co Ltd
Modderfontein "B" G M Ltd	Wolhuter G M Co Ltd

Copy of an agreement form of the NRC following Proclamation No. 77 of 1924. This Proclamation followed the findings of a Board of Inquiry set up under the Native Advances Act of 1921. The Act enforced registration of recruits and defined recruiting districts.

By the 1930s it was becoming clear that despite advances and what pay was carried home, the migrant work force was increasingly unable to reproduce itself on the land. Furthermore, less and less money was being remitted to the 'homelands' as more workers broke their ties with their homes and chose to remain on the Reef. These factors led to alarm from two quarters. By the 1940s larger municipalities found themselves with an escalating squatter problem, and the mines were faced with the deteriorating physical condition of their rural recruits.

The alarm of the mine owners is reflected in the Gold Producers' Committee evidence to the 1951 *Commission on the Socio-Economic Development of the Native Areas within the Union of South Africa*.

'The Gold Producers' Committee is of the opinion that it is in the interests of the country as a whole, no less than for the welfare of the native population, that the native areas should be made to produce the maximum quantity of food and that the first duty of the government should be to embark upon an intensive programme of agricultural development ... it would be far more beneficial for the native ... if the government were to intensify the existing programme of agricultural development rather than provide an artificial stimulus to industrial and urban development which may prove costly and premature.' (p. 3)

'The gradual deterioration of these (Reserve) areas is viewed with concern by the Gold Producers' Committee'. (p. 26)

The mine owners were insistent on their ability to pay only a bachelor wage to workers, and the state was in effect being asked to subsidise labour to the mines. And particularly after 1948, the state was prepared to do this, not through injections of capital into the rural areas (the capital was being expatriated), but through political repression, tight labour control through efflux and influx controls and the development of the Bantustan policy.

Transport : the bombellas

When the recruit had been brought in by the black runners and signed on by the trader, he might still have ahead of him a three or four day walk to the District Superintendent for attestation (thumbprinting). These paid officials of the recruiting organisations would keep a migrant

in a compound - often locked in - until the departure of a bombella train (the name means 'that which bumps'). These trains were notorious for their overcrowding and their squalor. But they were cheap:

'May we suggest (says a Telona circular to employers) that you take a returning recruit to the station and get his railway ticket home for him at BOMBELLA rates (and NOT 3rd class), by the cheapest route. The Railway will otherwise give him a 3rd class ticket by the all-rail route which costs 40/- to 70/- more.'³²

However these cheap through-trains were not without their problems for recruiters, as Villiers pointed out in 1914:

'Railway accommodation is not good, especially at certain seasons of the year when we are busy and they produce cattle trucks for us. Sometimes the boys will get into the cattle trucks, but very often they refuse ... We lose an enormous number of natives on the railway. The conductors, who are officers of the Native Affairs Department, are pretty well useless. They allow the boys to buy drink at Sterkstroom and other places on the railway. We lose a large number of natives who are allowed to get off the train. Women and people come around and sell drink to them.

Q. *What arrangements do you make for feeding the boys en route?*

A. Every boy is fed, and he pays for it.

Q. *Is he supplied at the beginning of the journey?*

A. Yes.

Q. *Why do you not make arrangements to feed them regular?*

A. They get bread and tobacco ... For some I do not think the boys eat very much on the way up. They are drunk as owls. If we were to arrange to stop these trains and feed them, I think we would lose a lot of natives. They would abscond and run away ... They have through-trains now from everywhere.'³³

Depending on the availability of labour, the recruiters would pay for rail fares or would deduct them from the migrant's pay. Half or full payment became a bonus in times of labour scarcity. But when recruiters had to pay fares they often complained bitterly:

'The average truck the natives travel in is a converted sheep truck and the following differences in fares when carrying sheep and carrying natives is remarkable:

To send 30 sheep from Alice to Germiston costs £8 and to send 30 natives the same distance in the same truck costs £55-5-0.'³⁴

The cramped, almost foodless journey, was often physically debilitating:

'The appalling travelling accommodation is no doubt responsible for a large percentage of the natives (medically) rejected at Dreihoek (Germiston) after they have been medically examined at their homes.' (Taberer 1923)³⁵

This was the tunnel of darkness between hunger at home and the pit-head, and out of it the state railways was making large sums from migrant fares. By 1910 mine workers were paying the state £600 000 a year for transport.

4. UNDERDEVELOPMENT, CLASS FORMATION AND RESISTANCE TO RECRUITMENT

In part, primitive accumulation is the expropriation of agricultural producers from the soil (Capital 1, 716). One form in which this can be seen is in the forcible driving of the peasantry from the land and the transferring of this land into modern private property. This occurred rapidly around urban areas in South Africa and more slowly in the areas which are now dominated by capitalist farmers.³⁶ In agriculture, the rising organic composition of capital operated to diminish absolutely the numbers employed in agricultural production. Many peasants and labour tenants were forced into the 'homelands' and others made up a large percentage of the squatter movements in the 1940s. Another form in which producers were separated from the soil resulted from the impact of capitalist production on continuing forms of non-capitalist production. The effect of the domination of the capitalist law of value over non-capitalist forms of agricultural production, unaccompanied as it was by the establishment of capitalist relations in the immediate process of production, led to a position where the non-capitalist forms of production were rapidly reduced to providing an ever-diminishing proportion of subsistence.

The destruction of the non-capitalist mode of production is seen by some radical writers as being delayed or inhibited in order to decrease the cost to capital of the reproduction of the labour force extracted from it. While this is to some extent true, there is dissent over the periodization of capital domination. Wolpe, for example, sees evidence of the non-capitalist mode of production existing until the late 1940s.³⁷ Such analysis debates the articulation of separate modes of production, and the 'homelands' are seen as contributing additional subsistence or value from

outside the relations of production of the capitalist mode of production. While it is true that colonial 'social formations' combined a number of modes of production, this can only be agreed upon at a certain level of abstraction that does not necessarily include geographical areas.

Laclau has commented that modes of production other than capital which coexist within the colonial economy are specific *forms* of subjugation of labour perpetuated over time by the requirements of industrial accumulation.³⁸ Banaji has gone further, suggesting that these modes are entirely deprived of their own laws of motion, and that peasants were integrated into capitalist relations of production through 'forced commercialization' of merchant capital, 'behind the backs' of their existing forms of production. Although the peasants retained the external attributes of the superceded forms of economy, subsistence production actually figured as the specific form of reproduction of labour power *within a capitalist process of production*.

'It becomes misleading, therefore, to regard as specific, separate modes of production in a system of modes of production dominated by capitalism.' This was, after all, the illusion which Lenin polemicized against so virorously in his earlier writings against Narodism, repeatedly making the point that capitalism always takes the 'technical process of production' as it finds it. Yet this illusion is today widespread in the neo-populist currents of 'third world political economy' which paradoxically end up by reconstituting the thesis of dual economy at the very centre of their analysis ...' (Banaji)³⁹

It is not appropriate to enter into a debate between these two approaches, more than to say that during the period covered by this paper (from about 1910) it appears that the aims of capital predominated within the majority of non-capitalist societies in South Africa, although in most of them non-capitalist *forms* of production continued, mainly because they were beneficial to mining capital. By then the decision to migrate was seldom in the hands of the migrant, discretionary spending had largely shifted to necessary spending, the physical conditions of the 'homelands' were deteriorating and wages from migrancy were the decisive factor in the reproduction of the family, even in the 'remote' Transkei. During the decades of this century, the situation in this particular 'homeland' was described by Bundy and Beinart as a period of:

'... falling productivity, changing consumption trends, the spread of debt, and above all the massive increase in labour migrancy, signalling the decay of the peasantry and the onset of proletarianisation.'⁴¹

Throughout this period a state-assisted ideology of a rural identity persisted through the 'reserve' policies in a number of 'key' areas. These policies included the allocation of small plots of land for the majority of families, the entrenchment of a separate 'native law' and the institutions of chieftancy, headmanship and lobolo. As merchant capital was increasingly shouldered aside by industrial capital in the 1880s and 1890s, labour became the chief requirement from the black peripheral areas, and although it would be misleading to view migrancy as an index of rural pauperisation, certain classes within these areas were reduced to destitution. The period between 1900 and 1950 was characterised by a shift in the allocation of land, power and wealth in the labour-catching areas brought about by the combined action of mining capital and the state. During this period capital penetration increased. In January 1952 there were 2 633 general dealers in the 'homelands', more than twice as many as in 1936.⁴² This was in line with the Tomlinson Commission's argument that

' ... (black) needs should be increased, or at least so developed that they are never quite satisfied. In other words, the mentality of the average Westerner, in this regard, should be implanted in them.' (p. 94)


Initially chiefs supported migrancy in order to maintain their control, which in many areas was being threatened by traders. When money started to replace cattle in lobolo transactions, especially after rinderpest and east coast fever epidemics in the 1890s and early 1900s, it became necessary for chiefs to procure it. An initial way was to take bribes from recruiters, but a more stable arrangement was to send juniors to the mines and levy a tax on them when they returned. Fundamental, however, was their demand for cash in the purchase of both brides and cattle.⁴³ From the enemies of capital in the period of primitive accumulation, these men rapidly became functionaries of the system, especially in the period of 'indirect rule' in the black territories. Their role was to assist in attempts to halt the total proletarianization of the migrant labour force and the decay of rural families in order to subsidise capital through

the reproduction of the migrant's dependants. This attempt was the major preoccupation of the Tomlinson Commission, and the thrust behind the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act and the Bantu Self-government Act eight years later. The result was an officially-sanctioned rise in the power of officially-appointed chiefs and headmen, their appropriation of land and resources, and the increasing impoverishment of large numbers of their kinsmen. In 1910 the Committee on the Native Labour Regulation Bill was told that many blacks, even then, had no access to cattle and land, and were thus dependent on traders' credit and migrancy for their survival (p. 300-321). By early 1970 this proportion was estimated at 60 percent in the Transkei and 84 percent in Lesotho.⁴⁵

Apart from the absence of those men young and able enough to introduce agricultural and technical innovations, migrancy exacerbated existing problems. Women, who were unable to clear new fields, continued to work overused ones on already impoverished soil. This led to less and less returns from the land, regardless of increased effort, further adding to the downward spiral of poverty. This created increasing dependence on wage labour and on chiefs, leading to an insecurity that was often manifested as conservatism. This position is described by David Webster:

'Because of their lack of security, migrants do not challenge the established order, indeed they rely on it ... A person who wishes to go to work as a migrant first approaches the senior member of his local kinship group for permission, then he seeks the permission of the headman of the district in which he lives, who then notifies the sub-chief and chief. The kinship group of elders have the task of overseeing the absent migrant's homestead and family while he is away, and the headman ensures that no-one encroaches on his fields and in a general, but vague, way protects the property. The chief is nominally the owner of all the land in his chiefdom, and has the power to deprive any person of access to land. The migrant is dependent on the chief, again in a general sense, to ensure that his right to live in the area is maintained while he is away.'⁴⁶

The implication of this indebtedness is that a migrant, who may be attempting to break free or loosen the bonds that tie him to his kinsman and the traditional power structure, becomes, today, even more indebted to, and dependent upon, the older men and power structure of the society.




Compound, Associated Manganese Mines near Kimberley, 1950.

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
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Compound, Associated Manganese Mines near Kimberley, 1950.




Migrants sorting manganese, Associated Manganese Mine near Kimberley, 1990s.

This is not to say, however, that migrants are passive units of labour. In the early period, recruiting was characterised by non-capitalist society resistance to proletarianization. It was later plagued by attempts to circumvent the *restrictions* on free urbanization and full proletarianization which it represented. The earlier period is represented by the numerous tax-collection wars and the triumph of capitalist armaments. The resistance of the later period can be found in the rise of black political organisations, anti-pass campaigns, bus boycotts and squatter movements of the cities. In the countryside it took the form of boycotts of trading stores, resistance to tax collectors, refusal to acknowledge the authority of chiefs, resistance to land betterment schemes, millennial movements, amalaita gangs and Fogo organisation. It also took the form of desertion from mines and bombella trains, strikes on the mines and attacks on indunas, compound staff and fellow migrants.


Of particular interest to this study is the boycott by rural women in the Transkei of trading stores. In 1920, shortly after the mineworkers strike on the Reef, a boycott lasting two weeks was mounted against a Butterworth trader for refusing to supply grain and coffin-boards on credit.⁴⁷ In 1922 a more extensive boycott was organised, beginning with a 'systematic boycotting of the trading stations by women' in the Herschel district. Men and women were often forcibly prevented from buying or selling at the stores. The boycott spread rapidly, and in July of that year a delegation of three to four hundred women assembled at the magistrate's office in Herschel to protest against prices and to request that the state take action against traders.⁴⁸ According to the magistrate's report

'... the women complain about the sale of mealies which are useless to them as they don't get cash for them but iron tickets which entitle them to buy at that store. This makes it impossible for them to pay their taxes. Moreover the mines are closed (due to the 1922 strike by white miners) and there is no work on the goldfields.'⁴⁹

As seen in Chapter 3, the traders were central to the recruitment process, and rural impoverishment was being laid at their feet because of their power over the lives of the people. Furthermore, against a background of poor harvests for several years, the traders were being blamed for the



Home near Dimbaza resettlement
camp, Ciskei, 1979



Coffee-pot stove and
concrete beds in a
Crown Mines compound



Member of the Transkei elite
inside a bakers' shop, Port
St Johns, Transkei, 1979



Malnourished peasant woman
with baby begging outside
bakers' shop, Port St Johns, 1979

shortage of cash from migrant wages. The traders, sure of their own power, took up the offensive by refusing to purchase, withdrawing credit and threatening to take debtors to court.

An interesting side-light on resentment against recruiters can be gleaned from an NRC recruiter in Tabankulu, who during times of drought had to flush his water-supply system at night to prevent reprisals from water-hungry villagers.

'It will be found too, during periods of water-shortage, that the filter in the main furrow is blocked by some unknown⁵⁰ persons, to prevent the water flowing down the pipe ...'

By the 1930s mass migrancy was entrenched. In the latter part of the decade the inflationary boom in South Africa, fuelled by the rise in the price of gold, led to a rapid development of manufacturing industry, further accelerated by the war. This resulted in the rapid growth of the industrial labour force, the number of black workers in manufacturing rising from 76 000 in 1933 to 149 000 in 1945. Blacks flocked to the industrial centres of the country, lured by rising wages, adding to the challenge of the black working class the problem of squatter camps. The key issues were the competing labour requirements of manufacturing and agriculture. The response of the Smuts government was the Fagan Commission, a document outlining the 'rehabilitation of the Reserves'. It suggested the division of these areas into residential, grazing and arable land, the creation of 'rural villages' for the families of the proletariat and an increasingly settled labour force.


The victory of the white workers, farmers and small businessmen in 1948, embodied in the Nationalist Party, ensured that the solutions would be sought in increased control over black trade unions and political organisations, the entrenchment and extension of migrancy and the denial of urban residency rights to blacks in the 'white' areas.⁵¹ In the short term, at least, the prayers of the private recruiters were about to be answered.

5. VOLUNTARIES, SQUATTERS AND RISING URBANIZATION

The 1940s were fulcrum years for labour recruitment. Before that recruits were involved in the business of proletarianization and urbanization of labour. The largest recruiter, the NRC/WNLA, was expected to wither away at a rate proportional to its success. The private recruiters, for the wrong reasons, said this was impossible. After the 1940s, as massive urbanization posed a threat to the mines cost structure and to the bourgeoisie in general, the recruiters were increasingly seen as administrators of influx and efflux control, arriving in the 1970s as sophisticated organisers of compulsory annual vacations for the workforce. Central to this change was the physical movement of the workforce.

Families had been moving towards the cities from the beginning of the century, but by the Second World War these centres contained a large floating surplus population, most of it black, housed in 'locations' and squatter camps. This emerging group was partly constituted by migration to the towns of increasing sections of the latent surplus population of the white capitalist farms and of the reserves.⁵²

However its ranks were also being swelled by the capital accumulation process itself: the growth of secondary manufacturing industry and the tendency of the organic composition of capital to rise (this is discussed in Chapter 6). The appearance of migrant families on a massive scale in the 1940s suggests both a change in the nature of capitalist farming and the inability of the reserves to provide part of the family's subsistence. The collapse of the reserves coincided with the expansion of jobs in the cities. Wages also increased but never reached the cost of family subsistence in Johannesburg where the largest squatter communities were situated.⁵³ In this city the black population grew rapidly between 1936 and 1946, from 229 122 to 384 628, the major increase taking place after war broke out.⁵⁴ The Johannesburg Municipality estimated that 57 percent of the increase was the result of migration from rural areas.⁵⁵ In addition to the underdevelopment of the reserves and rising urban wages several other factors assisted the in-movement of people. In the midst of the rising price of essential foodstuffs, a drought in the



Squatter camp near Johannesburg, 1955

reserve areas caused a serious shortage of maize, the staple diet. A Transkei missionary suggested that in 1942 the yields were a mere quarter to a seventh of the usual crop.⁵⁶ By this time, however, up to half the population of the area were too poor to buy a substitute. The maize shortage reached desperate proportions in 1946, and the mine workers' strike of the same year has been cited as a response to the situation. Whole families were moving into urban areas by this time, and were being assisted by the recruiters.

Voluntary workers had, until then, been central to the Chamber of Mines plan to phase out recruiting and decrease the costs attached to it. A work force that presented itself at the mine gates and returned home to the reserves of its own accord had been a pervading dream of the mine owners for 50 years. Out of a total of 192 151 blacks working on the Reef mines in 1910, 36 832 were not recruited.⁵⁷ Three years later, as shown on Chart 5.1, the number of non-recruits had jumped to 72 133. In 1925, a particularly bad year for recruiting due to a good agricultural season, there were still 57 695 voluntaries.⁵⁸ Originally gangs of voluntaries were brought to the Reef on the strength of impossible promises by labour 'jobbers' and sold to the highest bidder.⁵⁹ In 1928 voluntary recruits were incorporated into the NRC system by way of the Assisted Voluntary Scheme (AVS). These men would be assisted with food and some money, and would be attested and medically checked at the Germiston compound on arriving on the Reef. Although they had paid for their own train fare (often borrowed from traders), in times of labour shortage it would be refunded to them after a period of service. In his evidence to the Native Grievances Inquiry, the Chairman of the NRC described the mines' preference for voluntaries:

'We never recruit surface boys. They all recruit themselves. We could fill (our quota) ten times over (with them) and it is unnecessary to recruit them. All our contracts are for underground work.' (p. 42)

'The real vital difference between (the voluntary) and the recruited boy is that the voluntary boy has a certain amount of capital - the necessary amount to pay his railway fare ... He picks his own work and very often his own boss. They will go to a mine and ask if Smith is there, and if not, they won't go to the mine.' (p. 42)

'The voluntary is a superior class (and) I think this recruiting business is going to die out in time.' (p. 48)

Locals, Voluntaries & Blacks Recruited Independently in 1913

VOLUNTARIES & LOCALS ENGAGED BY MEMBERS OF THE W. N. L. A.	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	Sept.	October	November	December	TOTAL
East Coast (South of Lat. 22° S.)	1204	1587	1343	1304	1425	1210	1392	1016	1135	1302	2673	2005	11676
East Coast (North of Lat. 22° S.)	97	127	97	95	77	116	93	80	96	88	187	101	1253
Natal & Zululand	932	1251	973	1144	865	692	456	411	534	695	641	838	9432
Cape Colony (including Pondoland)	1921	2854	1990	2018	1886	1592	1089	1030	1543	2079	1808	1967	21777
Swaziland	85	66	76	86	51	45	29	41	46	55	71	70	721
Transvaal	1197	2230	2145	2085	1686	1294	985	792	700	883	745	1103	15845
Bechuanaland & Bech- uanaland Protectorate	25	108	130	97	76	61	32	41	27	63	34	68	767
Basutoland	463	536	547	393	309	214	170	197	208	201	246	336	3807
Rhodesia	25	36	43	61	34	61	23	38	27	41	42	48	479
German South West Africa	10	9	7	3	3	1	5	2	3	1	-	7	51
British Nyassaland Prot.	24	30	28	17	28	23	31	26	34	23	23	38	325
TOTAL	8973	8834	7379	7303	6440	5309	4305	3674	4349	5516	6470	6581	72133
RECRUITED INDEPENDENTLY OF THE W.N.L.A. & N.R.C.													
Cape Colony (including Pondoland)	224	133	208	127	113	64	108	172	149	136	154	316	1903
Natal & Zululand	5	9	8	3	9	12	5	6	-	12	5	10	84
Swaziland	5	1	3	-	1	-	1	1	-	1	-	-	13
Transvaal	412	347	449	358	262	294	251	369	420	400	176	170	3923
Bechuanaland & Bechuanaland Protect.	208	306	336	264	187	133	142	151	96	156	48	287	2314
Basutoland	798	617	1373	894	749	694	713	714	655	1216	1077	855	10355
Rhodesia	19	40	52	41	34	36	17	100	70	40	7	10	471
TOTAL	1671	1463	2429	1687	1385	1233	1237	1513	1398	1965	1466	1656	19063

The main reason workers paid their own way to the Rand was the ability it gave them to choose their employer. And with the relatively slack enforcement of influx control it was easy for them to 'disappear' and remain on the Reef. By 1951 the Gold Producers Committee estimated that 70 percent of their black labour force was non-recruited, 50 percent being AVS and 20 percent local workers. The remaining 30 percent were contract workers.⁶⁰ The Committee considered 'locals' to be workers transferring from other mines or from industry. However large numbers of these, and in fact a considerable proportion of the population of the Rand, were made up of deserters from the mines.

Moroney has identified two types of desertion: target and defensive. He sees target desertion as that occurring before a recruit reports for work:

'Many WNLA agents reported during this period that recruits in large numbers were signing on to be transported to the mine and deserting once they neared the Witwatersrand. They would then enter the labour market as free agents, tendering their services where they so desired. Many deserted the WNLA trains at Pretoria and either sought work there, in the military camps or private employ on a relatively permanent basis, or used this employment to gain a pass to travel independently to the Reef ... to seek better opportunities.'⁶¹

Defensive desertion meant that:

'Workers would desert when working or compound conditions became unbearable, when they did not receive full pay or when management detained them longer than they had intended. As such it was an active form of protest.'⁶²

As security for blacks on white farms and the conditions of the reserves both deteriorated, these men increasingly imported their families to the cities. Between 1911 and 1936 the male/female ratio among blacks in Johannesburg dropped from 16 to 1 down to 5 to 1. In 1946 it was 10 to 3.⁶³ Population figures for Johannesburg between 1904 and 1936 were as follows:

5.2 Population Growth, City of Johannesburg

Year	European	Non-European
1904	83 902	74 678
1918	137 673	117 151 (1911)
1921	150 286	132 665
1926	188 545	-
1931	199 507	148 300
1933	211 800	151 500
1934	222 000	190 700
1935	240 000	208 000
1936	257 530	261 738

Source: Phillips: Bantu in the city (1939)

The immediate problem caused by the influx was housing. In 1939 the number of families on the waiting list of the Johannesburg Municipality for housing was 143. By 1941 it was 4 500 and by 1947 it was 16 000, and the numbers of those not registered with the Municipality but being in need of housing was estimated at 40 000.⁶⁴ But even had there been sufficient housing it is unlikely that many of the working class would have been able to afford it. Despite the increased wages of the 1940s, black income was still below the cost of reproduction of a family, hence the massive increase in squatting (which cost nothing but effort), prostitution and illicit liquor brewing. Furthermore the increase in the wages of unskilled workers probably led to some unemployment as industry cut costs by installing machinery wherever possible.

By the end of the war there was widespread unemployment in South African cities. In 1946 the manager of the Johannesburg Non-European Affairs Department reported that

'... many hundreds of location tenants are seeking employment (and that it was) fair to assume that some thousands of male natives are unemployed.'⁶⁵

This was the labour climate in which Telona found itself in the late 1930s and 1940s. Situated around the corner from the Johannesburg Pass Office, the firm found it had an abundance of labour on its doorstep.

Due to a bureaucratic separation between the Pass Office and the Johannesburg Municipal Employment Bureaux, and the inefficiency of the latter,⁶⁶ Telona found a lucrative business touting at the Pass Office for non-Chamber mines which were demanding labour. And due to the shortage of jobs, black workers were prepared to accept the low wages and poor conditions offered. The following chart shows the number of locals recruited in December 1937, a number exceeding that by any trader-recruiter.

5.3 Recruits Passing Through Telona, December 1937

<u>FROM</u>		<u>DESTINATION</u>	
Locals	78	Onverwacht Chrome Mine	104
C. Hesketh	67	Machavie G. Mine Co.	78
J.M. Els	54	Cons. Rand Brick Potts.	57
G.H. Simpson	51	Zwartkop Chrome Mine	48
P. Mokhatla	51	South. Roodepoort M.R.A.	30
R.H. Linton	46	Durban Navigation Colls.	24
Blackbeard Bros.	39	Thabazimbi Iron Mine	19
Van Wezel	21	Marble Hall	12
Seboka	15	S.A. Manganese	12
du Plessis	11	New Lancaster G. Mine Co.	11
Returns	9	Newcastle Colliery	7
G.A. Seaman	8	Oogies Navigation Colls.	7
C.H. Els	7	Consolidated Marsfield Colls.	7
G. Hulley	6	Associated Manganese	58
Smithers	6		
J. Leeuw	5		
R. Grant	2		
Grundlingh	1		
C.B.C. Botha	1		
	<u>479</u>		<u>474</u>

The 5 unaccounted for were 'non-arrivals' or deserters

This situation was by no means new. In 1910 a Select Committee on Native Labour found that Mosterts was doing the same thing, albeit on a much smaller scale:

'It is admitted that touts bring boys to Mr. Mostert's office in Johannesburg to be engaged and that these touts are paid a commission for doing so. No inquiry is made as to where they get the boys; and, in many cases, they pick them up in the street. The excuse is that these touts were supposed to get the boys from the Pass Office only; and to do this by the consent of the (Native Affairs) Department.'⁶⁷

The mines were also making use of this surplus urban labour by housing jobless workers in their compounds as a reserve army of labour. These mines

'... carry a ... surplus composed of voluntary natives who prefer to remain in the compound awaiting the chance of employment rather than going elsewhere with the possibility of obtaining immediate work.'⁶⁸


Judging from its Recruiter Bulletins for the two decades following 1940, Telona increasingly attested local workers for surface jobs on the mines, using 'raw, red-blanket' recruits for the more unpopular underground work and for farms. However the labour problems of capitalist agriculture (with wages around 1/8d a shift) coincided with unemployment on the Rand, and Telona found it possible to add local labour to its 'youngsters, old men and cripples' destined for the farms, and continued to do this for many years. A letter, written as late as 1974 to the Bantu Affairs Commissioner, is illuminating on this point:

'It is imperative that our country's labour force be used to its maximum extent and this can greatly be assisted by the re-attestation of rejects who are capable and willing to work elsewhere. In the past we have re-attested rejects mainly for farm work and this has assisted farmers considerably in maintaining their labour strength and in producing and reaping crops so vital to the economy of the country. Over the years we have found that recruits are often rejected after they complain of some minor ailment and this is done solely to get away from that certain mine ...'⁶⁹

Telona's recruiting business took off in 1945, as the graph shows, as orders from big mines supplying the needs of the post-war reconstruction period increased. Prominent among these mines were those supplying manganese, coal, asbestos, chrome and copper. However although

5.4

Number of migrants recruited by
Therons Native Labour Organisation
(Telona) between 1928 and 1979



local recruits were more profitable to Telona (it was not necessary to pay a recruiting fee for 'joins' picked up at the Pass Office) they were often more 'job choosey' and gave mineowners reason for complaint. Indeed Telona was accused of 'scraping the gutters of Johannesburg for scum to send as labour to (the mine at) Penge', at a board meeting of Cape Blue Asbestos in 1957.⁷⁰

However recruitment of locals continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Although it tailed off in the latter decade this form of recruitment was still earning the company around R20 000 a year in 1963, as Figure 5.5 shows.

5.5 Commission Earned by Telona and Agents During 1963

1963	Recruits	Locals	Earnings	Per recruit	Payments	Per recruit
Mar.	636	161	R5 120	R8.05	R2 155	R4.62
Apr.	1 143	232	9 582	8.30	4 341	4.79
May	1 281	246	10 640	8.35	4 926	4.82
June	1 381	223	11 503	8.34	5 375	4.76
Jul.	1 267	203	10 430	8.24	4 763	4.60
Aug.	2 064	222	17 825	8.63	8 254	4.55
Sep.	2 137	226	11 812	8.80	8 756	4.66

Average/month 216 8.39

Average earned by Telona for locals per year R21 746

Supplying mines not affected by the cost constraints of gold, Telona's fortunes rose rapidly with manufacturing and the boom of the 1960s (see Figure 5.4), peaking in 1966. Figure 5.6 shows the destination, by industry, during this time of Telona recruits, and Figure 5.7 the geographical areas served by the firm.


5.6 Destination, by Industry, of Workers Recruited by Telona, 1964-1970

	1964/5	1965/6	1966/7	1967/8	1968/9	1969/70
Bleskop	8 614	12 130	15 317	10 811	6 503	11 597
Union Asbestos	2 809	3 019	2 722	3 172	1 258	1 698
Penge	1 284	3 001	3 442	2 941	2 044	2 495
Other asbestos	2 840	5 610	5 172	3 075	1 881	1 176
Glosom	4 156	5 154	5 225	4 432	4 219	4 222
Coal	3 609	6 086	4 068	5 030	5 211	5 296
Diamonds	758	1 618	1 867	1 616	1 785	1 817
Farms	843	1 247	1 185	1 589	2 108	2 657
Sugar	1 369	1 611	1 685	2 044	2 004	1 257
Frazer Alex.	926	1 238	1 426	972	709	740
Others ^x	245	2 378	2 129	3 568	2 793	1 925
Total	27 453	43 119	44 256	39 250	30 461	34 907

^xThese = Gold, S.A. Manganese, Tzimbi Mine, Chrome, Copper Lillie Est., N.T. E., Northern Lime, Republican Timbers.

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
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5.7 Destination of Recruits Passing Through Telona in 1960s

In the 1950s and 1960s, however, the state machinery for labour was being reconstructed, and was set on a course which was to collide with Telona in 1974.

6. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MANUFACTURING, LABOUR BUREAUX AND THE SQUEEZE ON TELONA

Capital invested in production for export from the peripheral economy of South Africa in the early part of this century gave rise to a degree of monetization of the economy. This, in turn, generated a local market for manufactured commodities. In order to protect the local industrialization (which grew to meet this demand) from the corrosive competition of international free trade, tariff barriers were thrown up. It has been argued that in part, the Pact government that came to power in 1924 represented industrial protection, the other part representing capitalist agriculture.⁷¹ The policies of this government were crucial in speeding up industrialization and altering the balance between local and foreign capital, as well as between mining, manufacturing and agriculture. By 1945 mining's contribution to the GDP had fallen, from around 18% in the twenties, to 13%, whereas industrial production was contributing 19% of the GDP. In 1970 its contribution stood around 31%.⁷² In 1945 the Board of Trade and Industries concluded 'that there has been on the whole a great increase in the average size of the industrial firm ... the higher fixed capital per establishment actually points to greater mechanization'. (par. 55)⁷³ Table 6.1 from the Gold Producers' Committee in 1951 shows the effects of this change on the employment of labour. Figure 6.2 is a graphic representation of the table, showing that around 1945 the numbers of blacks employed in manufacturing and on the Railway/Harbours exceeded those on the gold mines. Of significance is the steepness of the rise.

Since 1945 the number of black workers engaged in industry increased phenomenally, rising from 245 538 to 571 737 in 1955 and by 1970 it stood at 1 227 200 or 78% of the black workforce.⁷⁴ This continual supply of labour enabled the gross value of the new manufacturing industry to increase from about R600m. in 1948 to R3 600m. in 1964.⁷⁵

This rise in local secondary industrial production created the preconditions for the entry of monopoly capital. The effect on labour of the changing nature of the capitalist mode of production, however, was initially a process of attraction, and then repulsion. As we have seen, large numbers of workers had been attracted (or brought) to industrial centres

6.1 No. of Blacks Employed on Gold Mines, in Manufacturing and
on SAR/H Between 1933 and 1951


Year	Union & High Commission Territories	(a)			(b) [*]		
		ON GOLD MINES, MEMBERS OF THE CHAMBER			IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY AND IN THE S.A.R. & H.		
		Tropical	East Coast	Total	Manufacturing	S.A.R.&H.	Total
1933	177,390	200	48,455	228,045	74,362	22,008	96,370
1934	192,046	1,706	51,407	245,159	92,280	23,894	116,174
1935	201,747	1,109	62,544	265,400	112,091	28,787	140,878
1936	222,183	1,487	67,543	291,213	131,971	36,645	168,616
1937	210,314	6,269	81,165	297,748	145,688	42,203	187,891
1938	217,492	13,698	80,733	311,923	156,121	46,833	202,954
1939	222,869	18,519	75,372	316,760	156,550	46,956	203,506
1940	250,676	22,663	74,427	347,766	161,765	45,413	207,178
1941	262,783	21,999	79,126	363,908	181,308	41,245	222,553
1942	240,227	26,589	88,270	355,086	198,871	44,711	243,582
1943	200,619	21,641	79,609	301,869	211,050	48,339	259,389
1944	183,531	25,831	83,631	292,993	225,376	50,943	276,319
1945	194,139	30,437	77,761	302,337	245,538	54,978	300,516
1946	188,337	33,669	76,885	298,891	259,582	62,968	322,550
1947	173,924	34,722	80,311	288,957	277,703	73,665	351,368
1948	152,638	40,393	78,368	271,399	307,597	79,059	386,656
1949	160,504	42,395	83,177	286,076)	Not Available	80,600	Not Available
1950	173,261	39,748	81,416	294,425)	Available	74,245	Available
1951	161,264	39,466	86,710	286,440)			

* The figures under this heading are quoted from the Report of the Industrial Legislation Commission of Inquiry.

Source: Gold Producers' Committee, 1951.

6.2

Graphic Representation of 6.1



by a number of forces, not the least being the labour recruiters. In them manufacturing found an impoverished labour force from which it could extract a high rate of surplus value. However the effect of the rapid rise in the organic composition of capital was to increase the level of black unemployment. Simkins has shown that even during the boom period of 1960-1969, with nine years of growth at 6%, unemployment still stood at 1.6m., or 19% of the labour force.⁷⁶ The reasons for this push-pull effect are given by Marx:

'Considering the social capital in its totality, the movement of its accumulation now causes periodic changes, affecting it more or less as a whole, now distributes its various phases simultaneously over the different spheres of production. In some spheres a change in the composition of capital occurs without increase of its absolute magnitude, as a consequence of simple centralization; in others the absolute growth of capital is connected with absolute diminution of its variable constituent, or of the labour power absorbed by it; in others again, capital continues growing for a time on its given technical basis, and attracts additional labour-power in proportion to its increases while at other times it undergoes organic change, and lessens its variable constituent; in all spheres, the increase of the variable part of capital, and therefore the number of labourers employed by it, is always connected with violent fluctuations and transitory production of surplus population, whether this takes the more striking form of the repulsion of labourers already employed or the less evident but no less real form of the more difficult absorption of the additional labouring population through the usual channels.' (Capital I. 630)

In South Africa, the growth of this relative surplus population was accompanied by substantial state intervention in its control and distribution. To quote Wolpe (1976):

'Apartheid, as the mechanisms specific to South Africa in the period of secondary industrialisation under conditions of rising organic composition of capital, is an *expression* of the possibility of maintaining a cheap and controlled labour force, and a high rate of capitalist exploitation, which is in large part a consequence of the character of the industrial reserve army.'

The effect, and apartheid was an effect, was to disperse this industrial reserve army around the peripheries of South Africa, where social control was easier and cheaper, and from where it could be mobilized when needed.

through the contract system. This was brought about through the strict adherence to Acts on social engineering (Group Areas, Urban Areas Acts, Vagrancy Regulations etc.), ruthless suppression of black dissension (Suppression of Communism, Terrorism Acts etc.), removal of the industrial reserve army to Bantustans and the facilitation of labour to the industrial centres through the labour bureaux. The division was sharpened between blacks with residential rights in 'white' cities and those regarded as citizens of the Bantustans.

These policies were pursued in the 1950s in the context of substantial struggles between fractions of capital, but by the 1960s the grounds for opposition to the state's labour policies began to fall away when it was realised that apartheid did not necessarily mean the complete drying up of black labour in the urban areas. Central to this 'assurance' to capital was the institution of the labour bureau system. By 1948 a rough but ineffective state labour system had been created. The Government Notice No. 1988 of December 1911 prescribed many of the procedures used at the labour bureaux today, and in 1948 the Fagan Commission said that:

'A step which we consider urgently necessary is the institution of a wide but certainly organised network of labour bureaux. We are aware of the fact that labour bureaux are already in existence - some functioning under the Department of Labour, others under the Native Administrations of various municipalities. They do good work so far as they go, but what we have in mind is something that is much bigger and much more comprehensive.' (p. 27).

It took the stronger Nationalist Government, in 1949, to establish a nation-wide system of labour bureaux, part of its aim being to channel some of the 'surplus urban' and 'undesirable urban' blacks to the rural areas. Indeed the cornerstone of the system, at that stage, was to end any moves towards a free labour market and to channel labour into unpopular sectors, notably capitalist agriculture. In 1952 the Native Laws Amendment Act established a central labour bureau controlled either by Native Commissioners or by municipalities. This system was consolidated by the 1964 Bantu Labour Act. Under this piece of legislation the central labour bureau, under control of the Director of Bantu Labour, was empowered to regulate the activities and give guidance to the regional, district and various local bureaux established by the Act.

The functions of the labour bureaux were given in the 1965 Labour Regulations as:

- a) to place the Bantu in employment and to regulate the supply of labour with a view to correlating it with demand;
- b) to secure the co-operation of employers and work-seekers in connexion with the labour bureaux;
- c) to collect and correlate data and furnish information in connexion with the existence of vacancies and the availability of work-seekers;
- d) to ensure, as far as possible, that work-seekers are placed in employment for which they are best suited;
- e) to keep the Bantu Reference Bureau informed of the movement of Bantu workers; and
- f) generally to take all such steps as will ensure the efficient functioning of labour bureaux.

(Government Notice R1892, December 3 1965)

In 1968 regulations were proclaimed (excluding the Transkei which had similar arrangements) establishing territorial, district and tribal labour bureaux in the Bantustans.

By 1974 there were eight regional labour bureaux administered by regional labour commissioners, controlling 425 local labour bureaux in the urban areas of South Africa and 357 district labour bureaux in predominantly rural areas outside the Bantustans. There were also eight territorial bureaux controlling eight Bantustans, excluding the Transkei, and 418 tribal bureaux with functions similar to the regional and local bureaux outside the Bantustans.⁷⁷ Inside the Transkei, the development of the labour bureaux system over the other two main recruiters Teba and Telona, can be seen in Table 6.3, which is represented graphically in Figure 6.4.

The explicit aim of the system, co-ordinated by the central labour bureau in Pretoria, was to regulate the labour market by bringing employers and black work-seekers into contact with each other. But the system provided more than a labour exchange or recruiting service, because the powers granted to the various labour officers were such that they could control the movement of black labour throughout South Africa. For example a municipal labour officer could order any black who was unemployed, not


6.3 Number of Recruits Moved from the Transkei by Teba, Telona and the Labour Bureaux between 1960 and 1978

	Teba	Telona	Labour Bureaux
60	70 067	-	-
61	69 237	-	-
62	68 978	-	1 342
63	65 421	5 481	6 523
64	50 043	6 588	16 500
65	51 313	15 861	20 142
66	58 035	16 099	23 601
67	57 766	8 307	23 777
68	63 084	-	29 391
69	58 952	10 788	45 884
70	49 016	9 322	70 892
71	41 087	8 960	80 323
72	45 259	8 900	83 137
73	49 122	12 652	83 547
74	53 087	16 076	149 224
75	80 087	18 567	158 586
76	113 841	21 229	191 404
77	134 714	18 317	189 716
78	127 754	17 885	232 637

Source: Transkei Government, Department of Interior: Statistical Labour Reports to 1978 (Umtata)

registered as a work-seeker, or even if employed but illegally resident in an area, to return to the place from which he or she came. In addition, from 1968 all workers entering 'white' South Africa from the Bantustans for the first time had to do so on a contract not exceeding a year, after which they were forced to return home. In this way urban settlement was to be curbed.

6.4

Graphic Representation of 6.3

The effects of this squeeze on the free labour market were to prove crippling for Telona. As unemployment rose, the firm was left with two choices, both of which it acted on in the 1960s: one was to be a supplier of labour from the remotest parts of the periphery for the more unpopular jobs, many mines preferring the more politically 'docile' rural or 'red-blanket' workers. In this it clashed with the labour bureaux:

'Naturally it takes time to build up the Labour Bureau' (Telona wrote to its recruiters in 1955). 'They have now taken their first and second steps. They have stopped us accepting arrangements to recruit for Employers situated in "prescribed areas" (these are areas in each district into which only the Labour Bureau may send recruits). Now they have made the Head of the Labour Bureau into the Director of Native Labour (who controls the issue of all licences) and the issue of new licences has been held up.'

'So much for what is cooking. We have had an interview with the Minister of Native Affairs and the Director of Native Labour (and the Labour Bureau). A letter summarising the answer to our questions has been received from the Secretary for Native Affairs which says that of course as the Labour Bureau takes over, private recruiting will come to an end.'

'There are those who think that any progress by the Native is a danger to the European. We find that it is an insult to the intelligence to ask anyone to believe this. We cannot believe that any Government could commit the folly of doing away with us and remain in power as a Government, for it is the function of good Government to serve the people governed and to uphold their rights to progress. All else is bad government.'

The second choice was to act as a type of labour bureau for locals in Johannesburg. This choice, however, was abruptly cut off in 1974 by the state in what appears to have been an attempt to close down the firm completely.

Opposition to private recruiters had been mounting for 50 years previous to this action. In 1923 an International Labour Office delegation had been highly critical of privates on the grounds that 'labour catching for the sole purpose of remuneration is detrimental to the interests of the labourer', and various Commissions after that suggested that they be curtailed. A more serious complaint was about the leverage that private recruiters could exercise against employers in times of labour shortage. This was described by the Director of Telona:

'At present the whole thing has taken a somersault, as it did in the Depression. Today there's a surplus of work-seekers, so employers are not hard put. But for nine out of ten years in the past there's been a shortage and employers were keen to fall in line with suggestions and difficulties placed in the way of labour. Now employers are dictating the terms - demanding skilled labour. Now orders are scarce. And so now the recruiter is more like an employment agency. Before, private recruiting organisations were in a much better position (to voice employee grievances which inhibited recruiting) than employer-controlled ones, because if an employee in an employer-controlled firm reports on injustice he is likely to be fired if he's over-enthusiastic. With our private organisation we can reveal all these things that need correcting without being sacked. They can stop dealing with us if they like, but they aren't likely to do that in times of shortage. You see a private can be a potential thorn in the flesh of a firm.'⁷⁸

An even more serious complaint, against Telona specifically, was its recruitment of local labour in Johannesburg. The first shots were fired in 1971 in a report of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development:

'It is ... the policy ... to allow as far as possible only organisations which recruit specific workers for the group of employers concerned on a non-profit basis, and not to allow private recruiters, who are remunerated per worker recruited. It is hoped that these private recruiters will disappear in due course.' (RP 41/73, Dec. 1971, p.6)

At the time, in addition to massive Pass campaigns, the state was trying to limit the numbers of blacks employed in urban centres through the implementation of the Physical Planning Act of 1967, which stated that Ministerial consent was required for the extension or establishment of new factories in proclaimed (white) areas. An 'extension' of a factory was defined as an increase in the number of blacks employed. This, in particular, hit the Transvaal, where between 1971 and 1976 45 503 black workers were affected by refusals to extend work quotas under the Act.⁷⁹ At this time, too, many thousands of 'illegals' were pouring into Johannesburg with 'permission to work' stamped in their passes, and being legalised by recruitment at the Pass Office. Although Telona had been reducing its numbers of local recruits and expanding its rural network, the firm was still recruiting hundreds of locals a month through 1972 and 1973.

Then, in 1974, Telona lost its licence to recruit in South Africa following a downturn in the economy, an increase in inflation, and violence on the mines. The background to the conflicts is explored by Horner and Kooy (1979):⁸⁰ among the wage demands and 'faction fights' can be discerned a rising militancy among workers. It is significant that after similar pressure on the mines after 1976 Teba closed down its recruiting office in Cape Town due to the 'insolence' of 'troublemakers from the city' on the mines.⁸¹

It is probable that by early 1974, with wars intensifying on the South African borders, the state was becoming concerned about its control of labour. At the end of March that year Telona received the following letter from the Bantu Affairs Commissioner in Johannesburg:

'RECRUITING OF BANTU LABOUR

1. I regret to inform you that it has now been decided not to renew your labour agent's recruiting licence for 1975 or subsequent years.
2. The object of this letter is to inform you timeously of this fact so that you may make the necessary arrangements to discontinue all forms of recruiting on the 31 December 1974.
3. It follows that all the agreements which you entered with employers to recruit on their behalf will also expire on that date.
4. Likewise the licences of the labour agents presently recruiting for you or for Theron and Company (also known as Telona) will not be renewed.'

During the year a flurry of communication took place between the Commissioner and Telona. During that time Telona tried, and failed, to be taken over by its largest customer as an employer-recruiter organisation. However two events took place during this time that may have made the state retreat partially. In April Banda banned all recruiting from Malawi, and by mid-year the war in Mozambique appeared to be about to threaten the labour supply of the mines from this area. Both factors led to an intensified drive to recruit labour from South Africa, and this is probably partly behind the compromise which was reached between the Commissioner and Telona in October:

'RECRUITING BANTU' LABOUR

1. With further reference to your letter dated 8 July 1974 I have been asked to refer you to my letter dated 25 March 1974 in which you were informed that no new recruiting licences will be issued to your organisation after 1974.
2. My attention has, however, been drawn to the fact that this function has now been transferred to the Homeland governments in terms of paragraph 13 of Schedule 1 of Act 21/1971. You may therefore negotiate with the Transkei and Ciskei governments in regard to the issuing of recruiting licences to your agents.

In effect Theron himself was to lose his labour agents' licence, but Telona could still act as a central office for agents situated in the Bantustans. Recruiting was also to be curtailed at Telona offices in Mafeking, Kimberley, Bloemfontein, Ladysmith, Pietermaritzburg and the northern Transvaal.

The effect of this ban, after a sharp peak in 1975, seems to have been a steady decline in the number of recruits passing through the firm's books. Since then it has trimmed its staff, 'struggling on as a private organisation, trying to serve the little man'. Its main concern is administering compulsory leave to black mine workers on call-in cards (bonus cards) which entitle a worker to return to his previous job, usually at the same wage. One of Telona's largest customers, Rustenberg Plats, at one stage refused to pay recruiting fees for what amounted to simple administration in the Bantustans, but found that there was some value in employing a facilitator and rescinded a few months later. The Director, when interviewed, was philosophical:

'We don't worry about competition, if it's right that we should succeed, then we will succeed, otherwise we'll disappear. There's a power bigger than all of us, you know.'⁸²

The nature of that power, far from being celestial, appears however to be implied in the evidence of the Riekert Commission:

'The criticism levelled against the labour agent system was mainly that the system, particularly where the free-lance labour agent works for one or more employers or recruiting organisations at a per capita fee, lends itself to certain abuses and irregularities, including the recruitment of minor children; the recruitment of medically unfit people; the falsification of contracts; failure

to pay the wages agreed upon at recruitment; inadequate explanation of contractual conditions; the conveyance of recruited labourers in unroadworthy vehicles and misrepresentations regarding wages and conditions of employment. One of the reasons adduced for these irregularities was that such agents operate purely for gain, i.e., they try at all costs to recruit as many labourers as possible at a fee varying from R12 to R15 per head.

Many witnesses expressed particularly sharp criticism of the payment of per capita fees to labour agents, and were of the opinion that this particular practice was outmoded and indefensible and that it should be terminated. Salaried workers who recruited in accordance with the needs of employers/recruiting organisations or in accordance with quotas were preferable.' (p. 131)

It seems that in the rationalisation of the monolith of labour control legislation to suit monopoly capital, Telona is about to be 'streamlined' out of existence.

7. CONCLUSION: UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE MECHANISMS OF LABOUR RECRUITMENT AND CONTROL IN THE 1970s

What has been done so far is to follow the thread of a private labour recruiter through the development of the fabric of South African capitalism. What remains to be done is to situate Telona, very briefly, within the context of the labour pattern of the 1970s. Gerhard Maré has said that if the apartheid period up to the end of the 1950s can be characterised as that of the allocation of labour, then the 1960s and 1970s are the decades of labour relocation and unemployment.⁸³ This relocation of labour, reversing the urban inflow, has been undertaken by the state in response to a rising 'surplus' of labour drawn into the industrial centres and towns through the deterioration of the reserves and the destruction of the non-capitalist economy, the ejection of labour from capitalist farms and the general 'pull' of higher wages, as well as the activities of the labour recruiters. What has occurred in these centres is that the supply of labour has outstripped the demand, causing unemployment. Simkins has estimated that in 1977 the combined figures for underemployment and unemployment in South Africa were 2,3m., and Van der Merwe calculates that between 1970 and 1976 the *increase* in the number of unemployed was no fewer than 467 a day.⁸⁴ In order to understand the position of a labour

recruiter like Telona it is necessary to look at the super-abundance of labour constituted by this industrial reserve army and to look at the attempts made by the state to deal with its increasing demands for access to the means of production.

The demand for labour is related to the rate of employment creation in the economy. This in turn depends on the amount and type of investment that takes place in that economy. As we have seen, the South African economy is dominated by monopoly capital. In 1977 the Mouton Commission into the Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions Act found their investigation

'... confirms an exceptionally high degree of concentration of economic power in the four major divisions of the South African economy that were analysed (manufacturing, wholesale and retail, construction and transport).'⁸⁵

Apart from the penetration of international monopoly capital in both its overt form (GM, Shell, Caltex, Ford etc.) and covert form (as major share holders in South African 'front' companies) and the eight big mining houses, the economy is dominated by the major banks (Barclays, Standard, Nedbank, Volksas), the massive state corporations (SAR, Escom, Iscor etc.) and the large 'Afrikaner' conglomerates such as the Sanlam/Volksas/Federale Volksbeleggings group. Under this latter group, for example, are subsidiaries such as Phillips Radios and TV, Kleenex, Veka clothing, Die Beeld newspaper, Trust Bank, Hertz, Avis, Trek petrol, Metropolitan Homes Trust, General Mining, Union Corporation, Fedics, Ster/Kinekor and Satbel.⁸⁶ The result of this centralisation and concentration of capital was to increase its organic composition (the ratio of means of production to living labour in production). Between 1946 and 1972 real fixed capital stock in South Africa increased by 32 percent.⁸⁷ Much of this fixed stock was in foreign technology. A survey amongst manufacturers in 1977 established that 71 percent of firms were using techniques embodying at least 90 percent foreign technology and only 10 percent were using less than 50 percent foreign technology.⁸⁸

The control, influence and effect of this rise in organic composition is, of course, also felt in the field of labour utilisation (both quantitatively and qualitatively). Investment decisions are predominantly determined by profitability criteria and not social goals such as creating full employment. The existence of unemployment is perfectly compatible with capitalism

and, as we have seen, serves the interests of the owners of capital, strengthening their bargaining power vis-a-vis workers. It would therefore be a serious mistake to attribute the high level of underemployment and increase in unemployment to the current economic recession in the belief that it will disappear if and when an economic boom takes place. Simkins has shown that if the number of underemployed is to be kept constant (let alone reduced) within the present economic structure the economy needs to grow at 6,7 percent a year, a rate which the South African economy cannot hope to achieve for a sustained time. What is suggested from the above discussion is that the worsening position of labour has to be located in underlying structural causes within the political economy and is not part of a cyclical process of booms and slumps. Commenting on this, Maree says that:

'At best a boom in South Africa can keep constant the proportion of the underemployed African labour force even though the absolute level of underemployed workers increases. During a slump the relative and absolute number of underemployed African workers rises. Structural forces are therefore creating a tide of underemployed while trade cycles produce waves that push the tide out.'⁸⁹

In addition to the historical creation of a supply of cheap labour and the rising organic composition of capital, other factors contributing to this structural increase of the mass of unemployed are the industrial colour bar, excluding black workers from jobs, and industrial decentralisation, which is estimated to have blocked nine jobs for every one created.⁹⁰ The relative surplus population thus created is described by Marx as:

'... the pivot upon which the law of demand and supply of labour work. It confines the field of action of this law within the limits absolutely convenient to the activity of exploitation and to the domination of capital.' (1, p. 630)

In South Africa the state exerts a power to intervene directly in the workings of this law of supply and demand. The fears generated in the bourgeoisie by the uprising among black school children in 1976 and by the size of the problem of the urban unemployed have given rise to mass population removals to 'dumping' grounds, a tightening of influx control and the creation of 'legal laagers' around the towns, as well as an

attempt by the Riekert Commission to restructure the black population, driving a wedge between 'insiders' in the towns with Section 10 rights, and 'outsiders', those regarded as citizens of Bantustans. But although the rise in the numbers of the relative surplus population has paralleled an increase in state control, it would be misleading to put 'fear' at the centre of the calculation. The new legislation on influx control is not simply to expel surplus workers but to organise labour and harmonise it with the needs of capital, while ensuring the political stability of the state. It is important to grasp that the Riekert Commission did not suggest a change in the policy of separate development, but in its efforts to streamline existing legislation it acted to focus these policies and to make suggestions for their smoother evolution in the future. Many of Riekert's 'suggestions' were in force before the report was completed. The Commission simply added its weight to the movement of labour from areas of surplus to areas of deficit, suggested moves to cut down the loss of labour time through bureaucratic bottlenecks, and through the high job turnover at the point of production. It sought to shift the burden of 'illegal' employment onto employers with fines of up to R500, and to widen the gap between urban 'insiders' with Section 10(1) (a) and (b) rights and 'outsiders', with residency rights in the Bantustans, hoping thereby to create a semi-skilled labour aristocracy as a political buffer between the bourgeoisie and the working class. This latter class would be economically assimilated but politically segregated; sucked into the production process during booms and ejected into the Bantustans as a politically neutralised industrial reserve army during economic slumps.⁹¹

Fundamental to these suggestions would be state control of the working class:

- (e) There was virtually consensus among the witnesses that control over the urbanisation of the Black population was essential ...
- (f) Control over the rate of urbanisation is, in the light of circumstances in South Africa, an absolutely essential security measure ...⁹²


This control was increasing throughout the 1970s. Morris estimates that 400 000 labour tenants were removed from capitalist farms between 1971 and 1974.⁹³ And the effect of the 'pass laws' is given by the figures for arrests in main urban areas:

1976: 197 670 (of whom 24 719 females)
 1977: 173 571 (of whom 22 955 females)
 1978: 272 887 (of whom 47 977 females)⁹⁴

During the period mass removals of population took place under the bland name of 'resettlement'. It can be seen from Figure 7.1, however, that these removals were part of a restructuring of the labour force: a relocation of that part of the relative surplus population with slim legal claim to urban residency *out* of the centres of production, and its re-admission, when needed, as contract workers and commuters under terms favourable to capital. The workforce is now favoured or discriminated

7.1

Legal Laagers of the 1970s⁹⁵



against relative to its geographical location from the centres of production. During times of growth these centres tend to expand their labour-catching sphere, extending first to their own locations (people with Section 10 rights), then to the 'open' areas of nearby Bantustans where labour can be recruited without contract, then to the more remote parts of Bantustans where labour is hired on one-year contracts. In times of economic recession the further spheres are successively abandoned, leaving workers, through non-renewal of contracts, to their own resources (hence the rise in 'informal sector' activity).⁹⁶ This pattern of labour catchment is related particularly to farming, manufacturing and the service sector; the mines continuing to use their historically-evolved system of recruiting from remote areas and from neighbouring states. Table 7.2 gives the number of workseekers registered in each category of labour as of June 30 1977, and Table 7.3 shows the numbers recruited from the more 'remote' Transkei.

7.2

Workers per Sector on June 30 1977

	Foreign	South African
Agriculture	15 513	555 479
Mining/quarrying	287 826	467 890
Manufacturing	10 478	691 864
Construction	8 566	364 331
Wholesale/retail trade	4 125	343 365
Government service	10 288	472 879
Domestic service	14 301	590 966
Other	6 260	303 456

Source: Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1978,
Institute of Race Relations, p. 178.

7.3 Transkei Workers per Sector on June 30 1977

Agriculture	78 701
Mining/quarrying	164 838
Manufacturing	75 769
Construction	48 399
Wholesale/retail trade	29 042
Government service	59 543
Domestic service	42 630
Other	20 322


Source: Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1978,
SAIRR, p. 178.

The Riekert Commission, then, must be seen in the context of the steady increase in black unemployment, especially evident over the last five years. This increasing unemployment has undoubtedly been a contributory factor to the 1976 (largely township-based) disturbances which have threatened the status quo. The latter constituted a threat not only because of their disruptive effect locally, but also because foreign companies have seen them as a manifestation of the crisis in South Africa, and have thus been less willing to invest their capital in the country. Given the dependence of the economy on foreign capital, this is a threat with serious implications. Riekert, together with the Wiehahn Commission, must be seen as an attempt to pacify the urban workforce politically, raise the skills of these workers to the level required by monopoly capital (operators), and to create a cheap and docile unskilled workforce by withdrawing from any black without Section 10 qualifications the right to move at all.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the broader implications of these state policies. Considering the narrow focus adopted in this study, an understanding of the present function of Telona will be better served by a look at one arm of the migrancy oscillation: the mechanisms by which labour is brought to the centres of capitalist production.

Figure 7.4

Black Labour Force inside and outside South Africa, 1970



Source: Riekert Commission.

The Response of the Working Class

The suggestions of Riekert, as we have seen, are to drive a wedge into the hairline crack perceived between rural and urban workers. Together with Wiehahn, the state is to create a labour aristocracy in the towns, with relative security of tenure, skills-enrichment centres and increased bargaining rights within a limited arena. The 'untouchables' of the equation will be those without Section 10 rights. Although an industrial proletariat and a creation of capital, they will only be allowed into the

cities on one-year contracts until they become useless to capital, after which they will be banished with the rest of the relative surplus population to the underdeveloped peripheries to die.

In its efforts to neutralise the working class, the state is being assisted by such groups as the Urban Foundation.

The response of the working class to its tight ensnarement is multi-levelled. The most forthright response is that of illegal employment, flouting the law out of little more than desperation. A more unified response can be seen in the increasing number of strikes involving migrant workers in the late 1970s, some of them successful. However strike action is extremely difficult for a migrant who, by striking, violates the terms of his contract and usually has it cancelled by his action. Other actions include theft, bus boycotts, action taken over rents and poor food, and simple refusal to be recruited for unpopular sectors despite poverty. A response to the massive unemployment is the growth of alternative avenues of income, the so-called informal sector. This includes the sale of liquor, vegetables and old clothing, as well as prostitution and organised crime. This downward sharing of wages, often along kinship networks and stretching from the cities to the remotest rural areas, has created a common interest among large sectors of the black population in resisting the commonly-experienced and shared effects of poverty and official harrassment on living standards. Riekert's attempts to sever these links by attempting to restructure the working class into resident and contract workers will tend to sever these redistributive links, and the effects may pose a revolutionary challenge from the countryside to the South African capitalist state.

The Recruiting Corporations

Having looked at the structure of state labour recruitment, it is necessary to locate the part played by the independent recruiting corporations and, finally, by a private recruiter like Telona.

Riekert was careful not to suggest interference in the large mine recruiting organisations such as Teba, Vesamafa and Hansens for very good reasons: mining (together with farming) is crucial to the economy as an earner of foreign exchange. But mining is an unpopular sector for labour, which

can only be coaxed out of the most impoverished areas with propaganda and techniques built up over nearly a century of recruiting. On this score, the observation by Teba recruiters interviewed that the labour bureaux were inefficient was quite correct. Mining capital apparently still needs some old-style labour catchers. As a result the state exerts almost no control over mining recruiters, other than to prevent them recruiting in areas from which farm labour is drawn. But as the labour bureaux increase their efficiency and structural unemployment increases, labour recruitment for farming and mining becomes easier. There is a need however, for the mines to build up a certain level of operative skill among its labour force. This, in the face of unemployment and an increasing pool of unskilled labour, has led to the use of a call-in card system. This system is used by both the labour bureaux and the recruiting companies (a Transkei call-in card, TI 11(a), can be seen in Figure 7.5) in industry and particularly on mines. Under a call-in card, a worker is offered his old job back on his return from his compulsory one-month vacation in the Bantustan, sometimes at his old wage if it has increased above the basic. The result is that 'single' men are spending a large portion of their working life in urban hostels, fully proletarianised, but are being considered 'foreigners' by virtue of a one-month vacation to a Bantustan once a year. During that vacation, as a visit to several Transkei areas in late-1979 proved, they take no part in the rural life of their 'homes', taking instead a valid rest from their labours, drinking and talking with other 'city people' while their semi-estranged wives and children till the fields.

These recruits generally pay their own way up to the mines and industry, and in the case of mining the recruiting companies are becoming, increasingly, the administrators of compulsory holidays, medical tests and remittance and savings arrangements.

The part played by Telona in these arrangements seems to be decreasing rapidly. A Telona recruiter in Mount Ayliff in the Transkei said there had been a 57 percent decline in his 'business' over the previous three years, and an Encgobo recruiter said he was dealing almost exclusively with renewed contracts (call-ins). Although Telona recruiters are still earning fairly good wages through their work (between R300 and R1000 a month in the Transkei during 1979) it seems unlikely that mines will continue

Figure 7.5

Call-in Card

Form 14926/10/75.

T.L.11(a).

TRANSKEI GOVERNMENT TRANSKEISE REGERING
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA - REPUBLIEK VAN SUID-AFRIKA.

NO 73351
83831

ABRIDGED SERVICE CONTRACT - VERKORTE DIENSKONTRAK

(To be completed in QUADRUPPLICATE/Moet in VIERVOUD voltooi word.)

Requisition No. C-C Call-in Card.
Rekwissie Nr. C-C Inroepkaart.

This Service Contract is entered into between DIRECTOR National Institute for
Hierdie Dienskontrak is aangegaan tussen eg. P. J. Sandringham 2/131
(hereinafter referred to as the employer) (hieronder die werkgewer genoem)

and the Transkeian citizen whose name appears below (hereinafter referred to as the employee)
en die Transkeïse burger wie se naam hieronder verskyn (hieronder die werknemer genoem).

NAME: DELMARA DUDUKE IDENTITY NO. / PERSONSONOMMER: 17561

The employer engages the services of the employee and the employee undertakes to render service to the employer/Die werkgewer neem die werknemer in diens, en die werknemer onderneem om diens aan die werkgewer te lewer.

as ATLETADEKAT (Nature of work) (saad van werk)
at Johannesburg (Place) (Plek)
during the period 1 yr. (lurende die tydperk)

on the following conditions:-
teen die volgende voorwaardes:-

- (a) Basis of employment: Daily/weekly/monthly/shift
Basis van indiensneming: Daaglik/weeklik/maandeliks/skof
- (b) No. of work hours per day 8 hrs (c) No. of work days per week 7 days
Getal ure per dag: 8 Getal werkdag per week: 7
- (d) Cash wages paid daily/weekly/monthly
Kontantloste betaal daaglik/weeklik/maandeliks
- (e) Rations (food) Provided
Rantsoene (voedsel) OFFERED
- (f) Accommodation OFFERED
Akkommodasie Undertaken
- (g) Medical services Undertaken
Mediese dienste When necessary
- (h) Overtime (Rates) When necessary
Oortyd (Tantwe) nib
- (i) Vacation leave nib
Vakansieverlof nib
- (j) Sick leave nib
Siekteverlof nib
- (k) Transport arrangements nib
Vervoerarrangings nib
- (l) How rail fares and other advances will be recovered. nib
Hoe reiskoste en ander voorloste verhaal sal word nib

Recoverable from Employee Verhaalbaar van Werknemer			
Rail & Bus Fare Spoor- en Busgeld	Cash Advances Kontant Voorloste	Other Ander	Total Totaal
R c	R c	R c	R c

Non-Recoverable Expenditure Nie-Verhaalbare Uitgawe			
Rations for Journey Fadkos	Medical Exam. Mediese ondersoek	Other Ander	Total Totaal
R c	R c	R c	R c

(m) State whether work on surface or underground SURFACE
Meld of werk bogrond of ondergrond is SURFACE

(n) The employee hereby acknowledges receipt of the cash advances paid to him/her
Die werknemer erken hierby ontvang van die kontantvoorloste aan hom/haar uitbetaal.
No

Employee's Signature or own Mark
Werknemer se Handtekening of die Merk.

Signature of Employer (or Power-of-Attorney Holder, i.e. Magistrate or other Authorized Officer).
Handtekening van Werkgewer (of Prokureurshouer, d.w.s. Magistraat of ander Gemagtigde Beambte)
(NOT Attesting Officer/NIE Attesterende Beambte nie).

Interpreter and Witness to Mark/Signatures
Tolk en Getuie van Merke/Handtekeninge

I certify that the above service contract has been read aloud, interpreted, and fully explained to the worker concerned, that he/she understands the meaning and effect thereof, that he/she has voluntarily entered into the contract and has voluntarily affixed his/her signature/thumb print hereto in my presence and in the presence of the abovementioned witness. All additions, erasures and alterations has been initialed by me.
Ek sertifiseer dat bostaande dienskontrak hardop voorgelees, vertolk en ten volle verduidelik is aan die betrokke partys, dat hy/sy die betekenis en uitwerking daarvan verstaan, dat hy/sy die kontrak vrywillig aangegaan het en dat hy/sy vrywillig sy/haas handtekening/duifmadrufk hierop aangebring het in die teenwoordigheid van my en die getuie hierbo genoem. Alle byvoegings, skrappings en veranderings is deur my geparafeseer.

Deuman
Attesting Officer/Attesterende Beambte.

Date/Datum: 9/7 Place/Plek: 61476

to pay the company for the tasks it performs.⁹⁷ Almost all the Telona recruits were for platinum mines, particularly Rustenburg Platinum, which has already attempted to bypass the company and use a cheaper solution.

Although it is probably inadmissible to bury Telona before its death, it does seem, to quote its director, that it is rapidly becoming an anachronism within the development of South African capitalism.

NOTES

1. *Telona* is the Fanakalo name for Theron and Co. Other titles which will be used are:
Teba, or *kwaTeba*. Formerly the Native Recruiting Corp., the Chamber of Mines recruiting organisation operating within South Africa. It was coined from the name of Henry Taberer, one of the NRC founders, and now stands for The Employment Bureau of Africa.
Wenela. This is the Witwatersrand Native Labour Organisation, the organisation handling foreign recruits for the Chamber.
VesaMafa is the Natal Coal Owners Association.
Hanisa is Hansens Labour Recruiters, now owned by Anglo American Corporation.
2. McNamara (1978) and CMAR 1906, 1907 and 1908.
3. Jeeves.
4. *Ibid.* p. 18.
5. See CMAR 1906, 1907 and 1908.
6. See Native Grievances Inquiry, UG 37, Annexure 24 for a list of names of recruiter firms.
7. Quoted in Magubane p. 259.
8. In a speech delivered while Minister of Native Affairs, quoted in Magubane p. 236.
9. Lusikisiki NRC Area Report, 1954.
10. Queenstown NRC Area Report, 1954.
11. Villiers evidence to the NGI, p. 45.
12. NRC report on native labour position, 1926.
13. *Telona* tour report, 1951.
14. NRC tour report by Taberer, 1920.
15. *Telona* Bulletin, undated.
16. Fozia Fisher, p. 303.
17. Select Commission into the Native Regulation Bill 1911, p. 179.
18. In a confidential report on H.J. Hansen, probably by Taberer, 1924.
19. Draft report of the ILO delegation to the Union of South Africa, 1938/9.
20. Letter: Pax Theron to NRC, 1945.

21. Villiers evidence to the NGI, 1914, p. 13.
22. NGI report, p. 86/7.
23. Letter: Theron to Dr. Ekteen of the Postmasburg Manganese Mine, December 1953.
24. Bulletin 70, Telona, undated (Bulletin 69 is dated 1936).
25. Moroney p. 27. Industrial conflict in a labour repressive economy, Wits. Thesis, 1979.
26. Robertson: Economic Contact Between Black and White, South African Journal of Economics, Vol. 3, p. 16. Quoted in Moroney, p.27.
27. SNA 35/1809/03, quoted in Moroney, p.27.
28. McNamara (1978) p.18.
29. Villiers evidence to NGI p.28/9.
30. Taberer's evidence to NGI p.2.
- 31.
32. Telona circulars to employers, December 1949.
33. Evidence to NGI.
34. Report on recruiting in the Cape Province, Taberer, July 1923.
35. Ibid. p.7.
36. See Morris: The development of capitalism in South African agriculture: class struggle in the countryside. Economy and Society, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1976.
37. Wolpe, 1972.
38. Laclau: Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America, NLR, May/June 1971.
39. Banaji, 1977, p.34/5.
40. See Taberer's evidence to NGI, p.9-17.
41. Bundy and Beinart, 1979, p.5.
42. Morris, 1977; p.80.
43. See Harries, P.: Migrants and Marriage... 1979.
44. See Morris, 1976.
45. Innes and O'Meara for Transkei, Roger Leys for Lesotho.

46. D. Webster, p.13.
47. Bundy and Beinart, p.14.
48. Magistrates' reports from Herschel and Qumbu, quoted in Bundy and Beinart, p.15.
49. Ibid p.15.
50. NRC area report for Tabankulu, 1952.
51. See Bundy and Beinart p.25.
52. See Morris, 1976, and Wolpe, 1972.
53. See A.W. Stadler, 1979: Birds in the cornfields ...
54. Ibid p.20.
55. Ibid p.20.
56. Quoted in Stadler p.21.
57. Commission into the Native Labour Regulation Bill (NLRB), p.39.
58. Native Labour Position, 1926: NRC report.
59. NLRB p.4.
60. Report of the Gold Producers' Committee, 1951, p.5.
61. Essays in South African Labour History (Webster, ed.) p.36/7.
62. Ibid p.35.
63. Figures quoted from de Villiers, Africa Perspective 12, September 1979.
64. Ibid p.24.
65. de Villiers, 1979b.
66. Ibid.
67. Appendix B to the report of the Select Committee on Native Labour, Reports of Select Committees 1910/11 Vol.11 p. ix/x.
68. This was contained in a 1926 NRC memorandum suggesting the creation of a labour pool at the Driehoek compound on the Rand from which mines could draw labour. The scheme was seemingly rejected because it was found that mines carried their own surplus labour pools in their compounds. A similar situation was occurring on farms. A 1952 NRC report from Queenstown complained that farmers were damming up surplus labour on farms in case it was needed and not releasing it for recruiting.

69. Letter: Telona to Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Johannesburg, December 4, 1974.
70. Tour report, Telona, November 1957.
71. For a more detailed discussion see D.S. Kaplan, 1976.
72. From Morris, 1977, p.69.
73. Ibid p.70.
74. Figures from Morris (1977) except the 1945 figure which is from the Gold Producers' Committee, 1951.
75. Rich, 1976, p.14.
76. Simkins, 1976, Employment, Unemployment and Growth in South Africa, 1961-1969.
77. Most of the information on the labour bureaux system comes from an unpublished paper by Horner and Wilson entitled Central Labour Bureau.
78. Taped interview with Theron, 1979.
79. de Villiers op.cit.
80. Horner and Kooy: Conflict on South African goldmines, 1979.
81. Interview with Teba recruiter, Langa, Cape Town, June 1979.
82. Theron interview, op.cit.
83. Maré, South African Labour Bulletin, p.37. 1979.
84. Simkins, 1978 (in Maré), van der Merwe in Maree p.19.
85. Quoted in Maré p.37.
86. See the Monopolisation of the South African economy, Social Register 5, June 1979.
87. Maree p.29.
88. Nattrass and Brown: Capital intensity in South African manufacturing, 1977, quoted in Maree p.30.
89. Maree p.25.
90. Gottschalk, quoted in Maree p.42.
91. See Riekert: 'Don't worry, everything's clear,' Wages Commission, University of Cape Town, 1979.
92. Riekert Commission Report, quoted in Maré p.40.

93. Morris, 1977.
94. Maré p.44 - he attributes the massive increase in female arrests to the rapid deterioration of the Reserves in the late 1970s.
95. Claassens, report to the Labour Research Committee, 1979, p.7.
96. See Claassens, South African Labour Bulletin, November 1978.
97. From LRC questionnaires.

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