

# Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit



## What Drives Corruption? Evidence from North African Firms

*by*  
*Clara Delavallade*

## About the Author(s) and Acknowledgments

Clara Delavallade - School of Economics and Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU), University of Cape Town and Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne.  
UCT, Private Bag X3, Rondebosch 7701, South Africa. Tel: +27 216 505 239.  
Email: clara.delavallade@ensae.org.

I would like to thank Thomas Bossuoy, Julie Lochard, Jean-Marc Robin, the participants of ESNIE 2006 and of the Séminaire Doctorants CES-CERDI, in particular Catherine Araujo-Bonjean, as well as anonymous referees for helpful comments and discussions. This project was supported by a grant from the Forum Euroméditerranéen des Instituts de Sciences Économiques (FEM22-20).

## Recommended citation

Delavallade, C., I. (2011). What Drives Corruption? Evidence from North African Firms. A Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit Working Paper Number 68. Cape Town: SALDRU, University of Cape Town

---

ISBN: 978-1-920517-09-0

© Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, UCT, 2011

Working Papers can be downloaded in Adobe Acrobat format from [www.saldru.uct.ac.za](http://www.saldru.uct.ac.za).  
Printed copies of Working Papers are available for R15.00 each plus vat and postage charges.

Orders may be directed to:  
The Administrative Officer, SALDRU, University of Cape Town, Private Bag, Rondebosch, 7701,  
Tel: (021) 650 5696, Fax: (021) 650 5697, Email: [brenda.adams@uct.ac.za](mailto:brenda.adams@uct.ac.za)

# What Drives Corruption? Evidence from North African Firms

Clara Delavallade<sup>1</sup>

## Abstract

This paper empirically analyzes the main microeconomic determinants of two forms of corruption supply, administrative corruption and state capture, by Maghrebi firms. This study is based on a new database of nearly 600 Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian firms. I show that tax evasion is a major factor in the engagement of firms in administrative corruption. The latter increases with the share of sales hidden by the firm as long as it is below half of total sales, and slightly decreases thereafter. State capture is fostered by a failing enforcement of property and contract rights. Interestingly, less competitive firms appear to engage more in both forms of corruption than the most dynamic ones. After assessing the robustness of my empirical results, I draw a comparison of the factors of corruption in North Africa, Uganda and transition countries.

Keywords: Supply of Corruption, Administrative Corruption, State Capture, Tax Evasion, Competitiveness, North Africa

JEL Classification: C2, D73, O17, H32

---

<sup>1</sup>School of Economics and Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU), University of Cape Town and Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne.  
UCT, Private Bag X3, Rondebosch 7701, South Africa. Tel: +27 216 505 239.  
Email: clara.delavallade@ensae.org. I would like to thank Thomas Bossuroy, Julie Lochar, Jean-Marc Robin, the participants of *ESNIE 2006* and of the *Séminaire Doctorants CES-CERDI*, in particular Catherine Araujo-Bonjean, as well as anonymous referees for helpful comments and discussions. This project was supported by a grant from the Forum Euroméditerranéen des Instituts de Sciences Économiques (FEM22-20).

# 1 Introduction

What are the main microeconomic drivers of firms' practices of corruption? In the existing literature, there is quite a bit of uncertainty on the role played by firms' profitability and by tax evasion.

Firms' competitiveness may affect their practices of corruption in two opposite directions. On the one hand, the most competitive firms are the most profitable, enabling them to pay the highest bribes (Ades and Tella (1999), Bliss and Tella (1997), Clarke and Xu (2002), Svensson (2003)). On the other hand, the need for making high profits may be all the more pressing as the firm's competitiveness declines, as the latter lowers its negotiating power with business partners and bureaucrats (Gupta, Sharan, and de Mello 2000). In this case, the supply of bribes may well help compensate for a loss in competitiveness by tweaking the rules of economic activity, in order to reduce some costs, gain a competitive advantage on other firms (Gauthier and Reinikka 2001) or secure public procurement contracts. In sum, do firms pay bribes because they need to increase their future profits in order to stay competitive on an increasingly aggressive market or because they are already more competitive and make more profits than others?

Tax evasion may also have opposite effects on firms' corruption behaviors. On the one hand, firms hiding a wide share of their sales, in order to circumvent regulations or avoid taxation, may have to bribe inspectors regularly to maintain their shadow activity (Hindriks, Keen, and Muthoo 1999). On the other hand, large-scale tax evasion increases the probability of fraud detection and makes corruption more risky.

As a consequence, the impact of firms' profitability and tax evasion on their practices of corruption is uncertain *a priori*. This paper proposes to shed new light on the determinants of firms' supply of corruption by focusing on North African firms for the first time. This study is based on an econometric analysis of an original set of employer/employee matched data, covering 600 firms settled in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria in 2005 as well as about 6000 of their employees. I also lead comparisons with other empirical works on this topic and on former-USSR firms (Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann 2000) and Ugandan firms (Svensson 2003).

Controlling for endogeneity, I show that tax evasion affects corruption. Firms pay more bribes when they hide a large share of their activity but only if the risk of detection is low enough<sup>1</sup>. On the contrary, if evasion is so widespread that this risk is too high, then administrative corruption tends to lower when hidden sales increase. Hence tax evasion and administrative corruption are either complements or substitutes, according to the probability of fraud detection. Another interesting result is that administrative corruption and state capture are both linked negatively with firms' profitability, contradicting the results obtained by Svensson (2003), Clarke and Xu

---

<sup>1</sup>Following Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1996) who first developed the economic theory of crime, the seminal theory of corruption predicts that managers maximize firms' profits, net of bribes and make decisions on bribe-payments based on the analysis of expected returns which are a function of the likelihood of detection and severity of punishment (Ades and Tella (1997), Rose-Ackerman (1978)).

(2002) and Bliss and Tella (1997). The firms that are most engaged in corruption are the least competitive ones and not those with the highest profits. The supply of bribes corresponds more to a need for securing future profits than to an ability to pay bribes due to high current profits.

The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, I present the analytical framework and the context. The data are described in Section 3. Then, the econometric model and the method are exposed (Section 4). In Section 5, I report and comment the results obtained through ordered probit estimations. Section 6 is composed of robustness tests. I draw a comparison of these results on Maghrebi firms with results obtained on Ugandan and former-USSR firms in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.

## 2 Framework

### 2.1 Analytical Framework

Firms' supply of bribery is usually attributed to three major factors: (i) the extent of tax evasion or shadow activity (Johnson et al. (2000), Vostroknutova (2003), Hibbs and Piculescu (2005), Goerke (2006)); (ii) failures of the legal system – excessive regulation and weak enforcement of property rights – (Tanzi (1998), Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2000)); (iii) the firm's strong or weak competitiveness (Bardhan (2006), Svensson (2003), Ades and Tella (1999), Bliss and Tella (1997)). I will review the theoretical framework and empirical results of each of these factors, and derive hypotheses and predictions for the analysis.

The complementarity between tax evasion and corruption can be grasped both at a macro- and microeconomic level. From a macroeconomic standpoint, the more widespread tax evasion in a given economy, the more restricted the tax base. This reinforces corruption through two channels, the supply side from firms and the demand side from bureaucrats. On the one hand, tax evasion leads the government to increase the level of taxes paid by firms which do pay them. This may encourage them to pay more bribes in order to reduce the amount of taxes they pay. On the other hand, tax evasion decreases the total amount of levied taxes, which affects the quality of public services: less paid or less monitored public officials are more tempted by corruption, and property and contract rights are enforced less (Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton 1999). From a microeconomic standpoint, the size of bribes paid to a tax inspector are determined by firms' desire to keep part of their activity undeclared (Hindriks, Keen, and Muthoo 1999).

Tax evasion may also affect the supply of bribes in the opposite direction. A firm which hides a large share of their sales may want to pay fewer bribes in order to lower the risk of being caught (Goerke 2006). Tax evasion and corruption are then substitutes.

Studies on the link between shadow activity and corruption are still quite rare. They are mostly macroeconomic and focus on the analysis of these phenomena in former-USSR

countries (Johnson et al. (2000), Vostroknutova (2003)). The literature on the topic does not provide a clearcut view on either the complementarity or the substitutability between tax evasion and corruption.

I make here the hypothesis that tax evasion and corruption are complements for firms as long as the risk of being caught is below a certain threshold, determined by the share of their sales that firms do not declare. Below this threshold, firms pay bribes in proportion of their hidden activity. Above the threshold, when firms hide a wide part of their activity, the probability of being caught considered is too high, tax evasion and corruption are then substitutes for two major reasons: (i) large-scale tax evasion makes it too risky to practice corruption as well, (ii) tax evasion lowers costs linked with regulation and taxation to such an extent that corruption with this purpose is less necessary.

The failure of the legal system is put forward in most empirical studies on the main determinants of firms' practices of corruption – in particular the role played by the level of taxation, the regulatory quality and the enforcement of property rights.

Many of these studies attribute corruption to the monopolistic and discretionary power of the officials in charge of authorizing or inspecting activities subject to regulations or taxation. Rules and regulations (licenses, permits, authorizations) give bureaucrats higher opportunities to use their public discretionary power to extract bribes when i) they are vague and not transparent, ii) they require frequent contacts between citizens and bureaucrats iii) and there is no competition in the granting of these authorizations (Tanzi 1998). Svensson (2003) also reports that Ugandan firms pay higher bribes when they face higher levels of taxation, and more restrictive regulations, since then the bureaucrats' "control rights" are wider.

Furthermore, in former USSR countries, state capture and administrative corruption are shown to rise with a weak enforcement of property rights, which reveals the incapacity of courts to implement the law (Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton 1998). Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2000) examine the determinants of administrative corruption and state capture, especially the impact of judicial uncertainty on the practices of corruption of Eastern Europe and CIS countries. They show that firms facing uncertainty concerning their contract and property rights tend to engage more in both forms of corruption. A weak law enforcement favors corruption for two main reasons. First, corruption helps these firms overcome the difficulties due to the weak enforcement of their rights. This is particularly true in a context where the state does not provide a legal framework favorable to competition. Corruption is then less frequently or severely punished.

In this paper, I examine whether a failing legal system favors both state capture and administrative corruption in North African countries as well.

As for the link between competitiveness and corruption, it mainly has given rise either to theoretical studies (Ades and Tella (1999), Bliss and Tella (1997)) or to research on transition countries (Clarke and Xu 2002), with an exception: Svensson's paper on

Ugandan firms (Svensson 2003). These studies report opposite impacts of the firms' competitiveness on their practices of corruption.

Various studies show that a firm's competitiveness fosters its supply of bribes. Bliss and Tella (1997) analyze a private form of corruption, "surplus-shifting corruption", where firms spend part of their profits as bribes to public officials in order to maintain their activity: it is a form of "racket".<sup>2</sup> They show that private corruption increases with firms' profitability. When the least competitive firms exit from the market, the profitability of those remaining increases, which enables corrupt bureaucrats to exact higher bribes. Thus, more competition between firms may strengthen corruption by increasing the profitability of the firms which stay on the market. Svensson (2003) highlights the same impact of firms' profitability or competitiveness on their supply of bribes in Uganda. The underlying idea that the most profitable firms have more resources to pay bribes and engage more in corruption is also put forward by Ades and Tella (1999) and Clarke and Xu (2002) for East European and Central Asian countries.

On the contrary, Gauthier and Reinikka (2001) suggest that resorting to corruption may help firms counterbalance a competitive disadvantage. This is the hypothesis I test in the remainder of this paper: when a firm loses market share, it may tend to pay more bribes to gain public procurement contracts or reduce its costs. In this case, corruption is an investment, one which is more or less profitable, that the firm makes in order to increase its competitiveness and stay on the market.

To sum up, previous studies on firms' practices of corruption emphasize three major facts: i) tax evasion and corruption may be either complements or substitutes; ii) restrictive regulation and taxation and insufficient enforcement of property rights are strong determinants of the supply of corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, where state capture and administrative corruption also depend on firms' characteristics: size, type of ownership, etc.; iii) like tax evasion, the firm's competitiveness or profitability has an uncertain impact on the supply of bribes.

The data I use and present below enable me to test the following three hypotheses in the context of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia: (i) corruption first increases and then decreases with the firm's tax evasion; (ii) corruption is more widespread when property rights are weakly enforced; (iii) corruption decreases with the firm's competitiveness.

## 2.2 Context

In the 2000s, Maghrebi countries have carried out large-scale reforms. Competition has strengthened concurrently with the transition towards market economy, trade openness and the increase in capital flows. The liberalization of the economy has been reinforced by various free-trade agreements signed by the three countries. Besides bilateral and regional agreements, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia have all ratified the European Union

---

<sup>2</sup>Bliss and Tella (1997) make a distinction between "surplus-shifting corruption" and "cost-reducing corruption"; the latter occurs when a tax inspector reduces costs for a firm which bribes him.

Association Agreement (EUAA). At the time of the survey, the agreement has come into effect only in Tunisia and Morocco (in 1998 and 2000 respectively), and not yet in Algeria.

In this context, at the time of the survey, Morocco and Tunisia have strengthened dramatically the reforms aiming to reinforce the competitiveness of their firms, diversify their production and attract more foreign direct investments. In Algeria, structural reforms aiming to promote the private sector, especially privatization, have been delayed. In Morocco, although they have favored economic openness, foreign trade reforms started in the middle of the 1980s have not been able to curb the loss of competitiveness of Moroccan firms in the 1990s. In the three countries, the liberalization of the economy increased competition on the domestic market by alleviating trade barriers, speeding up privatization and redefining the role of the state. Maghrebi firms suffer from a relative disadvantage compared to their competitors (mostly European firms). Hence, they seem to have suffered from economic openness so far, losing domestic market share and not expanding on the foreign market yet. These firms have to face new constraints and adapt their behaviors to this changing and increasingly more competitive environment.

In parallel, the level of corruption, as measured by the GRICS index published by the World Bank, has somehow stagnated in Maghreb between 1996 and 2005. On a scale from -2.5 to 2.5, with 2.5 being the lowest level of corruption, it has increased very slightly in Morocco and Algeria and decreased slightly in Tunisia – moving from 0.26 to -0.09, from -0.35 to -0.43 and from -0.03 to 0.13 respectively. Corruption remains relatively widespread in North African countries, which creates additional uncertainties and costs for firms, thereby hampering economic activity. Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria respectively range 43<sup>rd</sup>, 78<sup>th</sup> and 97<sup>th</sup> out of 159 countries according to the *Transparency International* Corruption Perceptions Index in 2005.

## 3 Data

### 3.1 Definitions

This analysis focuses on two main forms of corruption. Administrative corruption refers to bribes given in order to influence the *application* of laws and regulations affecting firms' business. State capture accounts for the payment of bribes in order to influence the *content* of laws and regulations (Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann 2000).

I also examine shadow activity of recorded firms, recorded in the trade register. In the literature, this shadow activity might be labeled as informal activity (Johnson et al. (2000), Vostroknutova (2003)) but this term may encompass both hidden sales of recorded firms and activities of unrecorded firms, potentially introducing confusion. Given that firms hide part of their sales to avoid taxation or regulation (Loayza 1996), I refer to this phenomenon as tax evasion, as in Gauthier, Azam, and Goyette (2004),



Sanyal, Gang, and Goswami (2000), Gauthier and Gersovitz (1997). In this paper, I measure tax evasion by the percentage of their sales that firms do not declare.

### 3.2 The Survey

To measure these phenomena, I use an original data set computed by ROSES (Université Paris 1 / CNRS), with the participation of the Forum Euromediterranéen des Instituts de Sciences économiques (FEMISE). This data set is based on matched surveys employer/employee carried out in 2004-2005 in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. The surveys involved about 200 firms in each country and about 10 employees per firm. In total the database compounds 582 firms and 5682 employees. It includes, among others, a set of questions on tax evasion and on the firms' perceptions of corruption, regulation, taxes, competitiveness, and enforcement of their property rights, etc.

### 3.3 Measuring Perceptions

The key variables (corruption, tax evasion, quality of the judicial system) are measured in the survey by questions on perceptions. In particular, the questions on corruption and tax evasion are formulated as follows: "Do firms like yours...?". The purpose of this formulation is to reveal the firm's own behavior by bypassing self-censorship, from which all surveys on illicit or socially condemned practices suffer, be it drugs, criminality, alcoholism, corruption... The idea is that one feels freer to answer if one is not directly concerned by the question, but that the answer is largely guided by one's own practices.<sup>3</sup> This wording is similar to the one of the BEEPS surveys on transition countries (Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann 2000) and of the 1998 Ugandan enterprise survey (Reinikka and Svensson 2003). This enables me to avoid the respondent fearing the consequences of disclosing his own illegal behaviors, and to draw comparisons between the microeconomic determinants of corruption in North-Africa, former-USSR and Uganda.

There is of course a risk that the information we get by using formulations like "Firms like yours" or "Firms in your sector" may reflect collective representations, that may not be fully accurate. We may also collect strategic rather than real answers. This may particularly affect questions on taxes, regulations or public services, from firms willing to influence policy choices. It will be taken into account in the analysis. Finally, this survey has the advantage of providing a unique microeconomic database on institutions and different forms of corruption in three Maghrebi countries.

The questions used to define the variables under study are reproduced in Table 9 in Appendix. This table also provides the main descriptive statistics of these variables.

---

<sup>3</sup>This type of phrasing is one of the most commonly used in surveys where respondents are asked about illegal or immoral behavior, and especially about corruption practices (Clarke 2011).

The questions concerning corruption and tax evasion receive fewer responses than the other questions. As for administrative corruption and state capture, the median is below the mean. This is probably due to the fact that many firms that answer the question minimize the phenomenon. When a question is found to be embarrassing, the respondent can choose not to answer or to answer “no” to “protect itself”. However, I have enough answers and their standard errors are sufficiently high to perform a statistical and econometric analysis of hidden activities (corruption and tax evasion).

## 4 Econometric Model, Method and Expectations

I use the data presented above to estimate the following model which regresses two different dimensions of corruption – state capture and administrative corruption – on several factors<sup>4</sup>:

$$\begin{aligned} Corrup_i = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 Evasion_i + \beta_2 Evasion_i^2 + \beta_3 PropRights_i + \beta_4 Compet_i \\ & + \beta_5 Regul_i + \beta_6 Tax_i + \beta_7 Control_i + \theta_i \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

where  $Corrup_i$  represents either state capture ( $Capture_i$ ) or for administrative corruption ( $Admcorr_i$ ).  $Evasion$  stands for tax evasion. It is measured by the percentage of sales that the firm does not declare.  $PropRights_i$  is a dummy variable referring to firm i’s perception of the respect for its property and contract rights three years before.  $Compet_i$  is a dummy which indicates the firm’s competitiveness, proxied by the increase of the firm’s market share over the previous two years. It is thus a dynamic measure of the change in the firm’s competitiveness over time rather than a static measure of its profitability like in Svensson (2003).  $Regul_i$  stands for regulations affecting the firms. It is equal to 1 if the firm fully respects fiscal regulations.  $Tax_i$  gives the amount of corporate taxes as a percentage of the firm’s sales.  $Control_i$  encompasses different control variables according to the sub-model which measures the firm’s characteristics: its capital ( $Capital_i$ ), the financial stake of the state in the firm ( $PubCapital_i$ ), a dummy equal to one if the firm has ever been state-owned in the past ( $FormPublic_i$ ), the number of its employees ( $Nbemp_i$ ), the respondent’s status in the firm ( $CEO_i$ ) the firm’s country of origin ( $Tunisia_i$ ,  $Morocco_i$ ,  $Algeria_i$ ), its sector ( $InsurFin_i$ ,  $Hotel_i$ ,  $Transport_i$ ,  $Trade_i$ ,  $BuildInd_i$ ,  $FoodInd_i$ ,  $ChemicInd_i$ ,  $TextilInd_i$ ,  $ElecInd_i$ ).

I expect firms which hide a large share of their sales to offer more bribes in order to maintain part of their activity in the shadow sector. But, as mentioned in section 3, I assume that the relation between administrative corruption and tax evasion is an inverted U-shape: increasing below a certain threshold of tax evasion, slightly decreasing above. When the share of hidden sales is low, increasing evasion leads firms to pay

---

<sup>4</sup>Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables and of the main regressors are provided in figures 2 and 3 respectively in the Appendix.

bribes more frequently to “buy” controls and inspections. Corruption and tax evasion are then complementary. But for firms hiding a large part of their sales, i) increasing it enables them to avoid controls and regulations, and makes corruption less attractive; ii) the risk of being caught is higher, and firms limit their supply of bribes in order to limit the additional risk of detection due to corruption, tax evasion and corruption are then substitutes. To take this into account, I introduce a quadratic term. I expect  $\beta_1$  to be positive and  $\beta_2$  to be negative.

The analysis of the impact of tax evasion on corruption may suffer from an endogeneity bias. I test and control for this possibility in Section 6. The results suggest that tax evasion is exogenous in this analysis, mainly because of the nature and definition of the variables used.

Through bribes given to justice or police officers or inspectors, firms may “buy” the protection of their property and contract rights when the legal system cannot ensure it. The coefficient  $\beta_3$  is then expected to be negative.

One of the main hypotheses I make is that weakly competitive firms should be more tempted to resort to bribery to distort the rules of competition. On the contrary, a monopolistic firm, with a high market share does not need to bribe officials to get public procurement on its line of business since it has no competitors. I expect  $\beta_4$  to be negative. More precisely, to measure a firm’s competitiveness, I use a dummy equal to one if its market share has remained stable or increased during the last two years. This has two main advantages: i) it relies on real facts rather than on assumptions such as the index of demand elasticity used by Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2000); ii) since it relies on past event, it may be less subject to simultaneity with the measurement of corruption than a measure based on current events.<sup>5</sup>

Bribes can also enable firms to circumvent restrictive taxation and regulation. Tax evasion, regulation and taxation make it necessary to control for their existence (for the former) or implementation (for the latter two). Svensson (2003) refers to these as “control rights” which enable public agents (mainly inspectors) to enter into transactions, hence into negotiations with firms. I thus expect  $\beta_5$  and  $\beta_6$  to be positive.

I expect firms in which the State has a financial stake to benefit from privileged links with public officials. Such links may enable firms to influence the content and application of laws and regulations without having to buy such an influence, that is to say without having to engage in state capture (Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann 2000). They may practice less corruption and less often. The analysis by Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2000) of former USSR firms also suggests that small firms (with fewer than 50 employees) tend to engage in administrative corruption rather than in state capture, probably because the former is less costly. Hence, I expect the size of the firm, as well as its capital, to affect positively state capture and negatively administrative corruption. Moreover, it seems necessary to control for respondents’ characteristics.

---

<sup>5</sup>Another endogeneity bias may result from this relation between competitiveness and corruption. However, it is not very likely that a firm which engages more in corruption loses more market shares than others.

It is likely indeed that those who have a position with high responsibilities are more reluctant to be totally transparent on their firm’s practices of corruption. Corruption supply may differ between sectors. Industrial sectors, in which projects involve large amounts of money or highly rent-generating public procurement, may be more favorable to corruption, in particular to state capture. Finally, firms located in Tunisia may suffer from political pressure more than in Algeria and Morocco and report corruption less easily.

The results I expect from the econometric estimation of the models and presented above are displayed in the following table.

Table 1: Expected Signs of the Factors of Corruption

<b>Explanatory Variables</b>	<b>State Capture</b>	<b>Administrative Corruption</b>
Tax Evasion	(+)	(∩)
Competitiveness	(-)	(-)
Enforcement of Property Rights	(-)	(-)
Regulation	(+)	(+)
Taxes	(+)	(+)
Part of the State in the Capital	(-)	(-)
Capital	(+)	(-)
CEO	(-)	(-)
Number of Employees	(+)	(-)
Tunisia	(-)	(-)
Industrial sectors	(+)	(+)

I use ordered probit models to estimate these different effects. Indeed, the dependent variables - administrative corruption and state capture - are indexed between 1 and 6, hence are discrete and ordered. A firm’s engagements in administrative corruption and in state capture are respectively measured by the following questions: “Do firms like yours usually have to give public officials unofficial payments to be able to work?” and “Do firms like yours have to give public officials unofficial payments to influence the content of a law or regulation?” The answer might be 1: never; 2: seldom; 3: sometimes; 4: often; 5: mostly; or 6: always. A multinomial probit model would then neglect the ordinality of the explained variable, while a linear regression would consider the gap between indices 3 and 4 similar as the one between indices 1 and 2, whereas these only refer to a ranking position. In these two cases, I would not obtain consistent estimators. Therefore, the models generally used when dealing with that kind of variables are ordered probit and logit models. <sup>6</sup>

The large number of missing values in corruption data (36% for administrative corruption and 41% for state capture) suggests that there might be a selection bias. I control for this possibility in Section 6 and show that in either case, the selection bias is not significant. Thus, I use classical ordered probit estimations.

<sup>6</sup>Probit and logit models are based on an estimation of a continuous latent variable, underlying the ranked variable under study. In an ordered probit model, the residual associated with this latent variable is supposed to have a standard normal distribution.

## 5 Main Results

In the following section, I report the results of estimations of the impact of several explanatory factors, among which tax evasion, competitiveness and enforcement of property rights on two different dimensions of corruption: state capture and administrative corruption.

I first estimate the model with all the variables of interest and relevant control variables according to the analysis framework and then check that the results are stable when dropping insignificant variables. I then add sector dummies and drop the variables which are not significant first at the 15%, then at the 10% level. In the core of the paper, I only present the initial (unrestricted) and final specifications (see Table 2). The full procedure leading from the initial specification of the models to the final ones is presented in the Appendix, in Tables 10 and 11.

### 5.1 State Capture

The coefficients obtained for  $\beta$  are not equal to the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the conditional probabilities. The marginal effects  $\partial y/\partial x_k$  of explanatory variables included respectively in model 1.rest and 2.rest are provided in Tables 3 and 4.<sup>7</sup> For dummy variables,  $\partial y/\partial x_k$  stands for a discrete change of the variable from 0 to 1.

The frequency of **state capture** is not significantly affected by variations of the extent of *tax evasion*<sup>8</sup>. For equal levels of capital, the positive impact of tax evasion on state capture is not significant. This may be due to the high correlation between capital and state capture (this correlation is negative as shown in Table 2), and between capital and tax evasion (the correlation is also negative, as in Gauthier and Reinikka (2001)): small-capital firms engage more both in tax evasion and in state capture. The size of capital is a better predictor of state capture than undeclared sales, and state capture does not clearly emerge, either as a complement, or as a substitute for tax evasion.

*Competitiveness* appears to be one of the most relevant factors of state capture by North African firms. The effect I bring to the fore is opposite to the one highlighted in Svensson (2003) and Bliss and Tella (1997), and consistent with Gauthier and Reinikka (2001). Our main result is that, whatever the frequency, competitive firms always have a lower probability of paying bribes. This pattern is reinforced by the high magnitude of the marginal effect on the modality *Never*: competitive firms have a 15 percentage point higher probability of never paying bribes. Strikingly, once they engage in corruption,

---

<sup>7</sup>However, these figures must be evaluated with caution since estimators are consistent only under the assumption that the error terms have a normal distribution.

<sup>8</sup>However, the coefficient associated with the extent of tax evasion is significantly positive when not controlling for the stock of capital of the firm. The higher the proportion of a firm's sales which are not declared, the more likely it is to give bribes to influence the content of new laws, probably laws aiming for instance at punishing hidden activities.

Table 2: Ordered Probit Estimations: Initial and Final Models

	Model	1.unrest	1.rest	2.unrest	2.rest
	Explanatory Variables	<b>State Capture</b>		<b>Administrative Corruption</b>	
<b>Main</b>	<i>Evasion</i> .10 <sup>-1</sup>	0.35 (0.23)		0.47 <sup>b</sup> (0.18)	0.38 <sup>a</sup> (0.09)
	<i>Evasion</i> <sup>2</sup> .10 <sup>-3</sup>	-0.44 (0.35)		-0.39 (0.26)	-0.33 <sup>b</sup> (0.13)
	<i>Compet</i>	-0.78 <sup>a</sup> (0.23)	-0.69 <sup>a</sup> (0.18)	-0.46 <sup>c</sup> (0.26)	-0.53 <sup>a</sup> (0.19)
	<i>PropRights</i>	-0.41 (0.28)	-0.36 <sup>b</sup> (0.18)	-0.16 (0.26)	
<b>Links with the State</b>	<i>Recourse</i>	0.23 (0.45)		0.31 (0.41)	
	<i>Tax</i> .10 <sup>-2</sup>	0.44 (0.90)		0.54 (0.76)	
	<i>Regul</i>	0.11 (1.15)		-0.03 (0.48)	
<b>Firms' Characteristics</b>	<i>Capital</i> .10 <sup>-9</sup>	-0.75 <sup>b</sup> (0.35)	-0.30 <sup>b</sup> (0.14)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.07 <sup>a</sup> (0.02)
	<i>CEO</i>	0.32 (0.25)	0.44 <sup>b</sup> (0.17)	0.22 (0.27)	
	<i>Nbemp</i> .10 <sup>-2</sup>	-0.08 (0.07)		-0.19 <sup>b</sup> (0.08)	-0.16 <sup>a</sup> (0.06)
	<i>Year</i> .10 <sup>-1</sup>	-0.03 (0.09)		0.13 (0.09)	
	<i>PubCap</i> .10 <sup>-1</sup>	0.19 <sup>c</sup> (0.10)		0.12 <sup>b</sup> (0.05)	
	<i>ForCap</i> .10 <sup>-2</sup>	0.12 (0.48)		-0.15 (0.42)	
<b>Country</b>	<i>Tunisia</i>	0.36 (0.67)	-0.34 <sup>c</sup> (0.20)	0.02 (0.35)	
	<i>Morocco</i>	0.67 (0.64)		0.13 (0.36)	
<b>Sector</b>	<i>InsurFin</i> .10 <sup>1</sup>		-0.76 <sup>a</sup> (0.02)		-0.80 <sup>a</sup> (0.02)
	<i>Hotel</i> .10 <sup>1</sup>				-0.10 <sup>b</sup> (0.04)
	<i>Transport</i>				-0.91 <sup>c</sup> (0.52)
	<i>BuildInd</i>				0.59 <sup>b</sup> (0.26)
	Observations	110	217	116	213
	Log-Likelihood	-112.4	-239.2	-133.6	-277.5

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: <sup>a</sup> denotes significance at the 1% level, <sup>b</sup> at the 5% level and <sup>c</sup> at 10%. Residuals heteroscedasticity is corrected with White's method.

the difference in the probability of paying bribes between competitive and declining firms decreases with the frequency of bribes. However, this secondary result is not

Table 3: Marginal Effects for State Capture

	Frequency of State Capture					
	<i>Never</i>	<i>Seldom</i>	<i>Sometimes</i>	<i>Often</i>	<i>Mostly</i>	<i>Always</i>
<i>Compet</i> *	15.74	-8.49	-4.26	-1.44	-1.17	-0.38
<i>PropRights</i> *	7.18	-4.17	-1.87	-0.58	-0.44	-0.13
<i>Capital</i> .10 <sup>-9</sup>	5.53	-3.31	-1.41	-0.42	-0.31	-0.08
<i>CEO</i> *	-9.04	5.17	2.38	0.75	0.58	0.17
<i>Tunisia</i> *	5.81	-3.56	-1.45	-0.42	-0.30	-0.08
<i>InsurFin</i> *	16.49	-10.67	-3.83	-1.06	-0.74	-0.19
Observations	217	217	217	217	217	217

Notes: Marginal effects are given at the mean point of continuous explanatory variables, and for discrete change from 0 to 1 of dummy variables (noted \*). The figures are reported in percentage points.

robust to the estimation of a multinomial choice model (see Section 6), while the main result, that competitive firms have a lower probability of paying bribes at all, is robust under all specifications.

A possible interpretation is that a firm's loss of competitiveness on its market may prompt it to turn to bribery in order to influence to its advantage the content of laws and regulations affecting it, so as to try and win back part of its market share or to get public procurements. Since the question is asked indirectly, there is of course the possibility that less competitive firms tend to overstate corruption as a justification for their difficulties. However, the measurement of corruption is strictly identical to the one used by Svensson (2003) who obtains opposite results.

State capture significantly decreases with the *enforcement of property and contract rights*. These results converge with those of Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2000) on former USSR countries. Firms whose property and contract rights are not enforced or are badly enforced, may bribe influential bureaucrats either to correct the injustice or to settle compensatory mechanisms for their relative drawback. Hence, state-level corruption may be a way to reduce additional transaction costs due to a failing enforcement of law. Changing from low to high enforcement of property rights decreases by 7.18 percentage points the probability of never having to give unofficial payments to influence the content of laws.

Then the higher the amount of the *firm's capital*, the less likely its engagement in state capture. This casts doubt upon the argument that the firms which are more involved in corruption in general and in state capture in particular are those with the highest resources. On the contrary, small firms, in financial terms, being more vulnerable to current crises and competition, turn more frequently to state capture to protect themselves or carve out a place.

The sign of the coefficient associated with the *respondent's professional status* gives interesting information. Surprisingly, the higher the responsibility of the respondent, the more likely he is to declare that the firm often gives unofficial payments to modify

the content of laws and regulations, that is to say that the firm practices state capture. The first interpretation of these results may be given by the secret nature of corruption. The reason why chief executive officers are more aware than directors of human resources of their firm's practice of state capture, may be that the latter have little access to such information or activities which rather directly involve CEOs. A second interpretation might be that even if they know such practices, employees are less ready to reveal them because of their fear of being "punished" by their superiors, if not fired.

I also introduce dummies controlling for specific effects of the *country* or of the *sector* of the major line of business. I notice only two significant coefficients. Being settled in Tunisia reduces the propensity of firms to seek to influence the formulation of laws through bribes. This may have two interpretations: i) state capture is more widespread in Algeria and Morocco than in Tunisia; ii) Tunisian firms being more subject to political pressure than Algerian and Moroccan ones report and expose less easily corrupt practices. The latter explanation seems more likely given the authoritarian Tunisian political context. Finally, the only sector with significantly lower levels of state capture is the one of insurance and finance. This might be due to lower rent-generating public procurement in service sectors, and in this one in particular, than in industry sectors, together with more transparent interactions with incumbents.

In brief, the results show that North African firms are more willing to engage in state capture when their market share decreases, when their property and contract rights are badly enforced, and when they have small amounts of capital, as a whole when their activity is more threatened by competition.

## 5.2 Administrative Corruption

As expected, **administrative corruption** is linked to *tax evasion* through a quadratic relation (first increasing then slightly decreasing). Hence, the global marginal effect of tax evasion on administrative corruption, **GEvasion**, needs to be recalculated from the figures obtained for the marginal effects of  $Evasion \cdot 10^{-1}$  and  $Evasion^2 \cdot 10^{-3}$ .

The signs of the coefficient associated with the single term and the quadratic term of tax evasion indicates that administrative corruption first increases up to a certain threshold before slightly declining. Figure 1 suggests that the threshold is at about 55% of undeclared sales. Below this threshold, giving unofficial payments might therefore be a way to keep part of the sales hidden, in order to avoid paying some taxes. Hence, the dimension of corruption that is emphasized is a "surplus-shifting corruption" (Bliss and Tella 1997) which enables the survival of a business that would probably disappear without bribes. Above the threshold of 55%, the higher the percentage of sales undeclared, the lower the probability that firms give bribes to public officials.

The global marginal effect reported in Table 4 indicates that a one percent increase in undeclared sales reduces by 1.18 percentage points the probability of never having to give bribes to influence the application of regulations affecting the firm's business; it increases by 0.26 points the probability of having to give some most of the time.




Table 4: Marginal Effects for Administrative Corruption

	Frequency of Administrative Corruption					
	<i>Never</i>	<i>Seldom</i>	<i>Sometimes</i>	<i>Often</i>	<i>Mostly</i>	<i>Always</i>
<i>Evasion</i> .10 <sup>-1</sup>	-14.78	2.69	5.37	2.72	3.30	0.71
<i>Evasion</i> <sup>2</sup> .10 <sup>-3</sup>	12.67	-2.31	-4.60	-2.33	-2.83	-0.60
<b>GEvasion</b>	<b>-1.18</b>	<b>0.21</b>	<b>0.43</b>	<b>0.22</b>	<b>0.26</b>	<b>0.06</b>
<i>Compet</i> *	20.76	-2.74	-7.04	-4.04	-5.51	-1.42
<i>Capital</i> .10 <sup>-10</sup>	2.79	-0.51	-1.01	-0.51	-0.62	-0.13
<i>Nbemp</i> .10 <sup>-2</sup>	6.06	-1.10	-2.20	-1.11	-1.35	-0.29
<i>InsurFin</i> *	47.97	-16.17	-17.55	-6.53	-6.56	-1.17
<i>Hotel</i> *	30.70	-9.27	-11.67	-4.53	-4.49	-0.74
<i>Transport</i> *	28.06	-8.43	-10.70	-4.16	-4.10	-0.67
<i>BuildInd</i> *	-23.31	1.83	7.22	4.77	7.28	2.20

Notes: Marginal effects are given at the mean point of continuous explanatory variables, and for discrete change from 0 to 1 of dummy variables (noted \*). The figures are reported in percentage points. **GEvasion** stands for the global marginal effect of the variable of Tax Evasion. It is given by the following combination:  $\mathbf{GEvasion} = \frac{\partial y}{\partial x_1} + 2\bar{x}_1 \frac{\partial y}{\partial x_2}$  according to the notations of equation 1.

Figure 1: Regression Fit of *Administrative Corruption* on *Tax Evasion*



As with state capture, the firm's *competitiveness*, proxied by the variation of its market share, has a negative impact on administrative corruption. If the market share of firms increases or is stable, i.e. if it is competitive, the probability that it practices administrative corruption is significantly lower than for less competitive firms. Corruption hampers less the long-term expansion strategy of competitive firms since they enjoy a strong position on their market. On the contrary, less competitive firms might

be more tempted to resort to unofficial payments to compensate for their weak competitive position. This rather highlights the “cost-reducing” dimension of corruption. Contrary to what Svensson (2003) shows for Ugandan firms and to what Bliss and Tella (1997) explain in their theoretical model, this study suggests that North African firms which engage more often in corruption are not the most profitable ones but the least competitive ones.

Results on the *capital* of the firm and the *number of its employees* show that administrative corruption mostly concerns small firms, in financial terms and in terms of workforce, in keeping with what has been observed in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Finally, administrative corruption is more discriminating between *sectors* than state capture. Firms whose main activity is in a service sector except trade (insurance and financial services, hotel and restaurant, transport) are less likely to engage in administrative corruption than others. By contrast, those which have their main activity in building are significantly more inclined to petty corruption. Indeed, inspections are more frequent in this line of business in particular, and in industry in general, than in services, which increases incumbents’ control rights, hence bribing opportunities.

As a whole, firms’ engagement in administrative corruption is mainly determined by the extent to which they evade taxes. Administrative corruption increases with the percentage of hidden sales until this percentage reaches about one half, then administrative corruption decreases with the rise in tax evasion. It is pushed up by the weakness of their competitiveness but it does not seem to be sensitive to the security of property rights, contrary to state capture.

## 6 Robustness Tests

In the following section, I seek to ascertain the robustness of these results on the main determinants of state capture and administrative corruption. I focus on two potential sources of instability: the ranking of answers to the frequency of corruption and the existence of a selection bias.

### 6.1 Nature of the dependent variable

First, the distribution of both variables measuring the supply of corruption is not normal. Hence, the results on their determinants might be specific to such a distribution. To check if the results presented in the previous section hold with different distributions of the variables of corruption, I use **alternative cuts of the modalities** of state capture and administrative corruption. Instead of six modalities, I cut the variables of corruption into four by gathering the last three modalities (“often”, “mostly” and “always”) into a single one (the first three modalities are “never”, “seldom” and “sometimes”). I regress such variables of state capture and administrative corruption

on the variables of their respective restrictive model. The coefficients thus estimated by ordered probit are presented in Table 5 (models 1.rest\* and 2.rest\*).

Second, when using ordered probit estimations in section 5, the underlying assumption is that corruption supply from North African firms is graduated. Yet, firms' engagement in corruption might not be progressive. If the relevant decision for a firm is whether to engage in corruption or not, rather than the frequency of engagement, then a **binomial choice** model would fit better. Hence, I present the results of probit estimations in the following table in models 1.rest\*\* and 2.rest\*\*.

Table 5: Robustness Estimations

	Model	1.rest	1.rest*	1.rest**	2.rest	2.rest*	2.rest**
	Explanatory Variables		<b>State Capture</b>		<b>Administrative Corruption</b>		
<b>Main</b>	<i>Evasion</i> .10 <sup>-1</sup>				0.38 <sup>a</sup> (0.09)	0.48 <sup>a</sup> (0.10)	0.71 <sup>a</sup> (0.13)
	<i>Evasion</i> <sup>2</sup> .10 <sup>-3</sup>				-0.33 <sup>b</sup> (0.13)	-0.45 <sup>a</sup> (0.13)	-0.71 <sup>a</sup> (0.18)
	<i>Compet</i>	-0.69 <sup>a</sup> (0.18)	-0.60 <sup>a</sup> (0.18)	-0.46 <sup>a</sup> (0.16)	-0.53 <sup>a</sup> (0.19)	-0.42 <sup>b</sup> (0.20)	-0.23 <sup>c</sup> (0.13)
	<i>PropRights</i>	-0.36 <sup>b</sup> (0.18)	-0.33 <sup>c</sup> (0.18)	0.03 (0.16)			
<b>Firms' Characteristics</b>	<i>Capital</i> .10 <sup>-9</sup>	-0.30 <sup>b</sup> (0.14)	-0.30 <sup>b</sup> (0.14)	-0.30 <sup>b</sup> (0.13)	-0.07 <sup>a</sup> (0.02)	-0.07 <sup>a</sup> (0.02)	-0.05 <sup>b</sup> (0.02)
	<i>CEO</i>	0.44 <sup>b</sup> (0.17)	0.43 <sup>b</sup> (0.18)	0.57 <sup>a</sup> (0.18)			
	<i>Nbemp</i> .10 <sup>-2</sup>				-0.16 <sup>a</sup> (0.06)	-0.14 <sup>b</sup> (0.07)	-0.12 <sup>b</sup> (0.06)
<b>Country</b>	<i>Tunisia</i>	-0.34 <sup>c</sup> (0.20)	-0.33 <sup>c</sup> (0.21)	-0.33 (0.21)			
<b>Sector</b>	<i>InsurFin</i> .10 <sup>1</sup>	-0.76 <sup>a</sup> (0.02)	-0.79 <sup>a</sup> (0.02)	-1.00 <sup>a</sup> (0.00)	-0.80 <sup>a</sup> (0.02)	-0.76 <sup>a</sup> (0.02)	-1.00 <sup>a</sup> (0.00)
	<i>Hotel</i> .10 <sup>1</sup>				-0.10 <sup>b</sup> (0.04)	-0.10 <sup>b</sup> (0.04)	-0.10 <sup>c</sup> (0.05)
	<i>Transport</i>				-0.91 <sup>c</sup> (0.52)	-0.88 <sup>c</sup> (0.52)	-0.63 (0.62)
	<i>BuildInd</i>				0.59 <sup>b</sup> (0.26)	1.05 <sup>b</sup> (0.47)	1.00 <sup>a</sup> (0.00)
	Observations	217	217	210	213	213	200
	Log-Likelihood	-239.2	-215.75	-126.18	-277.5	-226.00	-109.93
	Method	<i>oprobit</i>	<i>oprobit</i>	<i>probit</i>	<i>oprobit</i>	<i>oprobit</i>	<i>probit</i>

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: <sup>a</sup> denotes significance at the 1% level, <sup>b</sup> at the 5% level and <sup>c</sup> at 10%. Residuals heteroscedasticity is corrected with White's method.

It seems that the results presented above for both state capture and administrative corruption are not sensitive to the number of modalities of these two variables. For 4-cut ordered answers, all coefficients are significant at least at the 10% level and their values are very close to those obtained with six modalities.

As for probit estimations, they show that the main factors of the frequency of both forms of corruption are also relevant in explaining firms' decision on whether to engage in corruption or not. Competitive and high-capital firms are less likely to turn both to state capture and administrative corruption, in the same way as, when they do so, they are less likely to resort frequently to corruption. The quadratic relation between tax evasion and administrative corruption is also valid.

There are minor differences with previous results (1.rest and 2.rest). The enforcement of property and contract rights does not significantly explain the decision of being involved in state capture. It means that the quality of the legal system affects the frequency of state capture rather than its occurrence.

Third, the frequency of engagement in corruption of a firm might not be progressive or ordered. In this case, a **multinomial choice** model would be preferable. In Tables 6 and 7, I provide robustness tests based on multinomial logit estimations: models 1.rest\*\*\* and 2.rest\*\*\*. The coefficients give the relative probability of firms engaging in corruption with a certain frequency by comparison with no corruption.

Table 6: Multinomial Logit Estimation: State Capture

Model	1.rest***				
Explanatory Variables	Dependent Variable: <b>State Capture</b>				
	<i>Seldom</i>	<i>Sometimes</i>	<i>Often</i>	<i>Mostly</i>	<i>Always</i>
<i>Compet</i>	-1.18 <sup>a</sup> (0.35)	-1.99 <sup>a</sup> (0.37)	-1.08 <sup>a</sup> (0.38)	-2.20 <sup>a</sup> (0.56)	-3.73 <sup>a</sup> (1.23)
<i>PropRights</i>	-0.08 (0.38)	-0.13 (0.33)	-2.07 <sup>a</sup> (0.61)	-1.67 <sup>a</sup> (0.58)	-2.65 <sup>b</sup> (1.20)
<i>Capital.10<sup>-9</sup></i>	-0.46 (0.36)	-0.75 (0.81)	-0.30 (0.35)	-1.99 (2.14)	-0.09 <sup>b</sup> (0.04)
<i>CEO</i>	0.43 (0.42)	0.69 (0.43)	-0.11 (0.67)	0.72 (0.63)	1.44 <sup>c</sup> (0.76)
<i>Tunisia</i>	-1.11 <sup>b</sup> (0.54)	-0.27 (0.48)	-1.67 (1.13)	-0.11 (0.81)	-33.95 <sup>a</sup> (0.60)
<i>InsurFin.10<sup>1</sup></i>	-3.64 <sup>a</sup> (0.06)	-3.57 <sup>a</sup> (0.07)	-3.47 <sup>a</sup> (0.09)	-3.38 <sup>a</sup> (0.09)	-3.23 <sup>a</sup> (0.16)
Observations	217				
Log-Likelihood	-229.59				

Notes: The reference modality stands for never being involved in state capture. By hypothesis, all the coefficients of such a modality are null. Standard errors in parentheses: <sup>a</sup> denotes significance at the 1% level, <sup>b</sup> at the 5% level and <sup>c</sup> at 10%. Residuals heteroscedasticity is corrected with White's method.

Our main results on the impact of the firm's competitiveness and the enforcement of its property rights on state capture are robust. However, contrary to the result obtained with an ordered probit, it seems that the difference in the probability of paying bribes between a competitive and a declining firm increases with the frequency of bribing. Our results on this should thus remain inconclusive.

Table 7: Multinomial Logit Estimation: Administrative Corruption

Model	2.rest***				
Explanatory Variables	Dependent Variable: <b>Administrative Corruption</b>				
	<i>Seldom</i>	<i>Sometimes</i>	<i>Often</i>	<i>Mostly</i>	<i>Always</i>
<i>Evasion</i> .10 <sup>-1</sup>	0.92 <sup>a</sup> (0.35)	1.20 <sup>a</sup> (0.32)	1.13 <sup>a</sup> (0.33)	1.29 <sup>a</sup> (0.35)	0.63 (0.46)
<i>Evasion</i> <sup>2</sup> .10 <sup>-3</sup>	-1.23 <sup>b</sup> (0.54)	-1.16 <sup>a</sup> (0.43)	-1.28 <sup>a</sup> (0.45)	-1.29 <sup>a</sup> (0.47)	-0.40 (0.54)
<i>Compet</i>	-1.13 <sup>a</sup> (0.32)	-1.34 <sup>a</sup> (0.38)	-1.53 <sup>a</sup> (0.37)	-2.49 <sup>a</sup> (0.52)	-2.25 <sup>a</sup> (0.66)
<i>Capital</i> .10 <sup>-9</sup>	-0.05 <sup>c</sup> (0.03)	-0.35 (0.22)	-0.32 (0.20)	-0.55 <sup>c</sup> (0.32)	-3.98 (8.53)
<i>Nbemp</i> .10 <sup>-2</sup>	-0.25 <sup>c</sup> (0.14)	-0.54 <sup>b</sup> (0.21)	-0.47 (0.34)	-0.34 <sup>b</sup> (0.15)	-1.28 <sup>c</sup> (0.77)
<i>InsurFin</i> .10 <sup>1</sup>	-3.69 <sup>a</sup> (0.05)	-3.62 <sup>a</sup> (0.06)	-3.61 <sup>a</sup> (0.06)	-3.51 <sup>a</sup> (0.07)	-3.47 <sup>a</sup> (0.10)
<i>Hotel</i> .10 <sup>1</sup>	-3.59 <sup>a</sup> (0.05)	-0.08 (0.10)	-3.55 <sup>a</sup> (0.06)	-3.50 <sup>a</sup> (0.06)	-3.45 <sup>a</sup> (0.06)
<i>Transport</i>	-0.24 (1.13)	-36.03 <sup>a</sup> (0.60)	-35.92 <sup>a</sup> (0.57)	-35.08 <sup>a</sup> (0.68)	-34.71 <sup>a</sup> (0.79)
<i>BuildInd</i>	-12.04 <sup>a</sup> (0.93)	22.16 .	22.66 <sup>a</sup> (1.10)	23.19 <sup>a</sup> (1.08)	-10.91 <sup>a</sup> (0.98)
Observations	213				
Log-Likelihood	-264.73				

Notes: The reference modality stands for never being involved in administrative corruption. By hypothesis, all the coefficients of such a modality are null. Standard errors in parentheses: <sup>a</sup> denotes significance at the 1% level, <sup>b</sup> at the 5% level and <sup>c</sup> at 10%. Residuals heteroscedasticity is corrected with White's method.

Like ordered probit estimations, multinomial logit estimations show the existence of a quadratic relation between the extent of tax evasion and administrative corruption. And the probability of turning to administrative corruption (seldom or mostly) diminishes with the size of the financial capital.

In brief, the main results are robust to the cut of the modalities of the variables of interest, administrative corruption and state capture, but also to the econometric method. The loss of competitiveness is relevant in explaining the engagement in corruption and its frequency, whereas tax evasion is critical for resorting to administrative corruption and its intensity. An exception is the failing enforcement of property rights, which significantly explains behaviors of frequent state capture rather than the decision of being involved in state capture (at a low level).

## 6.2 Is There an Endogeneity Bias?

If tax evasion is determined endogenously, i.e. if it is correlated with the error term, the analysis may suffer from an endogeneity bias<sup>9</sup>. There is a simultaneity bias if

<sup>9</sup>Endogeneity may be due to measurement errors, simultaneity bias or omitted variables. One example of an omitted variable is the legitimacy of the government. If the government has little

corruption, in turn, affects tax evasion. Ordinary least squares regressions performed on aggregated data (Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999), Johnson et al. (2000)) or firm-level data (Johnson et al. 2000) show that, in former-USSR countries, shadow activity increases with the level of corruption. In most corrupt countries, hiding sales is a way to bypass corrupt agents (Vostroknutova 2003).

As shown above, the determinants of the engagement in and the frequency of bribe-paying are very similar. And computing instrumentation is much easier in a binary choice model than in an ordered polytomous model. Hence I estimate an instrumented probit model to control and test for the endogeneity of tax evasion in the regression of administrative corruption<sup>10</sup>. I use the same specification as in model 2.rest in Table 2.

I use three different variables to predict the instrumented value of tax evasion.

- *Household* stands for the mean value of the number of persons depending financially on the firm's employees. It is taken from the employee survey, which increases the chance of exogeneity. We make the assumption that the more dependents a worker has, the lower his negotiation power and the less likely she is to refuse a job in a fraudulent firm. It is indeed likely that the illegal activities of the firm are a source of job insecurity for the employee, and that the employee has some information on these illegal activities. I expect a positive correlation between the size of employees' households and tax evasion.
- *Tax* is the level of taxes actually paid by the firm, as a percentage of her sales. I expect a negative correlation between *Tax* and tax evasion.
- *LaborReg* is equal to 1 if the firm fully respects labor regulations, 0 otherwise. When firms consider they face too restrictive regulations, they tend to hide part of their activity rather than pay bribes (Frye and Zhuravskaya 2001). As shown in Table 11 in the Appendix, *Tax* and *LaborReg* are not significantly correlated to administrative corruption.

I present the results of the first step of instrumentation in Table 12 in the Appendix and the results of the instrumented probit estimation in Table 13.

The instruments have the expected and significant effects on tax evasion. They are weak instruments as indicated by the weak value of the Fisher statistic (2.52). Indeed, Staiger and Stock (1997) show that an *F*-stat below 10 reflects weak instruments. However, the instruments explain 15% of the variance of tax evasion and their coefficients are significant at most at the 8%-level. Although insufficient, the instruments are good

---

legitimacy, individuals tend to circumvent taxes either by under-reporting their activity or by paying bribes (Rose-Ackerman 2004).

<sup>10</sup>The results of the estimation of state capture by instrumented probit estimation are not reported here for two main reasons: (i) tax evasion is likely to be affected by a kind of corruption aiming at altering the application of laws more than their formulation; (ii) when state capture is introduced as an explanatory variable in the regression of tax evasion, a Wald exogeneity test shows the absence of endogeneity.

predictors of tax evasion. As indicated by the Amemiya-Lee-Newey (ALN) overidentification test in Table 13, the instruments are exogenous to corruption, hence valid. I can therefore test the hypothesis of endogeneity of tax evasion. Wald exogeneity test shows that, for all specifications, tax evasion is exogenous.

The exogeneity of tax evasion derives from the exact kind of corruption we are studying here. There would be inverse causation if firms hide a bigger share of their sales in order to pay bribes less often. However, while the profitability of a firm affects the *amount* of bribes it has to pay (Svensson 2003), it is not likely that it affects the *frequency* of bribe-paying. Moreover, bribes are not only paid to bureaucrats who know about the firms' sales but to a much larger variety of public officials. Corruption here cannot be interpreted as a tax on profit but rather as a way to distort the market conditions or to keep illegal activities secret. It is therefore unlikely to affect the level of tax evasion.

The instrumented estimation shows different results only for the control variables. The main variables of interest have the same effects on administrative corruption as in the main estimation, which are shown to be robust in the absence of endogeneity.

### 6.3 Is There a Selection Bias?

In the sample I use, 41.31% of firms do not answer the question on the frequency of state capture, 36.14 on the frequency of administrative corruption. Figure 4 in the Appendix displays non-response rates by country. If non-response is not random and if it has an influence on the frequency of state capture, then inference based on classical ordered probit estimations is biased. The selection bias is due to the restriction of the analysis to a sample not randomly selected.

In this case, the selection equation is of the form:

$$y_{1i}^* = x'_{1i}\beta_1 + u_{1i} \quad (2)$$

$$y_{1i} = 1 \text{ if } y_{1i}^* > 0 \quad ; \quad y_{1i} = 0 \text{ otherwise} \quad (3)$$

so that  $y_{2i}$  is observed if and only if  $y_{1i} = 1$ . The equation of interest is:

$$y_{2i}^* = y_{2i}^{**} * y_{1i} \quad (4)$$

$$y_{2i}^{**} = x'_{2i}\beta_2 + u_{2i} \quad (5)$$

$$\begin{aligned} y_{2i} &= 1 \text{ if } y_{2i}^* \leq \mu_1 \\ y_{2i} &= 2 \text{ if } \mu_1 < y_{2i}^* \leq \mu_2 \\ &\dots \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

$$y_{2i} = 6 \text{ if } \mu_5 < y_{2i}^*.$$

From equations (4) and (5), I derive:

$$E(y_{2i}^* | x_{1i}, y_{1i} = 1) = x'_{2i}\beta_2 + E(u_{2i} | x_{1i}, y_{1i} = 1). \quad (7)$$

There is a selection bias if the error terms  $u_{1i}$  and  $u_{2i}$  are correlated, that is to say if  $E(u_{2i}|x_{1i}, y_{1i} = 1) \neq 0$ . In this case, classical ordered probit estimations yield inconsistent estimators.

Several methods may be used for treating this issue. Tobit models are not appropriate for two reasons: they apply to continuous data and they require that all determinants of non-response are common with those of the frequency of corruption. Heckman selection models enable some of the factors of non-response to be specific to the equation of selection but they also apply to continuous endogenous variables in the equation of interest. Here, I use a censored ordered probit model which fits with ordered polytomic endogenous variables in the equation of interest and which makes it possible to have different variables (as well as common ones) in both equations.

As suggested in Heckman (1979), I include a correction term for  $E(u_{2i}|x_{1i}, y_{1i} = 1)$  to take into account a potential selection bias. I assume that

$$E(u_{2i}|x_{1i}, y_{1i} = 1) = \gamma[y_{1i} - E(y_{1i}|x_i)]. \quad (8)$$

Thus, equation (5) becomes:

$$y_{2i}^{**} = x'_{2i}\beta_2 + \gamma[y_{1i} - \phi(x'_{1i}\hat{\beta}_1)] + \eta_2. \quad (9)$$

I run a two-step procedure. The results are presented in Table 8. First, I run a probit regression on the selection equation which helps to highlight the main factors of response to the questions on state capture (first column) and on administrative corruption (third column). From this regression, I build the estimated residual  $Selection = y_{1i} - \phi(x'_{1i}\hat{\beta}_1) = \hat{u}_{1i}$ . Secondly, I estimate the equation of interest by ordered probit. I regress the frequency of state capture (column 2) and administrative corruption (column 4) on relevant factors retained in section 5 and augmented with the variable *Selection*.

In columns *ResponseSC* and *ResponseAC*, I report the results of probit estimations of the factors of answer. The final specification is retained according to the same procedure as the one described for the main model (see section 5).

The correction term *Selection* included among regressors in the two equations of interest (*1.rest.S*) and (*2.rest.S*) has a very high z-statistic in both regressions, state capture and administrative corruption. This implies that there are no significant unobservable characteristics which determine both the probability of response ( $P(y_{1i} = 1)$ ) and the expected frequency of corruption ( $E(y_{2i}^*|x_{1i})$ ): the selection bias is not significant. As a robustness test for the existence of a selection bias, I calculate the likelihood ratio based on the null hypothesis that the parameter vector of the model satisfies the selection constraint. The likelihood ratio is equal to 15.24 with an associated p-value of 0.00. Hence, the Heckman ordered probit estimation can be considered equivalent to the combination of a probit for response and an ordered probit for the outcome, i.e. the frequency of corruption.

The probability of answering the question on the frequency of state capture significantly decreases with the respect of fiscal regulations and the age of the firm. Firms settled



Table 8: Selection Bias: Heckman Ordered Probit Estimations

Model	<i>Response SC</i>	1.rest.S	<i>Response AC</i>	2.rest.S
Explanatory Variables	<b>State Capture</b>		<b>Administrative Corruption</b>	
<i>Evasion</i> .10 <sup>-1</sup>				0.37 <sup>a</sup> (0.09)
<i>Evasion</i> <sup>2</sup> .10 <sup>-3</sup>				-0.30 <sup>b</sup> (0.13)
<i>Compet</i>		-0.70 <sup>a</sup> (0.18)		-0.58 <sup>a</sup> (0.20)
<i>PropRights</i>		-0.34 <sup>c</sup> (0.18)		
<i>Regul</i>	-0.46 <sup>b</sup> (0.20)			
<i>Capital</i> .10 <sup>-9</sup>		-0.33 <sup>b</sup> (0.15)		-0.07 <sup>a</sup> (0.02)
<i>CEO</i>		0.45 <sup>b</sup> (0.18)		
<i>Nbemp</i> .10 <sup>-2</sup>				-0.15 <sup>b</sup> (0.06)
<i>Year</i> .10 <sup>-3</sup>	0.28 <sup>a</sup> (0.10)		0.32 <sup>a</sup> (0.04)	
<i>ForCap</i> .10 <sup>-2</sup>			0.65 <sup>b</sup> (0.26)	
<i>Tunisia</i>		-0.48 <sup>c</sup> (0.26)	-0.55 <sup>a</sup> (0.12)	
<i>Morocco</i>	0.54 <sup>a</sup> (0.12)			
<i>InsurFin</i> .10 <sup>1</sup>		-0.83 <sup>a</sup> (0.02)		-0.80 <sup>a</sup> (0.02)
<i>Hotel</i> .10 <sup>1</sup>				-0.10 <sup>b</sup> (0.04)
<i>Transport</i>				-0.89 <sup>c</sup> (0.52)
<i>BuildInd</i>			-0.76 <sup>a</sup> (0.23)	0.77 <sup>a</sup> (0.25)
<i>FoodInd</i>	-0.43 <sup>b</sup> (0.18)			
<i>ElecInd</i>			-0.39 <sup>b</sup> (0.20)	
<i>Selection</i>		<b>1.10</b> <b>(0.98)</b>		<b>0.22</b> <b>(0.81)</b>
Observations	534	212	508	201
Log-likelihood	-346.20	-231.62	-310.20	-263.74
Method	<i>probit</i>	<i>oprobit</i>	<i>probit</i>	<i>oprobit</i>

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: <sup>a</sup> denotes significance at the 1% level, <sup>b</sup> at the 5% level and <sup>c</sup> at 10%. Residuals heteroscedasticity is corrected with White's method.

in Morocco are more likely to answer such a question. In the same way, older firms are more likely to censor themselves on their engagement in administrative corruption, as well as Tunisian firms and firms with a higher share of national capital (private or public) relative to foreign capital. Then, the probability of self-censoring on administrative corruption is higher for firms in building or electrical sectors. However, as mentioned, self-censorship does not have a significant influence on the frequency of both forms of corruption. And the significance of the most relevant factors of corruption of the two main specifications are not affected by the introduction of the correction term.

## 7 Comparison with Corruption Supply in Uganda and transition countries

In this section, I seek to compare firms' behaviors towards corruption in the Maghreb, in transition countries and in Uganda.

### 7.1 Corruption in Maghreb, Uganda and former-USSR

In their influential paper, Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2000) lead econometric analyses on the determinants of state capture and administrative corruption in 22 transition countries<sup>11</sup>. They show that state capture is more often practiced by large firms (i.e. with a high number of employees), whereas administrative corruption seems to be rather specific to small firms. Firms which suffer from a weak enforcement of their property and contract rights, those which cannot resort to other bureaucrats when the first one asks for bribes, as well as *de novo* firms, are more likely to engage in both forms of corruption. Indeed, partly public firms in these countries were shown to have privileged links with the state, which allowed them to influence regulation without having recourse to bribery. Hence, they were less likely to engage in corruption than *de novo* ones. Finally, neither state capture nor administrative corruption is significantly affected by market power (proxied by the inelasticity of the demand faced by firms).

Svensson's study on Ugandan firms does not make the distinction between state capture and administrative corruption but it has the advantage of being based on quantitative data on the amount of bribes paid. Corruption is higher for firms with a higher ability to pay (measured by their profitability) and for firms with a lower refusal power, which depends on the alternative return on the firms' capital stock. The extent of control rights of bureaucrats, as high as regulations, taxes and public services concerning the firm, enhances the level of bribes paid as well.

In the previous section, I only commented on the effects of variables relevant for the explanation of the supply of corruption in North Africa. Now, I also mention factors

---

<sup>11</sup>Their study also deals with the factors of influence, which I do not broach here.

which happened to be relevant for the analysis of the determinants of corruption in the former USSR (see Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2000)) and in Uganda (see Svensson (2003)) and introduced in initial models (1.unrest) and (2.unrest). For detailed results on the restriction procedure, see Tables 10 and 11 in Appendix.

First, the most striking difference concerns the impact of *competitiveness*. The results show that in North Africa, the firms that engaged the most in corruption are the least competitive ones, and not the most profitable ones as in Uganda<sup>12</sup>. In Maghreb, bribe-paying enables firms to reduce some costs or obtain public procurement contracts and therefore to compensate a waning position (Gauthier and Reinikka 2001). In Uganda, on the contrary, the firm's profitability is a good proxy for her ability to pay bribes, which attracts a high demand for "surplus-shifting", comparable to racket.

Besides, North African firms are more likely to engage in state capture when their *property and contract rights* are not enforced or are badly enforced, the impact on petty corruption not being significant, whereas a failing legal system strengthens both forms of corruption in transition countries.

Contrary to the situation in transition countries, differences in the links North African firms may have with the state do not significantly explain differences in their engagement in both forms of corruption. If corruption in former USSR countries is sensitive to the origin of the firm (*de novo*, privatized or public) and to the *financial stake of the state*, it is not the case in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Then, levels of *taxes* and perceptions on *regulations* do not affect corruption supply of North African firms, unlike Ugandan firms, probably because the "burden" effect of regulation is captured by tax evasion which might be the answer to restrictive taxes and regulations (Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton 1998). Another interesting comparison with corruption practices in other regions lies in the role of *bureaucratic recourse*<sup>13</sup>. In Uganda, firms with a higher refusal power pay less bribes. Similarly, in transition countries, firms which can have recourse to another official in case of bribe-appeal, hence which have a higher refusal power, pay bribes less often because bureaucrats are then in greater competition for the supply of the public good. In North African countries, bureaucratic recourse does not significantly affect corruption practices. Like in the former USSR, *small* firms are more likely to engage in administrative corruption in North Africa. However, they are also more likely to practice state capture in North Africa where fewer practice this kind of corruption compared with firms in the former USSR. With regard to Uganda, the size of the firm is not decisive. Finally, the existence of *sector-specific* effects is restricted to the North African situation. In Svensson (2003), industrial category dummies are not significant for Uganda. As for transition countries,

---

<sup>12</sup>I use the variation of the market share of the firm as a proxy for its profitability and competitiveness. This is different from examining the market share as a stock. The latter is not a good proxy for competitiveness or profitability since a state monopoly might not be competitive or profitable. It might be one of the reasons why when Svensson (2003) introduces this stock index, it does not appear to explain significantly the level of bribes.

<sup>13</sup>Bureaucratic recourse stands for the possibility for an individual to have recourse to another public agent when the first one seeks bribes. It is one dimension of the refusal power.

sectorial dummies are not introduced in the analysis of the determinants of corruption.

## 7.2 Are Hellman *et al.*'s results still valid?

Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann's (2000) results presented above are based on 1999 data, collected in the BEEPS survey, which cover 22 former-USSR countries. To be able to compare their results to mine as rigorously as possible, I need to ensure that the potential differences are not due to the different time spans under study. I therefore check the validity of Hellman *et al.*'s results over a longer period before drawing the comparison.

The BEEPS survey was conducted first in 1999, and again in 2002 and 2005 with more than 5000 firms. In this section, I use the 1999, 2002 and 2005 data and a pseudo-panel estimation method to test the validity of the results obtained on 1999 data across time. A classical panel estimation is not suitable here because the firms surveyed are different in 1999, 2002 and 2005.

The pseudo-panel estimation method was introduced by Deaton (1985). A fixed-effects model based on transversal data repeated over time can be identified and estimated consistently. Deaton (1985) suggests to the creation of cohorts of individuals with common characteristics, which can be observed every year and are constant over time. For each variable, the value of a cohort is given by the mean of the variable for the individuals in the cohort<sup>14</sup>. The means for each cohort are therefore considered as single observations in a pseudo-panel and I can apply classical panel estimation techniques.

I build 220 cohorts, composed of firms in the same country, created the same year and I estimate the following equation, like in Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2000), with data from 1999, 2002 and 2005, thereby introducing for the first time a temporal dimension in the analysis of the BEEPS data<sup>15</sup>:

$$\begin{aligned} Corrup_{ct} = & \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 PropRights_{ct} + \alpha_3 Compet_{ct} + \alpha_4 Recourse_{ct} \\ & + \alpha_5 Nbemp_{ct} + \alpha_6 Origin_{ct} + \epsilon_{ct}. \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

The variables are measured as in the survey on Maghrebi firms with three major exceptions.

When *Corrup* refers to administrative corruption, it is measured by the percent of revenues firms typically pay per annum in unofficial payments to public officials.

The question on insecurity of property rights which Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2000) use refers to the situation in 1996 in the 1999 survey. In 2002 and 2005, the

---

<sup>14</sup>In this sample, each cohort is composed of 68 firms on average.

<sup>15</sup>This enables me to take into account specific individual effects, which are actually cohort effects here.

same question is asked but refers to the present situation. To be consistent, I compute the variable *PropRights* (referring to the situation three years before) for 2002 and 2005 by using the mean of the cohort in 1999 and 2002 respectively.

The firm's competitiveness is measured here by the elasticity of the inelasticity of demand for the firm's major product line.

The results are presented in Table 14 in Appendix. The results of the Hausman test reflect that the specification with random effects should be rejected in the first regression of administrative corruption, yielding non efficient estimators. In the other regressions, the fixed-effects estimators are consistent and the random-effects ones are efficient. The goodness of fit is quite low and many coefficients are not significant at the 10%-level. One reason could be that the pseudo-panel technique induces a loss of information but it could also be the case that firms practices of corruption have changed over time and are driven by other factors in 2002 and 2005.

To try and improve the goodness of fit and to be able to draw comparisons with the main results on Maghrebi firms, I include *Evasion* and *Tax* in the set of explanatory variables and I estimate the same model as in Section 5 with the BEEPS data. The results are presented in Table 15 in Appendix.

The determinants of corruption put forward by Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2000) do not seem very stable over time: the specification of the model of state capture is particularly poor when introducing the 2002 and 2005 data. However, the main results on administrative corruption are still valid and are consistent with some of our findings on firms in Maghreb. The firms most likely to engage in administrative corruption are small firms, which face high judicial insecurity and have low bureaucratic recourse. Moreover, a weak competitive position favors administrative corruption. This result reinforces the assumption made above that corruption is a response to a loss of competitiveness. Finally, like in Maghreb, tax evasion favors administrative corruption as well, but I find no threshold effect for former-USSR firms.

## 8 Conclusion

The database I use provides new information on North African firms. In this paper, I seek to highlight the main factors of administrative corruption and state capture in this region, of both engagement in these two forms of corruption and frequency. I control for a potential selection bias and compare corruption behaviors in Maghreb, transition countries and Uganda.

The joint analysis of the main factors of administrative corruption and state capture in Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian formal firms reveals some striking results.

First, tax evasion and corruption go hand-in-hand. But, contrary to what studies on transition countries have revealed, in North Africa, it is true only up to a certain point,

and only for administrative corruption. When hidden sales are over about half of total sales, the likelihood to detect and punish the illegal activity of the firm is very high. In this case, decreasing tax evasion lowers this risk and enables the firm to pay more bribes – potentially to maintain some hidden activity. On the contrary, if the percentage of undeclared sales is below half of total sales, the risk of being caught is low and tax evasion and administrative corruption are complements.

Second, the quality of the legal and judicial system influences state capture, in a similar way as tax evasion influences administrative corruption. Firms which face a failing legal system and are not able to enforce their property rights, resort more often to state capture, thereby having a direct influence on the formulation of laws. However, whereas tax evasion and competitiveness influence both the decision to engage in corruption and its frequency, the protection of property rights appears to affect only the frequency of engagement.

Third, whereas state capture appears as an answer to insecure property rights and administrative corruption as a way to maintain part of the activity hidden, both forms of corruption help compensate decreasing competitiveness and low profitability. North African firms which engage more in corruption are not the most profitable ones, as Svensson (2003) suggests for Ugandan firms, but are the most threatened by competition. Low competitiveness incites firms to turn to bribery to influence the content or application of laws and regulations to their advantage in order to win back their position on the market or to hamper their competitors. Hence, these results are in line with the implications of Bliss and Tella's theoretical model: increasing competition may not reduce corruption. Yet the argument I make is different. While Bliss and Tella (1997) suggest that the least competitive firms exit and those which stay are the most profitable and can pay higher bribes, I argue that the least profitable firms engage more in corruption in order not to exit. This conclusion contrasts with previous studies showing that the competitive position does not explain significantly the supply of corruption in transition countries (see e.g. Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2000)).

Economic policy recommendations are manifold. This study emphasizes the necessity to settle different anti-corruption policies according i) to the different regions in the world, some factors of corruption being specific to some regions (e.g. refusal power) and some others having opposite effects in two different regions (e.g. profitability); ii) to the form of corruption that ought to be fought in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. If priority is given to the fight against state capture, then the legal and judicial system has to be reinforced so as to enforce property and contract rights in a more accurate way. But if priority is given to reducing administrative corruption, tax evasion has to be fought<sup>16</sup> with special attention to the market structure. Since the relation between tax evasion and administrative corruption is not linear, it may be counter-productive to try and restrain tax evasion (if it exceeds a certain threshold). However, limiting both forms of corruption may require controlling for the activity of firms losing their

---

<sup>16</sup>Such a recommendation focuses on the reduction of corruption and omits public choice analyses which emphasize the positive effect of tax evasion on households' revenues.

competitiveness, especially when competition increases in a given sector.

The ratification of various free-trade agreements by Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria has accelerated trade openness. As a consequence, in the short run, many firms have reduced their profits on the domestic market, favoring corruption. Though in the long run firms may gain market share and profits, thereby reducing corruption, this may explain why, despite the institutional reforms carried out over the last years, corruption has not really been constrained yet in North Africa.

## References

- Ades, Alberto, and Rafael Di Tella. 1997. "The New Economics of Corruption: a Survey and Some New Results." *Political Studies* 45 (3): 496–515.
- . 1999. "Rents, Competition, and Corruption." *American Economic Review* 89 (4): 982–993 (September).
- Bardhan, Pranab. 2006. "The economist's approach to the problem of corruption." *World Development* 34 (2): 341–348 (February).
- Becker, Gary S. 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach." *Journal of Political Economy* 76:169.
- Bliss, Christopher J.E., and Rafael Di Tella. 1997. "Does Competition Kill Corruption?" *Journal of Political Economy* 105:1001–23.
- Clarke, George R. G. 2011. "How Petty is Petty Corruption? Evidence from Firm Surveys in Africa." *World Development* 39 (7):1122–1132.
- Clarke, George R. G., and Lixin Colin Xu. 2002, February. "Ownership, competition, and corruption : bribe takers versus bribe payers." Policy research working paper series 2783, The World Bank.
- Deaton, Angus. 1985. "Panel Data from Time Series of Cross-sections." *Journal of Econometrics* 30 (1-2): 109–126.
- Ehrlich, Isaac. 1996. "Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 10 (1): 43–67 (Winter).
- Frye, Timothy, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. 2001, March. "Rackets, Regulation and the Rule of Law." Cepr discussion papers 2716, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gauthier, Bernard, Jean-Paul Azam, and Jonathan Goyette. 2004, November. "The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on Firm Growth and Social Welfare: Theory and Evidence." Cahiers de recherche 04-10, HEC Montral, Institut d'conomie applique.
- Gauthier, Bernard, and Mark Gersovitz. 1997. "Revenue Erosion through Exemption and Evasion in Cameroon, 1993." *Journal of Public Economics* 64 (3): 407–424 (June).

- Gauthier, Bernard, and Ritva Reinikka. 2001, December. "Shifting Tax Burdens through Exemptions and Evasion - An empirical Investigation of Uganda." Policy research working paper series 2735, The World Bank.
- Goerke, Laszlo. 2006. "Bureaucratic Corruption and Profit Tax Evasion." Cesifo working paper series CESifo Working Paper No., CESifo GmbH.
- Gupta, Sanjeev, Raju Sharan, and Luiz de Mello. 2000, February. "Corruption and Military Spending." Imf working papers 00/23, International Monetary Fund.
- Heckman, James J. 1979. "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error." *Econometrica* 47 (1): 153–61.
- Hellman, Joel S., Geraint Jones, and Daniel Kaufmann. 2000, September. "'Seize the state, seize the day': state capture, corruption, and influence in transition." Policy research working paper series 2444, The World Bank.
- Hibbs, Douglas, and Violeta Piculescu. 2005, August. "Institutions, Corruption and Tax Evasion in the Unofficial Economy." Public economics 0508003, EconWPA.
- Hindriks, Jean, Michael Keen, and Abhinay Muthoo. 1999. "Corruption, Extortion and Evasion." *Journal of Public Economics* 74 (3): 395–430 (December).
- Johnson, Simon, Daniel Kaufmann, John McMillan, and Christopher Woodruff. 2000. "Why do firms hide? Bribes and unofficial activity after communism." *Journal of Public Economics* 76 (3): 495–520 (June).
- Johnson, Simon, Daniel Kaufmann, and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton. 1998. "Regulatory Discretion and the Unofficial Economy." *American Economic Review* 88 (2): 387–92 (May).
- . 1999, August. "Corruption, public finances, and the unofficial economy." Policy research working paper series 2169, The World Bank.
- Loayza, Norman V. 1996. "The economics of the informal sector: a simple model and some empirical evidence from Latin America." *Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy* 45 (December): 129–162.
- Reinikka, Ritva, and Jakob Svensson. 2003, June. "Survey techniques to measure and explain corruption." Policy research working paper series 3071, The World Bank.
- Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1978. *Corruption: A Study in Political Economy*. New York: Academic Press.
- . 2004. "The Challenge of Poor Governance and Corruption." *Copenhagen Consensus Challenge Paper*.
- Sanyal, Amal, Ira N Gang, and Omkar Goswami. 2000. "Corruption, Tax Evasion and the Laffer Curve." *Public Choice* 105 (1-2): 61–78 (October).
- Staiger, Douglas, and James H. Stock. 1997. "Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments." *Econometrica* 65 (3): 557–586 (May).
- Svensson, Jakob. 2003. "Who Must Pay Bribes And How Much? Evidence From A Cross Section Of Firms." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 118 (1): 207–230 (February).



- Tanzi, Vito. 1998. "Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures." *IMF Staff Papers* 45 (4): 1.
- Vostroknutova, Ekaterina. 2003, March. "Shadow Economy, Rent-Seeking Activities and the Perils of Reinforcement of the Rule of Law." William Davidson Institute working papers series 2003-578, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School.

# Appendix

Table 9: Descriptive Statistics

<b>Label</b>	<b>Variable</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Obs</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std Err</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
<i>Capture</i>	State Capture	Do firms like yours have to give public officials unofficial payments to influence the content of a law or regulation? 1: never; 2: seldom; 3: sometimes; 4: often; 5: mostly; 6: always	341	1.81	1.27	1	6
<i>Admcorr</i>	Administrative Corruption	Do firms like yours usually have to give public officials unofficial payments to be able to work? 1: never; 2: seldom; 3: sometimes; 4: often; 5: mostly; 6: always	371	2.27	1.54	1	6
<i>Evasion</i>	Tax Evasion	In your opinion, what percentage of their sales do firms in your sector do not declare to the authorities? _%	433	11.75	19.79	0	87.5
<i>Corrstart</i>	Corruption: Starting an Activity	Do firms like yours have to give public officials unofficial payments to start their activity? 1: never; 2: sometimes; 3: often; 4: always	316	1.99	0.99	1	4
<i>Corrproc</i>	Corruption: Accelerating administrative procedures	Do firms like yours have to give public officials unofficial payments to accelerate administrative procedures? 1: never; 2: sometimes; 3: often; 4: always	359	2.50	1.16	1	4
<i>Compet</i>	Competition: Variation of Market share	During the last two years, has your market share increased or stayed stable: 1; decreased: 0	522	0.77	0.42	0	1
<i>PropRights</i>	Property Rights	Three years ago, did you trust courts to enforce your contract and property rights in case of commercial conflict? 0: no, not at all or no, not really; 1: yes, rather or yes, definitely	532	0.67	0.47	0	1
<i>Recourse</i>	Bureaucratic Recourse	Do you agree with what follows: "If a public official acts against the rules I can usually go to another official or to his superior and get the correct treatment without recourse to unofficial payments."	552	0.91	0.30	0	1
<i>Tax</i>	Corporate Taxes	What is the level of corporate taxes (as a percentage of your sales)?	311	28.64	20.87	0	100
<i>Regul</i>	Respect of Regulation	Do you manage to respect fiscal regulations? 0: partially; 1: totally	552	0.91	0.30	0	1

<b>Label</b>	<b>Variable</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Obs</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std Err</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
<i>Capital</i>	Capital	What is the amount of capital of your firm? (in billion Algerian Dinars)	450	2.69	21.75	$5.10^{-5}$	362.14
<i>CEO</i>	Status: CEO	What is your position in the firm? 1: CEO; 0: other	575	0.28	0.45	0	1
<i>Nbemp</i>	Size of the firm	How many employees do you have in your firm? --	549	120.22	224.59	10	2326
<i>Year</i>	Year of Foundation	When was your firm set up? -- %	567	1985.62	14.58	1848	2004
<i>PubCap</i>	Partly Public Firm	What is the public share in your firms capital? -- %	528	14.74	35.06	0	100
<i>ForCap</i>	Foreign Capital	What is the foreign share in your firms capital? -- %	528	9.07	26.25	0	100
<i>Tunisia</i>	Country: Tunisia	Where is your firm located? 1: Tunisia; 0: other	581	0.34	0.48	0	1
<i>Morocco</i>	Country: Morocco	Where is your firm located? 1:Morocco; 0: other	581	0.30	0.46	0	1
<i>InsurFin</i>	Sector: Insurance	In what sector is your main activity? Insurance and financial services	569	0.03	0.18	0	1
<i>Hotel</i>	Sector: Hotel	In what sector is your main activity? Hotels and restaurants	569	0.06	0.24	0	1
<i>Transp</i>	Sector: Transport	In what sector is your main activity? Transport	569	0.04	0.20	0	1
<i>Trade</i>	Sector: Trade	In what sector is your main activity? Trade	569	0.17	0.37	0	1
<i>BuildInd</i>	Sector: Building	In what sector is your main activity? Building materials, glass	569	0.06	0.24	0	1
<i>FoodInd</i>	Sector: Food-Process.	In what sector is your main activity? Food-Processing industries	569	0.12	0.32	0	1
<i>ChemicInd</i>	Sector: Chemical	In what sector is your main activity? Chemical industries	569	0.07	0.25	0	1
<i>TextilInd</i>	Sector: Textile	In what sector is your main activity? Textile, leather, clothing, shoe	569	0.17	0.37	0	1
<i>ElecInd</i>	Sector: Electrical	In what sector is your main activity? Electrical, electronics, electrical goods, mechanical engineering, metallurgical industry	569	0.09	0.29	0	1
<i>LaborReg</i>	Respect of Labor Regulation	Do you manage to respect labor regulations? 0: partially; 1: totally	557	0.80	0.40	0	1
<i>Household</i>	Household Size	How many people depend on you financially?	558	2.80	1.34	0	8.33

Table 10: Restriction of the Specification: State Capture

Model	1.unrest	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.10	1.11	1.12	1.rest
Explanatory Variables	Dependent Variable: <b>State Capture</b>												
<i>Evasion</i> .10 <sup>-1</sup>	0.35 (0.23)	0.35 (0.22)	0.34 (0.22)	0.34 (0.22)	-0.08 (0.14)	-0.07 (0.13)							
<i>Evasion</i> <sup>2</sup> .10 <sup>-3</sup>	-0.44 (0.35)	-0.43 (0.34)	-0.42 (0.34)	-0.43 (0.34)	0.14 (0.21)	0.14 (0.20)	0.05 (0.09)						
<i>Compet</i>	-0.78 <sup>a</sup> (0.23)	-0.79 <sup>a</sup> (0.23)	-0.78 <sup>a</sup> (0.22)	-0.78 <sup>a</sup> (0.22)	-0.69 <sup>a</sup> (0.19)	-0.69 <sup>a</sup> (0.19)	-0.68 <sup>a</sup> (0.19)	-0.76 <sup>a</sup> (0.18)	-0.59 <sup>a</sup> (0.18)	-0.64 <sup>a</sup> (0.18)	-0.68 <sup>a</sup> (0.18)	-0.66 <sup>a</sup> (0.20)	-0.69 <sup>a</sup> (0.18)
<i>PropRights</i>	-0.41 (0.28)	-0.41 (0.27)	-0.43 (0.27)	-0.44 (0.28)	-0.37 <sup>c</sup> (0.21)	-0.39 <sup>c</sup> (0.21)	-0.38 <sup>c</sup> (0.21)	-0.44 <sup>b</sup> (0.20)	-0.37 <sup>b</sup> (0.19)	-0.38 <sup>b</sup> (0.18)	-0.38 <sup>b</sup> (0.18)	-0.28 (0.18)	-0.36 <sup>b</sup> (0.18)
<i>Recourse</i>	0.23 (0.45)	0.23 (0.46)	0.23 (0.46)	0.23 (0.46)	-0.15 (0.27)	-0.17 (0.27)	-0.14 (0.26)	-0.13 (0.23)					
<i>Tax</i> .10 <sup>-2</sup>	0.44 (0.90)	0.44 (0.92)	0.38 (0.88)	0.39 (0.88)									
<i>Regul</i>	0.11 (1.15)												
<i>Capital</i> .10 <sup>-9</sup>	-0.75 <sup>b</sup> (0.35)	-0.75 <sup>b</sup> (0.36)	-0.77 <sup>b</sup> (0.36)	-0.72 <sup>c</sup> (0.38)	-0.44 <sup>c</sup> (0.24)	-0.45 <sup>c</sup> (0.24)	-0.43 <sup>c</sup> (0.22)	-0.48 <sup>a</sup> (0.18)	-0.40 <sup>b</sup> (0.16)	-0.26 <sup>b</sup> (0.11)	-0.29 <sup>b</sup> (0.13)	-0.30 <sup>b</sup> (0.12)	-0.30 <sup>b</sup> (0.14)
<i>CEO</i>	0.32 (0.25)	0.32 (0.26)	0.32 (0.26)	0.32 (0.25)	0.41 <sup>b</sup> (0.20)	0.40 <sup>b</sup> (0.20)	0.40 <sup>b</sup> (0.20)	0.40 <sup>b</sup> (0.19)	0.39 <sup>b</sup> (0.18)	0.36 <sup>b</sup> (0.17)	0.39 <sup>b</sup> (0.17)	0.49 <sup>a</sup> (0.18)	0.44 <sup>b</sup> (0.17)
<i>Nbemp</i> .10 <sup>-2</sup>	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.13 <sup>b</sup> (0.05)	-0.11 <sup>b</sup> (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)			
<i>Age</i> .10 <sup>-1</sup>	-0.03 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.09)										
<i>PubCap</i> .10 <sup>-1</sup>	0.19 <sup>c</sup> (0.10)	0.19 <sup>b</sup> (0.09)	0.19 <sup>b</sup> (0.09)	0.19 <sup>b</sup> (0.09)	0.07 (0.04)	0.08 <sup>c</sup> (0.04)	0.08 <sup>c</sup> (0.04)	0.09 <sup>b</sup> (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)				
<i>ForCap</i> .10 <sup>-2</sup>	0.12 (0.48)	0.14 (0.48)											
<i>Tunisia</i>	0.36 (0.67)	0.37 (0.61)	0.39 (0.62)	0.40 (0.62)	-0.43 (0.33)	-0.36 (0.27)	-0.37 (0.27)	-0.41 <sup>c</sup> (0.25)	-0.34 (0.21)	-0.39 <sup>c</sup> (0.20)	-0.36 <sup>c</sup> (0.20)	-0.36 <sup>c</sup> (0.20)	-0.34 <sup>c</sup> (0.20)
<i>Morocco</i>	0.67 (0.64)	0.66 (0.62)	0.68 (0.61)	0.69 (0.62)	-0.14 (0.30)								
<i>InsurFin</i> .10 <sup>1</sup>												-0.73 <sup>a</sup> (0.03)	-0.76 <sup>a</sup> (0.02)
<i>Hotel</i> .10 <sup>1</sup>												0.03 (0.05)	
<i>Transport</i>												-0.51 (0.61)	
<i>BuildInd</i>												0.30 (0.46)	
<i>Trade</i>												0.31 (0.28)	
<i>FoodInd</i>												0.70 <sup>b</sup> (0.34)	
<i>ChemicInd</i>												0.57 (0.35)	
<i>TextilInd</i>												0.40 (0.26)	
<i>ElecInd</i>												0.41 (0.34)	
Observations	110	111	111	111	167	167	167	187	204	214	222	217	217
Log-Likelihood	-112.4	-112.8	-112.8	-112.9	-190.1	-190.2	-190.4	-206.0	-225.3	-236.8	-246.7	-235.0	-239.2

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: <sup>a</sup> denotes significance at the 1% level, <sup>b</sup> at the 5% level and <sup>c</sup> at 10%. Residuals heteroscedasticity is corrected with White's method.

Figure 2: Distributional Plots of *Administrative Corruption* and *State Capture*







Figure 3: Distributional Plots of Three Main Factors of Corruption

**Informal Activity, as a Percentage of Total Activity**



**Competitiveness: Variation of Market Share**



**Enforcement of Property Rights**




Table 11: Restriction of the Specification: Administrative Corruption

Model	2.unrest	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.8	2.9	2.10	2.11	2.rest
Explanatory Variables	Dependent Variable: <b>Administrative Corruption</b>											
<i>Evasion</i> .10 <sup>-1</sup>	0.47 <sup>b</sup> (0.18)	0.47 <sup>b</sup> (0.18)	0.47 <sup>a</sup> (0.18)	0.48 <sup>a</sup> (0.17)	0.47 <sup>a</sup> (0.18)	0.52 <sup>a</sup> (0.17)	0.43 <sup>a</sup> (0.10)	0.43 <sup>a</sup> (0.09)	0.44 <sup>a</sup> (0.09)	0.45 <sup>a</sup> (0.09)	0.37 <sup>a</sup> (0.09)	0.38 <sup>a</sup> (0.09)
<i>Evasion</i> <sup>2</sup> .10 <sup>-3</sup>	-0.39 (0.26)	-0.40 (0.25)	-0.40 (0.25)	-0.41 <sup>c</sup> (0.25)	-0.40 (0.25)	-0.46 <sup>c</sup> (0.25)	-0.36 <sup>a</sup> (0.12)	-0.40 <sup>a</sup> (0.12)	-0.40 <sup>a</sup> (0.13)	-0.43 <sup>a</sup> (0.13)	-0.32 <sup>b</sup> (0.13)	-0.33 <sup>b</sup> (0.13)
<i>Compet</i>	-0.46 <sup>c</sup> (0.26)	-0.46 <sup>c</sup> (0.26)	-0.47 <sup>c</sup> (0.25)	-0.47 <sup>c</sup> (0.25)	-0.47 <sup>c</sup> (0.25)	-0.39 (0.25)	-0.53 <sup>a</sup> (0.21)	-0.57 <sup>a</sup> (0.19)	-0.59 <sup>a</sup> (0.19)	-0.57 <sup>a</sup> (0.19)	-0.55 <sup>a</sup> (0.21)	-0.53 <sup>a</sup> (0.19)
<i>PropRights</i>	-0.16 (0.26)	-0.16 (0.26)	-0.17 (0.25)	-0.15 (0.25)	-0.14 (0.25)							
<i>Recourse</i>	0.31 (0.41)	0.31 (0.41)	0.30 (0.41)	0.30 (0.41)	0.35 (0.33)	0.49 (0.31)	0.07 (0.21)					
<i>Tax</i> .10 <sup>-2</sup>	0.54 (0.76)	0.54 (0.74)	0.54 (0.75)	0.62 (0.70)	0.63 (0.70)	0.37 (0.67)						
<i>Regul</i>	-0.03 (0.48)	-0.02 (0.46)										
<i>Capital</i> .10 <sup>-9</sup>	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.09 <sup>a</sup> (0.03)	-0.08 <sup>a</sup> (0.02)	-0.07 <sup>a</sup> (0.02)	-0.07 <sup>a</sup> (0.02)	-0.07 <sup>a</sup> (0.02)	-0.07 <sup>a</sup> (0.02)
<i>CEO</i>	0.22 (0.27)	0.22 (0.25)	0.24 (0.25)	0.25 (0.24)	0.25 (0.24)	0.33 (0.24)	0.31 <sup>c</sup> (0.18)	0.29 <sup>c</sup> (0.17)	0.26 (0.17)	0.29 <sup>c</sup> (0.16)	0.25 (0.17)	
<i>Nbemp</i> .10 <sup>-2</sup>	-0.19 <sup>b</sup> (0.08)	-0.19 <sup>b</sup> (0.08)	-0.19 <sup>b</sup> (0.08)	-0.20 <sup>b</sup> (0.08)	-0.19 <sup>b</sup> (0.08)	-0.21 <sup>a</sup> (0.08)	-0.19 <sup>a</sup> (0.06)	-0.17 <sup>a</sup> (0.06)	-0.14 <sup>a</sup> (0.05)	-0.15 <sup>a</sup> (0.05)	-0.16 <sup>a</sup> (0.06)	-0.16 <sup>a</sup> (0.06)
<i>Age</i> .10 <sup>-1</sup>	0.13 (0.09)	0.13 (0.09)	0.12 (0.09)	0.12 (0.09)	0.12 (0.09)	0.12 (0.08)	0.08 (0.06)	0.10 <sup>c</sup> (0.06)	0.09 (0.05)			
<i>PubCap</i> .10 <sup>-1</sup>	0.12 <sup>b</sup> (0.05)	0.12 <sup>b</sup> (0.05)	0.12 <sup>b</sup> (0.05)	0.12 <sup>b</sup> (0.05)	0.11 <sup>b</sup> (0.05)	0.10 <sup>b</sup> (0.05)	0.06 <sup>c</sup> (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)				
<i>ForCap</i> .10 <sup>-2</sup>	-0.15 (0.42)	-0.15 (0.42)	-0.13 (0.42)									
<i>Tunisia</i>	0.02 (0.35)											
<i>Morocco</i>	0.13 (0.36)	0.11 (0.31)	0.10 (0.31)	0.12 (0.31)								
<i>InsurFin</i> .10 <sup>1</sup>											-0.78 <sup>a</sup> (0.02)	-0.80 <sup>a</sup> (0.02)
<i>Hotel</i> .10 <sup>1</sup>											-0.14 <sup>b</sup> (0.06)	-0.10 <sup>b</sup> (0.04)
<i>Transport</i>											-1.04 <sup>c</sup> (0.56)	-0.91 <sup>c</sup> (0.52)
<i>BuildInd</i>											0.42 (0.29)	0.59 <sup>b</sup> (0.26)
<i>Trade</i>											-0.16 (0.24)	
<i>FoodInd</i>											-0.30 (0.29)	
<i>ChemicInd</i>											0.05 (0.31)	
<i>TextilInd</i>											-0.24 (0.27)	
<i>ElecInd</i>											-0.11 (0.45)	
Observations	116	116	117	117	117	121	188	203	213	216	210	213
Log-Likelihood	-133.6	-133.6	-134.0	-134.0	-134.1	-141.1	-246.9	-266.6	-279.3	-283.7	-270.4	-277.5

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: <sup>a</sup> denotes significance at the 1% level, <sup>b</sup> at the 5% level and <sup>c</sup> at 10%. Residuals heteroscedasticity is corrected with White's method.

Table 12: How Relevant Are the Instruments

Model		2.rest.IV.1	
Explanatory Variables		$Evasion.10^{-1}$	$Evasion^2.10^{-3}$
<b>Excluded Instruments</b>	<i>Household</i>	0.35 <sup>a</sup> (0.12)	0.27 <sup>a</sup> (0.08)
	$Tax.10^{-2}$	-1.72 <sup>b</sup> (0.81)	-0.89 <sup>c</sup> (0.54)
	<i>LaborReg</i>	-0.76 <sup>c</sup> (0.43)	-0.19 (0.29)
	<i>Compet</i>	0.15 (0.35)	0.06 (0.24)
<b>Included Instruments</b>	$Capital.10^{-11}$	0.23 (0.51)	0.01 (0.35)
	$Nbemp.10^{-3}$	-0.08 (1.09)	-0.15 (0.74)
	<i>Hotel</i>	-0.78 (0.65)	-0.41 (0.44)
	<i>Transport</i>	-0.50 (0.90)	-0.10 (0.61)
	$R^2$	0.15	0.12
$F$ stat.	2.52 <sup>b</sup>	1.94 <sup>c</sup>	
Observations	127	127	

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: <sup>a</sup> denotes significance at the 1% level, <sup>b</sup> at the 5% level and <sup>c</sup> at 10%. Residuals heteroscedasticity is corrected with White's method.



Table 13: Instrumented Probit Estimation

	Model	2.rest.IV.1	2.rest.IV.2	2.rest.IV.3	2.rest.IV.4
	Explanatory Variables	<b>Administrative Corruption</b>			
<b>Main Variables</b>	<i>Evasion</i> .10 <sup>-1</sup>	1.20 <sup>c</sup> (0.72)	1.20 <sup>c</sup> (0.71)	1.45 <sup>b</sup> (0.68)	1.43 <sup>b</sup> (0.66)
	<i>Evasion</i> <sup>2</sup> .10 <sup>-3</sup>	-1.48 (1.16)	-1.48 (1.16)	-2.12 <sup>b</sup> (1.08)	-2.07 <sup>b</sup> (1.05)
	<i>Compet</i>	-0.43 (0.29)	-0.44 (0.29)	-0.50 <sup>c</sup> (0.27)	-0.54 <sup>b</sup> (0.27)
<b>Firms' Characteristics</b>	<i>Capital</i> .10 <sup>-9</sup>	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.07)		
	<i>Nbemp</i> .10 <sup>-2</sup>	-0.15 (0.10)	-0.15 (0.10)	-0.00 (0.07)	
<b>Sector</b>	<i>InsurFin</i> .10 <sup>1</sup>	dropped	dropped	dropped	dropped
	<i>Hotel</i> .10 <sup>1</sup>	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.11 <sup>c</sup> (0.07)	-0.11 <sup>c</sup> (0.06)
	<i>Transport</i>	-0.12 (0.79)			
	<i>BuildInd</i>	dropped	dropped	dropped	dropped
	Observations	127	127	158	160
	$\chi^2$ Wald	13.15 <sup>c</sup>	12.64 <sup>b</sup>	13.60 <sup>b</sup>	13.79 <sup>a</sup>
<b>Overidentification Test</b>	$\chi^2$ ALN	1.02	1.03	1.07	1.12
	P-value	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.29
<b>Instruments Relevance Test</b>	<i>F</i> stat. 1 <sup>e</sup> et. <i>Fraude</i>	2.52 <sup>a</sup>	2.85 <sup>a</sup>	5.41 <sup>a</sup>	6.59 <sup>a</sup>
	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup> 1 <sup>e</sup> et. <i>Fraude</i>	0.15	0.14	0.18	0.18
	<i>F</i> stat. 1 <sup>e</sup> et. <i>Fraude</i> <sup>2</sup>	1.94 <sup>a</sup>	2.23 <sup>a</sup>	4.39 <sup>a</sup>	5.23 <sup>a</sup>
	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup> 1 <sup>e</sup> et. <i>Fraude</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.12	0.12	0.15	0.15
<b>d'exognit</b>	$\chi^2$ Wald	0.38	0.41	2.13	1.97
	Prob > $\chi^2$	0.83	0.81	0.35	0.37

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: <sup>a</sup> denotes significance at the 1% level, <sup>b</sup> at the 5% level and <sup>c</sup> at 10%. Residuals heteroscedasticity is corrected with White's method.

Figure 4: Non Response Rates





Table 14: Validity of Hellman *et al.*'s Results: Pseudo-Panel Estimation

Dependent Variable	Administrative Corruption						State capture					
	Hellman <i>et al.</i>	Fixed Effects	Random Effects	Fixed Effects	Random Effects	Random Effects	Hellman <i>et al.</i>	Fixed Effects	Random Effects	Fixed Effects	Random Effects	Random Effects
<i>Origin: DeNovo</i>	0.009 <sup>b</sup> (2.43)	-0.47 (-0.37)	1.80 <sup>a</sup> (2.63)	0.16 (0.15)	0.40 (0.67)	0.40 (0.67)	0.399 <sup>b</sup> (3.43)	-0.03 (-0.61)	0.01 (0.30)	-0.03 (-0.59)	0.01 (0.34)	0.01 (0.34)
<i>Privatized</i>	0.005 (1.44)	0.29 (0.27)	1.91 <sup>b</sup> (2.40)	0.71 (0.77)	1.44 <sup>b</sup> (2.12)	1.44 <sup>b</sup> (2.12)	0.173 (1.58)	0.03 (0.57)	0.01 (0.16)	0.03 (0.56)	0.01 (0.18)	0.01 (0.18)
<i>Nbemp: Small</i>	0.014 <sup>b</sup> (3.26)	-5.63 <sup>a</sup> (-4.54)	-2.00 <sup>b</sup> (-2.34)	1.66 (1.42)	1.72 <sup>b</sup> (2.23)	1.72 <sup>b</sup> (2.23)	-0.382 <sup>b</sup> (-2.89)	0.09 (1.55)	0.04 (1.11)	0.11 (1.63)	0.04 (0.94)	0.04 (0.94)
<i>Medium</i>	0.003 (0.77)	-1.29 (-0.96)	1.56 (1.61)	0.79 (0.69)	1.54 <sup>c</sup> (1.86)	1.54 <sup>c</sup> (1.86)	-0.283 <sup>b</sup> (-2.41)	0.09 (1.45)	0.04 (0.93)	0.09 (1.48)	0.04 (0.92)	0.04 (0.92)
<i>PropRights</i>	0.006 <sup>b</sup> (6.76)	0.42 (1.37)	0.60 <sup>a</sup> (3.57)	0.35 (1.38)	0.50 <sup>a</sup> (3.45)	0.50 <sup>a</sup> (3.45)	0.082 <sup>b</sup> (3.08)	0.00 (0.19)	0.01 (1.36)	0.00 (0.17)	0.01 (1.37)	0.01 (1.37)
<i>Compet</i>	0.000 (0.16)	-1.97 <sup>a</sup> (-5.65)	-1.70 <sup>a</sup> (-6.58)	-0.36 (-1.16)	-0.41 <sup>c</sup> (-1.75)	-0.41 <sup>c</sup> (-1.75)	0.015 (0.46)	0.02 (1.58)	0.01 (0.73)	0.03 (1.61)	0.01 (0.55)	0.01 (0.55)
<i>Recourse</i>	-0.006 <sup>b</sup> (-8.43)	-0.25 (-0.95)	-0.29 (-1.61)	-0.39 <sup>c</sup> (-1.82)	-0.51 <sup>a</sup> (-3.31)	-0.51 <sup>a</sup> (-3.31)	-0.117 <sup>b</sup> (-5.20)	-0.03 <sup>b</sup> (-2.33)	-0.02 <sup>b</sup> (-2.22)	-0.03 <sup>b</sup> (-2.36)	-0.02 <sup>b</sup> (-2.17)	-0.02 <sup>b</sup> (-2.17)
2002				-3.04 <sup>a</sup> (-11.10)	-2.90 <sup>a</sup> (-12.14)	-2.90 <sup>a</sup> (-12.14)				-0.01 (-0.53)	0.00 (0.26)	0.00 (0.26)
2005				-3.55 <sup>a</sup> (-12.64)	-3.43 <sup>a</sup> (-14.37)	-3.43 <sup>a</sup> (-14.37)				-0.01 (-0.52)	0.00 (0.33)	0.00 (0.33)
Observations	1902	547	547	547	547	547	2030	547	547	547	547	547
R <sup>2</sup>	0.19	0.22	0.17	0.38	0.39	0.39	0.06*	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03
Hausman Test		0.00	0.00	0.54	0.54	0.54		0.20	0.20	0.25	0.25	0.25

Notes: t-statistic in parentheses; <sup>a</sup> denotes significance at the 1% level, <sup>b</sup> at the 5% level and <sup>c</sup> at 10%. For each dependent variable, the first column reports (Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann 2000)'s results, the second column reports pseudo-panel estimates with fixed effects, and the third column reports pseudo-panel estimates with random effects. \*: Since I estimate an ordered probit model, this value corresponds to the pseudo R<sup>2</sup>.

Table 15: Validity of *Hellman et al.*'s Results: Extensions

Dependent Variable	Administrative Corruption				State Capture			
	Fixed Effects	Random Effects	Fixed Effects	Random Effects	Fixed Effects	Random Effects	Fixed Effects	Random Effects
<i>Origin: DeNovo</i>	-0.29 (-0.26)	1.27 <sup>b</sup> (2.04)	0.12 (0.11)	0.68 (1.17)	-0.03 (-0.59)	0.01 (0.23)	-0.04 (-0.65)	0.01 (0.36)
<i>Privatized</i>	0.70 (0.72)	1.64 <sup>b</sup> (2.31)	0.79 (0.88)	1.50 <sup>b</sup> (2.29)	0.03 (0.63)	0.00 (0.12)	0.03 (0.55)	0.00 (0.07)
<i>Nbemp: Small</i>	-2.95 <sup>b</sup> (-2.56)	-2.05 <sup>a</sup> (-2.60)	0.86 (0.74)	0.48 (0.62)	0.10 <sup>c</sup> (1.70)	0.04 (0.93)	0.10 (1.45)	0.01 (0.23)
<i>Medium</i>	-1.03 (-0.87)	0.56 (0.65)	0.28 (0.25)	1.05 (1.30)	0.09 (1.48)	0.03 (0.75)	0.08 (1.34)	0.02 (0.53)
<i>PropRights</i>	0.50 <sup>c</sup> (1.86)	0.34 <sup>b</sup> (2.22)	0.36 (1.44)	0.41 <sup>a</sup> (2.91)	0.00 (0.22)	0.01 (1.02)	0.00 (0.20)	0.01 (0.86)
<i>Compet</i>	-0.97 <sup>a</sup> (-2.95)	-0.84 <sup>a</sup> (-3.39)	-0.43 (-1.38)	-0.38 (-1.63)	0.03 <sup>c</sup> (1.77)	0.02 (1.30)	0.03 (1.64)	0.01 (0.87)
<i>Recourse</i>	-0.14 (-0.63)	-0.04 (-0.24)	-0.33 (-1.54)	-0.40 <sup>a</sup> (-2.59)	-0.03 <sup>b</sup> (-2.26)	-0.02 <sup>c</sup> (-1.89)	-0.03 <sup>b</sup> (-2.22)	-0.01 (-1.42)
<i>Tax</i>	1.16 <sup>a</sup> (4.95)	0.71 <sup>a</sup> (4.00)	0.04 (0.14)	-0.11 (-0.59)	0.00 (0.34)	0.00 (0.18)	0.01 (0.42)	0.01 (1.03)
<i>Evasion</i>	0.09 <sup>a</sup> (7.34)	0.10 <sup>a</sup> (9.62)	0.05 <sup>a</sup> (3.83)	0.06 <sup>a</sup> (6.39)	0.00 (1.04)	0.00 <sup>a</sup> (2.59)	0.00 (1.11)	0.00 <sup>a</sup> (3.19)
2002			-2.64 <sup>a</sup> (-7.81)	-2.53 <sup>a</sup> (-9.52)			0.00 (0.12)	0.02 (1.50)
2005			-2.84 <sup>a</sup> (-7.40)	-2.71 <sup>a</sup> (-9.40)			0.01 (0.35)	0.03 <sup>b</sup> (2.09)
Observations	547	547	547	547	547	547	547	547
$R^2$	0.40	0.39	0.50	0.50	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05
Hausman Test	0.00		0.57		0.06		0.26	


Notes: t-statistic in parentheses: <sup>a</sup> denotes significance at the 1% level, <sup>b</sup> at the 5% level and <sup>c</sup> at 10%.

# southern africa labour and development research unit

---

The Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) conducts research directed at improving the well-being of South Africa's poor. It was established in 1975. Over the next two decades the unit's research played a central role in documenting the human costs of apartheid. Key projects from this period included the Farm Labour Conference (1976), the Economics of Health Care Conference (1978), and the Second Carnegie Enquiry into Poverty and Development in South Africa (1983-86). At the urging of the African National Congress, from 1992-1994 SALDRU and the World Bank coordinated the Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development (PSLSD). This project provide baseline data for the implementation of post-apartheid socio-economic policies through South Africa's first non-racial national sample survey.

In the post-apartheid period, SALDRU has continued to gather data and conduct research directed at informing and assessing anti-poverty policy. In line with its historical contribution, SALDRU's researchers continue to conduct research detailing changing patterns of well-being in South Africa and assessing the impact of government policy on the poor. Current research work falls into the following research themes: post-apartheid poverty; employment and migration dynamics; family support structures in an era of rapid social change; public works and public infrastructure programmes, financial strategies of the poor; common property resources and the poor. Key survey projects include the Langeberg Integrated Family Survey (1999), the Khayelitsha/Mitchell's Plain Survey (2000), the ongoing Cape Area Panel Study (2001-) and the Financial Diaries Project.



[www.saldru.uct.ac.za](http://www.saldru.uct.ac.za)

Level 3, School of Economics Building, Middle Campus, University of Cape Town  
Private Bag, Rondebosch 7701, Cape Town, South Africa

Tel: +27 (0)21 650 5696

Fax: +27 (0) 21 650 5797

Web: [www.saldru.uct.ac.za](http://www.saldru.uct.ac.za)

