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The demand side of clientelism: The role of client's perceptions and values*

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Abstract

Political science literature on clientelism has tended to focus primarily on the role of parties and brokers, leaving the demand side of clientelism - the choices of potential clients - relatively unexplored. This paper proposes a formal framework sheeding light on the demand side of clientelism. We conceptualize clientelistic choice as one between engaging in clientelism, on the one hand, and supporting a redistributive platform, on the other. This approach allows us to draw insights from the social psychology literature on mobilization and the economics literature on redistribution preferences. Our framework nests the standard model of clientelistic choice, with factors such as poverty and ideological stance, but also includes other factors such as perceptions of political efficacy and values regarding the legitimacy of existing inequalities. We start with a simple static model that allows us to study the role of these factors in a simple, unified way. Our framework is well suited to address issues relatively unexplored in the literature, including the role of clients in the persistence of clientelism and the reasons clientelism persists or is eliminated. Most importantly, we address how clientelism gets transformed from a "traditional" type of clientelism, embedded in legitimized social relations, to a "modern" type, such as vote buying. To address these issues, we study a dynamic extension of the model where efficacy and legitimacy perceptions are endogenized and the degree of informational connectivity in the community is incorporated. In our model, efficacy and legitimation perceptions reinforce each other because efficacy perceptions lead people to expect high and sustained inequality which is then legitimized in order to protect self-esteem. This generates multiple steady states, one of which resembles a "traditional" form of clientelism that features widespread clientelism and disempowered clients that legitimize social inequalities. Informational connectivity breaks this reinforcement mechanism and thus leads to a unique steady state where clientelism and programmatic redistribution co-exist, and that resembles a "modern" type of clientelism.

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1 Introduction

Political clientelism - a vertical relation where a client gives up political voice in exchange for personalized material benefits from a patron - has generated strong interest in the academic and policy world. This interest originates, on the one hand, from clientelisms' persistence and pervasiveness, and on the other from its harmful implications for political accountability, provision of public goods, and the persistence of inequality.[1] Against this background, it is not surprising that a large literature in political science has emerged to shed light on the causes and mechanics of clientelism, with several recent monographs and edited volumes on the topic (see Stokes et al. (2013), Abente Brun (2014), Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) and Weitz-Shapiro (2014)).

What is surprising, however, is that the client's agency is by and large absent from this literature, which focuses instead either on the supply side of clientelism (i.e. the party or patron strategies) or on the mechanics of the exchange (the role of monitoring vs. reciprocity to sustain the exchange, the role of brokers, etc.). Although these are certainly important topics they are insufficient to fully understand the phenomenon and its persistence. It obviously takes two sides to sustain a clientelistic relationship a patron and a client, and without clients willing to give up their political voice in exchange for particularistic goods, clientelism could hardly persist.

Clients are obviously not entirely absent from current political science research: When studying topics such as the types of goods that parties tend to provide, or the role of brokers in clientelisic exchanges, the behavior of clients is, implicitly or explicitly, accounted for. Our point is rather that voters rarely are the main focus of attention, and are mostly relegated to a subsidiary role. A stark example of the neglect of clients agency in the political science literature is work investigating why not all voters are engaged in clientelistic relations. In this work, the problem is framed as one of party targeting, rather than of voter demand: The puzzle to explain becomes why some voters are targeted by parties rather than the alternatives available to potential clients and the factors weighting in their decision. Debates have thus centered on voters characteristics particularly relevant for partys calculations, such as whether voters are core vs. swing voters (GansMorse et al. (2013), Nichter (2008), Stokes (2005)), or whether they display intrinsic reciprocity (Finan and Schechter, 2012). These characteristics, however, give us little insight into the reasons why individuals engage in clientelism.

Recent ethnographic work, in contrast, makes clear that it is not just that the clients happen to be the lucky ones that were targeted by the patron or broker; the choice of the potential client is important as well. Auyero's (1999) work on patron client relations in Argentina suggests that it is often prospective clients approaching the brokers for help - not vice-versa. The following quote from Lapegna 2011 is also explicit when it comes to the agency of poor people in their clientelism choice: "*I get angry when they say that it's just the politicians' blame; if we go and vote for them, if the people get their bag of mercaderia and go and vote, even though they know that after the elections they're not going to give them anything [...] Its not the politicians' blame, it's ours too for voting for them*".

This paper proposes a framework for shedding light on the demand side of clientelism. We develop a formal model that incorporates factors from diverse strands of literature, most notably from ethnographic evidence on clientelism and from social psychology lit-

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[1]For political accountability, see Kitschelt (2000) and Stokes (2007a); for the inefficient allocation of public resources, see Keefer and Khemani (2005) and Robinson and Verdier (2013); for inequality persistence, see De Ferranti (2004), Pellicer (2009) and Pellicer et al. (2011).

erature. A crucial element of our model is that perceptions and values of clients are not given, but respond to the environment, thus generating different forms of clientelism. In this way, the model is able to provide new insights into the evolution and persistence of clientelism.

The standard approach on demand for clientelism conceptualizes the client's choice simply as a trade off between short-term and secure material gain from the clientelistic party against the potential expressive benefits from voting for the party closest ideologically.[2] This has led the literature to emphasize the role of poverty as *the* key determinant of demand for clientelism. The role of poverty comes from decreasing marginal utility of income, which makes poorer individuals value the material benefits more and hence they are more willing to give up policy preferences than middle classes. We believe this approach to the demand for clientlism is insufficient for two reasons. First, although poverty certainly plays an important role, it can hardly be the only factor relevant for engaging in clientelism from the client point of view. Even in slums where poverty is pervasive, only some individuals are shown to engage in clientelism. Auyero (2000), for instance, shows that even the slum's most powerful broker could only command about a hundred clients - whereas the slum had a voting population of around 7000 (p.74). Second, even when it comes to the role of poverty, the standard framework can be misleading, for it disregards that the poor stand to gain most from redistribution. In a world where most policy promises are about redistribution, the puzzle to explain should thus be why the poor choose the material benefits of clientelism rather than those of policy redistribution?

We conceptualize the potential client's choice as between engaging in a clientelistic relation (and receiving material transfers) or engaging in horizontal mobilization (i.e. supporting a redistributve platform). This conceptualization emerges naturally from the definition of clientelism: If clientelism is a vertical relation where the poor give up their political voice it seems natural to consider that the political voice suppressed would challenge existing hierarchical structures. Moreover, it is useful for thinking about clientelism in a policy relevant way, as it can give insights on factors that push potential clients into and away from clientelism relative to an option that gives the poor political voice and equality. Our framework nests the standard approach to clientelism demand introducing a utility cost of engaging in clientelism relative to supporting the redistributive platform. This cost captures the ideological cost of giving up programmatic support, as in the standard framework.[3] It is important to point out that we are able to achieve a relatively general framework for the demand side of clientelism while keeping simplicity by ignoring the supply side.

Our conceptualization of clientelism choice (opposing it to redistributive mobilization) allows us to consider a whole new range of factors potentially relevant for clientelism in addition to those from the existing literature. This is accomplished partly via two strands of literature in which redistributive mobilization is important: First, the strand of social psychology literature that studies reasons why individuals from disadvantage groups engage in mobilization to redress their disadvantage; and, second, the economics literature on preferences for redistribution, which studies reasons why individuals demand more or less redistribution from the state. From these strands of literature, we incorporate factors such as the perceptions of the *efficacy* of horizontal mobilization, and perceptions of *legit-*

[2]See, among others, Calvo and Murillo (2012) Corstange (2010) Nichter (2014) Stokes et al. (2013) Stokes (2007a) Stokes (2007b) Stokes (2005) GansMorse et al. (2013).

[3]In a recent article, Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. (2014) provide an alternative implicit framework that emphasizes the potential moral condemnation of clientelism's harmful society-wide implications. Our framework also nests this approach by considering the utility cost of enagaging in clientelism as a moral cost.

imacy of social inequality. Efficacy perceptions are modeled as the perceived probability that the redistributive platform will succeed. (Il)legitimacy perceptions are modeled as the degree of aversion to inequality in the society. We also consider more standard factors from the clientelism literature, such as poverty and patron factual bargaining power, which we model as the cost that the patron can inflict on the client if she reneges on the clientelistic relation (Shami, 2012).

We first formulate a simple static model that incorporates these factors and study their effect on demand for clientelism. The most notable result is on poverty. Our framework shows that the standard argument is useful at relatively high levels of income, where redistribution is irrelevant. For lower levels of income, money is so valuable that ideological or moral considerations are irrelevant. What is required for the poorest to be more vulnerable to clientelism than lower middle classes is something in addition to utility costs and decreasing marginal utility: redistribution needs to be perceived as future and/or uncertain relative to clientelistic benefits, and marginal utility needs to decrease at an increasing rate. Then, the extreme poor will be in so much need that they will be willing to give up future redistribution in exchange for even small immediate income. These are more stringent conditions than in the standard model but, we believe, still realistic. This result has practical implications: it implies that campaigns to reduce clientelism that emphasize moral or ideological considerations in lower middle class communities might be in-effective, while campaigns emphasizing redistribution might succeed.

Our simple static model can contribute to an emerging debate on the normative implications of clientelism. While the dominant view portrays clientelism as negative, some scholars have pointed out that clientelism may have positive aspects in certain contexts. These debates point at the relative bargaining power of patron and clients as key to evaluate the welfare consequences of clientelism for poorer individuals (see Shami (2012) and Hilgers (2012). We address client empowerment by considering it the other side of the coin of the demand price of clientelism: Clients drawn to clientelism for little or not compensation can be considered highly disempowered and vice versa. In our framework, client bargaining power comes from the possibility to redistribute away from the patron. Perceptions and realities that make this redistribution larger, more likely and, generally, more valuable increase the bargaining power of the client. Thus, clients are disempowered, not only by patron's factual power, but also by factors such as corruption, which reduces realized redistribution, by legitimizing inequalities, which reduces the value of redistribution, or by perceptions of efficacy, which make redistribution less likely. Importantly, some of this factors are "real", in the sense that they can be easily anchored in reality, such as patron factual power, while others are purely psychological, such as inequality legitimization.

The emphasis of the political science literature on clientelism on the supply side of clientelism and the focus on poverty applies, not only to static analyses of clientelism, but also to dynamic questions about the persistence or decline of clientelism. From this perspective, the key question considered has been whether and when clientelism looses its cost-effectiveness as an electoral strategy from a party point of view.[4] In other words, clientelism persists if it pays off electorally and vice-versa. In these accounts, the costs and benefits from a party's point of view are again strongly influenced by the share of poor voters in the electorate. Stokes et al. (2013), for instance, emphasize large scale socio-economic transformations such as industrialization and economic growth that generated a wealthier electorate in their explanation of the demise of vote-buying in the U.S. and

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[4]See among others Vicente (2014), Weitz-Shapiro (2012), Stokes et al. (2013), and Fujiwara and Wantchekon (2013)

the U.K. Likewise, Weitz-Shapiro (2012) argues that the electoral cost of a clientelistic strategy is largely determined by the share of middle class constituents vs. poorer ones with the former seeing clientelism as working against their self-interest.

However, the agency of the poor is clearly important when considering questions of persistence and transformation of clientelism, and factors other than poverty are likely to matter. Thompson (1963), for instance, describes the transformations among the perceptions and choices of the poor in bringing about working class movements that challenged paternalistic (i.e. clientelistic) relations between the rich and the poor in XVIIIth century England. Shami (2012) shows the move towards horizontal collective action from poor people's perspective and the consequent decline in clientelistic relations in some Pakistani villages. These result, not from increases in income of the poor, but from improved road connectivity and the consequent loss of patron bargaining power in these communities. Pellicer (2009) illustrates different types of transitions from clientelistic (vertical) relations to redistributive mobilization (horizontal) in different historical settings, emphasizing in some cases the role of elites and in others the role of the poor. For instance, it is argued that the massive discredit and loss of bargaining power of German elites following the Napoleonic defeats contributed to the birth of a strong working class movement in that country.

Perhaps even more importantly, not all transitions away from these paternalistic (or "traditional") forms of clientelism result in programmatic politics, and understanding these transformations requires considering factors other than poverty. As important as the elimination of clientelism is the transformation in its nature away from "traditional" forms to "modern" forms. We believe that the nature of this transformation has not received sufficient attention in the literature. Hilgers (2012), for instance, refers to this transformation when stating: "The clientelism observed in developing democracies today is, thus, not the familiar beast observed in traditional societies and authoritarian regimes" (p. 4). Addressing this transformation, and more generally, the different nature of clientelism in different contexts, requires considering demand factors other than poverty. While "traditional" clientelism is a legitimized relation embedded in social relations, typically associated with high patron bargaining power (e.g. Shami (2012)), vote buying is rather an instrumental exchange of money/gifts for votes and is rather linked to disaffection and cynical attitudes towards the possibility of political change, as shown by its most extreme form: vote buying. Both forms of clientelism involve poor individuals, but with different attitudes and perceptions.

The transformation from traditional to modern forms of clientelism could be related to rural to urban migration, as accounts of "traditional" forms typically focus on rural settings while those of "modern" forms focus on urban ones. However, even in urban ones, ethnographic accounts show a variety of experiences of clientelism that echo the fundamental distinction between "traditional" and "modern" clientelism.Auyero (1999, 2000) on Buenos Aires and Hilger's work on Mexico ((2009)), for instance, argue that the clientelistic relationship is viewed by clients in friendship-style terms, emphasizing the intense ties between clients and brokers/ patrons that can take the form of a "fictive kinship" with the patron. In contrast, the work of Lazar (2004) on Bolivia, Becerra Mizuno (2013) on Mexico, and Gay (1998) on Brazil emphasize rather the instrumentalist view of the exchange, with clients portrayed as having a relatively cynical attitude towards clientelism and politics in general: individuals, and even communities in this work, are often shown seeking to diversify their patrons or offer themselves to the highest bidder.

Our model is well suited to provide insights on the persistence, elimination and transformation of clientelism, as it incorporates factors relevant for characterizing different

forms of clientelism: patron bargaining power, inequality legitimizing attitudes, and perceptions of political in-efficacy.

In the second part of the paper, we thus consider a dynamic extension of the model where efficacy and legitimacy perceptions are endogenized and where these perceptions interact dynamically with the level of clientelism. Most notably, legitimacy perceptions (i.e. the degree to which people legitimize existing inequality) are endogenized using insights from social psychology literature. In particular, we allow parents to purposefully transmit these values to their offspring in order to protect their self esteem. Following Major et al. , this is done assuming that beliefs that delegitimize inequality can protect one's self esteem in the short run but, if these beliefs are held chronically, in the long run they become harmful. Parents will thus try to protect their children by transmitting them inequality legitimizing beliefs if they think that high inequality is inevitable. Efficacy perceptions are defined in the model as the perceived probability that the horizontal platform will succeed. Thus they are naturally endogenized by considering them based on previous support for the redistributive platform.

We also introduce the notion of informational connectivity in the process by which perceptions of legitimacy and efficacy are generated. We link informational connectivity to the variety of information potential clients are exposed to. We assume that as poor individuals are exposed to more varied sources of information, it becomes more difficult for parents to manipulate their offspring values and so perceptions of legitimacy are easier to anchor in "reality". Moreover, we consider that more information exposure leads to a larger variety of accounts of efficacy, with more diversity of opinion regarding whether the political situation can be changed or not.

The key dynamic mechanism delivered by the model is the complementarity, or mutual reinforcement, of perceived efficacy and inequality legitimation. Low efficacy perceptions will induce parents to believe that inequality is there to stay, leading them to transmit legitimizing values to their children to protect their self esteem. High levels of legitimacy, in turn, will lead to higher tolerance of clientelism, leading to less perceived efficacy, more clientelism and thus even more inequality legitimation.

This mechanism generates multiple steady states. One steady states features widespread clientelism, low perceptions of efficacy and high degree of inequality legitimization. The other steady state features opposite characteristics. We show that the clientelistic steady state will obtain if the patron has high enough bargaining power. This steady state thus resembles a "traditional" type of clientelism, with high patron bargaining power and high levels of inequality legitimation by clients.

"Traditional" steady states have two relevant and sensible features in the model. First, clients in such situations will be particularly disempowered, not just by the patron factual power, but also by the disempowering perceptions and values that clients hold. The very need to protect self esteem against their harsh reality leads clients in traditional settings to cement their disempowerment. Second, and relatedly, "traditional" clientlelism will be very resilient, again because they will be supported as much by patron factual power as by clients perceptions. Even if the patron loses for some reason bargaining power, the steady state will persist supported by clients values.

The mechanism reinforcing efficacy and legitimation breaks down in a situation of high connectivity. Then, parents lose the ability to manipulate childern's legitimacy values; efficacy, in turn, becomes determined more on idyiosincratic experiences than on the aggregate past. Communities will then converge to a situation with intermediate levels of clientelism, efficacy perceptions and inequality legitimation. In such society, clientelism will be of a more "modern" type, with clients being the ones that, relative to the average

have had idiosyncratic experiences leading them to be particularly cynical, believing that it is impossible to change things.

Therefore, our model implies that, starting from a "traditional" situation, clientelism can be *eliminated* (with difficulty) with massive structural transformations such as a massive loss of patron bargaining power or massive increases in incomes. However, it can gradually be *transformed*, with increasing connectivity; that is with phenomena such as large rural-urban migration or with differences in exposure to communication technology. We also show that client empowerment is lower in "traditional" than in "modern" settings, and that policies to combat clientelism are more likely to be effective in "traditional" than in "modern" settings.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the decision to engage in clientelism, discussing several factors taken from various strands of literature. Section 3 presents the static model incorporating these factors in a unified framework. Section 4 extends the model dynamically to obtain implications on the nature of different forms of clientelism. Section 5 concludes.

2 The decision to engage in clientelism

2.1 The alternative to clientelism

A framework to characterize the demand for clientelism requires setting up a choice between different alternatives that potential clients face. We propose to conceptualize this choice as between engaging in a clientlistic relation vs. engaging in horizontal mobilization supporting a redistributive platform. We view mobilization in a very broad sense, including voting, protest, or even social movement activism.

We believe these alternatives capture the essence of the problem from a client's point of view; indeed the very definition of clientelism suggests such conceptualization. Although there are different ways of defining clientelism, all broad definitions have two components: First, a clientelistic relation is hierarchical with the patron having a status that is superior to the one of the client. Second, the relation involves an exchange of particularistic goods received by the client *in exchange for allegiance or political support.* For instance, in a recent article, clientelism is defined minimally as centering on "unequal access to scarce resources, and the exchange relation in which a powerful actor trades such resources for political support from less powerful actors" (Shefner, 2013).[5] Engaging into a clientelistic relation from a clients point of view thus implies giving up the possibility of challenging his inferior status and deferring social mobilization to the patron. It seems most natural to consider that the alternative to this is to engage in horizontal mobilization in order to challenge the status quo and bring about equality (income equality, or more generally power or status equality).

We are of course not the first or the only ones to conceptualize clientelism and horizontal mobilization as opposite poles. Shefner (2013) assesses clientelism vs. "democracy" understood as two different macro systems that structure political participation. His starting point is that clientelistic behavior as much as "democratic behaviour" are rational political behavior that responds to available political opportunities. Democracy is associated to groups that are autonomous and pursue their own interest while clientelism structures political participation in a way that reflects the hierarchy of power between client and patron: clients obtain material benefits but give up part of claim making to

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[5]See, among many others also Stokes (2007b) Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. (2012) and Hicken (2011) for similar characterizations of clientelism.

higher authorities. Moreover, solidarity is shared between citizens in a democracy whereas in clientelistic systems clients express solidarity and allegiance to patrons.

The dichotomy between clientelism and horizontal mobilization has also been central in ethnographic and case studies of clientelism. Shefner (2001), studying coalitions of community organizations in Mexico during the 1990s, argues that these coalitions allow for the pursuit of collective and global goals. He then contrasts these coalitions with a clientelistic setting where isolated agents press for local demands. Auyero et al. (2009) take for granted the view that clientelism discourages contentious collective action and is conceptualized as its antithesis. Their review of the relevant literature offers examples of "rival forms of organization- one that is hierarchical and clientelist and another that emphasizes democratic participation, political autonomy".[6]

Below, we will model the clientelistic choice as a choice between supporting a redistributive platform that yields (income, status or power) redistribution in the future with some probability, and engaging into a clientelistic relation that yields immediate material benefits.

2.2 Determinants of the clientelistic vs. horizontal mobilization choice

Which factors should be considered when considering explicitly the decision to engage in clientelism or to support a redistributive platform? The clientelism literature proper emphasizes some factors. These factors come from studies that explicitly focus on micro determinants of clientelism (such as poverty or risk aversion), as well as from studies that address demand-side factors even without explicitly considering the client's choice (such as the credibility of redistributive platforms). In addition to the clientelism literature, conceptualizing the clientelism choice as the antithesis of redistributive mobilization, allows us to borrow from two other strands of literature that focus on drivers/limitations of mobilization for redistribution: the social psychology literature on mobilization and the economics and political science literature on demand for redistribution.

The social psychology literature on mobilization focuses on the individual motives of members of a disadvantaged group to engage in action to redress the inequality they suffer.[7] Van Zomeren et al. (2008) integrates the insights from Social Identity Theory with the broader literature on social movements and identify three key explanatory factors for individual mobilization: the perceived injustice of group relations; the perceived group efficacy; and the perceived group identification. In a meta analysis of empirical work on the effect of these three variables on willingness to mobilize that surveys around 200 empirical studies – some observational and some experimental – Van Zomeren et al. (2008) conclude that the three factors, injustice, efficacy and identity,have an independent effect on mobilization.[8]

The demand for redsitribution literature starts from two related puzzles: the limited redistribution observed in democracies despite the fact that the median voter is poorer than average, and the observed lack of relation between inequality and demand for redistribution over time and across countries. A large literature has emerged arguing for factors and mechanisms that might limit the demand for redistribution. A recent review

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[6]The key point of their paper is actually to argue that clientelism and collective action are not necessarily incompatible phenomena, although their point applies to macro situations as opposed to individual choices.

[7]For key contributions to this literature see Tajfel (1974), Ellemers (1993), Wright et al. (1990) and Van Zomeren et al. (2008).

[8]They find that experimental estimates are on average similar to observational ones, implying that the relations appear to be causal.

by Alesina and Giuliano (2009) considers among the most important factors: the belief that that the government is wasteful and inequality aversion/ beliefs about the fairness of the income distribution.

The main factors we extract from these different strands of literature are detailed in what follows.

2.2.1 Poverty, risk aversion and discount rates

Poverty, risk aversion and discount rates are factors that have been emphasized by the clientelism literature when explicitly considering the clients choices. Poverty is probably the most widely considered factor explaining clientelism from the client's perspective. Decreasing marginal utility of income makes poor people value more material clientelistic transfers: poor people's clientelistic demand at a given price will be higher. This insight appears for example in Dixit and Londregan (1996) and Stokes et al. (2013).

The role of risk aversion and discount rates become clear once the benefits of clientelism are considered to be the *immediate* and *certain* material benefits it provides. Any programmatic alternative will, in comparison, have riskier and more future benefits. Risk averse and/ or impatient individuals will thus display higher clientelistic demand.[9]

2.2.2 Patron bargaining power

The patron's bargaining power is likely to be an important determinant of clientelism because it influences how costly it is to support redistributive alterantives. This is explicit in the ethnographic literature on clientelism that documents clients' awareness that patrons will withhold future benefits from clients that do not show up for a political activity (rally, meeting) or whom they believe to have voted for another party (see, for instance Auyero (1999); Hilgers (2009); Nichter (2014)). How much this will be enforced and actually harms the client depends on the relative bargaining power of clients and patrons. Shami (2012) emphasizes the role of patron's power in the context of rural traditional social relations, where patrons and clients interact in a variety of social and economic spheres. Patrons can exert considerable power over clients, preventing them from engaging in contentious collective action.

We will model the bargaining power of the patron as a portion of income that gets subtracted from the potential client as a punishment by the patron if the potential client supports the redistributive platform.

2.2.3 Inequality legitimation

In the social psychology literature, perceived injustice is a key driver of mobilization to overcome group inequality. The more unjust differences between group are perceived, the more horizontal mobilization to overcome inequality. Perceived injustice is linked to relative deprivation theory that emphasizes the role of grievances for mobilization and allows for the sense of deprivation to be evaluated relative to some reference group. Although such perceived injustice is insufficient to bring about mobilization by itself, it is considered to be a necessary part of any theory attempting to explain individual mobilization (Van Zomeren et al., 2008; Walker and Smith, 2002).

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[9]Medina and Stokes (2002), using a somewhat different approach, also consider risk. Their model assumes that the patron has control over the only risk free technology available and so risk averse individuals are predicted to engage more in clientelism.

The demand for redistribution literature emphasizes the related notion of inequality aversion. An important component of inequality aversion is the perception of the legitimacy of the income distribution: people believing that the current distribution of income or of power emerges from a fair process, or that consider its end-result legitimate, will be less averse to inequality and thus less prone to demand redistribution. The concept of inequality aversion/ legitimacy of the distribution matches well the concept of injustice from the social psychology literature.

An important point to note regarding perceptions of injustice and legitimacy, is that they can be considered endogenous to the process of inequality generation. As discussed below, an important part of the social psychology literature has sought to understand how perceptions of injustice and legitimacy are formed, and which forces might lead an individual to over or under-estimate injustice (see also Benabou and Tirole (2006)).

We will incorporate inequality legitimation below essentially as inequality aversion, although we will build on the social psychology literature to model them in a somewhat more refined way than usual. In the dynamic extension of the model, perceptions of injustice will be endogenized and allowed to evolve over time.

2.2.4 Efficacy

The importance of "efficacy", in a variety of forms, emerges from the three strands of literature we consider and is a particularly relevant factor. In the social psychology literature, group efficacy relates to the perceptions of individuals of the likelihood that the mobilization of the group will succeed. In this strand of literature, efficacy is a relevant factor for explaining individual mobilization: individuals will mobilize if they believe there are chances of success otherwise, they will stay at home (see Van Zomeren et al. (2008) and Klandermans (1984)).

The redistribution literature emphasizes the importance of government wastefulness, a notion related to efficacy. Perceptions of corruption or wastefulness of the public sector can be key for limiting demand for redistribution: Even individuals poorer than average will restrict their demand for redistribution if they believe that a substantial portion of the proceeds from redistribution will get lost on the way. Government wastefulness is akin to efficacy in that both concepts relate to how likely it is that redistribution will actually occur. The social psychology concept emphasizes more the success of mobilization in affecting policy whereas the demand for redistribution concept emphasizes rather the ultimate outcome of the policy.

The clientelism literature also considers notions similar to efficacy and corruption/ waste. The literature highlights the credibility of redistributive alternatives to clientelism. If these alternatives are unlikely to succeed, clientelism is preferable from an individual perspective. Two elements can be taken from the clientelistic literature that can hamper the credibility of programmatic promises. First, powerful veto players can signal to voters that a given platform stands little chance of implementation.[10] In the most extreme form, this veto player could be an authoritarian ruler. Indeed, it has been shown that in elections, where (non-incumbent) parties cannot credibly commit to implementing policies voters are likely to demand clientelistic handouts and patronage (Ghandi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Lust, 2009; Lust-Okar, 2006). Second, high levels of corruption can lead to a general lack of credibility of politician promises. This is emphasized by qualitative research on clientelism that shows how high levels of corruption lead to a general disillusionment with any party, and ultimately, to the belief that there is no viable alternative to clientelism

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[10]For an overview, see Kitschelt and Kselman (2013) and Müller (2007).

(Becerra Mizuno, 2013; Hilgers, 2009; Lazar, 2004).

In the model, we will capture efficacy and waste/corruption separately. Efficacy will be modeled as the perceived probability that the redistributive platform succeeds. Waste/corruption will be modeled as the level of redistribution achieved *once the platform succeeds*. In the dynamic version of the model, efficacy perceptions will be endogenized and their dynamics considered.

2.2.5 Group identification

Group identification is one of the building blocks of the strand of social psychology literature we consider. Group identification reduces the cost of collective action and therefore makes mobilization more effective. Simpson and Macy 2004 argue, and show in a laboratory setting, that increasing the group identification of the members of a disadvantaged group increases cooperation even when cooperation goes against their isolated self interest.

We introduce this factor in the model below by considering that it determines how much her participation in the redistributive platform will increase its chances of success. An isolated individual will acknowledge that her actions are unlikely to have much of an effect and the overall probability of redistribution success would remain largely unchanged with her participation. An individual with strong group identification, however, will assume the possibility of collective action within her group. She will rather take the perspective of the group when evaluating the effect of supporting the redistributive platform, which will thus be non-negligible.

2.2.6 Ideological preferences for and against clientelistic practices and policies

Political choices, be them a clientelistic engagement or support for some programmatic platform or party can have an ideological component. In the clientelism literature, this ideological component can take different forms. The most typical is the one mentioned in the introduction: to consider that parties and voters have ideological positions and so engaging in clientelism implies giving up the pleasure from supporting ones preferred ideology. The formal models of Dixit and Londregan (1996) and Stokes et al. (2013) provide a good illustration of this approach: the clientelism choice is conceptualized as pitting the material benefits of clientelism against the potential ideological cost of not supporting one's preferred ideological position. This, and similar settings, have been used to address the question of wehtehr clientelistic parties target, or ought to target core vs. swing voters.

A second way in which ideological components are incorporated into clientelistic choices can be found in Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. (2014). This paper assumes that clientelism has negative implications at the societal level and that individuals may hold negative moral attitudes towards it. In this framework, prospective clients implicitly trade-off the material benefits of clientelism with the moral cost of engaging in a socially harmful activity. Analytically, this approach is similar to the previous one if one equates the moral cost of clientelism with be the ideological distance between the clientelistic and the alternative party in the previous setting.

We introduce these factors parsimoniously as a utility cost from engaging in clientelism. This utility cost can then be interpreted as coming from moral considerations or from ideological expressive participation.

3 A formal framework of demand for clientelism

3.1 The clientelism choice

3.1.1 Model set up

We propose a formal framework to study demand for clientelism incorporating factors typically considered in the clientelism literature as well as those merging when considering collective action and demand or redistribution literature. These factors are: 1. Poverty, 2. Discount rates, 3. Patron's bargaining power, 4. Inequality legitimation, 5. Perceived efficacy of redistribution, 6. Perceived corruption/ waste, 7. Group Identification, and 8. Ideological costs/benefits of clientelism.

We consider a very simple two period model, adapted from Pellicer (2009). The model involves an individual that considers the trade-offs involved in engaging into clientelistic relations with a patron. The setting into which this decision takes place is one where there are essentially two alternatives: either to become client of a patron, which will provide immediate transfers with certainty, or lend support to a redistributive platform that has some chances of achieving society-wide redistribution in the future. We model only the decision of relatively poor individuals that may become clients to a powerful patron. The income of these individuals is y while average income is higher and is denoted as $\bar{y}$. A redistributive platform exists that might achieve a given level of redistribution (yielding $(1-w)\bar{y}$ to everyone), but only in the second period and with perceived probability p. The parameter p represents efficacy whereas $1-w$ captures the share that reaches the individual after subtracting waste and corruption. A clientelistic relation, in contrast, yields a secure transfer T during the two periods (except if the redistribution platform succeeds). The future (i.e. the second period) is discounted with factor β, which thus measures patience. For simplicity we assume logarithmic utility.

We also allow for individuals to have different preferences regarding the legitimacy of the income distribution; i.e. find social inequality unjust with strength θ. As we will explain in more detail below, building on our discussion of social psychology literature, we assume the following. *Deligitimizing* inequality strongly (high θ) is beneficial for one's self esteem (i.e. gives positive utility) when young. However, if inequality is suffered for too long (i.e. also when old), it is harmful for self esteem and provokes negative utility. Thus, the psychological effect of social inequality is:

$$\theta(\alpha Ln(\frac{\bar{y}}{y}) - \beta[(1-p)Ln(\frac{\bar{y}}{y}) - pLn(\frac{\bar{y}}{(1-w)\bar{y}})])$$

.

In order to derive simple expressions we characterize inequality as $Ln(\frac{\bar{y}}{y})$ (i.e. the percent distance of the poor to average income). [11] Social inequality thus gives positive utility when young with strength $\theta\alpha$, and negative utility when old, discounted with factor β. We assume that $\alpha < 1$, i.e. injustice perceptions are more harmful when old than beneficial when young. With probability p social inequality is only $Ln(\frac{\bar{y}}{(1-w)\bar{y}})$ (zero with no waste or corruption). This seemingly complicated way of modeling inequality legitimation will have it's payoffs when these perceptions are endogenized. In what follows, we will call θ inequality delegitimation, or inequality aversion, or simply injustice perceptions.

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[11]Notice that this measure of inequality does not incorporate the transfer T, because inequality aversion applies to the degree of inequality at the collective, rather than individual, level.

Table 1: Parameters of the model

Factor	Parameter
Income (Poverty)	y
Discounting	β
Patron power	γ
Inequality legitimization	θ
Efficacy	p
Waste/ corruption	w
Group ID	g
Ideological cost clientelism	K

Finally, engaging in clientelism generates a utility cost K, which may emerge from moral considerations or because of ideological affinity with the redistributive platform.

3.1.2 The demand for clientelism

If the individual decides to engage in clientelism, her utility is thus:

$$V_C = Ln(y+T) + \beta[pLn((1-w)\bar{y}) + (1-p)Ln(y+T)]$$
$$+ \theta(\alpha Ln(\frac{\bar{y}}{y}) - \beta[pLn(\frac{\bar{y}}{(1-w)\bar{y}}) + (1-p)Ln(\frac{\bar{y}}{y})])$$
$$- (1 + \beta(1-p))K$$

where the first term is the utility from the net income in the first period, the second correspond to the income in case of successful and unsuccessful redistribution in the second period, discounted with factor β. Notice that even if the individual chooses clientelism, successful redistribution might still occur with probability p. The third term of the equation represents the utility consequences of inequality deligitimation and the fourth term, involving K is the discounted utility cost of clientelism, which applies as long as the redistributive platform does not succeed.

If the individual chooses to support the redistributve platform, she gives up the transfer T, but she increases the chances of redistribution occurring from p to $p + g$. The parameter g captures the degree of group identification. In addition to giving up the clientelistic transfer T, choosing to support the redistributive platform might involve a punishment from the prospective patron. We thus let income under this alternative to be $(1 - \gamma)y$, where γ captures the degree of *bargaining power of the patron*. A γ equal to one implies total power of the prospective patron over the prospective client, so that the client remains totally deprived of income if she challenges the patron. Her utility in case of supporting the redistributive platform is thus:

$$V_R = Ln((1-\gamma)y) + \beta[(p+g)Ln((1-w)\bar{y}) + (1-p-g)Ln((1-\gamma)y)]$$
$$+ \theta(\alpha Ln(\frac{\bar{y}}{y}) - \beta[(p+g)Ln(\frac{\bar{y}}{(1-w)\bar{y}}) + (1-p-g)Ln(\frac{\bar{y}}{y})])$$

For convenience, table 1 shows the mapping of potential explanatory factors to the parameters of the model.

Clientelism is a preferable alternative if $V_C > V_R$. This condition simplifies to:

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$$Ln\frac{y+T}{(1-\gamma)y} > K + \frac{g}{\frac{1}{\beta}+(1-p)}[Ln\frac{(1-w)\bar{y}}{(1-\gamma)y} + \theta Ln\frac{(1-w)\bar{y}}{y}] \qquad (1)$$

This equation has a simple interpretation. The LHS is the benefits of choosing clientelism coming from the gain in income from the transfer T. The RHS is the benefit from choosing the redistributive platform. These benefits stem from saving the utility costs of clientelism K and from the increased likelihood of successful redistribution g. The latter are discounted by $\frac{1}{\beta}+(1-p)$ since gains accrue only in the second period and even then only with some probability. The actual gains in income in case redistribution succeeds are $\frac{(1-w)\bar{y}}{(1-\gamma)y}$ plus the inequality aversion utility gain from the reduction in inequality $\theta Ln(\frac{(1-w)\bar{y}}{y})$.

Equation (1) gives the individual demand for clientelism: considering T as the price of clientelism, the equation says when clientelism will be "purchased" for all possible prices T (or, maybe more precisely, when one's vote will be *sold*). In a full model, the supply of clientelism would also be modeled and the interplay of supply and demand would yield an equilibrium price. Here, we wish to provide a "partial equilibrium" model that focuses only on the demand side and that takes the price T as given. Equation (1) can then be used to derive how the different parameters "shift" the demand curve. In particular, setting the equation to equality yields the minimum transfer $\hat{T}$, that would make people with given parameter values just happy to choose clientelism. Parameters that increase this $\hat{T}$ imply more reluctance to accept clientlism and are then interpreted as reducing the demand for clientelism. These comparative statics are straightforward.

Equation (1) delivers some clear-cut comparative statics. In particular, it is clear from simple inspection that higher p, g, β, θ, and K will increase $\hat{T}$. In words, clientelism is discouraged by perceptions of efficacy (p) and group identification (g) because they make one feel that choosing horizontal mobilization will make more of a difference and render the benefits of clientelism less likely. Since the benefits of collective action accrue only in the future, patience (β) will encourage collective action and discourage clientelism. Since the only way in the model to reduce inequality collectively is redistribution, more inequality aversion also discourages clientelism. And finally clientelism will be discouraged the higher its ideological costs K.

Comparative statics on income y, however, are not straightforward and are of particular interest. Standard models cast the choice of clientelism between material benefits from clientelism and the expressive benefits from voting for a party closer ideologically. Because of decreasing marginal utility of income, material benefits have more value for poorer people and they are willing to give up more ideological benefits. While the result has high intuitive appeal, it is somewhat artificial in that the programmatic choice has no material implications. In reality, however, programmatic alternatives are to a large extent about material benefits, and particularly about some form of redistribution. Since the poor stand to gain most from redistribution, this makes the role of poverty a priory more ambiguous. The question when evaluating the role of poverty for clientelism should then be: why do poor people appear more vulnerable to clientelism *even if* they stand to gain a lot from redistributive platforms? This question, which cannot be addressed by standard approaches, is at the heart of our framework. In order to deal with the question in a simple way we simplify equation (1) by setting θ, w, and γ to zero. We also denote the multiplicative term in (1) as $\phi \equiv \frac{g}{\frac{1}{\beta}+(1-p)} < 1$. This yields:

$$Ln(1 + \frac{T}{y}) > \phi Ln \frac{\bar{y}}{y} + K \tag{2}$$

The equation shows a more nuanced relation between income and clientelism. If redistribution appears unachievable ($\phi = 0$) or individuals are relatively well off, (i.e. upper middle classes with y close to $\bar{y}$), the first term in the right hand side (RHS) disappears and the only cost of clientelism is the utility cost K, as in the standard models. Then, indeed, decreasing marginal utility of income makes the LHS decrease with income so that more income is associated to less demand for clientelism. However, for poorer people the calculation is different. As income goes towards zero, the LFS and the first term of the RHS go towards infinity, which means that income becomes so valuable that the utility cost K essentially plays no role. In this model, this is because log utility exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion, and marginal utility of income goes towards infinity as income goes to zero. The relevant trade off is now between the increase in income that redistribution can achieve and the increase in income from the clientelistic transfers. Because choosing redistribution generates an increase in income only in the future and even then only with some probability (i.e. ϕ is lower than one), the extreme poor will be more willing to give up such distant and uncertain redistribution in exchange for even a small clientelistic transfer today.[12] Thus, the model predicts that lower middle classes can be drawn away from clientelism by the promise of redistirbution and upper middle classes by alternative ideological programs or a moral condemnation of clientelism. This implies, for instance, that programs that stress moral condemnation of clientelism are likely to have little effect in relatively poor communities.

3.1.3 Sources of clients' empowerment

Demand for clientelism is closely related to the degree of clients' overall bargaining power. In particular, the demand price $\hat{T}$, the transfer a client requires in order to engage in a clientelistic relation, operationalizes clients power: Someone willing to engage in clientelistic relation, say, without receiving any benefits can be considered highly disempowered, while someone that requires an astronomical sum would be considered highly empowered.

Rearranging equation (1) slightly, using the approximation $Ln(1 + x) \approx x$ for small x, and solving for $\hat{T}$ yields a simple expression for the demand price of clientelism that highlights the structure and sources of client's empowerment.

$$\hat{T} \approx y(K + \phi(I - w)(1 + \theta) - (1 - \phi)\gamma) \tag{3}$$

where we have denoted inequality $\frac{\bar{y}-y}{y}$ as I.

The equation shows that income contributes to clients empowerment in line with what was explained above as does the utility cost K. The remaining terms of equation 3 (the last two terms) are best interpreted as the net result of empowering and disempowering forces. The first factor $(I-w)(1+\theta)$ is a measure of redistributable inequality $(I-w)$, with its real and psychological components $1 + \theta$. This can be considered the *potential redistributive power of the client*, since this is the value of what the client can manage to extract from the patron if horizontal mobilization succeeds. The second factor (γ) is the *factual bargaining power of the patron*. The weight assigned to the potential bargaining power of the client

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[12]Notice that this relies on decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA). Utility functions with decreasing marginal utility of income, but without DARA will typically imply that the poorest are *less* willing to engage in clientelism than lower middle classes. IT is easy to see this, for instance usng cuadratic utility which exhibits increasing absolute risk aversion.

relative to the patron is ϕ, which captures, as we saw above, the perceptual capabilities of the individual to enact its potential power, depending on perceived efficacy, group identification and patience. These perceptions and preferences empower potential clients by redirecting their attention away from their current situation towards the achievement of redistribution.

These results make clear that client's empowerment has factual as well as perceptual/ value components or, to be more precise, perceptual components more and less easily anchored in reality. For instance, the potential redistributive power of the client, includes the actual redistribution that the poor could achieve $(I - w)$, but also the degree to which inequality is legitimized θ. Inequality legitimation is thus, in this framework, a disempowering force. Similarly, perceptions of efficacy can be to a certain extent anchored in reality, but patience and maybe group identification are more purely psychological in nature. This implies that empowerment has sources directly anchored in current reality, but also more subtle psychological forces, and the existence of these has potentially important implications. To explore these implications, we will extend the model below to endogenize some of this perceptions, notably inequality legitimization and perceived efficacy.

4   Dynamics with endogenous legitimacy and efficacy

Deriving the demand for clientelism in a static setting is a useful first step for obtaining insights on the clientelism choice. Our framework allows for going one step further and study how clientelism and values/ perceptions might co-evolve to reach different steady states in different situations. In particular, we extend the model to make legitimacy and efficacy endogenous, and consider their evolution over time. In the rest of this section, for simplicity, we use the approximation of the clientelism choice in equation 3 and ignore time discounting, setting β to one.

4.1   Traditional clientelism, vote buying and the endogeneity of injustice and efficacy perceptions

An important message from social psychology literature is that preferences and perceptions are endogenous to social realities, an idea that has become key in behavioral economics. Considering perceptions as endogenous can help yielding insights on the different nature of clientelism in different places: whether clientelism takes the form of more anonymized vote buying or has a more "traditional" form, i.e. it is rather embedded in deeper social relations.

Intuitively, three of our key factors in the demand for clientelism speak to this distinction between vote buying vs. traditional clientelism: patron bargaining power (γ), perceptions of efficacy (p) and perceptions of injustice (θ). We consider "traditional" clientelism as embedded in legitimized social relations, where patron and clients interact in several spheres, in addition to the clientelistic political exchange. In such situation, the patron has various tools to affect the utility of the client, and thus relatively high bargaining power (Shami 2012). The profile of the client would be of someone that legitimizes to a certain extent the inequalities in the status quo, considering that everyone has its place in the social hierarchy (low θ). In contrast, the profile of a person that sells her vote in an anonymized way fits well intuitively with someone rather cynical that believes that politicians follow their own interests and there are no chances of implementing political change (low (p).

Endogenizing p and θ then could give insights into the way "traditional" clientelism

and vote buying come about, and the consequences they have for the role of different factors. The key question is, how can efficacy p and injustice perceptions θ be endogenized? There a simple and strightforward way in which efficacy can be thought of as endogenous to clientelism. At the society level, perceptions of efficacy should depend to a certain extent on the amount of people that choose in given moment to support the redistributive platform. If most people in a the society support redistribution, it makes sense to perceive that redistribution is likely, i.e. that p is high. Conversely in a society where most people are engaged in clientelism, it would make sense to perceive p to be low. In reality, many factors, real and psychological, will mediate between the amount of people engaged in clientelism and perceptions of efficacy, but considering p, as a first approximation, to depend mainly on the amount of people that supports the redistributive platform seems to be a sensible benchmark.

The endogeneity of injustice perceptions is more subtle: possibly more interesting but also more controversial. A strand of the literature on social psychology has focused for decades on understanding when and why individuals in disadvantaged groups legitimize the existing inequality. Major and Schmader (2001) provides a useful synthesis of two opposing views on the matter. On the one hand, "ego defense perspectives" argue that people from disadvantage groups can buffer their self esteem by over attributing personal bad outcomes to external factors such as discrimination and injustice. Evidence from lab experiments indeed show that perceiving a system as illegitimate can be beneficial to self-esteem when evaluating a given situation. On the other hand, "system justification theories" posit that some people from disadvantaged groups tend to have surprising tolerance of injustice and to '*over-legitimize*" hierarchies and inequality. These authors argue that believing that we live in an unfair world can create serious threats to one's self esteem. Perceiving that the system one lives in is unfair can threaten the feeling of being socially accepted, or generate anxiety by eroding one's perception of predictability and control over the environment. There is indeed some evidence that individuals from disadvantaged groups that perceived themselves to be consistently targets of discrimination tend to display lower self esteem. Major and Schmader (2001) synthesize these opposing points of view by arguing that perceptions of illegitimacy may be protective emotionally in the short run but harmful if sustained chronically. Thus, they argue that the system justification perspective is likely to be more prominent in situations where group differences are seen as "global and stable". Below, we will endogenize perceived injustice below using these insights. The fact that these arguments implicitly conceptualize perceptions of injustice as determined in a way that minimizes individual discomfort or maximizes individual well-being will allow us to incorporate these insights in a straightforward way in the model.

4.2 Endogenizing perceptions of efficacy

We model the evolution of efficacy perceptions in the simplest possible way. At the beginning of each dynasty, say $t+1$, all individuals start with a benchmark perception p_{t+1}. From this benchmark, as the individual accumulates experiences through life, perceptions change according to the realization of a random variable ϵ^i. Thus:

$$p_{t+1}^i = p_{t+1} + \epsilon_i \qquad (4)$$

where we assume ϵ^i to be time-invariant, following a uniform distribution with mean zero and extremes $\pm\sigma$. σ thus indexes the variability of the idiosyncratic shock to p. This can be thought of as a measure of informational openness of the society. Only in an

informationally open society will children be able to accumulate experiences that counter the average perceptions in their society. Notice that p is considered a probability and so should be bounded between 0 and 1; a more rigorous rendering of equation (4) would be $p_{t+1}^i = min(max(p_{t+1} + \epsilon_i, 0), 1)$. It turns out that this has only small implications that do not affect the main results of the model. To keep notation light we will carry on with the formulation in (4), and remind the reader when relevant of the boundedness of p.

How is the benchmark p_{t+1} determined? We assume that this is just the percent of the previous generation that supported a redistributive platform. For deriving this value, we use equation (3). As it is, equation (3) tells the level of transfers below which people support redistribution. If we take transfers T as fixed and allow efficacy perceptions p to vary, the equation can be thought as giving a critical value of efficacy $\hat{p}$ above which people support redistribution. The share of the population that supports redistribution at t is thus:

$$p_{t+1} = \int_{\hat{p}}^1 dp_t^i \tag{5}$$

with $\hat{p} \equiv 2 - \dfrac{g((I-w)(1+\theta)+\gamma)}{T/y + \gamma - K}$ and the integral going over the i.

This yields a recursive formulation for benchmark (or average) perceptions p_t of the form:

$$p_{t+1} = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2\sigma}(p_t - \hat{p}) \tag{6}$$

Notice the dynamics implied by (6): Dynamics will be explosive if $\sigma < \frac{1}{2}$; otherwise, p will converge.[13] Therefore, if idiosyncratic shocks are unimportant, perceptions of efficacy (and levels clientelism) will go towards extremes: either everyone will become clientelistic or everyone will support the redistributive platform. The reason is that, with small idiosyncratic shocks everyone will behave similarly, and if efficacy p_t happens to be, say, lower than the critical value $\hat{p}$, essentially everyone will find it worth to engage in clientelism and the next generation will have as benchmark a perception of almost zero efficacy, so that the society will remain clientelistic. If idiosyncratic shocks are sufficiently large, in contrast, even in a situation where most parents are clientelistic, there will be a substantial amount of children that exposed to experiences that suggest high potential efficacy, and the society will avoid becoming totally clientelistic.

4.3   Endogenizing perceptions of legitimacy/injustice

We endogenize perceptions of injustice by considering that they can be partially "chosen". To make things concrete, we assume that parents, in their education, can affect their offspring's injustice perceptions. However, we also assume that there is a "true" value of injustice θ^* and children's perceptions end up being a weighted average of parental choices z and the "true" value. In particular, we assume that generation $t+1$ perceptions equal:

$$\theta_{t+1} = \eta\theta^* + (1-\eta)z_{t+1}$$

The parameter η captures, again, the degree of informational connectivity of the society. In a completely closed society, where one is exposed to a single view of the

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[13]The boundary argument mentioned above applies here as well: the expression is to be thought as bounded between zero and one. In addition, if $\hat{p}$ is higher (lower) than one (zero), p_{t+1} will be zero (one)

world transmitted by parents, that view will be very powerful in shaping ones beliefs. Perceptions and values will have no anchor in reality, because there will be no terms of comparison, and value systems can be developed and accepted that bear no relation with actual injustices. Informational connectivity brings other points of view that help evaluating the reality of local injustice relative to other places. This decreases the weight of the values transmitted by parents and increases that of "true" injustice in determining actual injustice perceptions.

We assume that parents transmit injustice values altruistically, in order to maximize their children's utility.[14] However, we find it reasonable to assume that there are adjustment costs in the transmission of values, in the sense that it is psychologically costly for parents to transmit values far away from those they believe themselves. For simplicity, this costs are assumed to be quadratic. focusing only on the terms that include θ, the maximization problem of the parent is simply:

$$Max\, \theta_{t+1}(I - w)(\alpha - (1 - p_t)) - \frac{1}{2}(z_{t+1} - \theta_t)^2 \tag{7}$$

Rearranging, the first order condition yields the following law of motion for θ:

$$\theta_{t+1} - \theta_t = \eta(\theta^* - \theta_t) + (1 - \eta)^2(I - w)(p_t - (1 - \alpha)) \tag{8}$$

Injustice perceptions will become more or less acute in a society depending on two factors. First, there will be a tendency to go towards the "true" injustice level θ^*: as first term of the equation shows, injustice perceptions will increase if they are currently below the true ones and vice versa. However, injustice perceptions also move independently of real injustice, from the attempts of parents to avoid pain to their children. This is given by the second term of the equation. If p_t is low enough, parents will realize that high inequality is largely inevitable and long lasting and will want to shield their children from the pain of bearing a sense of injustice for a protracted period of time. Thus, they will make them less sensitive to injustice than themselves and injustice perceptions will decrease over time. In contrast, if p_t is high enough, inequality will be be unlikely to last and injustice perceptions will be helpful for children as they will protect their children's self esteem while young. in that case, then, injustice perceptions will increase over time. The relative importance of "reality" considerations vs. utility maximizing ones, will be determined by η, the degree of informational connectivity. In an informationally connected society, parents will have little scope to affect children's perceptions, and these will converge towards the real θ^*. If, in contrast, society is informationally isolated, injustice perceptions will drift independently of reality following parental attempts to protect their children.

4.4 Dynamics and steady states

Equations (6) and (8) form a system of equations in differences that jointly determine the dynamics of efficacy and legitimacy at the society level. For ease of reference, these are reproduced here and rearranged when convenient:

$$p_{t+1} - p_t = \frac{1 - 2\sigma}{2\sigma}p_t + \frac{1}{2\sigma}(\hat{p}_t - \sigma) \tag{9a}$$

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[14]Future extensions might allow for divergence of interest between parents and children, or allow for parents to have different values of parameters than children. Parents, for instance, could try to manipulate their children's values in order to induce them to choose.

$$\theta_{t+1} - \theta_t = \eta(\theta^* - \theta_t) + (1 - \eta)^2(I - w)(p_t - (1 - \alpha)) \tag{9b}$$

where $\hat{p}_t \equiv 2 - \dfrac{(I - w)(1 + \theta_t) + \gamma}{T/y + \gamma - K}$ has now a subscript t to make explicit its dependence of θ_t.

Setting the left hand side of these equations to zero yields the schedules that keep p and θ constant, respectively, in the (p, θ) space:

$$\Delta p = 0 \;\rightarrow\; p_t = \frac{1}{1 - 2\sigma}(\hat{p}_t - \sigma) \tag{10a}$$

$$\Delta\theta = 0 \;\rightarrow\; \theta_t = \theta^* + \frac{(1 - \eta)^2}{\eta}(I - w)(p_t - (1 - \alpha)) \tag{10b}$$

These schedules can then be used to construct a phase diagram depicting the dynamics of the system. The $\Delta\theta = 0$ schedule is upward sloping and the slope depends crucially on the degree of informational connectivity, as proxied by η (see left panel of figure 1). As η goes to one and reality becomes the key determinant of injustice perceptions, the schedule becomes flat and injustice perceptions converge to the "real" injustice level θ^*, regardless of efficacy perceptions. When η goes to zero, the schedule becomes vertical: since there is no anchoring for evaluating injustice, all that matters is parents' evaluation of efficacy, with low sense of efficacy leading parents to shield their children by making them legitimize more strongly existing inequalities.

The $\Delta p = 0$ schedule may slope upwards or downwards depending, again, on informational connectivity, this time as proxied by σ (see left right panel of figure 1). At low levels of σ, dynamics are divergent and dictated by whether current efficacy is higher or lower than the critical threshold $\hat{p}$. The $\Delta p = 0$ schedule will be downward sloping, as $\hat{p}$ is decreasing in θ: efficacy will quickly go towards one if injustice perceptions are high, unless perceived efficacy is very low, as this will bring most people to support the redistributive platform, and viceversa. As σ increases, efficacy becomes more and more determined by idiosyncratic experiences and less and less by previous average levels of efficacy and the slope of $\Delta p = 0$ becomes more and more positive. In the extreme case where σ tends to infinity, essentially half of the population holds positive efficacy beliefs and half hold negative ones, irrespective of previous efficacy perceptions. Thus, the $\Delta p = 0$ becomes vertical, at $p = \dfrac{1}{2}$, and attractive, so that any former level of efficacy immediately converges to $\dfrac{1}{2}$.

There are two relevant cases of dynamics, depending on whether informational connectivity is high (σ and η high) or low.

Low informational connectivity

Consider first the case with low informational connectivity, depicted in figure 2. This is the case where σ and η are low and, in particular, where the slope of $\Delta p = 0$ is lower than that of $\Delta\theta = 0$. The steady state given by the intersection of the two schedules in the middle of the graph is then unstable. The resulting dynamics are divergent, with injustice and efficacy reinforcing each other. A low sense of efficacy leads to high levels of clientelism. Parents, realizing that instilling a sense of injustice to their children is likely to lead to their frustration, educate them rather to legitimize existing inequalities. This makes the following generations more supportive of clientelism, leading to even less sense of efficacy, and so on. The converse occurs at high levels of efficacy and injustice.

Communities with low informational connectivity can thus converge to two polar opposite types of steady state, one with low sense of efficacy and injustice and another one where the opposite occurs. Because average efficacy perceptions in this model are anchored in actual support for the redistributive platform, the former steady state is fully clientelistic and the latter is redistributive. The situation with pervasive clientelism, where perceptions of efficacy are low and where inequality is legitimized is akin to a "traditional steady state". The Figure 2 shows a parametric example of the model with low connnectivity, showing the trajectories followed by communities with different starting points. Communities starting with relatively low levels of p and θ are shown to converge to a "traditional" steady sate, and vice versa.[15]

An important implication of the model is that, if the patron has high enough bargaining power, virtually all isolated communities will converge to a traditional steady state. This is illustrated in figure 3. High patron bargaining power discourages support for the redistributive platform and encourages clientelism. This increases $\hat{p}$, and shifts the schedule $\Delta p = 0$ rightwards. This means that even relatively high initial sense of efficacy and injustice will not suffice to generate enough support for the redistributive platform, so that following generations will display less sens of efficacy and injustice and be even more inclined to support clientelism, putting in motion the vicious circle of disempowering perceptions and clientelism. The right panel of the figure shows a parametric example where all trajectories converge towards the "traditional" steady state, regardless where they start.

Importantly, traditional clientelistic steady states can survive even if the patron looses its bargaining power. As citizens perceptions adapt to the high patron bargaining power by becoming more and more hopeless and legitimizing inequality the more and more, eventually the actual bargaining power of the patron becomes unnecessary to support a traditional steady state: it is the values and perceptions of the citizens themselves that end up disempowering them, even in situations that could be "objectively" redressed. This can be easily seen by comparing figures 2 and 3: the levels of p and θ in the traditional steady state are too low to eliminate clientelism, even if patron bargaining power is relatively low, as in figure 2; or, to put it another way, communities that would have eliminated clientelism naturally under low patron bargaining power (such as bottom-right starting point in figure 2), become clientelistic if the patron bargaining power increases, and remains clientleistic even if patron power goes back down to the original level.

High informational connectivity

The system behaves in a dramatically different manner in a situation of high informational connectivity (where η and σ are large enough for the slope of $\Delta p = 0$ to be higher than that of $\Delta \theta = 0$). This case is depicted in figure 4. The steady state at the intersection of $\Delta p = 0$ and $\Delta \theta = 0$ is stable and all trajectories converge towards it. In the long run, regardless where they start, communities converge to a situation of intermediate injustice and efficacy perceptions, and intermediate levels of clientelism. In that situation, there is a wide variety of individual perceptions of efficacy given by the different individual experiences, and those that end up with low idiosyncratic perception of efficacy are drawn to clientelism. This steady state can be thought of a "modern" type of clientelism, where clients do not hold traditional values of hierarchy, but rather are cynical regarding the

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[15]Notice how the fact that p needs to be bounded between 0 and 1 implies that, once p reaches any of these boundaries, it stays traveling vertically towards the schedule $\Delta \theta = 0$, which features attractive dynamics. The steady states thus correspond to $p = 0, 1$, and θ given by equation 9b evaluated at $p = 0, 1$.

prospects of changing the system relative to the average. This type of clientelism is thus more akin to vote buying. The right panel of figure 4 shows a parametric example of this type of steady state, with all communities converging to the unique steady state with intermediate levels of θ and p.

4.5   The nature of clientelism in different steady states

Our model predicts two steady states with clientelism, the "traditional" steady state with low connectivity, pervasive clientelism and low efficacy and injustice perceptions, and the "modern" steady state, with high connectivity, and intermediate levels of the three variables. This allows us to compare these to clientelism situations, in terms of empowerment and in terms of responsiveness of clientelism demand to policy.

Client's empowerment in "traditional" vs. "modern" settings

We are particularly interested in assessing client's empowerment in "traditional" vs. "modern" settings. This can be done using the demand price of clientelism, $\hat{T}$, which operationalizes client's empowerment in our framework, as mentioned above.

Our model predicts higher client empowerment in "modern" than in "traditional" settings. The reason is that both perceptions of efficacy and of injustice, empower potential clients (increase $\hat{T}$), as mentioned above, and "traditional" steady states feature lower levels of both than "modern" steady states.[16] In other words, clients will be manage to obtain a better deal from their relation (or will be able to reject unattractive deals) in "modern" than in "traditional" settings. Clients in "modern" steady states will feature lower efficacy perceptions than the average of their community but still, on average, higher than zero, the level in traditional steady states. Figure 5 shows the evolution of the average $\hat{T}$ of the clients in the parametric examples used above for the cases of high and low connectivity (the ones with similar -low- patron bargaining power). Low connectivity trajectories are represented with dotted lines, and converge to a very low level of empowerment. Since only clients are represented in the figure, communities with no clientelism (such those in and approaching the "good" low-connectivity state state) do not appear. Communities in the high connectivity situation converge to a level of empowerment which is higher than the traditional one. Notice this happens even if some of the communities ending up in the traditional steady state have a more favorable starting point towards redistribution.

The remarkable feature of this result is that it is not driven by patrons bargaining power. While patron bargaining power is associated to "traditional" steady states, as shown above, our results are not driven by this. Rather, it is the very psychological accommodation of clients in "traditional" settings that ends up disempowering them. It is because clients loose the sense of efficacy and end up protecting themselves by legitimizing inequalities that they give up the very psychological inclinations that would empower them vis-a-vis the patron.

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[16]This is easy to see. Keeping all parameters constant, "traditional" steady states are associated to lower η and σ. "Traditional" steady states correspond to the point in the $\Delta\theta = 0$ schedule where $p = 0$, while "modern" steady states correspond to the intersection of $\Delta\theta = 0$ and $\Delta p = 0$. Consider first, the role of σ. A lower σ rotates $\Delta p = 0$ but leaves $\Delta\theta = 0$ unchanged. Since $\Delta\theta = 0$ is upward sloping, the point at $\Delta\theta = 0$ that intersects with $\Delta p = 0$ will be, by construction, at higher levels of p and θ than the point where $p = 0$. A similar argument applies to a lower η, except that it also rotates $\Delta\theta = 0$ counterclockwise to make it steeper and thus implies that the "traditional" point at $p = 0$ is at an even lower level of θ.

Reducing clientelism in "traditional" vs. "modern" settings

Our model also develops insights on reducing clientelism. The general result of the model is that clientleism will be more responsive to interventions in "modern" settings relative to "traditional" ones. There are two reasons for this. First, this is because clientelism is "inframarginal" in traditional settings. In "modern" settings, clientelism and policy support coexist, and there are "marginal" individuals; i.e. individuals roughly indifferent between the two. Policies that increase $\hat{T}$, say, by reducing patron's bargaining power or corruption, will have an impact on such marginal clients, driving them to programmatic support. Clientelism is "inframarginal" in "traditional" settings in the sense that everyone chooses clientelism and no one is indifferent between the two political alternatives. The reason, is, again, the adaptation of client's perceptions and their resulting disempowerment: client's legitimation of inequality brings them beyond indifference to horizontal mobilization. In other words, their disempowerment grows to the extent that they become locked-in the clientelistic relation. In that context, policy interventions are largely ineffective unless they are of a very large magnitude.

A second reason why interventions are likely to be more effective in "modern" settings than in "traditional" ones concerns dynamics. Traditional clientelism represents an extreme steady state that converges to a situation wth zero efficacy; i.e. full clientelism. Even interventions that succeed in affecting the level of clientleism in short run in such a setting are likely to be short lived: with the community returning endogenously to the traditional situation. Only a change in connectivity or a dramatic shift of parameters that strengthen the clients, such as a massive loss of patron bargaining power, could break the "traditional" steady state in the long run. "Modern" steady states, in contrast are much more fluid. Any change in parameters will affect the schedules $\Delta\theta = 0$ and $\Delta p = 0$ and therefore lead to a change in the steady state, and thus to a permanent change in the level of clientleism.

5   Conclusions

This paper has provided a framework to study demand for redistribution. We proposed a static model where the decision to engage in clientelism is pitted against the possibility to support a redistributive platform. This setting allowed us to borrow insights from social psychology literature on individual mobilization and on the economics literature on demand for redistribution. From these, we were able to consider the role of factors so far not addressed in the literature, such as patron factual bargaining power, perceptions of political efficacy, and values regarding the legitimacy of existing social inequalities. The consideration of these factors further allowed us to extend the model dynamically in order to address the nature and persistence of different forms of clientelism. In the dynamic version of the model efficacy and legitimacy perceptions were endogenized using insights from social psychology and these perceptions co-evolve with actual levels of clientelism. The dynamic extension also introduces parameters that capture the degree of informational connectivity.

When informational connectivity is low, our model generates multiples steady states driven by a complementarity between in-efficacy and legitimacy perceptions. One steady state features widespread clientelism, clients that legitimize inequality in order to protect their self esteem, and is more likely to emerge when patrons have high factual bargaining power. This resembles a "traditional" type of clientelism. We show that the very response of clients to their difficult hopeless situation in terms of inequality legitimation

will make them particularly disempowered and render the situation particularly resilient. Informational connectivity breaks the complementarity between in-efficacy and legitimacy perceptions and thus leads to a unique steady state, where clientelism and programmatic redistribution co-exist and which resembles a "modern" type of clientelism.

Our model nests, from the demand point of view, the standard model of clientelism choice. The standard model, however, is particularly simple because of the literature's focus on the supply side. We are able to be more general on the demand side while keeping simplicity by disregarding the supply side. Further research needs to empirically assess the relevance of the mechanisms obtained in our model as well as to theoretically extend the model to bring in the supply side.

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Figure 1: Building Blocks of Phase Diagram - Role of Infomational Connectivity

Figure 2: Phase Diagram - Low Informational Connectivity

Figure 3: Phase Diagram - Low Informational Connectivity - High patron bargaining power

Figure 4: Phase Diagram - High Informational Connectivity

Figure 5: Clients empowerment

southern africa labour and development research unit

The Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) conducts research directed at improving the well-being of South Africa's poor. It was established in 1975. Over the next two decades the unit's research played a central role in documenting the human costs of apartheid. Key projects from this period included the Farm Labour Conference (1976), the Economics of Health Care Conference (1978), and the Second Carnegie Enquiry into Poverty and Development in South Africa (1983-86). At the urging of the African National Congress, from 1992-1994 SALDRU and the World Bank coordinated the Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development (PSLSD). This project provide baseline data for the implementation of post-apartheid socio-economic policies through South Africa's first non-racial national sample survey.

In the post-apartheid period, SALDRU has continued to gather data and conduct research directed at informing and assessing anti-poverty policy.   In line with its historical contribution, SALDRU's researchers continue to conduct research detailing changing patterns of well-being in South Africa and assessing the impact of government policy on the poor. Current research work falls into the following research themes: post-apartheid poverty; employment and migration dynamics; family support structures in an era of rapid social change; public works and public infrastructure programmes, financial strategies of the poor; common property resources and the poor. Key survey projects include the Langeberg Integrated Family Survey (1999), the Khayelitsha/Mitchell's Plain Survey (2000), the ongoing Cape Area Panel Study (2001-) and the Financial Diaries Project.