Contribution Norms in Heterogeneous Groups: A Climate Change Framing

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Show simple item record van der Hoven, Zoe en_US Visser, Martine en_US Brick, Kerri en_US 2013-02-28T13:39:53Z 2013-02-28T13:39:53Z 2012 en_US
dc.description public good; contribution norm; communication; heterogeneity; climate change en_US
dc.description.abstract While results from public good games with homogeneous players reflect the contribution norm of equal contributions, it is unclear what contribution norm will arise in a heterogeneous setting. Climate change is a perfect example of a social dilemma involving heterogeneous agents. As such, using a public good game with a climate change framing, this study examines what contribution norm arises when players are asymmetric in terms of their impact on the public good (mitigation). The climate change framing exacerbates equity considerations and ultimately increases the difficulty of finding a generalizable concept of fairness (contribution norm) acceptable to both player-types. The efficacy of communication as a means to promoting public good provision is also considered. The default contribution norm, irrespective of player-type, was to free-ride. With the introduction of communication, two dominant contribution norms emerge: free-riding and perfect cooperation. Classification-JEL: H41, Q54, Q58 Length: 27 pages en_US
dc.publisher Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit en_US
dc.title Contribution Norms in Heterogeneous Groups: A Climate Change Framing en_US

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