Abstract:
This paper presents a survey experiment in South Africa that focuses on the role of mobilization for demand for redistribution. Previous literature has found that providing information on inequality raises concerns about inequality but need not lead to a change in tax preferences. We argue that mobilization might provide the missing link between information and political behavior regarding demand for redistribution. We operationalize mobilization from an individual perspective as the belief that a decrease in inequality is feasible. If this belief is absent, information about inequality might simply increase the pessimism of respondents and remain inconsequential for policy preferences. We test this idea with a survey experiment in two townships of Cape Town, which includes one pure information and two mobilization treatments. The first mobilization treatment informs respondents about the (much lower inequality) in neighboring countries. The second provides elite support for redistribution via video messages of South African leaders. Consistent with previous literature, we find that pure information on inequality increases concern for inequality but has no effects on tax preferences. Mobilization treatments, in contrast, shake the belief that a decrease in inequality is feasible and consequently lead to a change in tax preferences. While the mechanism regarding information on lower inequality in neighboring countries is as expected, the one for the videos is puzzling: videos make people believe that inequality is more, instead of less, inevitable, and this leads to lower tax preferences. We conjecture that this is due to a lack of credibility of the leaders considered which makes viewers more pessimistic and has a demobilizing effect. An important innovation of the survey experiment is action outcomes where respondents are offered to send an SMS or sign a petition to disseminate their tax preferences.
